

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY




BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT
FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY
HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE

Cornell University Library
B2758 .R52

Metaphysical works / of ... Immanuel Kant



3 1924 029 021 520



Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.



E. Kant.

METAPHYSICAL WORKS

OF THE CELEBRATED
IMMANUEL KANT,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

WITH

SKETCH OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

JOHN RICHARDSON,

MANY YEARS A STUDENT OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

CONTAINING

1. LOGIC.
2. PROLEGOMENA TO FUTURE METAPHYSICS.
3. ENQUIRY INTO THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
GOD, AND INTO THE THEODICY, *now first published.*

LONDON:
MDCCCXXXVI.

LOGIC

FROM THE GERMAN

OF EMMANUEL KANT, M. A.

*DOCTOR AND LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF PURE PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF KONINGSBERG, AND MEMBER OF THE
ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF BERLIN;*

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED

A Sketch of his Life and Writings :

By JOHN RICHARDSON,

*AUTHOR OF A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OF PROOF FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, AND INTO THE THEODICY.*

London :

PRINTED FOR W. SIMPKIN AND R. MARSHALL, STATIONERS' COURT,
LUDGATE-STREET.

1819.

PREFACE

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

It is not augmenting the sciences, but disfiguring them, when their boundaries are allowed to encroach on one another. For which reason, and as logic is a science, wherein nothing is fully shewn and strictly proved but the formal rules of all thinking, and as we by consequence abstract in it from all objects of knowledge, as well as from their difference, our author has left us his logic free from every extraneous admixture of either ontological, or anthropological, or psychological, or metaphysical matter.

Whoever has but a clear and distinct conception of the proper nature of this science, will soon discover the great difference between Kant's Logic and all former treatises on the same subject, not only by its being purer and more systematical, but, for all its scientific strictness of method, by its being simpler, and divested of many of the tinsel trappings of mood and of figure. The translator therefore conceives himself warrantable in presenting it to the English public.*

* This Treatise on Logic, which is intended for a manual for lectures, is a posthumous work, and it is the editor Gottlob

He trusts too, that candid and competent judges (unfortunately not a very numerous body in any nation) will not repudiate, on a slight review, a system, which is purged of much useless, though ostentatious, scholastic subtilty, and which is now taught and flourishes in all the protestant universities of Germany. As to his labour (a very secondary consideration), by the way, it will, if it or any light that he may have thrown on a science (the critical philosophy), which he has been studying for years both in Germany and at home, shall hereafter be found to deserve the approbation of those judges, be amply requited.

Benjamin Fesche (doctor and private teacher of philosophy in the university of Koningsberg, fellow of the Learned Society of Francfort on the Oder, disciple, follower, and friend of Kant) whom we have to thank for having thus faithfully published his illustrious master's manuscript. The doctor has promised us his *Metaphysic* also, which he likewise has in manuscript in Kant's own writing, and which, the moment it comes to hand, the translator intends to turn and to publish; when we shall have something systematical and complete of this incomparably great man's own, and not be any longer troubled with scraps, mutilated extracts, and imperfect quotations, which cannot convey his sense or spirit, and only serve to deceive the public by giving them a false notion of his method of philosophising, by leading those totally ignorant of the principles of his system to prattle superficially of his profound doctrine, and by making a mere dogmatic jargon of his sublime science.

When the arts and the sciences are improved and enlarged, many more words, than those which sufficed in their infancy, become necessary, *Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt.* The author found the technical or rather the scientific words and terms of the German language inadequate to his method of critical philosophising, and was consequently obliged to coin new ones. The translator of course is reduced to the same necessity in English; for that language is not less copious than our vernacular tongue; and circumlocution or a periphrastical style tends greatly to enfeeble philosophical reasoning.

Should any critic, however, or philosopher, whose province it more immediately is, deign to suggest words or terms more expressive of the meaning, than his may be, he, as his sole aim, in clothing his author's thoughts in an English dress, is, to render their sense faithfully without any affectation of novelty, and to contribute his mite to propagate and diffuse useful and sublime knowledge, will, should this work have the fortune to survive the present edition, then adopt those more apposite words and terms with gratitude and pleasure; for he, though in this instance little more than a mere translator, is far above logomachy, or a dispute about words.

True logic (says Watts) does not require a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to puff

up the mind with empty sounds and a pride of false learning ; yet some distinctions and terms of art are necessary to range every conception in its proper class, and to keep our thoughts from confusion. . .

Though we may and in fact do syllogize both in conversation and in common writings, it is, like Mr. Jourdain (in Moliere's *Bourgeois Gentilhomme*), who spoke in prose for more than forty years, without knowing it.

An acquaintance with the school form of ratiocination, however, is indispensable to every man not only of science, but of a liberal education. The world (continues the doctor) is now grown so wise as not to suffer this valuable science to be engrossed by the schools. In so polite and so knowing an age, every man of reason will covet some acquaintance with logic, since it renders its daily service to wisdom and to virtue, and is subservient to the affairs of common life, as well as to the sciences.

In short, the study of the species of logic contained in this compendium should, in the academical instruction, precede the study of all philosophy, like a quarantine (so to say), which the disciple, who has a mind to go out of the land of prejudice and error into the territory of more enlightened reason and of the sciences, must perform.

It is to be hoped, that Kant's accurate and profound method of philosophising, a small specimen

of which is exhibited in this work, will meet with a better reception from our philosophers, than Harvey's doctrine did, at the beginning, from our physicians. For Hume relates, that no physician in Europe, who had reached the age of forty, ever, to the end of his life, adopted Harvey's doctrine of the circulation of the blood; and that his practice in London diminished extremely from the reproach incurred by this great and signal discovery.—So slow is the progress of truth in every science, even when not opposed by either factious or superstitious prejudices!—"So slow

The growth of what is excellent ; so hard
T'attain perfection in this nether world !"

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

	<i>Page</i>
I. <i>Conception of Logic</i>	9
II. <i>Chief Divisions of Logic: Propounding Use of this Science. Sketch of a History of it</i>	17
III. <i>Conception of Philosophy in General. Philosophy considered according to both the scholastic and the mundane Conception. Essential Requisites and Ends of Philosophising. The most general and the chief Problems of this Science.</i>	25
IV. <i>Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy</i>	32
V. <i>Cognition in general. Intuitive and Discursive Cognition; Intuition and Conception, and their Distinction in particular. Logical and Esthetical Perfection of Cognition</i>	42
VI. <i>Particular logical Perfections of Cognition.</i>	
A. <i>Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quantity</i>	52
VII. B. <i>Do. Do. Relation</i>	67
VIII. C. <i>Do. Do. Quality</i>	79
IX. D. <i>Do. Do. Modality</i>	91
X. <i>Probability. Explanation of the Probable. Distinction of Probability from Verisimilitude. Mathematical and Philosophical Probability. Doubt both subjective and objective. Sceptical, Dogmatical, and Critical Cast of Mind or Method of Philosophising. Hypotheses</i>	115

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

Of the Distinction of theoretical and of practical Cognition 122

LOGIC.

PART THE FIRST.

General Doctrine of Elements.

<i>Sec. I. Of Conceptions</i>	-	125
<i>II. of Judgments</i>	-	141
<i>III. of Syllogisms</i>	-	160

PART THE SECOND.

General Doctrine of Method.

<i>I. Promoting the logical Perfection of Cognition by the Definition, the Exposition, and the Description of Conceptions.</i>	-	-	-	197
--	---	---	---	-----

APPENDIX.

<i>II. Promoting the Perfection of Cognition by the logical Division of Conceptions.</i>	-	-	209
<i>A Sketch of the Author's Life and Writings by the Translator.</i>	-	-	216

INTRODUCTION.



I.

Conception of Logic.

EVERY thing in nature, as well in the inanimate as in the animated world, happens or is done according to rules, though we do not always know them. Water falls according to the laws of gravitation, and the motion of walking is performed by animals according to rules. The fish in the water, the bird in the air, moves according to rules. All nature, in general, is nothing but a coherence of phenomena according to rules; and there is no where any want of rule. When we think we find that want, we can only say that, in this case, the rules are unknown to us!

The exercise of our powers too takes place according to certain rules, which we observe without a knowledge of them at first, till we attain it by degrees by essays and a longer use of our powers, nay, make them (the rules) so easy to ourselves at last, that we have great difficulty to think of them in the abstract. Universal grammar, for instance, is the form of a language in general. But we speak without knowing grammar; and he,

who speaks without knowing it, has a grammar and speaks according to rules, of which he is not sensible.

The understanding in particular, like all other powers in general, is bound in its operations to rules, which we can investigate. Yes, the understanding is to be considered as the source and the faculty of conceiving of rules in general. For, as the sensitivity, or the sensitive faculty (*sensualitas**), is the faculty of intuitions, the understanding is that of thinking, that is to say, of reducing the representations of the senses to rules. It is therefore desirous of looking for rules, and satisfied when it has found them. The question then is, as the understanding is the source of rules, on what rules it proceeds itself.

For there is not the least doubt, but we can, neither think, nor use our understanding otherwise, than according to certain rules. But we can think of these rules again by themselves, that is, we can conceive of them without their application, or in the abstract. What are these rules?

All the rules, according to which the understanding proceeds, are, either necessary, or contingent. The former are those, without which no use of the understanding would be possible; the latter those, without which a certain determinate use of it would

* As the word sensuality has degenerated from its original meaning in our language, we crave leave to substitute the word Sensitivity to express the intuitive faculty.

not take place. The contingent rules, which depend upon a determinate object of cognition, are as manifold as the objects themselves. For example, there is a use of the understanding in the mathematics, in metaphysics, in moral philosophy, &c. The rules of this particular determinate use of the understanding in the aforesaid sciences are contingent; because it is contingent, whether we think of this or of that object to which these particular rules have reference.

But, when we set aside all the cognition, which we must borrow from the objects merely, and reflect entirely upon the use of the understanding in general, we discover those rules of it, which are absolutely necessary in every respect and without regarding any particular objects of thinking; because without them we could not think at all. Hence can they be known *à priori*, that is, independently of all experience; because they comprise, without distinction of objects, merely the condition of the use of the understanding in general, whether it (the use) be pure or empirical. And hence it follows, that the universal and the necessary rules of thinking in general can regard its form merely, by no means its matter. Consequently the science, which comprehends these universal and necessary rules, is merely a science of the form of the cognition of our understanding, or of thinking. And we can frame to ourselves an idea of the possibility of a science of that sort, in the same manner as that of a universal

grammar, which contains nothing more than the bare form of language in general, without words that belong to the matter of language.

This science of the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general, or of (what amounts to the same thing) the mere form of thinking in general, we name **Logic**.

As a science, which extends to all thinking in general, without regarding objects, as the matter of thinking, **Logic** is,

1, to be considered as the foundation of all the other sciences, and as the propedeytic (pre-exercitation) of all use of the understanding. But it cannot, because of its totally abstracting from all objects,

2, be an organon of the sciences.

By an organon we understand the direction how a certain cognition is to be brought about. But, thereto it is required, that we previously know the object of the cognition which is to be produced according to certain rules. An organon of the sciences therefore is not mere logic, because it gives to presuppose the exact knowledge of the sciences, of their objects, and of their sources. The mathematics, for instance, as a science which comprises the ground of the enlarging of our cognition with respect to a certain use of reason, are an excellent organon. Whereas logic, as it, the universal propedeytic of the use of the understanding and of reason in general, must not be

made to go into the sciences and to anticipate their matter, is but a universal art of reason (*canonica Epicuri*) to make cognitions in general suitable to the form of the understanding, and consequently in this view only to be denominated an organon, which however serves, not for the enlarging, but merely for the judging and the regulating of our knowledge.

3. As a science of the necessary laws of thinking, without which laws no use of the understanding or of reason has place, and which are by consequence the sole conditions, on which the understanding can agree with itself or be consistent,—the necessary laws and conditions of its right use—logic, however, is a canon. And it, as a canon of the understanding and of reason, must of course not borrow principles, either from any science, or from any experience whatever; it must comprehend nothing but laws *à priori*, which are necessary and apertain to the understanding in general.

Some logicians presuppose psychological principles in logic. But to introduce such principles as those into it, is just as absurd as to take moral philosophy from life. Were we to take principles from psychology, that is, from the observations on our understanding, we should but see how thinking goes on, and how it is under the various subjective impediments and conditions; this would consequently lead to the knowledge of merely contingent laws. In logic, however, the inquiry is after,

not contingent, but necessary rules; not how we think, but how we are to think. Hence must the rules of logic be taken, not from the contingent, but from the necessary use of the understanding, which is found in us without all psychology. In logic we want to know, not how the understanding is and thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking, but how it shall proceed in thinking. It is to teach us the right use of the understanding, that is, its use agreeing with itself.

From the foregoing explication of logic we may derive the other essential properties of this science, that it is,

4, a science of reason as to the matter, not as to the mere form; because its rules are not taken from experience, and because it has reason also for its object. Logic, therefore, is a self-cognition of the understanding and of reason, not however as to their faculties with regard to objects, but entirely as to the form. In logic, we would not ask, what does the understanding know, and how much can it know; or how far does its cognition go? For that were self-cognition with regard to its material use, and consequently belongs to metaphysic. In logic there is but the question, how does the understanding know itself?

As a rational science, as to both the matter and the form, logic finally is,

5, a doctrine, or demonstrated theory. For, as it is occupied, not about the common and, as such, mere-

ly empirical use of the understanding and of reason, but entirely about the universal and the necessary laws of thinking in general, it depends upon principles, *à priori*, from which all its rules can be derived and proved to be that, to which all cognition of reason must be conformable.

By logic's being, as a science *à priori* or as a doctrine, to be held a canon of the use of the understanding, it is essentially distinguished from esthetic which, as mere criticism of taste, has not a canon (a law), but only a *norma* (a pattern, or rule merely for judging), which consists in universal agreement. Esthetic contains the rules of the agreement of cognition with the laws of the sensitive faculty; logic, on the other hand, the rules of the agreement of cognition with the laws of the understanding and of reason. That has but empirical principles and of course can never be a science or a doctrine, provided that we understand by a doctrine a dogmatical instruction on principles *à priori*, in which every thing is known by the understanding without any other information received from experience, and which gives us rules, whose observance yields the desired perfection.

Many, particularly orators and poets, have attempted to reason on taste, but never been able to give a decisive judgment on it. Baumgarten, the philosopher, has formed a plan of an esthetic as a science. But Home has distinguished the esthetic righter by the appellation of Criticism, as that does

not give any rules *à priori*, which determine the judgment sufficiently, like logic, but takes its rules *à posteriori*, and renders the empirical laws, according to which we know the more imperfect and the more perfect (beautiful), more general by comparison only.

Logic, then, is more than mere criticism; it is a canon, which afterwards serves for a criticism, that is, for the principle of the judgment of all use of the understanding in general, though but of its rightness with respect to the mere form, as it (logic) is as little an organon as universal grammar.

Universal logic, as the propedæytic of all use of the understanding in general, is distinguished, in another point of view, from transcendental logic, in which the object itself is represented as an object of the bare understanding, whereas universal logic extends to all objects in general.

If we collect all the essential marks which pertain to the full determination of the conception of logic, we must give the following conception of it :

Logic, as to the mere form, but not as to the matter, is a science of reason; a science *à priori* of the necessary laws of thinking, with regard, not to particular objects, but to all objects in general; by consequence a science of the right use of the understanding and of reason in general, not subjectively, that is, not on empirical (psychological) principles, how the understanding thinks, but objectively, that is, on principles *à priori*, how it must think.

II.

Principal divisions of Logic.—Propounding.—Use of this Science.—Sketch of a History of it.

Logic is divided,

1, into the analytic and the dialectic. The analytic, by dissecting, discovers all the operations of reason, which we perform in thinking in general. It is, therefore, an analytic of the form of the understanding and of reason, and justly named the logic of truth; because it contains the necessary rules of all (formal) truth, without which our cognition is, without regard to the objects untrue in itself. It consequently is nothing more than a canon of dijudication (of the formal rightness of our cognition).

Should this merely theoretical and universal doctrine be used as a practical art, that is, as an organon, it would become a dialectic, a logic of appearance (*ars sophistica, disputatoria*), which arises from a mere abuse of the analytic, when, according to the bare logical form, the appearance of a true cognition whose marks must however be taken from the agreement with the objects, consequently from the matter, is fabricated.

In former times the dialectic was studied with great diligence. By this art false principles were

propounded under the appearance of truth, and it was endeavoured, conformably to them, to maintain things in appearance. Among the Greeks the dialecticians were the counsellors and the orators, who could lead the people as they pleased; because the people can be deceived by appearances. Dialectic, then, was at that time the art of appearance. In logic, it was for a time propounded under the name of the art of disputation, and so long was all logic and all philosophy the culture of certain praters, to fabricate every appearance. But nothing can be more unworthy of a philosopher, than the culture of an art of that sort. In this signification, therefore, it must be totally exploded, and, instead of it, a criticism of this false appearance introduced into logic.

We shall consequently have two parts of logic: the analytic, which propounds the formal criteria of truth; and the dialectic, which comprises the marks and the rules, by which we can know, that something does not agree with them. In this sense the dialectic would be of great use as a cathartic of the understanding.

Logic is usually divided still,

2, into natural or popular, and artificial or scientific (*logica scholastica*).

But this division is improper. For natural logic, or that of common sense, is not logic, but an anthropological science, which, as it handles the rules of the natural use of the understanding and of reason,

that are known but in the concrete, of course without consciousness of them in the abstract, has only empirical principles. Nothing but artificial or scientific logic, then, as a science of the necessary and of the universal rules of thinking, which, independently of the natural use of the understanding and of reason, must, though they can be found at first by the observation of that natural use only, be known in the abstract *à priori*, deserves the name of logic.

3. Yet another division of logic is, that into theoretical and practical. But this division too is wrong.

Universal logic, which, as a mere canon, abstracts from all objects, cannot have a practical part. This, as practical logic gives to presuppose the knowledge of a certain sort of objects, to which it is applied, were a contradiction *in adjecto*. Hence may we denominate every science practical logic; for in every science we must have a form of thinking. Universal logic considered as practical, can therefore be nothing more than a technic of learning in general, an organon of the scholastic method.

In consequence of this division logic has a dogmatical and a technical part. The former may be termed the doctrine of elements, the latter that of method. The practical or technical part of logic is a logical art that treats of the arrangement and of the logical terms of art and distinctions, in order thereby to facilitate the operations of the understanding.

In neither of the parts, however, whether the technical, or the dogmatical, must the least attention

be paid, either to the object, or to the subject of thinking. In the latter reference logic may be divided,

4, into pure and applied or mixed. In pure logic we separate the understanding from the other powers of the mind and consider what it does by itself. Applied logic considers the understanding as mixed with the other powers of the mind, which influence its operations and give it a false direction, so that it does not proceed according to the laws, which it knows to be the right ones.

In strict propriety, mixed or applied logic must not be termed logic. It is a psychology, in which we consider how our thinking usually goes on, not how it must go on. At last, indeed, it says what must be done, in order, under the various subjective impediments and limitations, to make a right use of the understanding; besides, we may learn from it what promotes the right use of the understanding, its helps or the correctors of logical faults and errors. But it is not propedeytic. For psychology, from which every thing in applied logic must be taken, is a part of the philosophical sciences, to which logic must be the propedeytic.

It is said, that the technic, or the method of constructing a science, must be propounded in the applied logic. But that is in vain, nay, even pernicious. In that case we begin to build before we have materials and give the form, but the matter is wanting. The technic must be propounded in every science.

Finally with respect to,

5, the division of logic into that of the common and that of the speculative understanding, we have to observe, that this science can by no means be thus divided.

It cannot be a science of the speculative understanding. For, as a logic of the speculative cognition or of the speculative use of reason, it were an organon of other sciences, and not a mere propædætic, or pre-exercitation, which must extend to all possible use of the understanding and of reason.

Just as little can logic be a production of common sense. This sense is the faculty of knowing the rules of cognition in the concrete. But logic must be a science of the rules of thinking in the abstract.

The universal human understanding may however be assumed as the object of logic; and in it we then abstract from the particular rules of speculative reason, and it is consequently distinguished from the logic of the speculative understanding.

As to the propounding of logic, it may be, either scholastic, or popular.

It, when it is suitable to the desire for knowledge, to the capacities and to the culture of those, who have a mind to treat the knowledge of the logical rules as a science, is scholastic. But it, when it descends to the capacities and the wants of those, who have a mind, not to study logic as a science, but to use it in order to enlighten their understandings, is popular. In the scholastic

propounding the rules must be exhibited in their universality, or in the abstract ; in the popular, on the other hand, in the particular, or in the concrete. The scholastic propounding is the basis of the popular ; for nobody can propound any thing in a popular way, but he who can do it more profoundly also.

To conclude, we here distinguish propounding from method. By method we understand the way in which a certain object, to whose cognition it is to be applied, is to be completely known. It must be taken from the nature of the science itself, and of course, as an order of thinking thereby determined and necessary, cannot be altered. Propounding signifies nothing but the way of communicating or delivering one's thoughts to others, in order to render a doctrine intelligible.

From what we have said of the nature and of the end of logic, the value of this science and the use of its study may be estimated according to a right and a determinate scale.

Logic is not a universal art of invention or of discovery ; not an organon of truth ; nor is it algebra, by whose assistance hidden truths may be discovered.

Yet it (logic) is useful and indispensable as a criticism on cognition ; or for judging, as well of common, as of speculative reason, in order not to instruct it, but to render it correct, and to make it consistent, or agree with itself. For the logical

principle of truth is, 'the agreement of the understanding with its own universal laws.

Finally, with regard to the history of logic, we shall only mention what follows :

The logic of the present day derives its origin from Aristotle's *Analytic*. That philosopher may be considered as the father of logic. He propounds it as an organon, and divides it into analytic and dialectic. His method is very scholastic and extends to the unfolding of the most general conceptions which form the basis of logic ; of which unfolding, however, there is no use ; because almost every thing in this case runs into mere subtilties, except that the denomination of various operations of the understanding is taken from it.

Besides, logic, since the times of the Stagyrice, has not gained much in point of matter ; nor can it do so from its very nature. But it may gain with respect to accuracy, determinateness, and distinctness. There are but few sciences, which can attain a permanent state, so as not to be altered any more. To those both logic and metaphysic pertain. Aristotle has omitted nothing of consequence belonging to the understanding ; we are but more accurate, methodical or orderly in the science of logic.

It was believed, that Lambert's *Organon* would augment logic much. But it contains nothing except more subtile divisions which, like all right subtilties, sharpen the intellect, but are of no material use.

Among the modern philosophers there are two, Leibnitz and Wolf, who have introduced universal logic.

Malebranche and Locke, as they handle the matter of cognition and the origin of conceptions, do not treat of any logic in the proper sense.

Wolf's universal logic is the best we have. Some have conjoined it with Aristotle's logic, for instance Reusch.

Baumgarten, a man, who has great merit in this respect, has concentrated Wolf's logic, and Mayer made comments on Baumgarten.

Crusius too is numbered among the modern logicians ; but he did not reflect sufficiently on the nature of this science. For his logic contains metaphysical principles, and consequently passes the bounds of logic ; besides, he establishes a criterion of truth, which can be none, and therefore gives in this respect free scope to all extravagancies.

In the present times there is not one celebrated logician, and we have no occasion for any new discoveries for logic ; because it comprises the form of thinking only.

III.

Conception of Philosophy in general. Philosophy considered according to both the scholastic and the mundane Conception. Essential Requisites and Ends of Philosophising. The most general and the chief Problems of this Science.

It is sometimes difficult to explain what is understood by a science. But the science gains in point of precision by the establishing of its determinate conception, and many faults, which slip in when the science cannot be distinguished from the sciences allied to it, are avoided.

Previously to our attempt to give a definition of philosophy, however, we must investigate the character of the various cognitions themselves, and, as the philosophical ones belong to the cognitions of reason, explain, in particular, what is to be understood by the latter.

The cognitions of reason are opposed to the historical cognitions. Those are cognitions from principles; these, cognitions from data. But a cognition may arise from reason and yet be historical; when, for example, a man of letters learns the productions of the reason of others, his cognition of them is merely historical.

Cognitions may be distinguished,

1, according to their objective origin, that is, the only source, from which a cognition is possible. In this respect all cognitions are, either rational, or empirical;

2, according to their subjective origin, that is, the way, in which a cognition can be acquired by men. Considered under the latter point of view, the cognitions are, either rational, or historical, in whatever way they in themselves may have taken their origin. A cognition therefore may be a cognition of reason objectively, when it is but historical subjectively.

It is pernicious to know some rational cognitions merely historically, but indifferent to know others so. The mariner, for instance, knows the rules of navigation historically from his tables; and that is enough for him. But, when the lawyer knows law historically only, he is rendered very unfit indeed for a good judge, and utterly so for a legislator.

From the adduced distinction between the objectively and the subjectively rational cognitions, it is obvious, that one may learn philosophy in a certain respect without being able to philosophise. By consequence he, who would become a philosopher, must exercise himself in making a free and not merely an imitative and, so to say, a mechanical use of his reason.

We have explained the cognitions of reason as cognitions from principles; and hence it follows, that they must be *à priori*. But there are two spe-

cies of cognitions, the mathematics and philosophy, which are both *à priori*, and yet very considerably distinct.

It is usually maintained, that the mathematics and philosophy, as the former treats of quantity, the latter of quality, are distinct from one another as to the object. That is however false. The distinction of these sciences cannot depend upon the object; for philosophy extends to every thing, consequently to quanta too, and the mathematics do so likewise, as far as every thing has a quantum. Nothing but the distinct sort of the cognition of reason or of the use of reason in the mathematics and in philosophy makes the specific distinction between these sciences. Philosophy is, The cognition of reason from mere conceptions; the mathematics, on the other hand, are, The cognition of reason from the construction of conceptions.

We construct conceptions when we exhibit them by intuition *à priori*, without experience, or when we exhibit by intuition the object, which corresponds to our conception of it. The mathematician never can use his reason according to mere conceptions; the philosopher never his by the construction of conceptions. In the mathematics reason is used in the concrete; the intuition however is not empirical, but we in this case make for ourselves something *à priori* the object of intuition.

We perceive, that the mathematics have this advantage of philosophy, that their cognitions are

intuitive ; while those of it are but discursive. And the reason of our reflecting more on quantities in the mathematics is, that quantities may be constructed by intuition *à priori* ; whereas qualities cannot be exhibited by intuition.

Philosophy is the system of philosophical cognitions, or of the cognitions of reason from conceptions. That is the scholastic conception of this science. According to the mundane conception, Philosophy is the science of the ultimate ends of human reason. This sublime conception, gives a dignity, that is, an absolute value, to philosophy. And it is really it only that is of intrinsic value, and gives a value to all other cognitions.

It is usually inquired, What is the use of philosophising and its scope—philosophy even considered as a science according to the school conception ?

In this scholastic sense of the word, philosophy extends to address only ; but it, relatively to the mundane conception, extends to utility. In the former respect philosophy is therefore a doctrine of address ; in the latter, a doctrine of wisdom ; the legislatrix of reason, and the philosopher, in this view, not the artificer, but the legislator of reason.

The artificer of reason or, as Socrates names him, the philodox, endeavours merely after speculative knowledge, without regarding how much the knowledge contributes to the final end of human rea-

son ; he gives rules for the use of reason for all sorts of ends. The practical philosopher or the sage, the teacher of wisdom both by doctrine and by example, is the philosopher in the proper sense. For philosophy is the idea of a perfect wisdom that shews us the final ends of human reason.

To philosophy in the scholastic sense two things are requisite :

The one, a sufficient stock of the cognitions of reason ; the other, a systematic coherence of these cognitions, or their conjunction in the idea of a whole.

Philosophy, not only allows a strictly systematic coherence, but is even the only science, which in the proper sense has a coherence of that sort, and gives all other sciences systematic unity.

But, with regard to philosophy according to the mundane sense (*in sensu cosmico*), it may be termed, A science of the highest maxim of the use of our reason, provided that we understand by a maxim, the internal principle of choice between various ends.

For philosophy, in this signification, is the science of the reference of all cognition and of all use of reason to the scope of human reason, to which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must conjoin to a unity.

The field of philosophy, in this cosmopolitical sense, may be reduced to the following questions :

1. What can we know ?
2. What ought we to do ?
3. What may we hope for ?
4. What is man ?

The first question is answered by metaphysic, the second by philosophy, the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. But they at bottom might all be considered as pertaining to anthropology ; because the three first questions refer to the last one.

The philosopher must therefore be able to determine,

- 1, the sources of human knowledge,
- 2, the sphere of the possible and the advantageous use of all knowledge, and finally,
- 3, the boundaries of reason.

The last is the most necessary, as well as the most difficult, but about which the philodox gives himself no trouble.

To a philosopher two things are chiefly requisite :
1, culture of his talents, and of address, in order to use them for all sorts of ends ;

2, habit in the use of all means to whatever ends he pleases. Both must be united ; for without knowledge one will never become a philosopher ; but knowledge alone, unless a proper conjunction of all cognitions and abilities in a unity and an insight into their agreement with the highest ends of human reason be superadded, will never constitute the philosopher.

In general whoever cannot philosophise, cannot name himself a philosopher. But philosophising cannot be learned but by exercise, and by the use of one's own reason.

And how should philosophy be susceptible of being learned? — Every philosophical thinker builds, so to say, his own work upon the ruins of another; but a work, stable in all its parts, has never yet been executed. Philosophy, therefore, as it is not yet given, cannot be learned. But suppose there were one extant, nobody, who should learn it, could even then say, that he is a philosopher; for his knowledge of it never could be but subjectively historical.

In the mathematics it is otherwise. This science may in some degree be learned; for the proofs in it are so evident, that every body may be convinced of them; and it may, on account of its evidence, be, as it were, laid up as a certain and a stable doctrine.

Whoever would learn to philosophise must, on the contrary, consider all the systems of philosophy as histories of the use of reason only, and as objects of the exercise of his philosophic talent.

The true philosopher, therefore, must, as a thinker for himself, make a free use of his reason, not an imitative use in a servile manner. But not, a dialectic use, that is, such a one as tends to give cognitions an appearance only of truth and of wisdom. This is the business of the mere sophister; but absolutely incompatible with the dignity of the philosopher, as a knower and teacher of wisdom.

For science is of an intrinsic value as an organon of wisdom only. But, as such, it is indispensable to it; so that it may well be maintained; that wisdom without science is a shadow of a perfection which we never shall reach.

Who hates science, but does not love wisdom the less on that account, is named a misologist. Misology commonly arises from a want of scientific knowledge, and from a certain sort of vanity therewith conjoined. And sometimes those, who at first cultivated the sciences with great diligence and success, but in the end found no satisfaction in all their knowledge, fall into the fault of misology.

Philosophy is the only science, which can yield us this internal satisfaction; for it closes, so to say, the scientific circle, and the sciences then obtain first, by it, order and cohesion.

We therefore shall have, for the behoof of the exercise in thinking for one's self, or of philosophising, to consider, more the method of our use of reason, than the propositions themselves, at which we arrive by it.

IV.

Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy.

It occasions some difficulty to determine the bounds, where the common use of the understanding ends and the speculative of it begins; or, when common cognition of reason becomes philosophy.

Yet there is in this case a pretty sure criterion:

The knowledge of the universal in the abstract is

speculative, that of the universal in the concrete common, cognition.—Philosophical cognition is speculative cognition of reason, and consequently it commences when the common use of reason begins to make essays in the knowledge of the universal in the abstract.

From this determination of the distinction between the common and the speculative use of reason, it may be judged what nation made the beginning in philosophising. Of all nations the Greeks began the first to philosophize. For they began the first to cultivate the cognitions of reason, not by the clew of images, but in the abstract; instead of which other nations never endeavoured to render conceptions intelligible to themselves but by images in the concrete. And there are nations, for instance, the Chinese and a few Indians, who treat of things taken merely from reason, such as God, the immortality of the soul, and many the like, but do not endeavour to investigate the nature of these objects according to conceptions and to rules in the abstract. In this case they make no distinction between the use of reason in the concrete and that in the abstract. Among the Persians and the Arabians some speculative use of reason is to be found; but they have taken its rules from Aristotle, of course from the Greeks. In Zoroaster's Zend-Avesta not the smallest trace of philosophy is to be discovered. That holds good of the esteemed Egyptian wisdom

which, in comparison of the Greek philosophy, is a mere trifle.

With regard to the mathematics too the Greeks are the first that cultivated this part of the cognition of reason after a speculative scientific method; as they have demonstrated every theorem from elements.

But when and where the philosophic spirit first arose among the Greeks, cannot be properly determined.

The first that introduced the use of speculative reason, and from whom the first steps of the human understanding to scientific culture are derived, is Thales, the author of the Ionic sect. He, though he was a mathematician too, is, as the mathematics in general have always preceded philosophy, distinguished by the name of physicus.

Besides, the first philosophers dressed every thing in images. For poetry, which is nothing but a dress of thoughts in images, is more ancient, than prose. Hence were men obliged at first to use, even with regard to things that are merely objects of pure reason, the language of imagery and the poetic style. Pheretzydes is said to be the first author that wrote in prose.

The Eleatics followed the Ionians. The principle of the Eleatic philosophy and of its founder, Xenophanes, is, 'In the senses there is illusion; the source of truth lies in the understanding only.'

Among the philosophers of this school Zeno of Elea distinguishes himself, both as a man of great understanding and acumen, and as a subtile dialectician.

Dialectic in the beginning signified the art of the pure use of the understanding with regard to abstract conceptions separated from all sensitivity: Hence the many commendations of this art among the ancients. Afterwards, when those philosophers, who totally rejected the testimony of the senses, necessarily attended to many subtilties, dialectic degenerated into the art of maintaining and of impugning every proposition. And thus did it become a mere exercise for the sophisters, who had a mind to reason on every thing, and studied to give appearance the colour of truth, to make black white. For which reason the name of sophist, by which a man that could speak reasonably and with a proper knowledge of every subject was understood, is become hated and contemptible, and instead of it the name of philosopher is introduced.*

At the time of the Ionic school there arose in Great Greece a man of rare parts, who, not only erected a school, but formed and accomplished a project that never had its like. It is Pythagoras, who was born in Samos. He founded a society of philosophers, who were united in an alliance with one

* In English we distinguish between a Sophist and a Sophister; the former was a teacher of wisdom in Athens, the latter is a specious or plausible but a false reasoner. T.

another by the law of secrecy. He divided his auditors into two classes; those of acusmatists (*ακουσματικοί*), who were allowed to hear only, and those of acromatists (*αχροματικοί*), who were permitted to ask questions too.

A few of his doctrines were exoteric, which he propounded to every body; the others were secret and esoteric, destined to the members of his alliance only, for some of whom he conceived an intimate friendship, and separated them entirely from the rest. He made the physics and theology the vehicle of his secret doctrines, by consequence the doctrine of the visible and of the invisible. Besides, he had various symbols, which in all probability were nothing but certain signs serving the Pythagoreans to communicate their thoughts to one another.

The end of his alliance seems to have been no other, than to purify religion from popular errors, to moderate tyranny, and to introduce more loyalty into states. But this alliance, which the tyrants began to be afraid of, had been destroyed a little before Pythagoras' death, and this philosophical society dissolved, partly by the execution, partly by the flight and the exile of the greater number of the allied. The few that remained were novices. And, as they did not know much of Pythagoras' particular doctrines, we can say nothing certain and determinate of them. Many doctrines have since been ascribed to Pythagoras, who was besides an excellent mathematician, but which are certainly counterfeited.

The most important epoch of the Greek philosophy commences with Socrates. For it is he, who gave the philosophic spirit and all the speculative heads quite a new practical direction. And he is almost the only one among mankind, whose conduct approaches nearly to the idea of that of a sage.

Of his disciples Plato, who occupied himself more in the practical doctrines of Socrates, is the most eximious; and of the disciples of Plato, Aristotle (founder of the peripatetic sect), who on the other hand improved speculative philosophy.

The Epicureans and the Stoics, who were the sworn enemies of one another, followed Plato and Aristotle. Those place the chief good in a cheerful heart, which they term voluptuousness; these found it in the greatness and the strength of the soul, by which all the *agréments*, or sweets of life, may be dispensed with.

In speculative philosophy the Stoics are dialectical; in moral, dogmatical, and shew in their practical principles, by which they have sown the seeds of the most sublime sentiments that ever were harboured, uncommonly great dignity. The founder of the Stoic school is Zeno of Cittium. The most celebrated men of this school among the Greek philosophers are Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

The Epicurean school never could acquire the reputation the Stoics had. But whatever may be said of the Epicureans, it is certain, that they observed the greatest moderation in enjoyment, and

were the best natural philosophers of all the thinkers of Greece.

We have still to remark, that the chief Greek schools bear particular names. The school of Plato is denominated, Academy, from the grove of Academus, in which he taught; that of Aristotle, Lyceum;* that of the Stoics, Porticus (*στοα*), a covered passage, from which the word, stoic, is derived; the school of Epicurus, Horti; because he taught in gardens. Plato's academy was followed by three other academies, which were founded by his disciples. Speusippus founded the first, Arcesilaus the second, and Carneades the third.

These academies inclined to scepticism. Both Speusippus and Arcesilaus were of the sceptical cast of mind, and Carneades was yet more so. On this account the sceptics, these acute, dialectic philosophers, were also named academics. The academics then followed the first great sceptic, Pyrrho, and his successors. Their teacher, Plato himself, gave occasion to that by propounding many of his doctrines dialogically, so that reasons *pro* and *contra* were adduced without his deciding on them, though he was at other times very dogmatical.

If we begin the epoch of scepticism from Pyrrho, we have a whole school of sceptics; who are materially distinguished in their way of thinking and

* The Lyceum (*λυκειον*), says Lucianus *de Gymnasiis*, is named from Apollo Luceus, to whom it was sacred. T.

their method from the dogmatists, by their making it the first maxim of all philosophical use of reason, To suspend one's judgment notwithstanding the greatest appearance of truth ; and laying down the principle, That philosophy consists in the equilibrium of judging, and teaches us to discover illusion. But nothing more of these sceptics remains, than the two works of Sextus Empiricus, wherein he has collected all their doubts.

When philosophy afterward passed from the Greeks to the Romans, it was not enlarged ; for the Romans never were but scholars.

In speculative philosophy Cicero is a disciple of Plato, in moral a stoic. Epictetus, Antoninus the philosopher, and Seneca belonged as the most eminent to the stoic sect. There were no teachers of natural philosophy among the Romans except Pliny the elder, who has left us a natural history.

Culture disappeared at last among the Romans too, and barbarity succeeded, till the Arabians began, in the sixth and the seventh centuries, to apply to the sciences and to revive Aristotle. The sciences and the consideration of the Stagyrte in particular, then recovered themselves in the West, but he was followed in a servile manner. In the eleventh and the twelfth centuries the scholastics appeared ; they explain Aristotle and carry his subtilties to infinite. They occupied themselves about nothing but mere abstractions. This scholastic method of false philosophising was supplanted at the time of the re-

formation ; and then there were eclectics in philosophy, that is, thinkers for themselves, who acknowledge no school, but seek truth, and adopt it where they find it.

But philosophy owes its amendment in more modern times, partly to the greater study of nature, partly to the conjunction of the mathematics with the physics. The order, which has been occasioned in thinking by the study of these sciences has diffused itself over the particular branches of philosophy in the proper sense. Bacon is the first and the greatest natural philosopher of more modern times. In his researches he treads the path of experience, and calls the attention to the importance and the indispensableness of observations and of experiments to the discovery of truth. It is however difficult to say whence the amendment of speculative philosophy comes. Descartes acquired not little merit with regard to it by contributing much to give thinking distinctness by his erected criterion of truth, which he puts in the clearness and the evidence of knowledge.

Leibnitz, however, and Locke, are to be numbered among the greatest and the most meritorious reformers of philosophy in our times. The latter endeavours to dissect the human understanding, and to shew what powers of the mind and what operations of it belong to this or to that cognition. But he has not finished the work of his investigation ; and his procedure is dogmatical, though his works

have been productive of this advantage, that philosophers begin to study the nature of the mind better and more profoundly.

As to the particular dogmatic method of philosophising peculiar to Leibnitz and to Wolf, it is very faulty. And there is so much illusion in it, that it is absolutely necessary to suspend the whole procedure, and, instead of it, to introduce another—the method of the critical philosophising, which consists in this, ‘To inquire into the procedure of reason itself, to dissect the whole human cognitive faculty, and to try how far its boundaries may extend.’*

In our age the physics are in the most flourishing state, and there are great names indeed among the natural philosophers, for instance, Newton. Later philosophers cannot properly be mentioned at present as distinguished and permanent names; because every thing in this science is, so to say, in a continual flux. What the one builds up, the other pulls down.

In moral philosophy we have not made greater progress than the ancients. But, as to the metaphysics, it seems as if we were at a loss with regard

* It may not be improper here to mention, that Kant himself is the founder of the critical philosophy, a system, which begins with a most accurate and a profound philosophy of mind, but which, though it has obtained long and justly supplanted all former systems in Germany, is (to the great discredit of our dogmatising sophists be it told) not yet known in our island! T.

to the investigation of metaphysical truths. At present a sort of indifference for this science prevails ; since many seem to pride themselves in speaking contemptuously of metaphysical inquiries, as mere useless brains-beating speculations. And yet metaphysic is true philosophy.

Our age is that of criticism, and we must see what will become of the critical essays of our time with respect to philosophy and to metaphysic in particular.*

V.

Cognition in general. Intuitive and discursive Cognition ; Intuition and Conception, and their Distinction in particular. Logical and Esthetical Perfection of Cognition.

ALL our cognition has a two-fold reference ; first, a reference to the object, secondly, that to the subject. It, in the former respect, refers to representation ; in the latter, to consciousness, the universal condition of all cognition or knowledge in the general (and which, properly speaking, is a representation that another representation is in us, T.).

* Those who do not read German will find Kant's critical works translated into Latin by professor Borne of Leipsic. But, as they are very difficult of translation, it were better to study them in German. They only give this age a just title to be named the age of criticism. T.

In every cognition matter, that is, the object, and form, that is, the way, in which we know the object, must be distinguished. If a savage for example, sees at a distance a house, whose use he does not know, he has, in the representation before him, the very same object, as another, who knows it determinately to be fitted for the habitation of men. But, as to the form, this knowledge of the same object is distinct in both. It with the one is mere intuition, but with the other at once intuition and conception.

The distinction of the form of cognition depends upon a condition, which accompanies all knowing—consciousness. If I am conscious to myself of the representation, it is clear; if I am not it is obscure.

As consciousness is the essential condition of all logical form of cognitions, logic can occupy itself, and must do so, with clear representations only, not with obscure ones. We consider in logic, not how representations arise, but how they agree with the logical form. And in general logic cannot handle mere representations and their possibility. That it leaves to the metaphysics to do. It occupies itself about the rules of thinking merely, about conceptions, judgments, and syllogisms, as the means by which all thinking is performed. It is true, something precedes before a representation becomes a conception. And that we will shew in its proper place. But we shall not inquire How representations arise. Logic indeed treats of know-

ing ; because in it thinking has place. Representation however is not cognition, but cognition always gives to presuppose representation. And this can absolutely not be explained.* For it would always be necessary to explain what representation is by another representation :

All clear representations, to which only the logical rules can be applied, may be distinguished with regard to distinctness and to indistinctness. If we are conscious to ourselves of the whole representation, but not of the multifarious that is contained in it, the representation is indistinct. For the dilucidation of the thing, take first an example by intuition :

We discover a country house at a distance. If we are conscious to ourselves, that the object perceived by intuition is a house, we must necessarily have a representation of its different parts—the windows, the doors, &c. For, if we did not see the parts, we could not see the house itself. But we are not conscious to ourselves of this representation of its various parts, and hence is our representation of the object itself an indistinct one.

If we wish to have an instance of indistinctness in conceptions, the conception of beauty may serve for the purpose. Every one has a clear conception of beauty. But various marks occur in this conception ; among others, that the beautiful must be

* Except by saying; that it is Internal determination of the mind, in any relation of time, in general. T.

something that is an object of the senses, and that pleases universally. If we cannot disentangle these and the various other marks of the beautiful our conception of it is never but indistinct.

An indistinct representation the disciples of Wolf term a confused one. But this epithet is not proper ; because the opposite of confusion is, not distinctness, but order. Distinctness is an effect of order, and indistinctness that of confusion ; and every confused cognition is of course an indistinct one. But the proposition does not hold conversely ; — not every indistinct cognition is a confused one. For in cognitions, in which there is no multifarious to be met with, there is, neither order, nor confusion.

That is the case with all simple representations, which never become distinct ; not because confusion, but because no multifarious, is to be met with in them. They must therefore be termed, not confused, but indistinct.

And even in the composed representations, in which a variety of marks may be distinguished, the indistinctness often proceeds from weakness of consciousness, not confusion. There may be distinctness as to the form, that is to say, I may be conscious to myself as to the multifarious in the representation ; but as to the matter the distinctness may decrease when the degree of consciousness becomes smaller, though perfect order exists. And that is the case with abstract representations.

Distinctness itself may be two-fold:

First, a sensual one. This consists in the consciousness of the multifarious by intuition. We see, for instance, the galaxy as a whitish streak; the rays of light from the single stars in it must necessarily have entered into the eye. But its representation was but clear, and becomes first by the telescope distinct; because we now discover the single stars contained in the galaxy:

Secondly, an intellectual one: Distinctness in conceptions, or distinctness of the understanding. This depends upon the dissection of the conception with respect to the multifarious that is comprised in it (the conception). There are, for example, contained in the conception of virtue as marks, 1, the conception of liberty, 2, that of the adherence to rules (of duty), and 3, that of the overcoming of the power of the inclinations, when they are repugnant to those rules. When we thus resolve the conception of virtue into its single constituents, we render it distinct to ourselves just by this analysis. But by this act of rendering distinct we add nothing to a conception; we but explain it. Hence are conceptions amended in distinctness, not as to the matter, but as to the form.

If we reflect on our cognitions with regard to the two essentially distinct fundamental capacities or faculties, those of sensitivity and of understanding, whence they arise, we shall hit the distinction between intuitions and conceptions. All our cogni-

tions, considered in this view, are either intuitions, or conceptions. The former have their source in the sensitivity, the power of intuitions ; the latter, in the understanding, the faculty of conceptions. This is the logical distinction between the understanding and the sensitivity, according to which distinction this yields nothing but intuitions, that, on the contrary, nothing but conceptions. Both fundamental faculties may however be considered in another point of view and defined in another way ; the sensitivity as a passivity or receptibility, the understanding as a spontaneity, or self-active power. But this mode of explication is metaphysical, not logical. And the sensitivity is usually named the inferior faculty, the understanding, on the other hand, the superior ; because the sensitivity gives the mere materials for thinking, but the understanding disposes of them and reduces them to rules or conceptions.

In the distinction between intuitive and discursive cognitions, or between intuitions and conceptions, here adduced, the variety of the esthetical and of the logical perfection of cognition is founded.

A cognition may be perfect according, either to laws of the sensitive faculty, or to those of the cognitive ; in the former case it is esthetically perfect, in the latter logically so. The esthetical perfection and the logical therefore are of a discrepant sort ; the former has relation to the sensitivity, the latter to the intellect. The logical perfection of cogni-

tion depends upon its agreement with the object ; by consequence upon universally valid laws, and can of course be judged according to rules *à priori*. The esthetical perfection consists in the agreement of the cognition with the subject, and bottoms upon the sensitive capacity peculiar to every single person. In the esthetical perfection, then, no objectively and universally valid laws, relatively to which it would be judged of *à priori* in a universally valid manner for all thinking beings in general, have place. If, however, there are universal laws of sensitivity, which hold good, not objectively, for all thinking beings in general, yet subjectively, for all humankind, an esthetical perfection, which comprises the ground of a subjectively universal, or a general, complacency, may be conceived. This is beauty—what pleases the senses intuitively and can be the object of a universal complacency ; because the laws of intuition are universal laws of sensitivity.

By this agreement with the universal laws of the sensitive receptibility the proper self-sufficient Beautiful, whose essence consists in the mere form, is specifically distinguished from the Agreeable, which pleases merely in the sensation by charms or moving, and can on that account be nothing but the ground of a mere private complacency.

And it is this essential esthetical perfection, which comports with the logical perfection, and admits of being conjoined with it the best of any.

Considered under this point of view the esthetical

perfection may be advantageous, with regard to that essential beautiful, to the logical perfection. But it, in another respect, is disadvantageous to it, if we consider in the esthetical perfection nothing but the unessential beautiful—the charming or the moving, which pleases in the mere sensation and refers, not to the bare form, but to the matter of the sensitivity. For charms and moving can spoil the logical perfection in our cognitions and judgments the most.

In general there always remains between the esthetical and the logical perfection of our cognition a sort of contest, which cannot be fully put an end to. The understanding wants to be informed, the sensitivity to be animated; the former desires insight, the latter capability. Cognitions, if they are to instruct, must be solid or profound; if they are to entertain, they must be beautiful. If a propounding is beautiful, but shallow, it may please the sensitivity, but cannot the understanding; if it conversely is profound, but dry, it can please the understanding only, not the sensitivity.

As the want of human nature, however, and the end of the popularity of cognition require, that we should endeavour to unite both perfections, we must study to furnish those cognitions with an esthetical perfection, which are in general capable of it, and to render a scholastic logically perfect cognition popular by the esthetical form. But in this endeavour to join the esthetical and the logical perfection in our cognitions we must not neglect the following

rules : 1, that the logical perfection is the basis of all other perfections, and therefore must not be quite postponed or sacrificed to any other ; 2, that the formal esthetical perfection—the agreement of cognition with the laws of intuition—be carefully considered ; because just in it the essential beautiful, which can be the least united with the logical perfection, consists ; 3, that we must be very cautious with charms and moving, by which a cognition acts upon sensation and obtains an interest for it ; because hereby the attention is so easily drawn from the object to the subject ; from which then a very disadvantageous influence on the logical perfection of cognition must obviously arise.

In order to make the distinctions, which have place between the logical and the esthetical perfections of cognition, still more knowable, not only in the general, but in various particular points of view, we shall compare them together with regard to the four chief points of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality, upon which the stress lies in the judgment on the perfection of cognition.

A cognition is perfect, 1, as to quantity, when it (a cognition) is universal ; 2, as to quality, when it is distinct ; 3, as to relation, when it is true ; and 4 and lastly, as to modality, when it is certain.

Considered in those points of view, a cognition is logically perfect, as to quantity, when it (a cognition) has objective universality (universality of the conception or of the rule) ; as to quality, when it has

objective distinctness (distinctness in the conception); as to relation, when it has objective truth; and finally as to modality, when it has objective certainty.

To those logical perfections the following esthetical perfections correspond relatively to those four main points:

1, the esthetical universality. This consists in the applicableness of a cognition to a multitude of objects, which serve for examples, to which its application can be made, and by which it may also be used for the purpose of popularity;

2, the esthetical distinctness. This is the distinctness by intuition, whereby an abstractly formed conception is exhibited in the concrete by examples, or illustrated;

3, the esthetical truth. A merely subjective truth, which consists but in the agreement of the cognition with the subject and with the laws of the appearance of sense, and by consequence is nothing more than a universal appearance;

4, the esthetical certainty. This depends upon what is necessary in consequence of the testimony of the senses, that is, what is confirmed by both sensation and experience.

In the perfections just mentioned two parts, multifariousness and unity, whose harmonious conjunction constitutes perfection in general, always occur. With the understanding the unity lies in the conception, with the senses in the intuition.

Mere multifariousness without unity cannot satisfy us. And hence is truth the chief of all perceptions; because it is, by the reference of our cognition to the object, the ground of unity. And even in the esthetical perfection truth always remains the *conditio sine qua non*, the chief negative condition, without which nothing can please taste universally. Hence needs nobody hope to make progress in the belles lettres, if he has not founded his cognition in logical perfection. And, as well the character, as the art of a genius, betrays itself in the greatest possible union of the logical with the esthetical perfection in general with respect to such knowledge, as is intended at once to edify and to entertain.

VI.

Particular logical Perfections of Cognition.

A. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quantity. Greatness. Extensive and intensive Greatness. Copiousness and Profoundness or Importance and Fertility of Cognition. Determination of the Horizon of our Cognition.

THE greatness (or quantum) of cognition may be taken in a two-fold sense, as, either extensive, or intensive. The former refers to the sphere of cognition and consequently consists in its abundance

and variety (or multifariousness); the latter, to its contents, which regard the great value (*Vielgültigkeit*) or the logical importance and fertility of a cognition, provided that it is considered as the ground of many and of great consequences (*non multa sed multum*).

In the enlarging of our cognitions or in advancing them to perfection, as to their extensive quantum, it is good to calculate how far a cognition agrees with our ends and our capacities. This reflection concerns the determination of the horizon of our cognitions, by which horizon is to be understood, The adequateness of the quantum of all the cognitions to the capacities and the ends of the subject.

The horizon may be determined,

1, logically, according to the faculty or the powers of cognition with respect to the interest of the understanding. We have here to judge how far we can go in our cognitions, how far we shall go in them, and how far certain cognitions serve with a logical view for means to these or to those principal cognitions, as our ends;

2, esthetically, according to taste with regard to the interest of feeling. *He* Who determines his horizon esthetically, endeavours to accommodate the science to the taste of the public, that is to say, to render it popular, or in general to acquire such cognitions only, as may be universally communicated,

and as please the class of the illiterate and in which they are interested ;

and 3, practically, according to the utility with regard to the interest of the will. The practical horizon, if it is determined according to the influence, which a cognition has on our morality, is pragmatical and of the greatest moment.*

The horizon then concerns the judgment and the determination of what man can know, of what he may know, and of what he ought to know.

As to the theoretically or logically determined horizon in particular—and it only can be the matter in hand in this place—we may consider it in, either the objective, or the subjective, point of view.

With regard to the objects the horizon is, either historical, or rational. The former is much wider than the latter, nay, it is immensely great ; for our historical knowledge has no bounds. Whereas the rational horizon may be fixed ; it for example may be determined to that sort of objects, to which the mathematical cognition cannot be extended. And with respect to the philosophical cognition of reason, how far reason can go in it *à priori*, without any experience.

* Knowledge, provided that it serves for accomplishing our design, is (according to Kant) Pragmatical—belongs to welfare. T.

Relatively to the subject the horizon is, either the universal and absolute, or a particular and conditional (a private) one.

By the absolute and universal horizon is to be understood the congruence of the boundaries of the human cognitions to those of all human perfection in general. And therefore the question, What can man, as man in general, know? now occurs.

The determination of the private horizon depends upon various empirical conditions and special considerations, for instance, of age, of sex, of rank, of the business or the profession, and many the like. Every particular class of men has, with regard to its special powers of knowledge, ends and stations peculiar to it; every head in proportion to the individuality of its powers and of its station, its own horizon. Finally, we may conceive of a horizon of sane reason and of one of science, which latter requires principles, in order to determine according to them what we can know (scientifically) and what we cannot.

What we cannot know is above our horizon; what we need not know or have no occasion to know, without our horizon. The latter however can hold but relatively, with regard to this or to that particular private end, to the attaining of which certain cognitions might, not only contribute nothing, but even be an impediment. For no cognition, though we may not always be able to see its utility, is absolutely useless in every respect. It is

therefore both an unwise and an unjust reproach, with which great men, who cultivate the sciences with laborious industry, are charged by shallow pates, when they ask, What is the use of doing so? This question must by no means be put by those who have a mind to occupy themselves about the sciences. A science, suppose it could throw a light on any one possible matter, were then useful enough. Every logically perfect cognition is always of some possible use which, though hitherto unknown to us, will perhaps be found out by posterity. Had nothing been ever considered in the culture of the sciences, but their material gain, their utility, we should have, neither arithmetic, nor geometry. Besides, our understanding is so ordered, that it finds satisfaction in the mere insight, and yet more than in the advantage that arises from it. This observation was made so early as by Plato. A man feels his own excellence on the occasion; he sees the meaning of having understanding. Men, who do not see that, must envy the brutes. The internal value, which cognitions are of by logical perfection, is not to be compared with their external value—that in the application.

As that, which lies without our horizon, if we need not know it according to our views, as not being necessary to us, is to be understood in a relative sense only, by no means in the absolute one, ^{so} that, which lies below our horizon, if we ^{ought} ~~should~~ not know it, as being pernicious to us, is to be so likewise.

With a view to the enlarging and to the determining of the boundaries (the *demarcation*) of our cognition, the following rules are to be recommended:

one must,

1, determine his horizon early, yet not sooner, than he can do it himself; which commonly does not happen before the twentieth year; *and never*

2, not alter it easily and often (not go from one thing to another);

3, not measure the horizon of others by his own, nor hold useless that which is of no use to him: it would be audacious to pretend to determine the horizon of others; because one does not sufficiently know, either their capacities, or their views;

4, neither extend it, nor limit it, too much. For he, who would know too much, knows nothing at last, and who on the contrary thinks some things do not concern him often deceives himself; as when, for instance, the philosopher thinks he can do without history;

and we should endeavour,

5, previously to determine the absolute horizon of the whole human race (as to the past and the future time), and in particular,

6, to determine the place, which our science occupies in the horizon of all knowledge. The universal encyclopedy, as a universal map of the sciences, serves for that purpose;

7, in the determination of a particular horizon to try carefully for what branch of knowledge he

has the greatest capacity and in what he takes the greatest delight; what is more or less necessary with regard to certain duties; what cannot consist with the necessary duties; and finally,

8, always to enlarge more than to contract our horizon.

In general we need not be apprehensive from the enlarging of the sciences of what d'Alembert is. For the load does not oppress us, but we are at a loss for room for our knowledge. Criticism on reason, on history and on historical works, a universal spirit, which extends to human knowledge in gross, and not merely in detail, will always diminish the sphere without lessening the matter. Nothing but the dross falls from the metal or the baser vehicle; the veil, which was necessary for a certain time, drops. With the enlarging of natural history, of the mathematics, &c. new methods which shorten the old matter and render the great number of books unnecessary, will be found out. Upon the discovery of such new methods and principles it will depend that we, without clogging the memory, can find every thing at pleasure with their assistance. Hence will he, who, like a genius shall comprise history under ideas, which can always remain, deserve well of it.

To the logical perfection of knowledge, with regard to its sphere, ignorance, a negative imperfection, or an imperfection of want, which, on account of the limits of our understanding, remains inseparable from our knowledge, is opposed.

We may consider ignorance both under a subjective and under an objective point of view.

1, Objectively taken, ignorance is, either a material, or a formal one. The former consists in a want of historical, the latter, in that of rational, cognitions. One must not be quite ignorant in any branch, but he may by all means limit the historical knowledge in order to apply the more to the rational, or conversely.

2, In a subjective sense, ignorance is, either a learned, a scientific, or a common one. Who distinctly sees the limits of knowledge, consequently the field of ignorance, where it begins—the philosopher, for example, who sees and proves how little we can know with respect to the structure of gold for want of the thereto requisite data, is ignorant scientifically, or in a learned manner. He, on the other hand, who is ignorant without perspecting the grounds of the bounds of ignorance and giving himself any trouble on that account, is so in a vulgar, not a scientific, manner. Such a man does not so much as know, that he knows nothing. For one never can represent to himself his ignorance otherwise, than by science, like a blind man, who cannot represent darkness to himself till he gets eyesight.

The knowledge of one's ignorance therefore gives us to presuppose science, and makes one modest, whereas imaginary knowledge puffs up. Socrates' ignorance was a commendable one; pro-

perly speaking, a knowledge of his want of knowledge, according to his own avowal. Consequently those, who possess a great deal of knowledge, and are for all that astonished at the quantum of what they do not know, cannot be reproached with ignorance.

In general the ignorance in things, whose knowledge goes above our horizon, is inculpable ; and it may be allowed (though but in the relative sense) with regard to the speculative use of our cognitive faculty, provided that the objects lie, not above our horizon, but without it. But ignorance is disgraceful in things, to know which it is very necessary and even easy for us.

There is however a distinction between being ignorant of any thing and taking no notice of it. It is good to take no notice of a great deal of that which is not good for us to know. Abstracting is still distinguished from both. We abstract from a cognition when we take no notice of its application, by which means we obtain it in the abstract and can then consider it the better in the universal as a principle. Such an abstracting from what does not belong to our purpose in the knowledge of a thing is useful and praiseworthy.

Logicians commonly are historically ignorant.

Historical knowledge without determinate bounds is polyhistory ; this puffs up. Polymathy is occupied in the cognition of reason. Both historical knowledge and knowledge of reason, extended without determi-

nate bounds, may be denominated pansophy. To historical knowledge the science of the instruments of learning, philology, which comprehends a critical knowledge of books and of languages (literature and linguistic), belongs.

Mere polyhistory is, so to say, learning, which is cyclopic, or wants an eye—that of philosophy; and a cyclops of a mathematician, a historian, a natural historian, a philologist or a linguist, is a scholar, who is great in all these branches, but holds, that all philosophy on them may be dispensed with.

The humaniora, by which the knowledge of the ancients that favours the union of science with taste, polishes rudeness, and promotes communicability and urbanity, wherein humanity consists, is understood.

The humaniora then regard an instruction in what serves for the culture of taste conformably to the patterns of the ancients. To them, eloquence, poetry, the knowledge acquired by reading the classical authors, and many similar acquirements pertain. All this humanistical knowledge may be considered as belonging to that part of philology, which is practical, and tends the most to the formation of taste. But, if we separate the mere philologist from the humanist, we shall find them to be distinguished from one another in this, that the former seeks in the ancients the instruments of learning, the latter, on the other hand, those of the formation of taste.

The *belles-lettrist* or the *bell'esprit* is a humanist

according to contemporary patterns in the living languages. He is therefore, not a man of learning—for none but the dead languages are at present learned ones—but a mere *dilettante* (connoisseur) of the knowledge of taste according to the mode, without standing in need of the ancients. He might be named the ape of the humanist. The polyhistorian must as a philologist be a linguist and a man of literature, and as a humanist, a classical scholar and an expounder of the classics. He, as a philologist, is cultivated, as a humanist, civilized.

With regard to the sciences there are two degeneracies of the reigning taste, pedantry and gallantry. The one applies to the sciences for the school merely, and thereby limits them with respect to their use; the other applies to them for nothing but society or the world and thereby confines them with respect to their matter.

Either the pedant, as a man of letters, is opposed to the man of the world and is a puffed-up man of letters without knowledge of the world, that is, without the knowledge of communicating his science; or he is to be considered as a man of ability in general, but in forms only, not as to the essence and the end. In the latter sense he is a picker of forms; limited with regard to the substance of things, he considers nothing but the outside. He is the unfortunate imitation, or the caricature, of a man of a methodical head. Hence may pedantry be denominated the painfulness and the useless exactness

or nicety (micrology) in forms. And a form of the scholastic method out of the school of that sort is to be met with, not only among the learned and in learning, but among other classes and in other things. The *etiquette*, or ceremony of courts, in society—what is it but a hunting after forms? In the army it is not quite so, though it seems so. But in conversation, in dress, in diet, in religion, much pedantry often reigns.

And exactness in forms suitable to the end proposed is profoundness (methodical, scholastic perfection). Pedantry is then an affected profoundness, and gallantry, as a mere courting of the approbation of taste, nothing but an affectation of popularity. For gallantry endeavours but to render itself agreeable to the reader and therefore not so much as to offend him with a hard word.

To avoid pedantry, extensive knowledge, not only in the sciences themselves, but with regard to their use, is required. For which reason nobody but the man of true erudition can detach himself from pedantry, which is always the property of a limited understanding.

In the endeavour to procure to our cognition the perfection at once of the scholastic profundity and of popularity, without committing the above-mentioned fault, either of an affected profundity, or of an affected popularity, we must above all things look to the scholastic perfection of our cognition—the methodical form of profundity—and then first

take care how we can render the methodical cognition learned in the school really popular, that is, so easy and universally communicable to others, that the profundity may not be supplanted by the popularity. For, the scholastic perfection, without which all science were nothing but a toy, must not be sacrificed for the sake of the popular perfection, or to please the people

But in order to learn true popularity we must read the ancients, for instance, Cicero's philosophical writings, the poets, Horace, Virgil, &c.; among the moderns, Hume, Shaftesbury, and many others; men, who had great intercourse with the refined world, without which intercourse it is not possible to be popular. For true popularity requires much practical knowledge of the world, knowledge of the conceptions, of the taste, and of the inclinations of men, upon which, in the exhibition and even in the choice of fit expressions adequate to popularity, constant attention is to be bestowed. A condescendence of that sort to the capacity of the public and to the usual expressions, by which the scholastic perfection is not undervalued, but the dress of the thoughts so ordered, as not to let the scaffold—what is methodical and technical of that perfection—be seen (as we draw with a pencil lines, upon which we write, and then rub them out), this truly popular perfection of cognition is in fact a great and a rare perfection, which betrays much insight in science. And it has, besides

many other merits, this one, that it can give a proof of the complete insight into a thing. For the merely scholastic examination of a cognition leaves behind the doubt, Whether the examination be not partial, and whether the cognition itself be of a value granted it by every body. The school, like common-sense, has its prejudices. The one improves the other. It is therefore important to try a cognition with men, whose understandings do not adhere to any school.

This perfection of cognition, by which the cognition is qualified for an easy and a universal communication, might also be termed the external extension, or the extensive greatness of a cognition, provided that it (a cognition) is spread externally among a great number of men.

As there are so many and so various cognitions, one would do well to make a plan for himself, according to which he so orders the sciences, as they may agree the best with his ends and contribute to promote them. All cognitions have a certain natural connexion with one another. If, in the endeavour after enlarging the cognitions, this their coherence is not attended to, the result of all great knowledge will be nothing but a mere rhapsody. But if one makes a principal science his end and considers all other cognitions as means only to accomplish it, he introduces a certain systematical character into his knowledge. And in order to go to work, in the enlarging of our cognitions, accord-

ing to a plan that is well ordered and suitable to the end proposed, we must try to learn that coherence of the cognitions among one another. A guidance to which is given by the architectonic of the sciences, a system according to ideas, in which the sciences, with regard to their affinity and their systematical conjunction, are considered as a whole of knowledge interesting humanity.

30 As to the intensive greatness of a cognition, that is to say, its weight or its great value and importance in particular, which, as we have already remarked, is essentially distinguished from the extensive, the mere copiousness, we shall make but these few remarks on it :

1, A cognition, which refers to the greatness, that is, the whole in the use of the understanding, is to be distinguished from the subtilty in the small (micrology).

2, Every cognition that promotes the logical perfection, as to the form, is logically important, for example, every mathematical proposition, every law of nature distinctly known, every right philosophic explication. The practical importance cannot be foreseen, but must be waited for.

3, A cognition may be difficult without being important, and *vice versa*. Difficulty therefore decides neither for, nor against, the value of the importance of a cognition. This depends upon the greatness or the plurality of the consequences. The more or the greater consequences a cognition

is productive of, the more use may be made of it, the more important it is. A cognition without weighty consequences is a useless speculation ; the scholastic philosophy, for instance, is of this nature.

VII.

B. Logical Perfection of Cognition, as to Relation. Truth. Material and formal or logical Truth. Criteria of logical Truth. Falsity and Error. Appearance, as the Source of Error. Means to avoid Errors.

TRUTH is a chief perfection of cognition, nay, the essential and the indispensable condition of all its perfection. Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with the object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, our cognition must, in order to hold good as true, agree with the object. But we can compare the object with our cognition in no other way, than by our knowing it. Our cognition therefore must confirm itself, but which is not near sufficient for truth. For, as the object is out of us and the cognition in us, we never can but judge whether our cognition of the object agrees with the cognition of the object. Such a circle in explaining the ancients named *dialele*. And the logicians were always reproached with this fault by the sceptics, who remarked, that

it is with that definition of truth just as if one should make a deposition before a court and appeal to a witness, whom nobody knows, but who has a mind to render himself worthy of belief by maintaining, that he who has called him as a witness, is an honest man. The accusation indeed is well founded. Only the solution of the aforementioned problem is absolutely impossible.

The question here is, Whether and how far there is a criterion of truth secure, universal, and fit to be used in the application? For that is the meaning of the question, What is truth?

To be able to answer this important question, we must distinguish that, which in our cognition belongs to its matter and refers to the object, from that which regards the mere form, as that condition, without which a cognition would in general be no cognition at all. With respect to this distinction between the objective material and the subjective formal reference in our cognition, the above question divides into the two particular ones :

1. Is there a universal material criterion of truth?
- and 2. Is there a universal formal one?

A universal material criterion of truth is not possible; it is even contradictory in itself. For, as a universal criterion that holds for all objects in general, it would need totally to abstract from all difference of them, and yet, as a material criterion, to extend to this very difference, in order to be able to determine whether a cognition agrees directly with that ob-

ject, to which it is referred, and not with any one object in general; by which nothing at all is said. In this agreement of a cognition with that determinate object, to which it is referred, material truth must however consist. For a cognition, which with regard to one object is true, may with regard to other objects be false. It is therefore absurd to require a universal material criterion of truth, which must at once abstract and not abstract from all difference of objects.

But, if the inquiry is after universal formal criteria of truth, the decision, that there may by all means be such, is easy. For formal truth consists entirely in the agreement of cognition with itself with total abstraction from all objects whatever and from all difference of them. And the universal formal criteria of truth consequently are nothing but universal logical marks of the agreement of cognition with itself, or (which is the same thing) with the universal laws of the understanding and of reason.

These formal universal criteria, though not sufficient for objective truth, are to be considered as its *conditio sine qua non*.

For the question, Whether the cognition agrees with itself (as to the form)? must precede the question, Whether it agrees with the object? And that is the province of logic.

The formal criteria of truth in logic are,
1, the proposition of contradiction, and,

2, that of sufficient reason.

By the former the logical possibility of a cognition is determined, by the latter the logical reality.

To the logical truth of a cognition belong,

First, that it be logically possible, that is, not repugnant to itself. This sign of the internal logical truth however is only negative; for a cognition, which is repugnant to itself, is false, but, when it is not so, not always true; and,

Secondly, that it be logically founded, that is, that it have, a, grounds and, b, not false consequences.

This second criterion of the external logical truth, relative to the logical coherence of a cognition with grounds and consequences, or of the rationalness of cognition, is positive. And the following rules hold here :

1, From the truth of the consequence the truth of the cognition as a ground may be inferred, but only negatively: when one false consequence flows from a cognition, the cognition itself is false. For, were the ground true, the consequence would be so likewise; because the consequence is determined by the ground.

But we cannot infer conversely: when not a false consequence flows from a cognition, it is true; for we can draw true inferences from a false ground.

2, When all the consequences of cognition are true, the cognition also is true. For, were but

something false in the cognition, a false consequence too would have place.

From the consequence we may then infer a ground, but without being able to determine it. We can only infer a determinate ground, that it is the true one, from the complex of all the consequences.

The former mode of inference, according to which the consequence can be but a negatively and an indirectly sufficient criterion of the truth of a cognition, is termed in logic the apagogical (*modus tollens*).

This procedure, of which great use is made in geometry, has the advantage, that we need derive but one false consequence from a cognition to prove its falseness. For example, in order to evince, that the earth is not flat, we need, without adducing positive and direct reasons, but infer and conclude apagogically, or indirectly, thus: Were the earth flat, the polestar would be equally high everywhere; but this is not the case; therefore the earth is not flat.

In the other, the positive and direct mode of inference (*modus ponens*), there occurs the difficulty, that the totality of the consequences cannot be known apodictically, and that we therefore are not led by this mode of illation but to a probable and a hypothetically true cognition (a hypothesis) according to the presupposition, that, when many consequences are true, all the others may be so likewise.

We may then lay down here three principles, as universal merely formal, or logical, criteria of truth; they are,

1, the principle of contradiction and of identity, by which the internal possibility of a cognition is determined for problematical judgments;

2, the principle of sufficient reason, upon which the (logical) reality of a cognition depends; that it is founded, as matter for assertive judgments;

3, the principle of the exclusive third (*principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria*), in which the (logical) necessity of a cognition is founded; that we must necessarily judge so and not otherwise, that is, that the opposite is false—for apodictical judgments.

The contrary of truth is falsehood which, if it is held truth, is named error. An erroneous judgment (for error as well as truth is only in the judgment) is therefore such a one, as takes the appearance of truth for truth itself.

How truth is possible, is, as the understanding acts here on its essential laws, easily known.

But how error in the formal sense of the word, that is to say, how the form of thinking contrary to the understanding is possible, is difficult to be comprehended, as it is in general not to be comprehended how any one power should deviate from its own essential laws. We can therefore seek the ground of errors just as little in the understanding itself and its essential laws, as in the limits of the

understanding, in which the 'cause of ignorance, but by no means that of error, lies. Had we no other cognitive power, than the understanding, we should never err. But there lies in us yet another indispensable source of cognition, the sensitivity; which supplies us with matter for thinking and acts according to other laws, than the understanding does. But from the sensitivity considered in and by itself, error cannot arise neither; because the senses never judge.

The ground of the origin of all error must consequently be looked for no where but in the insensible influence of the sensitivity on the intellect or, more accurately speaking, on judgment. This influence makes us in judging hold merely subjective grounds objective ones, and by consequence take the mere appearance of truth for truth itself. For therein consists the very essence of appearance which is on that account to be considered as a ground for holding a false cognition true.

What makes error possible is therefore the appearance, according to which the merely subjective in the judgment is exchanged for the objective.

In a certain sense the understanding too, provided that it, for want of the requisite attention to that influence of the sensitivity, is led by the appearance arising from it to hold merely subjective determinatives of judgment objective ones, or to admit that, which is not true but according to laws of, the sen-

sitivity, to be true according to its own laws, may be made the author of errors.

Only the fault of ignorance then lies in the limits of the understanding ; the fault of error we have to attribute to ourselves. Nature has denied us much knowledge, she leaves us in the inevitable ignorance of so much ; yet she does not occasion error. To it our own propensity to judge and to decide even when we are not able to do so, because of the limitation of our faculties, leads us.

All error however, into which the human understanding can fall, is but partial, and in every erroneous judgment there must always be something true. For a total error were an oppugnancy against the laws of the understanding and of reason.

With regard to what is true and erroneous in our cognition, we distinguish an exact from a crude cognition.

A cognition, when it is adequate to its object, or when with respect to its object not the smallest error has place, is exact ; it, when errors may be in it with an impediment to the design, is crude.

This distinction regards the larger or the stricter determinateness of our cognition. At first it is sometimes necessary to determine a cognition in a larger sphere, particularly in historical things. But in cognitions of reason every thing must be exactly (*stricte*) determined. In the large determination it is said, a cognition is determined *præter, propter*.

It always depends upon the purpose of a cognition whether it shall be crudely or exactly determined. The large determination still leaves a latitude for error, but which may have its determinate bounds. Error has place especially when a wide determination is taken for a strict one, for instance, in matters of morality, in which every thing must be strictly determined. Who do not do so are named, by the English, latitudinarians.

From the exactness, as an objective perfection of cognition—as the cognition in this case is fully congruent to the object—the subtilty as a subjective perfection of it may still be distinguished.

A cognition of a thing, when one discovers in it what usually escapes the attention of others, is subtle. It consequently requires a higher degree of attention and a greater exertion of the intellectual power.

Many blame all subtilty; because they cannot attain it. But it in itself does honor to the understanding, and is, provided that it is applied to an object worthy of observation, even meritorious and necessary. But it, when the same end might be attained with less attention and effort of the understanding, than is used, is a useless expense, and we fall into subtilties, which are difficult, but of no utility (*nugæ difficiles*).

As the crude is opposed to the exact, the gross is to the subtle.

From the nature of error, in whose conception,

as we have already remarked, besides falsity, the appearance of truth is contained as an essential mark, the following rule, which is important to the truth of our cognition, unfolds itself :

In order to avoid errors (and no error is at least absolutely inevitable, though it may be so relatively to the cases, in which it is, even at the risk of erring, unavoidable for us to judge) we must endeavour to discover and to explain the source of them—appearance or semblance. But that few philosophers have done. They have only endeavoured to determine the errors themselves, without shewing the appearance, whence they arise. The discovering and the solving of the appearance, however, is of much greater service to truth, than the direct shewing of errors themselves, by which their source cannot be stopped up, nor can the same appearance, because it is not known, be prevented from leading again to errors in other cases. For, if we are even convinced of having erred, there still remains to us, if the appearance itself, which forms the basis of our error, is not removed, scruples, little as we can adduce to their justification.

Besides, by explaining the appearance we do the erring person a sort of equity. For, nobody will allow, that he has erred without some one appearance of truth, which perhaps might have deceived one more acute ; because the stress of the affair rests upon subjective grounds.

An error, when the appearance is obvious to com-

mon sense, is termed an insipidity or absurdity. The reproach of absurdity is always a personal one, which we must avoid, particularly in the correcting of errors.

For to him, who maintains an absurdity, the appearance, which forms the basis of this evident falsity, is not obvious. This appearance must first be made obvious to him. If he still continues to maintain it, he is insipid indeed ; but then nothing more can be done with him. He has thereby rendered himself both incapable and unworthy of all farther instruction and refutation. For we cannot, properly speaking, prove to a person that he is absurd ; in this case all reasoning were in vain. When we prove the absurdity we speak no longer to the erring person, but to the rational man. Then, however, the discovery of the absurdity (*deductio ad absurdum*) is not necessary.

An insipid error may likewise be named such a one as nothing ; not so much as even appearance, serves it for an excuse ; as a gross error is that, which evinces ignorance in common cognition or a want of common attention.

Error in principles is greater than that in their application.

An external mark or an external test of truth is the comparison of our own judgments with those of others ; because that which is subjective is not inherent in the same way in all others, by consequence the appearance may be thereby explained. Hence

is the incompatibility of the judgments of others with ours to be considered as an external mark of error, and as a hint to investigate our proceeding in judging, but not immediately to reject it on that account. For we may perhaps be right in the thing and wrong in the manner only, that is, the propounding.

Common-sense is in itself too a touchstone, to discover the faults of the artificial use of the understanding, that is to say, to put one's self right in thinking or in the speculative use of reason by common-sense, when the common understanding is used as a test for the purpose of judging of the rightness of the speculative.

Universal rules and conditions of avoiding error in general are, 1, To think for one's self, 2, To conceive one's self in the place of another, and 3, Always to think consistently with one's self. The maxim of thinking for one's self may be distinguished by the denomination of the enlightened way of thinking; that of putting one's self, in thinking, in the place of another, the enlarged; and that of always thinking consistently with one's self, the consequential or solid.

VIII.

C. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quality. Clearness. Conception of a Mark in general. Various sorts of Marks. Determination of the logical Essence of a Thing. Its Distinction from the real Essence. Distinctness, a higher Degree of Clearness. Esthetical and Logical Distinctness. Discrepance between analytic and synthetic Distinctness:

THE human cognition is on the side of the understanding discursive ; that is, it is acquired by means of representations, which make a ground of cognition of that which is common to several things, consequently by means of marks, as such. We know things then by marks only.

A mark is in a thing that, which makes up a part of its cognition ; or (what amounts to the same) a partial representation, provided that it is considered as a ground of cognition of the whole representation. By consequence all our conceptions are marks and all thinking is nothing but a representing by means of marks.

Every mark may be considered in two points of view:

First, as a representation in itself ; and

Secondly, as belonging, as a partial conception, to the whole representation of a thing, and thereby as a ground of cognition of this thing itself.

All marks, considered as grounds of cognition, are of a twofold use ; either of an internal, or of an external. The internal use consists in derivation, in order to cognise the thing itself by marks, as its grounds of cognition. The external consists in comparison, provided that we can compare a thing with other things by means of marks according to the rules of identity and of distinction.*

Among the marks there are many specific distinctions, in which the following classification of those are founded :

1, Analytic or synthetic marks. Those are partial conceptions of the actual conception (which we form to ourselves in this conception), these, partial ones of the merely possible whole conception (which must consequently be first formed by a synthesis of several parts). The former are all conceptions of reason, the latter may be those of experience.

2, Co-ordinate or subordinate. This division of marks regards their connexion beside or under one another.

The marks, if each of them is represented as an

* Not diversity, but distinction or difference is the contrary - of identity or sameness ; diversity is that of similitude or likeness. Many of our authors confound these contraries. T.

immediate mark of the thing, are co-ordinate ; and, if one mark is represented only by means of another in the thing, subordinate. The conjunction of the co-ordinate marks so as to amount to the whole of the conception is named an aggregate ; the conjunction of the subordinate ones, a series. That, the aggregation of the co-ordinate marks, makes up the totality of the conception, but which, with regard to synthetic empirical conceptions, never can be completed.

The series of subordinate marks falls, *a parte ante*, or on the side of the grounds, upon insolvable conceptions, which cannot on account of their simplicity be farther dissected : it, *a parte post*, or with respect to the consequences, on the other hand, is infinite, because we have a highest genus, but not a lowest species.

With the synthesis of every new conception in the aggregation of co-ordinate marks the extensive or diffused distinctness increases in the same manner as with the farther analysis of the conceptions in the series of subordinate marks the intensive or deep distinctness does. This sort of distinctness, as it necessarily serves for the profundity or solidity of cognition, is chiefly the business of philosophy and, particularly in metaphysical perquisitions, carried to the highest pitch.

3, Affirmative or negative marks. By those we know what the thing is, by these what it is not.

The negative marks serve to keep us from errors.

Hence are they when it is impossible to err unnecessary, and necessary and of importance in those cases only, when they keep us from an important error, into which we may easily fall. For instance, with regard to the conception of a being like God, the negative marks are very necessary and of moment.

By affirmative marks we have then a mind to understand something; by negative ones (to which all marks whatsoever may be turned) only not to misunderstand or only not to err in it, even should we learn to know nothing of it.

4, Important and fertile or empty and unimportant marks.

A mark is important and fertile when it is a ground of cognition of great and of numerous consequences, partly with regard to its internal use (the use in the derivation) provided that it is sufficient, in order to know by it a great deal of the thing itself; partly with regard to its external use (the use in the comparison) provided that it serves to know, as well the similitude of a thing to many other things, as its diversity from many others.

Besides, we must here distinguish the logical importance and fertility from the practical—utility.

5, Sufficient and necessary or insufficient and contingent marks.

A mark, provided that it suffices always to distinguish the thing from all other things, is sufficient; otherwise it is insufficient, as, for example,

the mark of barking of the dog. But the sufficiency of marks, as well as their importance, is to be determined in a relative sense only, with reference to the ends, which are intended by a cognition.

Necessary marks finally are those, which must always be to be met with in the thing represented. Such marks are termed essential too, and stand opposed to the unessential and contingent, which may be separated from the conception of the thing.

But between the necessary marks there is yet a distinction.

Some of them belong to the thing as grounds of other marks of the very same thing; others again as consequences only of other marks.

The former are primitive and constitutive marks (*essentialia in sensu strictissimo*); the latter are denominated attributes (*consectaria, rationata*), and pertain likewise to the essence of the thing, but only with a proviso, that they must first be derived from those its essential parts; as, for instance, the three angles in the conception of a triangle from the three sides.

The unessential marks also are of a twofold sort; they regard either internal determinations of a thing (*modi*), or its external relations. For example, the mark of learning denotes an internal determination of man; being a master or a servant, only an external relation of him.

The complex of all the essential parts of a thing, or the sufficiency of its marks as to co-ordination or subordination, is the essence (*complexus notarum*

primitivarum, interne conceptui dato sufficientium ; s. complexus notarum, conceptum aliquem primitive constituentium).

But in this definition we must by no means think here of the real essence or the essence of nature of things, which we never can know. For, as logic abstracts from all the matter of cognition, by consequence from the thing itself, in this science nothing but the logical essence of things can possibly be on the carpet. And this we can easily know. For hereto belongs nothing farther than the knowledge of all the predicates, with regard to which an object is determined by its conception ; whereas to the real essence of the thing (*esse rei*) the knowledge of those predicates, upon which, all that belongs as a determinative to its essence depends, is required. If we chuse, for instance, to determine the logical essence of a body, we have no occasion to seek for the data to this in nature ; we need but turn our reflection to the marks which, as essential parts (*constitutiva, rationes*), originally constitute its fundamental conception. For the logical essence is nothing but The first fundamental conception of all the necessary marks of a thing (*esse conceptus*).

The first step of the perfection of our cognition, as to quality, is then the clearness of the cognition. The distinctness is a second step, or a higher degree of clearness. This consists in the clearness of the marks.

In the first place, we must in general distinguish here the logical distinctness from the esthetical.

The former depends upon the objective, the latter upon the subjective, clearness of the marks. That is a clearness by conceptions, this a clearness by intuition. The latter species of distinctness consists then in a mere vivacity and intelligibleness, that is to say, in a mere clearness by examples in the concrete (for many things that are not distinct may be intelligible, and conversely, many things that are difficult to be understood, because they refer back to remote marks, whose connexion with intuition is not possible but by a long series, may be distinct).

The objective distinctness often occasions subjective obscurity, and conversely. Hence is the logical distinctness seldom possible but to the disadvantage of the esthetical, and, *vice versa*, the esthetical distinctness by examples and likenesses, which are not quite adequate, but taken according to a certain analogy only, is often hurtful to the logical. And besides, examples in general are not marks, and belong, not as parts to the conception, but as intuitions for the use of the conception only. A distinctness by examples (the mere intelligibleness) is therefore of quite another sort, than the distinctness by conceptions as marks. Perspicuity consists in the conjunction of both, the esthetic or popular, with the scholastic or logical, distinctness. For, by a perspicacious head we understand the talent of a luminous exhibition of abstract and of profound cognitions, suitable to the capacity of common-sense.

In the second place, as to the logical distinctness in particular, it, if all the marks, which collectively taken make up the whole conception, have reached clearness, may be named a complete one. A conception, on the other hand, may be completely distinct, with regard to the totality either of its co-ordinate, or of its subordinate marks. The extensively complete or sufficient distinctness of a conception, which is also termed the amplitude, consists in the total clearness of the co-ordinate marks. The total clearness of the subordinate marks constitutes the intensively complete distinctness—the profundity or solidity.

The former species of the logical distinctness may be denominated the external, the latter the internal completeness of the clearness of the marks. This can be obtained from the pure conceptions of reason only, and from arbitrary conceptions, but not from empirical ones.

The extensive greatness or quantum of distinctness, provided that it is not abundant, is named precision. The amplitude and the precision together make up the adequateness (*cognitionem, quæ rem adæquat*); and in the intensively adequate cognition in the profundity conjoined with the extensively adequate one in the amplitude and the precision, the consummate perfection of a cognition (*consummata cognitionis perfectio*) (as to quality) consists.

Since it is the business of logic (as we have al-

ready remarked) to render clear conceptions distinct, the question now is, In what manner it does so.

The logicians of the Wolfian school place all the rendering of cognitions distinct in their mere dissection. But all distinctness does not depend upon the analysis of a given conception. It thereby arises with regard to those marks only, which are thought of in the conception, but by no means with regard to the marks, which are first added to the conception as parts of the whole possible conception.

That sort of distinctness, which arises, not by the analysis, but by the synthesis of the marks, is synthetic distinctness. And there is consequently an essential distinction between the two propositions : To form a distinct conception and, To render a conception distinct.

For, when we form a distinct conception, we begin with the parts and proceed from them to the whole. In this case no marks yet exist ; we obtain them first by means of the synthesis. From this synthetic procedure then the synthetic distinctness arises, which, as to the matter, enlarges the conception by that, which is superadded to it as a mark in the (pure or empirical) intuition. Both the mathematician and the natural philosopher use this synthetic procedure in rendering the conceptions distinct. For all distinctness of the properly mathematical, as well as of all other empirical, cognition, depends upon

an enlargement of it of this sort by a synthesis of the marks.

But, when we render a conception distinct, our cognition by no means increases, as to the matter, by this mere dissection. The matter remains the same; only the form is altered by our doing nothing but distinguishing better, or learning, to know with a clearer consciousness that, which lies in the given conception. As by the mere colouring of a map nothing more is added to the map itself; so by the mere clearing-up of a given conception by means of the analysis of its marks, the conception itself is not increased in the least.

The making of objects distinct belongs to the synthesis, the making of conceptions distinct, to the analysis. In the latter the whole precedes the parts, in the former the parts precede the whole. The philosopher renders none but given conceptions distinct. Sometimes one proceeds synthetically, even when the conception, which he has a mind to render distinct in this manner, is already given. This has often place in empirical propositions, provided that we are not satisfied with the marks already contained in a given conception.

The analytic procedure, in order to beget distinctness, about which procedure only logic can be occupied, is the first and the chief requisite in rendering our cognitions distinct. For the more distinct our cognition of a thing is, the stronger and

the more efficacious it can be. Only the analysis must not go so far, as at last to occasion the object itself to vanish.

Were we conscious to ourselves of all that which we know, we could not but be astonished at the multitude of our cognitions.

As to the objective value of our cognition in general, the following degrees, according to which it (our cognition) can be increased in this respect, may be conceived:

REPRESENTING something to one's self, is the first degree of cognition or knowledge;

Representing to one's self with consciousness or PERCEIVING (*percipere*) something, the second;*

KENNING (*noscere*) † something, or representing to one's self something in comparison of other things as to identity, as well as to distinction, the third;

Kenning with consciousness, that is, COGNISING (*cognoscere*) something, the fourth. The brute kens objects, but does not cognize them.

UNDERSTANDING (*intelligere*), that is, cognising by the understanding by means of conceptions, or conceiving of something, is the fifth. This is very

* Should not APPREHENDING, or receiving into the empirical consciousness, have a place here and precede perceiving? T.

† Must not we use Kenning here, in order to distinguish between this degree of cognition and the highest degree of holding true, Knowing (*scire*)? or what other word have we in English? T.

distinct from comprehending. We can conceive of many things, though we cannot comprehend them, for example, a *perpetuum mobile*, whose impossibility is shewn in the mechanics.

Cognising something by reason, or *PERSPECTING* (*perspicere*) or having an insight into it, is the sixth. We reach this in few things, and our cognitions grow fewer and fewer, the more we advance them towards perfection in point of value.

COMPREHENDING something, that is, cognising it by reason *à priori*, in the degree sufficient to our purpose, is the seventh and the last. For all our comprehending is but relative, that is to say, sufficient for a certain purpose; we comprehend nothing absolutely. Nothing more than what the mathematician demonstrates can be comprehended; for instance, that all the lines in the circle are proportional. And yet he does not comprehend how it happens, that so simple a figure as a circle has these properties. Hence is the field of conceiving or of the understanding in general much greater, than that of comprehending or of reason.

IX.

Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Modality. Certainty. Conception of Holding-true in general. Modes of Holding-true: Opining, Believing, and Knowing. Conviction and Persuasion. Reserving and Suspending a Judgment. Previous Judgments. Prejudices, their Sources and their chief Sorts.

TRUTH is an objective property of cognition; the judgment, by which something is represented as true (the reference to an understanding and therefore to a particular subject), is subjective, a holding-true.

HOLDING-TRUE is in general of a twofold nature: a certain and an uncertain. The certain holding-true or certainty, is conjoined with the consciousness of necessity; the uncertain, on the other hand, or uncertainty, with that of contingency, or of the possibility of the contrary. The latter again is, either subjectively as well as objectively insufficient, or objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient. That is termed opinion; this must be named belief.

There are consequently three sorts or modes of

holding-true: opining, believing, and knowing. The first is a problematical, the second an assertive, and the third an apodictical, judging. For, what we merely opine we in judging hold with consciousness but problematical; what we believe, assertive, not as objectively necessary, however, but as subjectively so (valid for one's self only); and what we know, apodictically certain, that is, universally and objectively necessary (valid for every body); even suppose the object itself, to which this certain holding-true refers, were a merely empirical truth. For this distinction of the holding-true according to the three modes just mentioned concerns nothing but the judgment with regard to the subjective criteria of the subsumption of a judgment under objective rules.*

Our holding immortality true, for instance, is merely problematical, if we but act as if we were immortal; but assertive, provided we believe, that we are so; and it were apodictical if we all knew, that there is a life after the present.

Between opining, believing, and knowing, then, there is a material distinction, which we shall here explain more closely and more at large.

1. OPINING, or holding-true on a ground of cognition, neither subjectively, nor objectively sufficient, may be considered as a previous judging,

* Subsuming is, ranking under a given rule (*casus datæ legis*). T.

(*sub conditione suspensiva ad interim*), which cannot well be dispensed with. We must opine before we assume and maintain, but be aware of holding an opinion more than a mere opinion. In all our cognising we for the most part begin with opining. Sometimes we have an obscure presagement* of truth; a thing seems to us to contain marks of truth; we are sensible of its truth before we cognise it with determinate certainty.

But when has mere opining place?—Not in any of the sciences that contain cognitions *à priori*; by consequence neither in the mathematics, nor in the metaphysics, nor in the ethics, but in empirical cognitions only, in the physics, in psychology, and such like; for it is a palpable absurdity to think of opining *à priori*. And in fact nothing would be more laughable, than to opine only in the mathematics. In them, as well as in the metaphysics and in moral philosophy, the object is either to know, or not to know. Hence can matters of opinion never be but objects of a cognition of experience, which cognition is possible in itself, but impossible to us only from the empirical limitations and conditions of our cognitive faculty and according to the degree of it depending upon them, which we possess. The ether of the modern natural philoso-

* The literal translation is Presension, but the Translator prefers sagement as referring more to the understanding, by which only we can discover truth. T.

phers, for example, is a mere matter of opinion. For of this, as of every opinion in general, whatever it may be, we perspect, that the contrary may perhaps be proved: Our holding-true in this case is therefore objectively, as well as subjectively, insufficient, though it, considered in itself, may be rendered complete.

2. BELIEVING, or holding-true on a ground which is objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient, has reference to objects, with regard to which we can, not only know nothing, but opine nothing, nay, not so much as pretend probability, but be merely certain, that it is not contradictory to think of such objects in the manner we do. The rest is a free holding-true, which is not necessary but with a practical view given *à priori*; consequently a holding-true of that which we assume on moral grounds in such a manner, as to be certain, that the contrary never can be proved.*

* Believing is not a particular source of cognition. It is a sort of 'incomplete holding-true with consciousness, and distinguished, when considered as limited to a particular sort of objects (*credibilia* or those of belief only), from opining, not by the degree, but by the relation, which it as a cognition bears acting. The merchant, for instance, in order to make a bargain, must not merely opine, that there is something to be gained by it, that is, that his opinion is sufficient for the undertaking at a venture. We have theoretical cognition (of the sensible), in which we can attain certainty, and with regard to all that which we can name human cognition this must be possible. We have similar certain cognitions totally *à priori* in practical laws;

Matters of belief then are, 1, not objects of empirical cognition. Hence can the historical belief,

but these are founded in a supersensible principle (liberty), as a principle of practical reason, in ourselves. But practical reason is a causality with regard to an object likewise supersensible, the chief good, which is not possible in the sensible world by our power, yet nature as the object of our theoretical reason must harmonize with it; for it is necessary, that the consequence or effect of this idea should be met with in the sensible world. We ought therefore to act in order to realize this end.

We find in the sensible world traces of a wisdom of art; and we believe, that the Cause of the world works with moral wisdom too for the chief good. This is a holding-true, which is sufficient to acting, that is, a belief. We stand in no need of that for acting, according to moral laws, for they are given by practical reason only; but we stand in need of the assumption of a Supreme Wisdom for the object of our moral will, to which we, besides the mere rightfulness of our actions, cannot avoid directing our ends. This is objectively not a necessary reference of our arbitrament, yet the chief good is subjectively necessarily the object of a good (every human) will, and the belief in its attainableness is necessarily presupposed for it.

Between the acquisition of a cognition by experience (*à posteriori*) and by reason (*à priori*) there is no mean. But between the cognition of an object and the mere presupposition of its possibility, there is a mean, either an empirical ground, or a ground of reason to assume its possibility with reference to a necessary extending of the field of possible objects beyond those, whose cognition is possible to us. This necessity does not obtain but when the object is cognised as practical and practically necessary by reason; for, to assume any thing in behalf of the mere enlargement of theoretical cognition, is always contingent. This practically necessary presupposition of an object is that of the possibility of the chief good as the object of the arbitrament, by consequence that of the conditions of this possibility (God, li-

commonly so named, not be termed belief, in the proper sense, and as such be opposed to knowing ;

berty, and immortality). This is a subjective necessity, to assume the reality of the object on account of the necessary determination of the will. This is the *casus extraordinarius*, without which practical reason cannot maintain itself with regard to its necessary end, and the *favor necessitatis* is of use to it here in its own judgment. It can acquire no object logically, but only oppose what impedes it in the use of this idea which pertains to it practically.

This belief is the necessity of assuming the objective reality of a conception (of the chief good), that is, the possibility of its object as an object of the arbitrament necessary *à priori*. When we consider actions only, we have no occasion for this belief. But if we have a mind to reach by actions the possession of the end possible by them, we must assume, that this end is quite possible. I can only say, that I find myself necessitated by my end according to laws of liberty to assume a chief good in the world as possible, but I can necessitate nobody else by grounds (belief is free).

The belief of reason consequently can never extend to theoretical cognition; for in it the objectively insufficient holding-true is merely opinion. It is merely a presupposition of reason with a subjective, but absolutely necessary practical, view. The mind-*edness* according to moral laws leads to an object of the arbitrament determinable by pure reason. The assuming of the attainableness of this object and consequently of the reality of the cause of its attainableness is a moral belief, or a holding-true, which is free and necessary with a moral view to the completion of its ends.

Fides is, properly speaking, faith *in pacto*, or a subjective confidence in one another, that the one will keep his word to the other—faith and belief. The former, when the *pactum* is made, the latter, when it is to be concluded.

because it may itself be a knowing. Holding-true on testimony is distinguished, neither as to the degree, nor as to the species, from holding true by one's own experience.

Nor are matters of belief, II, objects of the cognition of reason (cognition *à priori*), either of theoretical cognition, for example, in the mathematics and the metaphysics, or of the practical, in moral philosophy.

Mathematical truths of reason may be believed on testimonies, because error in this case, partly is not easily possible, partly can be easily discovered; but they cannot be known in this manner. Philosophical truths of reason, on the other hand, cannot be so much as believed; they must be only known; for philosophy does not admit of mere persuasion. And, as to the objects of the practical cognition of reason in moral philosophy in particular, the rights and the duties, a mere belief can just as little have place. We must be quite certain whether something is right or wrong, consonant to duty or contrary to it, licit or illicit. In moral things nothing can be done at a venture; nothing resolved on at the risk of infringing the law. For instance, it is not enough for a judge merely to believe, that one accused of having committed a crime has committed

According to analogy practical reason is (so to say) the promiser, man, the promissary, the good expected from the act, the *promissum*.

it. He must know it (juridically), or he is not influenced by conscience.

III. Only the objects, the holding-true of which is necessarily free, that is to say, not determined by grounds of truth, which are objectively independent of the nature and of the interest of the subject, are matters of belief.

Hence does belief afford, because of the merely subjective grounds, no conviction, which may be communicated and commands universal assent, like the conviction which proceeds from knowing. I only can be certain of the validity and of the immutability of my practical belief in the truth of a proposition, or the reality of a thing is that which, with regard to me, only supplies the place of a cognition, without being itself a cognition.

He, who does not assume that, which it is impossible to know but morally necessary to presuppose, is morally unbelieving: A want of moral interest always forms the basis of this sort of incredulity. The greater the moral mindedness of a man is, the firmer and the more lively will his belief be in all that, which he finds himself forced from the moral interest to assume or presuppose in a practically necessary view.

3. KNOWING (*scire*) is holding-true on a ground of cognition, which is both objectively and subjectively sufficient, or certainty, accordingly as it is founded, either in experience (one's own, as well as that of others communicated), or in reason, is

either empirical. or rational : This distinction consequently refers to both the sources, experience and reason from which all our knowledge is drawn.

The rational certainty (or rather the certainty of reason) is again, either mathematical, or philosophical ; that is intuitive, this discursive.

The mathematical certainty is named **EVIDENCE** ; because an intuitive cognition is clearer, than a discursive one. Though the mathematical and the philosophical cognitions of reason are in themselves equally certain, the species of certainty is distinct in them

The empirical certainty is an original one, provided that we are certain of something from our own experience, and a derived one, if we are so by the experience of others ; the latter is usually denominated the historical certainty.

The rational certainty (or rather the certainty of reason) is distinguished from the empirical by the consciousness of the necessity that is conjoined with it ; it is therefore an apodictical certainty, whereas the empirical is but an assertive one. We are rationally certain of what we would have perspected *à priori*, of course without all experience. Hence may our cognitions regard objects of experience, and yet their certainty be at once empirical and rational, provided that we cognise an empirically certain proposition from principles *à priori*.

Certainty of reason of every thing we cannot have ; but, when it is possible for us to have it, we must prefer it to the empirical certainty.

All certainty is either a mediate, or an immediate one, that is to say, it either requires a proof, or is capable and stands in need of none. Though so much in our cognition is certain but mediately, that is, only by a proof, there must be something indemonstrable, or immediately certain, and all our cognition must set out from immediately certain propositions.

The proofs, upon which all the mediate certainty of a cognition depends, are either direct, or indirect, apagogical. When we prove a truth by its grounds, we give a direct proof of it; and when we from the falsity of the contrary infer the truth of a proposition, an apagogical. But if the latter shall hold good, the propositions must be contradictorily or diametrically opposed to one another. For two propositions but contrarily opposed to one another may be both false. A proof, which is the ground of mathematical certainty, is termed a DEMONSTRATION, and that, which is the ground of philosophical certainty, an ACROMATICAL proof. The essential parts of every proof in general are its matter and its form; or the argument and the consequence.*

By a SCIENCE the complex of cognition, as a system, is to be understood. It is opposed to the common cognition, that is, the complex of cognition, as a mere aggregate. A system depends upon an idea of the whole, which precedes the parts; in

* That argument, which is the principal ground of perspecting the truth of a proposition, is named, by logicians, the *nervus probandi*. T.

the common cognition, on the other hand, or in the mere aggregate of cognitions, the parts precede the whole. There are historical sciences and sciences of reason.

In a science we often know the cognitions only, but not the things represented by them; consequently there may be a science of that our cognition of which is not a knowing.

The universal result of what has been said of the nature and of the species of holding-true is, That all our cognition is either logical, or practical. When we know, that we are divested of all subjective grounds and yet that the holding-true is sufficient, we are CONVINCED logically, or on objective grounds (the object is certain).

The complete holding-true on subjective grounds, however, which in a practical view are equal to objective ones, is likewise conviction, only not logical (it is certain), but practical (I am certain): And this practical conviction or moral belief is often firmer than all knowing. In knowing we listen to contrary grounds, but in believing we do not, because in it objective grounds are not concerned, but the moral interest of the subject is.*

* This practical conviction then is the belief of reason, which only, in the proper sense, must be named a belief and as such opposed to knowing and to all theoretical and logical conviction in general; because it never can be raised to knowing. Whereas the belief commonly termed historical must, as we have already observed, not be distinguished from knowing; because it, as a species of theoretical or logical holding-true, may itself be a

To conviction **PERSUASION**, a holding-true on insufficient grounds, which we do not know whether they are merely subjective or objective at the same time, stands opposed.

Persuasion often precedes conviction. We are conscious to ourselves of many cognitions but in such a manner, that we cannot judge whether the reasons of our holding-true are objective, or subjective. We therefore must, in order to be able from mere persuasion to reach conviction, first reflect, that is, see to what cognitive power a cognition belongs, and then investigate, that is, prove whether the reasons are sufficient, or insufficient, with regard to the object. Many rest satisfied with persuasion, some reflect, but few investigate. Whoever knows what pertains to certainty does neither easily confound persuasion and conviction, nor allow himself to be persuaded. There is a determinative to approbation, which determinative is composed of both objective and subjective grounds, and this mixed effect the greater number of mankind do not disentangle.

Though every persuasion, as to the form (*for-*

knowing. We can assume an empirical truth on the testimony of others with the same certainty, as if we had attained it by facts of our own experience. In the former sort of empirical knowing, as well as in the latter, there is something fallacious.

The historical or mediate empirical knowing depends upon the certitude of the testimonies. To the requisites of an unexceptionable witness sufficient capacity and integrity belong.

maliter) is, if an uncertain cognition seems by it to be certain, false, it, as to the matter (*materia-liter*), may be true. And thus is it distinguished from opinion, which, if it is held certain, is an uncertain cognition.

The sufficiency of holding-true (in believing) may be put to the test either by betting, or by making oath. To the former comparative, to the latter absolute, sufficiency of objective reasons is necessary, instead of which however, when they do not exist, an absolutely subjectively sufficient holding-true is valid or holds good.

We often use the phrases, To yield to one's judgment; to reserve, to suspend or to give up one's judgment. Those and similar phrases seem to denote, that there is something arbitrary in our judging, by our holding something true, because we have a mind to do so. The question here therefore is, Whether volition have an influence on our judgments?

The will has no influence on holding-true immediately; otherwise it were very absurd. When it is said, We believe willingly what we wish, it signifies but our good wishes, for instance, those of the father with regard to his children. Had the will an immediate influence on our conviction of what we wish, we should be constantly forming chimeras of a happy state, and would then hold them always true. But the will cannot contest convincing proofs, which are contrary to our wishes and our inclinations.

But, as far as the will either excites the understanding to the investigation of a truth, or withholds it from it, we must grant it (the will) an influence on the use of the understanding, and by consequence mediately on conviction itself, as it depends so much upon the use of the understanding.

But as to the suspending or reserving of our judgment in particular, it consists in the intention not to allow a merely previous judgment to become a determining one. A PREVIOUS JUDGMENT is a judgment, by which I represent to myself, that there are more reasons for the truth of a thing, than against it, but that these reasons do not suffice to a determining or definitive judgment, by which we decide directly for truth. Previous judging then is a judging merely problematical with consciousness.

The reservation of a judgment may take place with a twofold design ; either to seek for the reasons of the determining judgment ; or in order never to judge. In the former case the suspension of the judgment is named a critical one (*suspensio judicii indagatoria*) ; in the latter, a sceptical. For the sceptic disclaims all judging ; whereas the true philosopher, if he has not sufficient reasons for holding something true, but suspends his judgment.

To suspend one's judgment according to maxims, an exercised judgment, which is not found but at an advanced age, is required. The reservation of our approbation is in general a very difficult thing, partly because our understanding is so desirous of

enlarging itself and of enriching itself with knowledge by judging, partly because we have always a greater propensity to certain things, than to others. But whoever has been often obliged to retract his approbation and is thereby grown prudent and circumspect, does not bestow it so quickly, for fear of being under the necessity of retracting his judgment afterward. This retraction is always a mortification, and a reason of being diffident of all other knowledge.

We have still to notice here that, to let one's judgment remain *in dubio*, and to let it remain *in suspenso*, are not identical. In this we always take an interest in the thing; but in that it is not always suitable to our end and our interest to decide whether the thing is true or not.

Previous judgments are very necessary, nay, indispensable to the use of the understanding in all meditation and all investigation. For they serve to guide it in them and to furnish it with various means

When we meditate on an object we must always judge previously and, as it were, get the scent of the cognition we are to acquire. And if one's objects are inventions and discoveries, he must always make a previous plan for himself; else his thoughts are employed at random. Hence may be conceived by previous judgments maxims for the investigation of a thing. They might be named anticipations too; because one anticipates his judg-

ment of a thing before he knows what must determine it. Such judgments are therefore of great utility; and even rules how to judge of an object previously might be given.

Prejudices must be distinguished from previous judgments.

Previous judgments, if adopted as principles, are **PREJUDICES**. Every prejudice is to be considered as a principle of erroneous judgment, and not prejudices, but erroneous judgments arise from prejudices. The false cognition, which arises from a prejudice, must therefore be distinguished from its source, the prejudice. The bodement of dreams, for example, is in itself not a prejudice, but an error, which arises from the received general rule: What falls out according to expectation a few times, does so always or is for ever to be held true. And this principle, from which the bodement of dreams flows, is a prejudice.

Prejudices are sometimes true previous judgments; only their serving us for principles or for determining judgments, is wrong. The reason of this illusion is to be looked for in subjective grounds' being falsely held objective ones, from a want of reflection that must precede all judging. For, though we may assume several cognitions, for instance, the immediately certain propositions, without investigating them, that is, without proving the conditions of their truth, we judge of nothing without reflecting, that is to say, without comparing a

cognition with the cognitive faculty (the sensitivity or the understanding) whence it must needs arise. If we assume judgments without this reflection, which is even necessary when no investigation has place, prejudices, or principles for judging for subjective reasons, falsely held objective ones, arise therefrom.

The principal fountains of prejudices are, imitation, custom or assuetude, and inclination.

Imitation has a universal influence on our judgments; for it is a strong reason to hold true that, which others have given out to be so. Hence the prejudice, What every body does is right. As to the prejudices, which arise from custom, they can be extirpated by length of time only, by the understanding, stopped and detained by little and little in judging by contrary reasons, by the understanding's being thereby brought by degrees to an opposite way of thinking. But if a prejudice of custom originates in imitation too, it is difficult to cure the person who is filled with it. A prejudice from imitation may likewise be named, a propension to the passive use of reason or to the mechanism of reason, instead of its (reason's) spontaneity under laws.

Reason is an active principle, which must take nothing from the authority of others, not even, when its pure use is concerned, from experience. But the indolence of a great many makes them chuse rather to tread in the footsteps of others, than

to take the trouble of exercising their own intellectual faculties. Such men never can be but copies of others, and were every body of this sort, the world would remain for ever upon the same spot without making farther progress. It therefore is highly necessary and important not to confine youth, as it is usually done, to mere imitating.

There are so many things, which contribute to accustom us to the maxim of imitation and thereby to make reason a soil fertile in predudices! To such aids of imitation pertain,

1. FORMULES, which are rules, whose expression serves for a pattern for imitation. Besides, they are very useful for the purpose of ease in intricate propositions, and therefore the most acute endeavour to find out rules of this sort.

2. SAYINGS, or aphorisms, which express a pregnant sense with so great precision, that it seems the sense cannot be comprised in fewer words. These sayings (*dicta*), which must always be taken from others, to whom a certain infallibility is ascribed, serve, because of this authority, for a rule and a law. The *dicta* of the bible are denominated κατ' ἐξοχην sayings.

3. SENTENCES, or propositions, which, as productions of a mature judgment, recommend themselves and often, by the energy of the thoughts they contain, maintain their credit for centuries.

4. CANONS, which are universal didascalical propositions that serve for a basis to the sciences, and express something well digested and sublime. That

they may please the more, they may be expressed in a sententious manner, and,

5. PROVERBS, or adages, which are popular rules of common-sense, or expressions of its popular judgments. As such merely provincial propositions serve none but the vulgar for sentences and canons, they are not used among those of a more liberal education.

From the aforesaid three universal sources of prejudices, and especially from imitation, many particular prejudices have their issue. We shall here touch on the following only, as the most common ones :

I. Prejudices of authority. Under this head may be ranked,

a, the prejudice arising from the authority of a person. When we, in things that depend upon experience and upon testimonies, build our knowledge upon the authority of other persons. we cannot on that account be accused of any prejudice ; for in things of this sort the authority of a person must, as we cannot experience every thing ourselves and embrace it with our own understanding, be the foundation of our judgments. But, when we make the authority of others the ground of our holding-true with regard to cognitions of reason, we assume these cognitions on a mere prejudice. For truths of reason hold anonymously ; relatively to them the question is, not Who said it, but What is said (*non quis, sed quid*)? It is of no conse-

quence whether a cognition be of a noble extraction or not; but yet the propensity to the prejudice arising from the authority of great men is very common, partly because of the limitation of one's own insight, partly from a desire of imitating that, which is described to us as great. Besides, the authority of the person serves to flatter our vanity in an indirect manner. As, for instance, the subjects of a potent despot are proud of being treated all alike by him, for the least may consider himself so far equal with the greatest, as both of them are nothing in comparison of the illimited power of their ruler; the admirers of a great man judge themselves equal, if the merits, which they may possess among themselves, are to be considered as insignificant in comparison of his pre-eminence. Hence do the highly finished extolled great men feed the propensity to the prejudice of the authority of a person not a little on more than one ground.

b, The prejudice arising from the authority of a multitude. To this prejudice the populace in particular are inclined. For they, not being able to judge of the merits, abilities, and knowledge of a man, rather abide by the judgment of a multitude, on the presupposition that, What every body says must be true. Yet this judgment has reference with them to nothing but historical things; in matters of religion, in which they themselves are interested, they rely upon the judgment of the learned.

It is remarkable, that the ignorant are in general

prepossessed in favor of learning, and that the learned, on the other hand, are so in favor of common-sense.

When all the endeavours of a man of letters, after he has pretty well gone through the circle of the sciences, do not afford him the proper satisfaction, he at last grows diffident of learning, particularly with regard to those speculations, in which the conceptions cannot be rendered sensible, and whose foundation is not solid, as, for example, in the metaphysics. But, as he thinks the key to truth in certain objects must be to be found somewhere, he, after having looked for it so long in vain in the way of the scientific investigation, seeks it in common-sense.

But this hope is very fallacious; for when the cultivated faculty of reason can effectuate nothing with regard to the cognition of certain things, the uncultivated will certainly do it just as little. Every where in the metaphysics the appeal to the decisions of common-sense is quite inadmissible; because in them no case can be exhibited in the concrete. But in moral philosophy it is not so. In it not only all the rules can be given in the concrete, but practical reason reveals itself in general more clearly and rightly by the organ of the common use of the understanding, than by that of the speculative. Hence does the common understanding often judge righter of matters of morality, than the speculative.

c. The prejudice of the authority of the age. In this class of prejudices the prejudice of antiquity is one of the principal ones. We no doubt have reason to judge favourably of antiquity; but it is only a reason for a moderate reverence, whose bounds we but too often pass, by our making the ancients, so to say, treasurers of cognitions and of the sciences, raising the relative value of their writings to an absolute one, and trusting ourselves blindly to their guidance. To esteem the ancients so excessively is, to reduce the understanding to its years of infancy and to neglect the use of one's own talent. And we would lie under a great mistake if we should believe, that all the ancients wrote in so classic a manner, as those, whose writings have reached us, have done. As time sifts every thing, and as nothing but that, which is of an intrinsic value, is preserved, we may presume, not without reason, that we possess no writings of the ancients but the best.

There are several reasons for the begetting and the maintaining of the prejudice of antiquity.

When something exceeds expectation according to a universal rule, one at first wonders at it and then this wondering often passes to admiration. That is the case with regard to the ancients, when we find in them something that, considering the circumstances of the time in which they lived, we did not look for. Another reason lies in this cir-

cumstance, that the knowledge of the ancients and of antiquity shews learning and having read much ; which, common and insignificant as the things that have been drawn from the study of the ancients may be in themselves, always procures respect. A third reason is, the gratitude we owe the ancients for having broken the ice for us to much knowledge. For which it should seem equitable to hold them in particular veneration, but whose measure we often exceed. A fourth reason finally is to be sought in a certain envy of one's contemporaries. Whoever cannot cope with the moderns, praises at their expense the ancients to the skies, that the moderns may not be able to raise themselves above him.*

The prejudice of novelty is the contrary to that. The authority of antiquity and the prejudice in its favor fell now and then ; particularly at the beginning of the century before the last, when the celebrated Fontenelle declared for the moderns. With respect to cognitions susceptible of enlargement, it is very natural for us to put more confidence in the moderns, than in the ancients. But this judgment has only a foundation as a mere previous judgment. If we make it a determining one, it becomes a prejudice.

* This last reason seems quite applicable to our author's own enemies, and envy to be the only secret spring of their impotent opposition. But, as this venerable old man is now sunk into the grave, "Envy will drop her snakes, and stern-eyed Fury's self will melt." T.

2, Prejudices from self-love, or logical egotism, according to which one holds the agreement of his own judgment with the judgments of others an unnecessary criterion of truth. They, as they manifest themselves by a certain predilection to what is a production of one's own understanding, for instance, one's own system, are opposed to the prejudices of authority.

Whether is it good and adviseable to let prejudices remain, or even to favor them? It is astonishing, that in our age such questions, especially this one with regard to favoring prejudices, should still be put. Favoring one's prejudices, is just as much as deceiving one with a good view. To leave prejudices untouched, however, may be done; for who can occupy himself about discovering and about removing the prejudices of every body? But whether it is not adviseable to labour at their extirpation with all one's might?—is another question. Old and rooted prejudices are difficult to be overcome; because they exculpate themselves and are, as it were, their own judge. And letting prejudices remain is endeavoured to be excused by saying, that mischief would be occasioned by their extirpation. But, admitting this mischief;—it (this extirpation) will be productive of great good hereafter.

X.

Probability. Explication of the Probabilities. Distinction of Probability from Verisimilitude. Mathematical and Philosophical Probability. Doubt both subjective and objective. Sceptical, Dogmatical, and Critical Way of Thinking or Method of Philosophising. Hypothesis.

THE doctrine of the knowledge of the probabilities which are to be considered as an approximation to certitude, belongs to the doctrine of the certainty of our knowledge.

By PROBABILITY, a holding-true on insufficient grounds, but which have a greater relation to sufficient ones, than the grounds of the contrary, is to be understood. By this explication we distinguish probability from mere VERISIMILITUDE or likelihood, a holding-true on insufficient grounds, provided that they are greater, than the grounds of the contrary.

The ground of holding-true may be either objectively, or subjectively, greater, than that of the contrary. Which of the two it is cannot be found out but by comparing the grounds of holding-true with the sufficient grounds; for then the grounds of holding-true are greater, than those of the contrary

can be. In probability the ground of holding-true therefore holds objectively, in verisimilitude, on the other hand, only subjectively. Verisimilitude is only a greatness of persuasion, probability an approximation to certainty. Probability must always have a scale. For, as we are to compare the insufficient grounds with the sufficient ones, we must know how much is requisite to certainty. But no scale is necessary to mere verisimilitude; because in it we compare the insufficient grounds, not with the sufficient ones, but with those of the contrary.

The points (*momenta*) of probability may be either homogeneous, or heterogeneous. If they are the former, as in the mathematical cognition, they must be numbered; if the latter, as in the philosophical, pondered, that is, estimated according to the effect; but this after removing the impediments in the mind. The latter yield no relation to certainty, but only the relation of one verisimilitude to another. Hence it follows, that the mathematician only can determine the relation of insufficient grounds to the sufficient holding-true. For, in the philosophical cognition, probability cannot be estimated on account of the heterogeneity of the grounds; in it the weights, so to say, are not all stamped. In strict propriety, it can therefore be said but of the mathematical probability, that it is more than the half of certainty.

Much has been said of a logic of probability. But it is not possible; for, when the relation of the in-

sufficient grounds to the sufficient ground cannot be mathematically weighed, no rules are of any assistance. And no universal rules of probability whatever can be given, except that the error does not happen on one side, but a ground of agreement must be in the object; as also that, when two opposite sides err in both an equal number and an equal degree, the truth lies in the middle.

DOUBT is a contrary reason for holding-true or a mere impediment to it, which may be either subjectively, or objectively considered. Doubt is sometimes taken subjectively as a state of an irresolute mind, and objectively as the knowledge of the insufficiency of the reasons for holding-true. In the latter respect it is named an OBJECTION, that is, an objective reason of holding a cognition held true false.

A merely subjectively valid contrary reason for holding-true is a SCRUPLE. As to it, one does not know whether the impediment to holding-true is grounded objectively, or but subjectively, for instance, only in inclination, in custom, and such like. We doubt without being able to explain ourselves and determinately with regard to the reason of doubting and without being able to perspect whether this reason lies in the object itself, or but in the subject. If it shall be possible to remove such scruples, they must be raised to the distinctness and the determinateness of an objection. For certainty is brought to distinctness and to completeness by ob-

jections, and nobody can be certain of a thing unless contrary reasons, by which it can be determined how far one is from the truth or how near it, are assigned. And it is not enough merely to answer every doubt; it must be resolved too, that is, it must be made comprehensible how the scruple arose. If that is not done, the scruple is only put off, but not removed; the seed of doubting still remains. In many cases indeed we cannot know whether the impediment to holding-true in us has subjective or objective grounds, and consequently cannot remove the scruple by discovering the false appearance; because we can compare our cognitions, not always with the object, but often with one another only. It is therefore modest not to offer one's objections but as doubts.

There is a principle of doubting, which consists in the maxim, 'to treat cognitions with the view of rendering them uncertain and of shewing the impossibility of coming at certainty.' This method of philosophising is the sceptical cast of mind, or SCEPTICISM. It is opposed to the dogmatic way of thinking, or DOGMATISM, which is, 'a blind confidence in the faculty of reason's enlarging itself *à priori* by mere conceptions, barely from the seeming success.'

Both methods, when they become universal, are faulty. For there is much knowledge, with respect to which we cannot proceed dogmatically; and scepticism, on the other hand, by its giving over all

affirmative cognition, baffles all our efforts to acquire the possession of a knowledge of the certain. But pernicious as this scepticism is, the sceptical method, provided that nothing farther is understood by it, than the mode of treating something as uncertain and of reducing it to the greatest uncertainty in the hope of thus tracing truth, is both useful and suitable to the end proposed. This method then is, correctly speaking, a mere suspension of judging. It is very useful to the CRITICAL procedure, by which 'that method of philosophising, whereby we investigate the sources of our assertions or of our objections and the grounds upon which they depend,' is to be understood ;—a method, which affords a hope of coming at truth.

In the mathematics and the physics scepticism has not place. Only that cognition, which is neither mathematical, nor empirical, pure philosophy, could have occasioned it. Absolute scepticism gives out every thing for appearance. It therefore distinguishes appearance from truth and of course must have a mark of distinction ; consequently presuppose a knowledge of truth ; by which it contradicts itself.

We have already noticed of probability, that it is a mere approximation to certainty. And that is likewise the case with hypotheses in particular, by which we can arrive at, never an apodictical certainty in our knowledge, but always sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller degree of probability only.

A **HYPOTHESIS** is A holding of the judgment of the truth of a ground true for the sake of the sufficiency of the consequences ; or, shorter, The holding of a presupposition true as a ground.

All holding true in hypotheses is consequently founded in the presupposition's being sufficient, as a ground, to explain other cognitions, as consequences. For in that case we infer the truth of the ground from that of the consequence. But, as this mode of inference, as above-mentioned, cannot give a sufficient criterion of truth and lead to an apodictical certainty but when all the possible consequences of an assumed ground are true, it is obvious that, as we never can determine all the possible consequences, hypotheses always remain hypotheses, that is, presuppositions, at whose full certainty we never can arrive. The probability of a hypothesis, however, may, when all the consequences, which have hitherto occurred to us, can be explained on the presupposed ground, increase and raise itself to an analogon of certainty. For in such a case there is no reason why we should suppose, that all the possible consequences cannot be explained from it. In this case we therefore submit to the hypothesis, as if it were quite certain, though it is not so but by induction.

And yet something must be apodictically certain in every hypothesis ;

1. The possibility of the presupposition itself. When, for example, we suppose a subterraneous fire for the explication of earthquakes and of vol-

canos ; a fire of that sort must be possible, if not just as flaming, as an ardent body. But for the behoof of certain other phenomena to make an animal of the earth, in which the circulation of the internal fluids causes the heat, is to erect a mere fiction and not a hypothesis. For realities may be feigned, but not possibilities ; these must be certain.

2. The consequence. The consequences must flow right from the assumed ground ; else the hypothesis becomes a mere chimera.

3. The unity. It is an essential requisite of a hypothesis, that it be but one and stand in need of no subsidiary hypotheses for its support. If in a hypothesis we are under the necessity of calling in the assistance of several other hypotheses, it thereby loses very much of its probability. For the more consequences that may be inferred from a hypothesis there are, the more probable it is ; the fewer, the more improbable. The hypothesis of Tycho de Brahe, for instance, did not suffice to the explanation of many phenomena ; he therefore used several new hypotheses for the purpose of completing. In this case it may be conjectured, that the adopted hypothesis cannot be the genuine ground. Whereas the Copernical system is a hypothesis, from which every thing that is intended to be explained by it (so far as it has hitherto occurred to us) may be explained. In it we have no occasion of subsidiary hypotheses.

There are sciences, which do not allow of hypo-

theses; as, for example, the mathematics and the metaphysics. But hypotheses in natural philosophy are both useful and indispensable.

APPENDIX.

*Of the Distinction of theoretical and of practical Cognition.**

A cognition is denominated practical in contradistinction to not only the theoretical, but the speculative cognition.

Practical cognitions either are,

1. Imperatives and in this view opposed to the theoretical cognitions; or comprise,

2. the grounds to possible imperatives, and are in this view opposed to the speculative cognitions.

By IMPERATIVE in general every proposition that expresses a possible free action, by which a certain end is to be realized, is to be understood. Every cognition, then, which contains imperatives, is PRACTICAL and to be termed so in contradistinction.

* The distinction made, in the critical philosophy, between what is practical and what belongs to the praxis, must be well attended to. We consider something theoretically when we have in view that only, which pertains to a thing, but practically, when we reflect on what ought to pertain to it through liberty. Theory is, Principles of procedure represented in the general; Praxis, Application to cases occurring in experience. A physician, for instance, when he endeavours to cure his patients according to his theory, exercises the praxis of medicine. T.

tion to the theoretical cognition. For THEORETICAL cognitions are such as express, not what must be and ought to be, but what is; consequently have for their object, not an acting, but a being or an existing.

If on the contrary we oppose the practical cognitions to the speculative ones, they may be theoretical too, provided that imperatives can be deduced from them. They are then, considered in this respect, as to the value (*in potentia*) or objectively, practical. By SPECULATIVE cognitions we understand those, from which no rules of conduct can be derived, or which comprise no grounds for possible imperatives. In theology, for example, there are a great number of the like merely speculative propositions. Speculative cognitions of that sort then are always theoretical; but not conversely; every theoretical cognition is not speculative; it may, considered under another point of view, be at the same time practical.

Every thing tends at last to the practical; and the practical value of our cognition consists in this tendence of all that which is theoretical and of all speculation with regard to their use. This value however is not an unconditional one but when the end, to which the practical use of the cognition is directed, is an unconditional end. MORALITY is the only unconditional and ultimate end (scope), to which every practical use of our cognition must finally be referred, and we on that account denomi-

nate morality the absolute practical. And that part of philosophy, which has morality for its object, must therefore be, by way of eminence, named **PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY**; though every other philosophical science may always have its practical part, that is, may contain a direction to the practical use of the erected theories for realizing certain ends.

And thus much with regard to cognition, as preparatory to the study of logic. We now proceed to logic itself, a dry, but a short science.

LOGIC

PART THE FIRST.

General Doctrine of Elements.

SECTION THE FIRST.

Conceptions.

§ I.

Conception in general and its Distinction from Intuition.

ALL Cognitions, that is, representations referred with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions, or conceptions.

An intuition is a single, a conception a universal (*per notas communes*) or reflected-on (*disursiva*), representation.

The cognition or knowledge by conceptions is termed thinking (*cognitio discursiva*) or cogitation.

Scholion I. The conception is opposed to the intuition; for that, as aforesaid, is a universal representation or a representation of that which is com-

* Very little reflection, and a very slight knowledge of logic will suffice to shew the fault of treating Perception in this section of the Doctrine of Elements instead of Conceptions. T.

mon to several objects, consequently a representation, provided that it can be contained in various ones.

2. It is mere tautology to speak of universal or of common conceptions; a fault, which originates in a wrong division of conceptions into universal, particular, and single. Not the conceptions themselves, but their use, can be thus divided.

2.

Matter and Form of Conceptions.

Matter and form are to be distinguished in every conception. The object is the matter of the conception; the universality, its form.

3.

Empirical and Pure Conceptions.

A conception is either an empirical, or a pure (*intellectualis*) one. A pure conception is one, which is not taken from experience, but arises, as to the matter too, from the understanding.

An idea is a conception of reason, whose object cannot be met with in experience.*

* As in our language far too vague a sense is affixed to the word Idea, the following gradation of representation used in the critical philosophy will shew its proper and original Platonic meaning: Representation, that is, internal determination of

Scho. I. An empirical conception arises out of the senses by the comparison of the objects of experience, and obtains by the understanding merely the form of universality. The reality of these conceptions depends upon actual experience, whence they, as to their matter, are drawn. But, whether there are pure conceptions of the understanding, which, as such, entirely spring from the intellect independently of all experience, metaphysic must investigate.

2. The conceptions of reason, or ideas, can lead to no real objects at all; because all these must be comprehended in a possible experience. But they serve to guide the understanding by means of reason with regard to experience and to the use of its

our mind in any relation of time, in general, is the genus. Under it Perception, a representation with consciousness, ranks. Sensation is a perception, which refers to the subject only, as the modification of his state; Cognition, an objective perception. This is either Intuition or Conception. The former has an immediate reference to the object and is single; the latter, a mediate one, by means of a mark, which may be common to several things. A conception is, as mentioned in the text, either empirical, or pure, and a pure conception, provided that it has its origin in the understanding only (not in the pure image of the sensitive faculty) is styled a Notion. A conception from notions, which surmounts the possibility of the reach of experience, is termed an Idea, or a conception of reason. To one accustomed to this accurate distinction it must be insupportable to hear the representation of the red colour named an idea; it cannot so much as be named a notion, or a conception of the understanding (See Kant's Criticism on pure Reason). T.

rules in full perfection, and to shew, that all possible things are not objects of experience, and that the principles of its possibility do not hold of things in themselves, nor even of objects of experience as things in themselves (*in se*).

An idea contains the archêtype of the use of the understanding, for instance, the idea of the universe, which must be necessary, not as a constitutive principle for the empirical use of the understanding, but as a regulative one in behalf of the thorough coherence of the empirical use of our intellect. It is then to be considered as a necessary fundamental conception, in order either to complete objectively, or to consider the intellectual operations of subordination as interminate or unbounded. And an idea cannot be obtained by composition; for in it the whole is before the part. Yet there are ideas, to which an approximation has place. That is the case with the mathematical ideas, or those of the mathematical generation of the whole, which are materially distinguished from the dynamical ones that are heterogeneous to all concrete conceptions; because the whole is distinct from these conceptions, not as to quantity (as in the mathematical conceptions), but as to quality.

We cannot furnish any theoretical idea with objective reality or prove the objective reality of any theoretical idea, but the idea of liberty; because it is the condition of the moral law whose reality is, so to say, an axiom. The reality of the idea of God cannot be proved but by it (liberty) and therefore

with a practical view only, that is, so to act, as if there were a God; consequently for this purpose only.

In all sciences, especially those of reason, the idea of the science is its universal sketch or contour; of course the sphere of all the cognitions that belong to it. Such an idea of the whole, the first thing we have to look for and to consider in a science, is architectonic, as, for example, the idea of the science of law.

The idea of humanity, that of a perfect commonwealth, that of a happy life, that of many other things, is wanting to most men. Many men have no idea of (to use the common expression) what they would be at; hence do they proceed according to instinct and to authority.

4.

Conceptions given (à priori or à posteriori) and factitious Conceptions.

All conceptions are, as to the matter, either given, or factitious ones. The former are given either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*.

All empirical conceptions, or those given *à posteriori*, are named conceptions of experience; those given *à priori*, notions.

Scho. I. The form of a conception as a discursive representation, is always factitious,

5.

Logical Origin of Conceptions.

The origin of conceptions, as to the mere form, depends upon reflection and upon abstraction from the difference of the things betokened by a certain representation. And consequently the question, What operations of the understanding constitute a conception, or (which amounts to the same thing) belong to the begetting of a conception from given representations? naturally occurs here.

Schö. I. As universal logic abstracts from all the matter of cognition by conceptions, or from all the matter of thinking, it cannot weigh the conception but with regard to its form, that is, but subjectively; not how it determines an object by a mark, but how it can be referred to several objects. Universal logic by consequence has to investigate not the source of conceptions, not how conceptions arise as representations, but how given representations become conceptions in thinking; it is all one whether these conceptions contain any thing either taken from experience, or fictitious, or taken from the nature of the understanding. This logical origin of conceptions—the origin as to their mere form—consists in the reflection, by which a representation common to several objects (*conceptus communis*) arises, as that form, which is required to judgment. In logic therefore nothing but

the distinction of reflection is considered in the conceptions.

2. The origin of conceptions with respect to their matter, according to which a conception is either empirical, or arbitrable, or intellectual, it is the province of metaphysic to consider.

6.

Logical Acts of Comparison, of Reflection, and of Abstraction.

The logical acts of the understanding, by which conceptions as to their form are engendered, are,

1, the comparison, or the comparing of representations with one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;

2, the reflection, or reflecting how various representations may be comprehended in one consciousness; and, finally,

3, the abstraction, or the separation of all that by which the given representations are distinguished from one another.

Scho. 1. In order to form conceptions from representations, then, we must be able to compare, to reflect, and to abstract; for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and the universal conditions of the engendering of every conception in general. We see, for example, a birch, a lime, and an oak. When we first compare these objects together we mark, that they

are different from one another in respect to the trunk, the arms, the branches, the leaves, and abstract from their size, their figure, &c.; in this manner we obtain the conception of a tree.

2. The word abstraction is not always used right (in German) in logic. We must say, not to abstract, but to abstract from, something. When, for instance, we think of the red colour only of scarlet cloth, we abstract from the cloth; if we abstract from the colour too and conceive of the scarlet as a substance in general, we abstract from still more determinations, and our conception is thereby become yet more abstract. For the greater the number of the differences of things left out of a conception, or the greater the number of the determinations in it abstracted from, is, the more abstract the conception. Hence should abstracting conceptions, in strict propriety, be termed abstracting ones, that is to say, conceptions, in which several abstractions occur. The conception of body, for instance, is, properly speaking, not an abstract conception; for, from body itself we can by no means abstract, else we should not have a conception of it. But, in order to have it, we must by all means abstract from the size, the colour, the rigidity or the fluidity, in a word, from all the special determinations of particular bodies. The most abstract conception is that, which has nothing in common with any thing distinct from it. It is the conception of something; for nothing is distinct from it, and of course has not any thing in common with it.

3. Abstraction is but the negative condition, on which universally valid representation can be generated; comparison and reflection are the positive conditions. For no conception is produced by abstraction; this but finishes that and confines it within its determinate bounds.

7.

Matter and Sphere of Conceptions.

EVERY conception, as a partial one, is contained in the representation of things; but, as the ground of cognition, that is, the mark, these things are contained under it. In the former respect every conception has matter; in the latter, a sphere.

The matter and the sphere of a conception bear one another a converse relation. The more a conception contains under it, the less it contains in itself, and *vice versa*.

Scho. The universality, or the universal validity of a conception, depends upon the conception's being, not a partial one, but a ground of cognition.

8.

Greatness of the Sphere of Conceptions.

THE sphere of a conception is the greater, the greater the number of things that rank under it and can be thought of by it is.

Scho. As it is said of a ground in general, that

it contains the consequence under it; it may likewise be said of a conception that it, as a ground of cognition, contains under it all those things, from which it has been obtained by means of abstraction, for instance, the conception of metal contains gold, silver, copper, &c. under it. For, as every conception, as a universally valid representation, comprises that which several representations of different things have in common, all these things, which are in this view contained under it, may be represented by it. And just that constitutes the utility of a conception. The greater the number of things that can be represented by a conception is, the greater its sphere. The conception of body, for example, has a greater sphere, than that of metal.

9.

Superior and Inferior Conceptions.

Conceptions, if they have under them other conceptions, which in relation to them are named inferior ones, are denominated superior ones. A mark of a mark, a remote mark, is a superior conception; a conception, in respect to a remote mark, an inferior one.

Scho. As superior and inferior conceptions are so termed but respectively, the very same conception, taken in various references, may be at once a superior and an inferior one. The conception of man, for instance, is, in respect to the conception of

centaur, a superior, but, in respect to that of animal, an inferior one.

10.

Kind (genus) and Sort (species).

A superior conception is, relatively to its inferior, named genus; an inferior, relatively to its superior, species.

Generic and special conceptions are, like superior and inferior ones, distinguished, not, as to their nature, but with regard to their relation to one another (*termine à quo, or ad quod*) in the logical subordination.

11.

Highest Genus and lowest Species.

That genus, which is not a species, is the highest (*genus summum non est species*); and that species, which is not a genus, is the lowest (*species, quæ non est genus, est infima*).

According to the law of continuity, however, there can be neither a lowest, nor a proxime species.

Scho. If we conceive of a series of several conceptions subordinated to one another, for example, iron, metal, body, substance, thing, we may obtain higher and higher genera; for every species is always to be considered as a genus with regard to

its inferior conception, for instance, the conception of a man of learning with regard to that of a philosopher, till we at last arrive at a genus that cannot be a species again. And one of that sort we must finally reach; because there must at last be a higher conception, from which, as such, nothing can be farther abstracted without the whole conception's vanishing. But in the whole series of species and of genera there is no such thing as a lowest conception or a lowest species, under which no other conception or species is contained; because one of that sort could not possibly be determined. For, if we have a conception, which we apply immediately to individuals, specific distinctions, either which we do not notice, or to which we pay no attention, may exist with respect to it. There are no lowest conceptions but comparatively for use, which have obtained this signification, as it were, by convention, provided that we are agreed not to go deeper in a certain matter.

Relatively to the determination of the special and of the generic conceptions, then, this universal law—There is a genus that cannot be any more a species; but there are no species but what may become genera again—holds good.

12.

Larger and stricter Conceptions. Alternate Conceptions.

A superior conception is also named a larger; an inferior, a stricter or narrower.

Conceptions, which have the same sphere, are distinguished by the name of alternate ones.

13.

Relation of the inferior to the superior, of the larger to the stricter, Conceptions.

The inferior conception is not contained in the superior; for it contains more in itself than the superior; but is contained under it; because the superior contains the ground of cognition of the inferior.

Again, the one cognition is larger than the other, not because it contains more under it—for we cannot know that—but because it contains under it the other conception and still more than it.

14.

Universal Rules relative to the Subordination of Conceptions.

With regard to the logical sphere of conceptions the following rules hold:

1, What agrees with or is repugnant to the superior conceptions, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to all the inferior ones, which are contained under those; and,

2, conversely, What agrees with or is repugnant to all inferior conceptions, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to their superior ones.

Scho. Because that, in which things agree, flows from their universal properties, and that, in which they are different, from their particular ones, we cannot conclude that, What agrees with or is repugnant to an inferior conception, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to other inferior conceptions, which belong with it to a superior one. *Exempli gratia*, we cannot conclude, that that, which does not agree with man, does not with angels neither.

15.

Conditions of the Origin of superior and of inferior Conceptions: logical Abstraction and Determination.

By continued logical abstraction higher and higher conceptions arise; and, on the other hand, by continued logical determination lower and lower ones. The greatest possible abstraction yields the highest or the most abstract conception—that one, from which no farther determination can be thought of as away. The highest finished determination would yield a thoroughly determined conception (*conceptum omnimode determinatum*); that is, a conception, to which no farther determination can be conceived to be added.

Scho. As single things only or individuals are thoroughly determined, cognitions as intuitions only, but not as conceptions, can be thoroughly determined; in regard to the latter the logical deter-

mination never can be considered as finished (§ 11. N).

16.

Use of Conceptions in the Abstract and in the Concrete.

Every conception may be used both universally and particularly (*in abstracto* and *in concreto*). The inferior conception is used in the abstract relatively to its superior ; the superior, in the concrete relatively to its inferior.

Scho. 1. The words, abstract and concrete, refer not so much to the conceptions in themselves (for every conception is an abstract one), as to their use. And this may again have different degrees, accordingly as a conception is treated, now more, then less, abstractedly or concretely, *id est*, accordingly as sometimes more, sometimes fewer, determinations are either omitted, or superadded. By the abstract use a conception comes nearer the highest genus, by the concrete, on the other hand, nearer the individual.

2. Which use of conceptions, the abstract or the concrete, is the preferable?—Nothing can be decided on this point. The value of the one is not to be estimated less, than that of the other. By very abstract conceptions we cognise in many things little ; by very concrete ones, in few things much ; consequently what we gain on the one side we lose on the other. A conception, which has a great

sphere, is so very useful, as it can be applied to many things; but then there is the less contained in it. In the conception of substance, for instance, we do not conceive of so much, as in that of chalk.

3. The art of popularity consists in hitting the relation between the representation in the abstract and that in the concrete in the same cognition; therefore between the conceptions and their exhibition, whereby the maximum of cognition, with regard as well to the sphere as to the matter is attained.

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.

SECTION THE FIRST.

Judgments.

17.

Explication of a Judgment in General.

A JUDGMENT is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation, provided that they make up a conception.

18.

Matter and Form of Judgments.

Matter and form pertain to every judgment as its very constituents. The matter consists in the cognitions, which are given and conjoined in the unity of consciousness in the judgment; the form of the judgment, in the determination of the way in which the various representations, as such, belong to one consciousness.

19.

Object of logical Reflection—the mere Form of Judgments.

As logic abstracts from every real or objective distinction of cognition, it can occupy itself as little about the matter of judgments, as about that of conceptions. It consequently has to consider

merely the distinction of judgments with regard to their bare form.

20.

*Logical Forms of Judgments: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality.**

The distinctions of Judgments with respect to their form may be reduced to the four main points of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality, with regard to which just as many various sorts of judgments are determined.

21.

Quantity of Judgments: Universal, particular,† single.

As to quantity, judgments are either universal, or particular, or single; accordingly as the subject in the judgment is either quite included in the notion of the predicate, or excluded from it, or but

* Relatively to the distinction of judgments as to their mere form the following questions occur: How many representations are compared with the unity? Are they exhibited as conjoined or not? What sort of conjunction is it? With what degree of holding-true is this conjunction conceived of? The two first regard the internal properties of judgments, the two last the relations to one another, and of the judgments to the cognitive faculty. T.

† Our author would rather have these judgments, when used in metaphysic, termed Plurative. See his reasoning on this subject in the 20th paragraph of his PROLEGOMENA turned by the Translator.

in part included in it, in part excluded from it. In the universal judgment the sphere of one conception is comprehended quite within that of another; in the particular a part of one conception is comprehended under the sphere of another; and in the single a conception, which has no sphere at all, is consequently comprehended merely as a part under the sphere of another conception.

Scholion 1. Single judgments, as to the form, are to be esteemed in the use equal to universal; for in both the predicate holds with regard to the subject without exception. For example, in the single proposition, Caius is mortal; an exception can have place just as little, as in the universal one, All men are mortal. For there is but one Caius.

2. With respect to the universality of a cognition, a real distinction between general and universal propositions has place, but which does not concern logic. General propositions are those which contain something of the universal of certain objects and therefore not sufficient conditions of the subsumption, for instance, the proposition, Proofs must be made in a solid manner; universal propositions are such, as maintain something of an object universally.

3. Universal rules are either analytically, or synthetically universal. Those abstract from the distinctions; these attend to them and of course determine with regard to them. The more simple an object is cogitated, the sooner analytical universality in consequence of a conception is possible.

4. When universal propositions, without knowing them in the concrete, cannot be perspected in their universality, they cannot serve for a rule, and consequently cannot hold heuristically in the application, but are only problems for the universal grounds of that which is first known in particular cases. For example, the proposition, Whoever has no interest in lying and knows the truth, speaks truth; this proposition is not to be perspected in its universality; because we cannot know the limitation to the condition of the disinterested person but by experience; namely, that men can lie from interested motives; which lying proceeds from their not adhering firmly to morality. An observation that teaches us to know the frailty of human nature.

5. Of particular judgments it is to be noticed that, if they shall be capable of being perspected by reason, and therefore have a rational, not merely an intellectual (abstracted) form, the subject must be a larger (*latior*) conception, than the predicate. Let the predicate be always $= O$, the subject \square , thus:



it is a particular judgment; for something belonging to a is b, something not b—that flows from reason—But let it be thus:



every a, at least when it is less than b, but not when greater, can be contained under b ; by consequence it is but fortuitously particular.

22.

Quality of Judgments: Affirmative, negative, indefinite.

As to quality, judgments are either affirmative, or negative, or indefinite. In an affirmative or positive one the subject is thought of under the sphere of a predicate ; it, in a negative, is placed without the sphere ; and, in an indefinite, put within the sphere of a conception, which lies without the sphere of another conception.

Scho. 1. The indefinite judgment shews not only that a subject is not contained under the sphere of a predicate, but that it lies without its sphere somewhere in the indefinite sphere ; this judgment therefore represents the sphere of the predicate as limited.

Every possible thing is either A, or not A. If we say, Something is not A, *exempli gratia*, The human soul is not mortal. Some men are not literati. This is an indefinite judgment. For by it it is determined beyond the definite sphere of A not to what conception the object belongs, but that it belongs to the sphere without A, which is, properly speaking, not a sphere at all, but the bordering of a sphere on the indefinite or bounding itself.

Though the exclusion is a negation, the limitation of a conception is a positive operation. Hence are bounds positive conceptions of limited objects.

2. According to the principle of the exclusion of every third (*exclusi tertii*) the sphere of one conception is, relatively to another, either exclusive, or inclusive. But, as logic has to do merely with the form of the judgment, not with the conceptions as to their matter, the distinction of the indefinite from the negative judgments does not appertain to this science.

3. In negative judgments the negation always affects the copula; in indefinite, not the copula, but the predicate is affected by it; which circumstance is expressed the best in Latin.

23.

Relation of Judgments: Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.

As to relation, judgments are either categorical, or hypothetical, or disjunctive. The given representations in a judgment are subordinated to one another in the unity of consciousness either as the predicate to the subject, or as the consequent to the antecedent, or as a member of the division to the divided conception. By the first relation categorical judgments are determined, by the second hypothetical, and by the third disjunctive.

24.

Categorical Judgments.

In these the subject and the predicate make up their matter; the form, by which the relation (of agreement or of disagreement) between the subject and the predicate is determined and expressed, is termed the copula.

Scho. Categorical judgments make up the matter of other judgments; but from this we must not think, as several logicians do, that both hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are nothing more than different dresses of categorical ones, and can therefore be all reduced to them. All the three judgments depend upon essentially distinct logical functions of the understanding, and consequently must be discussed according to their specific distinction.

25.

Hypothetical Judgments.

The matter of these consists of two judgments, which are connected together as antecedent and consequent. The one of these judgments, which contains the ground, is the antecedent (*prius*); the other, which stands in the relation of consequence to that, the consequent (*posterius*); and the representation of this sort of connexion of both judgments together forming the unity of consciousness

is named the consequence, which makes up the form of hypothetical judgments.

Scho. I. What the copula is to categorical judgments, the consequence is to hypothetical ones, their form.

2. Some think it easy to transform a hypothetical proposition to a categorical. But it is not practicable; because they are quite distinct by their very nature. In categorical judgments nothing is problematical, but every thing assertive; whereas in hypothetical ones, the consequence only is assertive or positive. In the latter we may therefore connect two false judgments together; for in this case the whole affair is the rightness in the connexion—the form of the consequence; upon which the logical truth of these judgments depends. There is an essential distinction between these two propositions: All bodies are divisible, and, If all bodies are composed, they are divisible. In the former the thing is maintained directly; it in the latter is maintained on a problematically expressed condition only.

26.

Modes of Connexion in hypothetical Judgments: Modus ponens and Modus tollens.

The form of connexion in hypothetical judgments is twofold; the laying down (*modus ponens*) and the annulling (*modus tollens*).

1. When the antecedent or ground is true, the consequent determined by it is likewise true. This is denominated the *modus ponens* ;

2. When the consequent is false, the antecedent or ground is likewise false ; the *modus tollens*.

27.

Disjunctive Judgments.

A judgment, when the parts of the sphere of a given conception determine one another in the whole or to a whole as complements, is disjunctive.

28.

Matter and Form of disjunctive Judgments.

The several given judgments, of which the disjunctive judgment is composed, constitute its matter, and are named the members of disjunction or opposition. In the disjunction itself, that is, in the determination of the relation of the various judgments, as members of the whole sphere of the divided cognition excluding one another, the form of these judgments consists.

Scho. All disjunctive judgments then represent various judgments as in the commerce of a sphere and do not produce any judgment but by the limitation of the others with regard to the whole sphere ; they consequently determine the relation of every

judgment to the whole sphere, and thereby the relation, which these members of disjunction have to one another. Not one member in this judgment therefore determines another but with a proviso, that all the members are in commerce as parts of a whole sphere of cognition, without which nothing in a certain reference can be thought of.

29.

Peculiar Character of disjunctive Judgments.

The peculiar character of all disjunctive judgments, whereby their specific distinction, as to the point of relation, from the others, in particular from the categorical ones, is determined, consists in this, that all the members of disjunction are problematical judgments, of which nothing else is thought, than that they, as parts of the sphere of a cognition, each the complement of the other to the whole (*complementum ad totum*), taken together, are equal to that sphere. And hence it follows, that the truth must be contained in one of these problematical judgments or (what amounts to the same thing) that one of them must hold assertively; because besides them the sphere of cognition comprehends nothing more on the given conditions and the one is opposed to the other; by consequence they only, and but one of them, can be true.

Scho. In a categorical judgment the thing, whose representation is considered as a part of the sphere of another subordinate representation, is considered as contained under this its superior conception ; consequently in the subordination of the spheres here the part of the part is compared with the whole. But in disjunctive judgments we go from the whole to all the parts taken together. What is contained under the sphere of a conception, is likewise contained under any one of the parts of this sphere. Accordingly the sphere must be first divided. When we, for instance, form the disjunctive judgment, ‘a learned man is either a mere historian, or a philosopher, or a mathematician,’ we determine by it, that these conceptions, as to the sphere, are parts of the sphere of the learned, but by no means parts of one another, and that they, collectively taken, are complete.

That in disjunctive judgments, not the sphere of the divided conception, as contained in the sphere of the divisions, but that which is contained under the divided conception, as contained under one of the members of division, is considered, the following scheme of the comparison between categorical and disjunctive judgments may render the matter more intuitive :

In categorical judgments, x is what is contained under b , and likewise under a ;

In disjunctive ones x , contained under a , is contained under either b , or c , and so on ;

b	c
d	e

$x = \text{learned}$
 $a = \text{learned}$
 b, c, d, e

The division in disjunctive judgments therefore shews not the co-ordination of the parts of the whole conception, but all the parts of its sphere. In these judgments we cogitate many things by one conception; in those, one thing by many conceptions, for example, the definite by all the marks of co-ordination.

30.

Modality of Judgments: Problematical, assertive, apodictical.

As to modality, by which point the relation of the whole judgment to the cognitive faculty is determined, judgments are either problematical, or assertive, or apodictical. The problematical ones are accompanied with the consciousness of the mere possibility, the assertive with that of the reality, and the apodictical with that of the necessity of judging.

Scho. I. The modality consequently shews the way only, in which something is maintained or denied in a judgment: whether nothing is made out with regard to the truth or the untruth of a judgment, as in the problematical judgment, The soul

may be immortal ; or whether something is determined with regard to it, as in the assertive judgment, The soul is immortal ; or whether the truth of a judgment is expressed with the dignity of necessity, as in the apodictical judgment, The soul must be immortal. This determination of the merely possible or actual or necessary truth consequently concerns the judgment itself only, by no means the thing, which is judged of.

2. In problematical judgments, which may be said to be those, whose matter is given with the possible relation between the predicate and the subject, the subject must always have a smaller sphere, than the predicate.

3. Upon the distinction between probable and assertive judgments the true distinction between judgments and propositions depends, which distinction, with regard to those, was formerly made falsely in the mere expression by words, without which we could not judge at all. In a judgment the relation of various representations to the unity of consciousness is conceived of merely as problematical ; in a proposition, on the other hand, as assertive. A problematical proposition is a contradiction *in adjecto*. Ere we have a proposition, we must judge ; and we judge of much that we cannot make out, but which we must do the moment we determine a judgment as a proposition. It is however good to judge problematically before we assume the judgment as assertive, in order to prove

it in this way. And it is not always necessary to our purpose to have assertive judgments.

31.

Expoundable Propositions.

Propositions, in which both an affirmation and a negation are comprised, but in an occult manner, so that the affirmation is made distinctly, but the negation cryptically, are expoundable.

Scho. In the expoundable proposition (for instance), Few men are learned, there lies, 1, but in a hidden manner, the negative judgment, Many men are not learned; and, 2, the affirmative one, Some men are learned. As the nature of expoundable propositions depends entirely upon conditions of language, on which we can express laconically two judgments at once, the remark, that there may be in our language judgments, which must be expounded, belongs to grammar, not to logic.

32.

Theoretical and practical Propositions.

Theoretical propositions are those, which refer to an object and determine what belongs or does not belong to it; practical ones, again, those, which express the action, whereby, as the necessary condition of an object, this object is possible.

Scho. Logic has to handle practical propositions

as to the form only, which in this respect are opposed to the theoretical ones. Practical propositions as to the matter, and in this view distinct from speculative ones, belong to moral philosophy.

33.

Indemonstrable and Demonstrable Propositions.

Demonstrable or evincible propositions are those capable of proof; those not so are named indemonstrable.

Immediately certain judgments are indemonstrable, and therefore to be considered as elemental propositions.

34.

Principles.

Immediately certain judgments *à priori* may be termed fundamental propositions or positions, provided that other judgments can be evinced by them, but they themselves cannot be subordinated to any other judgment. They on that account are denominated principles (beginnings).

35.

Intuitive and Discursive Principles : Axioms and Acroams.

Principles are either intuitive, or discursive. The

former may of course be exhibited by intuition, or immediate representation, and are named axioms; the latter cannot be expressed but by conceptions, and may be distinguished by the appellation of *acroams*.

36.

Analytic and Synthetic Propositions.

Those propositions, whose certainty depends upon the identity of the conceptions (of the predicate with the notion of the subject), are analytical. Those, whose certainty is not founded in that identity, must be named *synthetical*.

Scho. I. To every x , to which the conception of body ($a + b$) belongs, extension (b) also belongs; is an example of an analytic proposition.

To every x , to which the conception of body ($a + b$) belongs, attraction (c) too belongs; is an example of a synthetic one. The synthetic propositions increase the cognition *materialiter*; the analytic ones, merely *formaliter*. Those comprehend determinations; these, nothing but logical predicates.

2, Analytic principles, being discursive, are not axioms. Nor are synthetic ones neither, but when intuitive.

37.

Tautological Propositions.

The identity of the conceptions in analytic judgments may be either an explicit or an implicit one.

In the former case the analytic propositions are tautological.

Scho I. Tautological propositions are virtually empty, or void of consequence; for they are of no use whatever. Such is, for instance, the tautological proposition, A man is a man. For if we can say nothing more of a man, than that he is a man, we know nothing more of him at all.*

Whereas implicitly identical propositions are not void of consequence or useless; for they render the predicate, which lies infolded (*implicite*) in the conception of the subject, clear by development (*explicatio*).

2. Propositions void of consequence must be distinguished from those void of sense, which are so because they regard the determination of what is commonly named occult qualities.

38.

Postulate and Problem.

A postulate is a practical immediately certain proposition, or a principle, which determines a possible action, whereby it is presupposed, that the way of performing it is immediately certain.

* Some modern German philosophasters have had the assurance to lay down the tautological proposition, 'I am I,' as a principle, from which all science and all human knowledge must be derived. T.

Problems are demonstrable propositions that require a direction or a rule for their solution, or those that express an action, whose way of being performed is not immediately certain.

Scho. I. There may be theoretical postulates too for the behoof of practical reason. Such as those of the existence of God, of moral liberty, and of a future world, which are theoretical hypotheses necessary in a practical view.

2. To a problem there belong, 1, the question, which contains what is to be performed, 2, the resolution, which comprises the manner, in which what is to be performed can be done, and, 3, the demonstration, that, when we shall have proceeded in such a manner, what is required will be performed.

39.

Theorems, Corollaries, Lemmas, and Scholia.

Theorems are theoretical propositions capable and standing in need of a proof; Corollaries and consequtaries, immediate consequences of a preceding proposition; Lemmas, propositions not native in the science, in which they are presupposed as evinced, but taken from other sciences; Scholia, mere illustrative propositions, which consequently do not belong as members to the whole of the system.

Scho. The thesis and the demonstration are es-

sential and universal points of every theorem. The distinction between theorems and corollaries may besides be placed in this, that these are immediately concluded, but those drawn from immediately certain propositions by a series of consequences.

40.

Judgments of Perception and Experience.

A judgment of perception is merely subjective; an objective judgment from perceptions is a judgment of experience.

Scho. A judgment from mere perceptions is hardly possible but by one's representation's being expressed as a perception. In perceiving a steeple, we perceive the red colour on it; but cannot say, it is red. For this were not only an empirical judgment, but a judgment of experience, that is, an empirical judgment, by which we obtain a conception of the object. For example, In touching a stone we feel warmth; is a judgment of perception; the stone is warm, on the other hand, a judgment of experience. In the latter, what is merely in the subject must not be considered as belonging to the object; for a judgment of experience is the perception, whence the conception of the object arises, for instance, Whether luminous points move in the moon, or in the atmosphere, or in the eye of the beholder.

General Doctrine of Elements.

SECTION THE THIRD.

Syllogisms.

41.

Syllogism in general.

By syllogising we understand that function of thinking, by which one judgment is derived from another. A syllogism (or an argumentation) in general is consequently the deduction of one judgment from another.

42.

Immediate and Mediate Syllogisms.

All syllogisms are either immediate, or mediate.

An immediate syllogism (*consequentia immediata*) is the deduction of one judgment from another without an intermedial judgment. A syllogism, when, besides the conception, which a judgment contains, other conceptions are used for the purpose of deriving a cognition from them, is mediate.

43.

Syllogisms of the Understanding, of Reason, and of Judgment.

Immediate syllogisms are stiled syllogisms of the understanding too ; whereas all mediate ones are those either of reason, or of judgment. We shall here treat of the immediate ones first.

I. Syllogisms of the Understanding.

44.

Peculiar Nature of the Syllogisms of the Understanding.

The essential character of all immediate syllogisms and the principle of their possibility consist entirely in an alteration of the mere form of the judgments: while the matter of the judgments (the subject and the predicate) remains invariably the same.

Scholium I. By the form only and by no means by the matter of the judgments' being altered in the immediate syllogisms, these syllogisms are distinguished from all mediate ones, in which the judgments are distinct as to the matter too ; because a new conception as an intermedial judgment, or as a middle term, must survene in order to infer the one judgment from the other. When, for example, we argue, All men are mortal ; therefore Caius is mortal. This is not an immediate syllogism. For we,

for the inference, stand in need of the intermedial judgment, Caius is a man; but by this new conception the matter of the judgments is altered.

2. An intermedial judgment, it is true, may be thrown in the syllogisms of the understanding too; but then it is merely tautological. As, for instance, in the immediate syllogism: All men are mortal; some men are men; therefore some men are mortal. The middle term is a tautological proposition.

45.

Moods of the Syllogisms of the Understanding.

The syllogisms of the understanding go through all the classes of the logical functions of judging, and are consequently determined in their principal moods or forms by the points of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality. Upon that the following division of these syllogisms depends :

46.

I. Syllogisms of the Understanding (with regard to the Quantity of Judgments) per Judicia subalternata.

In these syllogisms of the understanding both the judgments are distinct as to quantity, and the particular judgment is deduced from the universal agreeably to the principle: The inference of the particu-

lar from the universal holds (*ab universali ad particulare valet consequentia*).

Scho. A judgment, when it is contained under another, is termed subaltern ; as, for example, particular judgments under universal ones (Every man is fallible ; some man is fallible.—No man is infallible ; some man is not infallible. T.).

47.

2. *Syllogisms of the Understanding (with regard to the Quality of Judgments) per Judicia opposita.*

In syllogisms of the understanding of this form the alteration regards the quality of the judgments considered with respect to opposition. As this opposition may be a threefold one, it yields the particular division of the immediate syllogising by contradictorily opposed judgments, by contrary, and by subcontrary ones.

Scho. Syllogisms of the understanding by equipollent judgments cannot in strict propriety be named syllogisms ; for no consequence has place in them ; they are rather to be considered as a mere substitution of the words, which denote the very same conception, by which means the judgments themselves remain unaltered even as to the form. Not all men are virtuous, for instance, and, Some men are not virtuous. Both judgments express the very same thing.

48.

a. *Syllogisms of the Understanding per
Judicia contradictorie opposita.*

In syllogisms of the understanding by judgments which are contradictorily opposed to one another, and, as such, constitute the genuine pure opposition, the truth of the one of the contradictory judgments is inferred from the falsity of the other, and conversely. For the genuine opposition, which has place in these syllogisms, contains neither more, nor less, than what belongs to opposition. Agreeably to the principle of the exclusive third both repugnant judgments cannot be true; but they can just as little be both false. When therefore the one is true, the other is false, and conversely (All logic is the same repetition; some logic is not the same repetition. T.).

49.

b. *Syllogisms of the Understanding per
Judicia contrarie opposita.*

Contrarily opposed judgments are those, the one of which is universally affirmative, the other universally negative. As the one of them expresses more, than the other, and as in what it expresses more, than the mere negation of the other, the falsity may lie, they never can be both true, but

may be both false. With regard to these contrary judgments then, the inference of the falsity of the one from the truth of the other holds; but not conversely (Every enlightened man is divested of prejudices; no enlightened man is divested of prejudices. T.).

50.

c. *Syllogisms of the Understanding per
Judicia subcontrarie opposita.*

Subcontrarily opposed judgments are judgments, the one of which affirms or denies particularly what the other denies or affirms particularly.

As they may be both true, but cannot be both false, only the following conclusion holds with regard to them: When the one of these propositions is false, the other is true; but not conversely.

Scho. In the subcontrary judgments no pure strict opposition obtains; for it is not denied or affirmed of the same objects in the one what is affirmed or denied of the other. *Exempli gratia*, in the syllogism: Some men are learned; therefore some men are not learned—that, which is denied in the latter judgment, is not maintained of the same men in the former.

51.

3. *Syllogisms of the Understanding (with regard to the Relation of Judgments) per Judicia conversa, sive per Conversionem.*

Immediate syllogisms by conversion regard the relation of judgments and consist in the transposition of the subject and of the predicate in both judgments ; so that the subject of the one judgment is made the predicate of the other, and conversely (thus, No virtue is vice ; no vice is virtue. T.).

52.

Pure and Altered Conversion.

In conversion either the quantity of the judgments is altered, or it remains unaltered. In the former case the converted (*conversum*) is as to quantity distinct from the converting (*convertente*), and the conversion is termed an altered one (*conversio per accidens*); in the latter case the conversion is named a pure one (*conversio simpliciter talis*) (Take this example, Every A is B ; some B is A. No A is B ; some B is not A—Every A is B ; every B is A. Some A is not B ; some B is not A. T.).

53.

Universal Rules of Conversion.

Relatively to the syllogisms of the understanding by conversion the following rules hold :

1. Universally affirmative judgments cannot be converted but *per accidens* ; for in them the predicate is a larger conception, and consequently some of it only is contained in the conception of the subject.

2. But all universally negative judgments may be *simpliciter* converted ; for in them the subject is taken out of the sphere of the predicate. Just so are,

3. All particularly affirmative propositions *simpliciter* convertible ; for in these judgments a part of the sphere of the subject is subsumpted under the predicate, by consequence a part of the sphere of the predicate may be subsumpted under the subject.

Scho. 1. In universally affirmative judgments the subject, as it is contained under the sphere of the predicate, is considered as a *contentum* of the predicate. We therefore cannot argue, for instance, but thus, All men are mortal ; consequently some of those contained under the conception of mortal are men. But the reason of universally negative judgments' being *simpliciter* convertible is, that two conceptions universally repugnant to one another, repugn one another in the same sphere.

2. Several universally assertive judgments may be simply converted. But the ground of that lies not in their form, but in the peculiar quality of their matter ; for example, the judgments : All that which is immutable is necessary, and All that which is necessary is immutable.

54.

4. *Syllogisms of the Understanding (with regard to the Modality of Judgments) per Judicia contraposita.*

The form of the immediate syllogism by contraposition consists in that metathesis of the judgments, by which the quantity remains the same, but the quality is altered. These syllogisms, by their turning an assertive judgment to an apodictical one, regard nothing but the modality of judgments.

55.

Universal Rule of Contraposition.

With regard to contraposition the following universal rule holds :

All universally affirmative judgments may be simply contraposed. For, when the predicate, as that which contains the subject under it, consequently the whole sphere, is denied, a part of it, that is, the subject, must likewise be so (Every A is B, may be thus contraposed, 1, Every non B is non A ; 2, No non B is A. T.).

(Scho I. The metathesis of judgments by conversion and that by contraposition then are so far opposed to one another, as that alters the quantity only, this nothing but the quality. T.).

(2. These forms of immediate syllogisms refer merely to categorical judgments. T.).*

II. Syllogisms of Reason.

56.

Syllogism of Reason in General.

A syllogism of reason is the knowledge of the necessity of a proposition by the subsumption of its condition under a given universal rule.

57.

Universal Principle of all Syllogisms of Reason.

The universal principle, upon which the validity of all syllogising by reason depends, may be determinately expressed in this formula :

* While we have the alteration of the bare form of the judgments in these syllogisms in view, and while their matter remains the same, no other affinity of two hypothetical judgments, than what consists in changing the hypothesis and the thesis, is cogitable. For instance, If there is fire, there is smoke; and if there is smoke, there is fire. But there can be no affinity between a disjunctive and another judgment. In disjunctive judgments there is neither quantity nor quality to be considered. As the relation, which they bear one another, is that of two conceptions, the objective validity of the one of which excludes that of the other, it allows of no logical distinction. T.

What ranks under a condition of a rule, ranks under the rule itself.

Scho. The syllogism of reason premises a universal rule and a subsumption under its condition. We thereby cognise the conclusion *à priori* not in the single, but as comprehended in the universal and as necessary on a certain condition. And this, that every thing ranks under the universal and is determinable by universal rules, is the very principle of rationality or of necessity.

58.

Constituents of a Syllogism of Reason.

To every syllogism of reason the following three essential parts belong :

1, a universal rule, which is named the major proposition ;

2, the proposition, by which a cognition is subsumed under the condition of the universal rule, and which is denominated the minor proposition (and sometimes the assumption) ; and,

3, the proposition, which either affirms or denies the predicate of the rule of the subsumed cognition, is named the conclusion (or inference or illation).

The two first propositions conjoined are termed the premises.

(For instance, Every thing composed is mutable (major) ; bodies are composed (minor) ; *ergo* bodies are mutable (conclusion). T.).

Scho. A rule is an assertion or a universal condition. The relation of the condition to the assertion, that is to say, how this ranks under that, is the exponent of the rule.

By the subsumption we mean, the knowledge that the condition has place (somewhere).

The consequence is, the conjunction of that which has been subsumpted under the condition with the assertion of the rule.

59.

Matter and Form of Syllogisms of Reason.

The matter of syllogisms of reason consists in the premises ; the form, in the conclusion, provided that it comprises the consequence.

Scho. I. In every syllogism of reason then the truth of the premises must be first proved, and then the rightness of the consequence. In the repudiation of a syllogism of reason never the conclusion, but either the premises, or the consequence, must always be the first rejected.

2. In every syllogism of reason the conclusion is given the moment the premises and the consequence are.

Division of the Syllogisms of Reason (as to Relation) into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.

All rules (judgments) contain objective unity of the consciousness of the multifarious of cognition; consequently a condition, on which one cognition belongs with another to one consciousness. Only three conditions of this unity are cogitable either as the subject of the inherence of the marks, or as the ground of the dependence of one cognition upon another, or as the conjunction of the parts in a whole (logical division.) There can therefore be but just as many sorts of universal rules (*propositiones majores*), by which the consequence of one judgment from another is obtained. And in that the division of all syllogisms of reason into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, is founded.

Scho. I. The syllogisms of reason can be divided neither as to quantity—for every major is a rule, by consequence something universal—nor as to quality—for it is equipollent whether the conclusion is affirmative or negative—nor as to modality—for the conclusion is always accompanied with the consciousness of necessity, and of course has the dignity of an apodictical proposition. Nothing therefore but the relation, as the only possible ground of division (*fundamentum divisionis*) of the syllogisms of reason, remains.

2. Many logicians hold the categorical syllogisms of reason only ordinary ; and all the others extraordinary. But it is without foundation and false. For all these three species are productions of equally right functions of reason, and which functions are alike essentially distinguished from one another.

61.

Proper Distinction between categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive Syllogisms of Reason.

That which is distinctive in these three species of syllogism* lies in the major proposition. In categorical syllogisms the major is a categorical proposition ; in hypothetical ones, a hypothetical or problematical one ; and in disjunctive, a disjunctive.

62.

Categorical Syllogisms of Reason.

In every categorical syllogism there are three principal conceptions (*termini*) :

1, the predicate in the conclusion ; which conception is denominated the major term ; because it has a greater sphere than the subject ;

* Whenever Syllogism is simply mentioned, we always understand by it a syllogism of reason or a ratiocination. T.

2, the (subject) in the conclusion, whose conception is named the minor term ; and,

3, an intermedial mark, which receives the appellation of the middle term (and sometimes of the argument) ; because by it a cognition is subsumpted under the condition of the rule.

Scho. I. This distinction of the terms has not place but in categorical syllogisms ; because they only conclude by means of a middle term ; in the others, but by the subsumption of a proposition represented problematically in the major and assertively in the minor.

(2. The three propositions are stiled the proxime matter ; the three terms, the remote ; and the major and the minor, the extremes. T.).

63.

Principle of categorical Syllogisms of Reason.

The principle, upon which both the possibility and the validity of all categorical syllogisms depend, is this :

What agrees with the mark of a thing, agrees with the thing itself ; and what is repugnant to the mark of a thing, is repugnant to the thing itself (*nota notæ est nota rei ipsius ; repugnans notæ, repugnat rei ipsi*).

Scho. From the principle just laid down the *Dic-tum de omni et nullo* may be easily deduced, and it

can therefore hold as the first principle neither for syllogisms of reason, nor for categorical ones in particular.

The generic and the special conceptions are universal marks of all the things that rank under them. Consequently the rule, What agrees or is repugnant to the genus or the species, agrees or is repugnant to all the objects that are contained under the genus or the species, holds. And this rule is the very *Dictum de omni et nullo*.

64.

Rules for the Categorical Syllogisms of Reason.

From the nature and the principle of categorical syllogisms the following rules for them flow :

1. In every categorical syllogism neither more, nor fewer terms, than three, can be contained ; for in it we must conjoin two conceptions (the subject and the predicate) by an intermedial mark.

2. The premises must not be all negative (*ex puris negativis nihil sequitur*) ; for the subsumption in the minor proposition, as it expresses, that a cognition ranks under the condition of the rule, must be affirmative.

2. Nor must all the premises be particular propositions neither (*ex puris particularibus nihil sequitur*) ; else there were no rule, that is, no universal proposition, whence a particular cognition could be inferred.

4. The conclusion always follows the weaker

part of the premises, that is, the negative and the particular proposition in the premises, as it is named the weaker part of the categorical syllogism (*conclusio sequitur partem debiliorem*).

Hence if,

5, one of the premises is a negative proposition, the conclusion must likewise be negative ; and,

6, if one of the premises is a particular proposition, the conclusion also must be particular ;

7, In all categorical syllogisms the major must be a universal, the minor a particular, proposition ; and hence it follows :

8, and finally, that the conclusion must relatively to quality follow the major, but, relatively to quantity, the minor proposition.

Scho. That the conclusion must always follow the negative and the particular proposition in the premises, is easy to be perspected.

If we make the minor proposition particular and say, Some is contained under the rule ; we can say in the conclusion nothing but that the predicate of the rule agrees with some ; because we have not subsumpted any more under the rule. And when we have a negative proposition for the rule (the major), we must make the conclusion too negative. For, when the major proposition says, Of all that which ranks under the condition of the rule some one predicate must be denied ; the conclusion must likewise deny the predicate of that (the subject), which has been subsumpted under the condition of the rule.

65.

Pure and impure categorical Syllogisms of Reason.

A categorical syllogism is pure or simple when in it neither an immediate consequence is intermixed, nor the legitimate order of the premises altered, (for instance, Those, who are guilty of pious frauds, cannot be acceptable to God; therefore hypocrites cannot be acceptable to him; otherwise it is termed an impure or a complex one (*ratiocinium impurum*, s. *hybridum*).

66.

Impure Syllogisms of Reason by the Metathesis of the Propositions. Figures.

Those syllogisms which arise from the transposition of the propositions and in which therefore the order of these is not the legitimate one, are to be considered as impure. This case occurs in what is commonly named the three last figures of the categorical ratiocinations.

67.

Four Figures of Syllogisms.

By figures those four modes of syllogising, whose distinction is determined by the particular disposition of the premises and of their conceptions, are to understood.

68.

Determinative of their Distinction by the various Disposition of the middle Term.

The middle term, upon whose disposition the great stress of the business depends, may occupy either 1, in the major proposition the place of the subject and in the minor that of the predicate; or 2, in both the premises the place of the predicate; or 3, in both the place of the subject; or 4, and finally, in the major proposition the place of the predicate and in the minor that of the subject. By these four cases the distinction of the four figures is determined. Let S denote the subject of the conclusion, P its predicate, and M. the middle term; the scheme of these four figures may be thus erected;

M P	P M	M P	P M
S M	S M	M S	M S
S P	S P	S P	S P

69.

Rule for the first, as the only legitimate, Figure.

The rule of the first figure is, That the major be a universal, the minor an affirmative proposition

And, as that must be the universal rule of all categorical syllogisms in general, it is obvious, that the first figure is the only legitimate one, which forms the basis of all the others, and to which they, if they shall have validity, must be reduced by the metathesis of the premises.

Scho. The first figure may have a conclusion of every quantity and of every quality. In the other figures there are but conclusions of a certain form ; some moods of them are here excluded. That shews, that these figures are not perfect, but that there are in them certain restrictions, which prevent the conclusion's being in all the moods, as in the first figure (thus, All that which is rational is a spirit ; the human soul is rational ; therefore the human soul is a spirit—or (take this instance of a negative syllogism) Nothing immutable can be measured by time, the duration of God is immutable ; *ergo* the duration of God cannot be measured by time. T.)

70.

Condition of the Reduction of the three last Figures to the first One.

The condition of the validity of the three last figures, on which a right or legitimate mode of ratiocinating is possible in each of them, is, That the middle term obtain in the propositions a place,

whence their order may arise by means of immediate consequences according to the rules of the first figure. Hence have we the following rules for the three last figures :

71.

Rule of the second Figure.

In the second figure the minor stands right, the major must therefore be converted so that it may remain universal. That however is not possible but when it (the major) is universally negative ; but it, if affirmative, must be contraposed. In both cases the conclusion is negative (*sequitur partem debiliorem.*)

Scho. The rule of this figure is, That, to which the mark of a thing is repugnant, is repugnant to the thing itself. Here we must convert and say, That, to which a mark is repugnant, is repugnant to this mark ; or we must convert the conclusion thus, That, to which the mark of a thing is repugnant, the thing itself is repugnant to ; consequently it is repugnant to the thing (For example, Nothing perishable is simple ; *of course nothing simple is perishable* ; the human soul is simple ; therefore the human soul is not perishable. The question here is not what is said, but what is indispensably necessary to be thought if there shall be a right consequence. The illative or conclusive capacity of the argumentation evidently consists in the sim-

ply converted member in italics, by whose insertion, however, the syllogism itself is rendered redundant. T.).

72.

Rule of the Third Figure.

In the third figure the major stands right; by consequence the minor must be converted; yet so that an affirmative proposition may result from it. This however is not possible but when the affirmative proposition is particular; consequently the conclusion is particular.

Scho. The rule of this figure is, What agrees or is repugnant to a mark, agrees or is repugnant to some things, under which this mark is contained. We must first say: agrees or is repugnant to all that which is contained under this mark (For instance, All men are sinners; all men are rational beings; *consequently some rational beings are men*; therefore some rational beings are sinners. Which reasoning is not regularly consequential but by means of the conversion *per accidens* in italics. T.).

73.

Rule of the fourth Figure.

When in this figure the major is universally negative, it may be simply converted; and in the same manner the minor as particular; consequently the conclusion is negative. Whereas the major, if it is universally affirmative, cannot be converted

but *per accidens* or contraposed ; the conclusion therefore is either particular, or negative. If the conclusion is not converted either a metathesis of the premises, or a conversion of both of them, must take place.

Scho. In this figure we syllogize thus, The predicate adheres to the middle term, this to the subject (of the conclusion), consequently the subject to the predicate ; which however is not the case, but its converse follows. In order to render that possible, the major must be made the minor, and *vice versa*, and the conclusion converted ; because in the former alteration the minor is turned to the major term (The negative syllogism must run thus: No dunce is learned ; consequently no learned man is a dunce ; some learned men are pious ; consequently some pious men are learned ; therefore some pious men are not dunces. Affirmative syllogisms in this figure are not possible ; they, when attempted to be framed, all run into the first figure, consequently are useless, and have properly been long repudiated. T.).*

* The ancient logicians and the scholastics used their utmost endeavours to find out all the possible moods of syllogizing in these four figures, which they distinguished by strange words, whose meaning is easily gathered from these lines :

74.

Universal Result of the three last Figures.

From the adduced rules for the three last figures it is obvious,

1, that there is a universally affirmative conclusion in neither of them, and that the conclusion is either negative or particular ;

2, that in each of them an immediate consequence, not explicitly shewn, but which must be implied, is intermixed ; that consequently,

3, all these three last modes of syllogizing must,

Asserit A, negat E ; verum universaliter ambo.

Asserit I, negat O ; sed particulariter ambo.

Whoever has a mind to admire the diligent and to regret the fruitless labours of the ancients, will see the moods and the figures amply discussed in Watts's *Logic* and in Kame's *Art of Thinking*. But the former author errs when he says (page 259) that *the consonants are neglected and that the four vowels A, E, I, O, only are regarded in the artificial words*. A proof of the contrary of this assertion, however, is, that in *Cesare and Festino*, for instance, the first consonants, C and F, shew to what form of syllogism of the first figure that of the second figure is to be reduced, and consequently point out the natural order of the conceptions, in which the knowledge of the conclusion is begotten. The consonant, s, in the first syllables of both words and every where else, denotes the *simple* conversion of the judgments ; the p, in *Darapti* and *Felapton*, the conversion *per accidens* ; the m, in *Camestres*, the metathesis. That then the doctor either seems to have ignored or, what is more probable, has but over-looked. T.

as no pure syllogism can have more than three terms: be named not pure, but impure syllogisms (*rat. hyb.*).*

75.

2. *Hypothetical Syllogisms of Reason.*

A hypothetical ratiocination is, as above-mentioned, a syllogism that has a hypothetical proposition for its major. It therefore consists of two propositions, an antecedent and a consequent; in it we argue according to the *modus* either *ponens*, or *tollens*.

Scho. I. Hypothetical syllogisms then have no

* It is, says our author in his treatise on The false subtilty of the four syllogistic Figures, easy to discover the first occasion of this subtilty. He, who first wrote a syllogism in three lines below one another, considered it as a chess-board and tried what would be the result of the transposition of the places of the middle term, and was as much surprised when he perceived, that a rational sense was produced, as a person that discovers an anagram is. It is just as childish to be over-joyed with the one, as with the other, especially as it is forgot, that nothing new in point of distinctness, but only an indistinctness is introduced. But it is the lot of the human understanding either to be anxiously inquisitive and to fall on impertinencies, or to catch rashly at objects too great and to build castles in the air. The one half of the multitude of thinkers chuse the number 666, the other either the origin of animals and of plants, or the mysteries of Providence. The error, into which both classes fall, is, according to the difference of their heads, of a very different sort. T.

middle term, and nothing is shewn in them but the consequence of one proposition of another. In their major the consequence of two propositions, the former of which is a premiss, the latter a conclusion, is expressed. The minor is a transformation of the problematical condition in a categorical proposition (Thus, If A is, B is ; A is ; therefore B is. And, If A is, B is ; but B is not ; ergo A is not. T.).

2. From the hypothetical syllogism's consisting but of two propositions, without having a middle term, it may be seen, that it is, accurately speaking, not a syllogism of reason, but rather an immediate consequence evincible from an antecedent and a consequent, as to either the matter or the form (*consequentia immediata demonstrabilis [ex antecedente et consequente] vel quoad materiam vel quoad formam*).

Every syllogism of reason must be a proof. Now the hypothetical syllogism carries in it the ground of proof only or the argument. Consequently it is clear, that it cannot be a syllogism of reason.

76.

The Principle of hypothetical Syllogisms.

The principle of the ground: *A ratione ad rationatum ;—à negatione rationati ad negationem rationis, valet consequentia*, is the principle of hypothetical syllogisms.

77.

3. *Disjunctive Syllogisms of Reason.*

In these the major is a disjunctive proposition and consequently, as such, must have members of division or disjunction.

In disjunctive syllogisms we argue either from the truth of the one member of disjunction to the falsity of the others, or from the falsity of all the members except one to the truth of this one. That is done by the *modus ponens* (or *ponendo tollentem*), this by the *modus tollens* (or *tollendo ponentem*).

Scho. 1. All the members of disjunction, one excepted, taken together, make up the contradictory opposite of this one. Consequently a dichotomy, according to which when the one of them is true the other must be false and *vice versa*, has place here (The universal form of this syllogism is, What is A, is either B, or C; A is not B; it is therefore C. T.).

2: All disjunctive ratiocinations of more than two members of disjunction then are, properly speaking, polysyllogistic. For a true distinction can be but *bimembris*, and the logical division is nothing more than *bimembris*; but the *membra subdividentia* are put among the *membra dividencia* for the sake of brevity.

78.

Principle of the disjunctive Syllogisms.

It is the principle of the exclusive third : *A negatione unius contradictorie oppositum ad affirmationem alterius ;—à positione unius ad negationem alterius—valet consequentia.*

79.

Dilemma.

A dilemma (*argumentum utrinquæ feriens. T.*) is a hypothetically disjunctive syllogism, or a hypothetical argument, whose consequent is a disjunctive judgment. The hypothetical proposition, whose consequent is disjunctive, is the major proposition ; the minor affirms, that the consequent (*per omnia membra*) is false, and the conclusion, that the antecedent is so. (*A remotione consequentis ad negationem antecedentis valet consequentia*).

Scho. (The universal form of a dilemma, trilemma, tetralemma, or how many members of division soever there may be, is this, If A is either B, or C, or D is ; but neither B, nor C, nor D is ; therefore A is not. T.) The ancients valued the dilemma much and named it the *syllogismus cornutus*. They knew how to put an opponent to straits by mentioning every thing that he could possibly have recourse to, and then refuted it all to him. In every

opinion he adopted they pointed out many difficulties to him. But it is a sophistical artifice not to refute propositions directly, but to point out difficulties; which artifice may be used in many, nay, in most things.

If we chose immediately to declare false every thing, in which there are difficulties, it is an easy play to reject every thing. It is good to shew the impossibility of the contrary; but it is somewhat illusory when the incomprehensibility of the contrary is held its impossibility. The dilemmas therefore, though consequential, are very captious or ensnaring. They may be used not only to defend true propositions, but to impugn true ones by difficulties started against them.

80.

Formal and cryptical Syllogisms of Reason.

A syllogism of reason in due form (*ratiocinium formale*) is a syllogism which not only contains every thing requisite as to the matter, but is properly and completely expressed as to the form. The cryptical syllogisms are opposed to the formal ones. All those, in which either the premises are displaced, or one of them is omitted, or the middle term only conjoined with the conclusion, may be considered as cryptical or hidden. A syllogism of the second sort, in which one of the premises is not expressed but reserved in the mind, is a defective

(an imperfect or a mutilated) one, or an enthymeme (*syllogismus truncatus*). That of the third sort, is a contracted syllogism.

(Scho. Let me give you these instances of an enthymeme: Anthony is a profligate; therefore Anthony must be despised. Whoever has committed murder must die. The soul is indivisible, for it does not occupy any space; is an example of a contracted syllogism. T.).

III. Syllogisms of Judgment.

81.

Determining and Reflecting Judgment.

The faculty of Judgment is twofold; the determining and the reflecting. The former goes from the universal to the particular; the latter, from the particular to the universal: This is but of subjective validity; for the universal, to which it proceeds from the particular, is nothing but an empirical, a mere analogon of the logical, universality.

82.

Syllogisms of (the reflecting) Judgment.

They are certain argumentative modes of arriving at universal conceptions from particular ones. They therefore are functions not of the determining, but of the reflecting judgment; and consequently they determine not the object, but the way of thinking of it, in order to obtain the knowledge of it.

83.

The Principle of these Syllogisms.

The principle, in which the syllogisms of judgment are founded, is this, That many do not agree in one without a common ground, but that what belongs to many in this way is necessary on a common ground.

Scho. As the syllogisms of judgment bottom upon that principle, they cannot be held immediate ones.

84.

Induction and Analogy—the two Species of Syllogism of Judgment.

Judgment, whilst it proceeds from the particular to the general, in order to gather general judgments from experience, of course not *à priori*, infers either from many all things of a sort, or from many determinations and properties, in which things of the same sort agree, the others, provided that they pertain to the same principle. The former species of inference is named the syllogism by induction, the latter that according to analogy.

Scho. 1. Induction then infers *à particulari ad universale* according to the principle of rendering (empirically) universal: What agrees to many things of a species, agrees to the rest too. Analogy infers the total from the particular resemblance

of two things, according to the principle of specification: Things of a sort, of which we know many agreeing marks, agree in the other marks that we know in some things of this sort, but do not perceive in other things. Induction extends the empirically given from the particular to the universal with regard to many objects; analogy, on the other hand, the given properties of a thing to several of the very same thing. One in many, therefore in all: induction; many in one (that is, in others too), therefore the rest in it: analogy. For example, the argument for immortality, from the complete unfolding of the predispositions of nature of every creature, is a syllogism according to analogy.

In the syllogism according to analogy, however, the identity of the ground (*per ratio*) is not required. We conclude according to analogy nothing but rational inhabitants of the moon, not men. And we cannot conclude according to analogy beyond the *tertium comparationis*.

2. Every syllogism of reason must yield necessity. Hence are induction and analogy not syllogisms of reason, but logical presumptions or empirical syllogisms; and by induction we obtain general, but not universal propositions.

3. These syllogisms of judgment are useful and indispensable for the purpose of enlarging our cognition of experience. But, as they afford empirical certainty only, we must use them with great caution.

85.

Simple and Compound Syllogisms of Reason.

A ratiocination when it consists of but one syllogism, is simple; when of several syllogisms, compound.*

86.

Polysyllogistic Ratiocination.

A compound syllogism, in which the various syllogisms are conjoined not by mere co-ordination, but by subordination, that is, as grounds and as consequences, is termed a concatenation of syllogisms (*ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*).

87.

Prosyllogisms and Episylogisms.

In the series of compound syllogisms we may argue in a twofold way, either from the grounds down to the consequences, or from these up to those. The former is done by episylogisms; the latter, by prosyllogisms.

An episylogism, in the series of syllogisms, is that syllogism, whose premiss is the conclusion of a prosyllogism—of course of a syllogism, which has the premiss of the former for its conclusion.

* A compound syllogism, whose premises are contracted syllogisms, goes under the denomination of Epichireme. T.

88.

Sorites.

A syllogism consisting of several abridged syllogisms producing one conclusion, is named a sorites (or heap), which may be either progressive, or regressive (Goclenian), accordingly as we ascend from the more proxime to the more remote grounds or descend from the more remote ones to the more proxime.

89.

Categorical and Hypothetical Sorites.

The progressive as well as the (retrograde or) regressive sorites may again be either categorical, or hypothetical. That consists of categorical propositions as a series of predicates ; this, of hypothetical ones as a series of consequences.

90.

Fallacy. Paralogism. Sophism.

A syllogism, which, though it has the appearance of a right one for it, is false in point of form, is termed a fallacy. A syllogism of that nature, when one deceives himself with it, is a paralogism ; and when he endeavours to deceive others with it, a sophism.*

* There is, says Kant in the treatise aforementioned, yet another use of the syllogistic art : by means of it to puzzle the ques-

Scho. The ancients occupied themselves much about the art of framing sophisms. Hence are there many of them; for instance, the *sophisma figuræ dictionis*, in which the middle term is taken in a different sense; the *sophisma à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*, wherein the necessary limitation is omitted; (the *fallacia accidentis*, in which one decides with regard to the essential properties of a subject according to something merely accidental; *sophisma ambiguitatis vel amphibolie*, by which four terms are concealed in a syllogism; *non causa pro causa*, or the assigning of a false cause (*post hoc, ergo propter hoc*); *sophisma sensus compositi et divisi*, or the falsifying of the context, when two expressions are used in a different signification; *sophisma ignorantie elenchi*, that is, mistaking the question, or the merely pretended contrary conclusion (*qui-proquo*); *sophisma polyzeteseos*, or the insidious questioning; *sophisma heterozeteseos*, or the indifference obtained by importunity; and finally the assuming of a false argument (*sophisma falsi mediæ s. fallacia non causæ ut causæ*), wherein the consequence is faulty. T.).

tion so as to get the better of the unwary in a learned contest. But, as this use belongs to the gymnastics of the learned (an art which may otherwise be very useful, but does not contribute much to the advantage of truth), I shall pass it by in silence. T.

91.

Leap in Syllogising.

A leap (*saltus*) in syllogising or proving is the conjunction of the one premiss with the conclusion, so that the other is left out. A leap of this sort, when any body may easily add the wanting premiss in thought, is regular (*legitimus*); but, when the subsumption is not clear, irregular (*illegitimus*). In it a remote mark is connected with a thing without an intermedial mark.

92.

Petitio Principii. Circulus in Probando.

By begging the question (*pet. prin.*) we understand assuming, for the purpose of an argument, a proposition as an immediately certain one, though it requires a proof. And one, when he lays the proposition, which he has a mind to prove, as a foundation to its own proof, is guilty of a circle in proving.

Scho. A circle in proving is often difficult to be detected; and this fault is usually committed the oftenest just when the proofs are difficult. (Would it not, for example, were the scriptures to be proved to be the word of God by the authority of the church, and the authority of the church to be proved by the scriptures as the word of God—be a glaring circle? T.).

Probatio plus et minus probans.

A proof may prove too much, as well as too little. It, in the latter case, proves a part only of what is to be proved, but, in the former, extends to what is false.

Scho. A proof that proves too little may be true, and consequently is not to be rejected. But, does it prove too much? it proves more than is true; and that is then false. For instance, the proof against suicide, 'That whoever has not given life, cannot take it away,' proves too much; for, on this ground, we could not kill any animal. It is therefore false.

LOGIC

PART THE SECOND.

General Doctrine of Method.

94.

Manner and Method.

ALL cognition or knowledge and a whole of it must be conformable to a rule. (Want of rule is want of reason). And this rule is either that of manner (free), or that of method (coactive).

(Scholion. Manner (*modus aestheticus*) is, in propounding, that conjunction of one's thoughts, which has no other standard, than the feeling of the unity in the exhibition. T.).

95.

Form of Science. Method.

Cognition, as science, must be arranged after a method. For, as aforesaid, a science is a whole of cognition as a system and not merely as an aggregate. It therefore requires a cognition, which is systematical, consequently disposed according to digested rules.

96.

Doctrine of Method—its Object and its End.

As the doctrine of elements in logic has the elements and the conditions of the perfection of a cognition for its matter ; the doctrine of method, as the other part of logic, has to treat of the form of a science in general, or of the way of proceeding in order to connect the multifarious of cognition in a science.

97.

Means of Promoting the logical Perfection of Cognition.

The doctrine of method must shew the way, in which we attain the perfection of cognition. Now the most essential logical perfections of cognition consist in its distinctness, its profundity and systematical order, so as to make up the whole of a science. The doctrine of method therefore has chiefly to point out the means, by which these perfections of cognition are promoted.

98.

Conditions of the Distinctness of Cognition.

The distinctness of cognitions and their conjunction in a systematical whole depend upon the dis-

tinctness of the conceptions with regard to what is contained as well in them as under them.

The distinct consciousness of the matter of conceptions is promoted by their exposition and their definition ; the distinct consciousness of their sphere, on the contrary, by their logical division. We shall first handle the means of promoting the distinctness of conceptions with respect to their matter.

I. Promotion of the logical Perfection of Cognition by the Definition, the Exposition, and the Description of Conceptions.

99.

Definition.

A definition is a sufficiently distinct and adequate conception (*conceptus rei adequatus in minimis terminis ; complete determinatus*).

Scho. A definition only is to be considered as a logically perfect conception ; for in it the two most essential perfections of a conception, distinctness and the completeness and the precision in distinctness (the quantity of distinctness), are united.

100.

Analytic and Synthetic Definition.

All definitions are either analytical, or synthetical. The former are those of a given conception ; the latter, those of a factitious one.

101.

*Given and Factitious Conceptions à priori
and à posteriori.*

The given conceptions of an analytic definition are so either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*; and the factitious ones of a synthetic definition are so formed likewise.

102.

*Synthetic Definitions by Exposition or
by Construction.*

The synthesis of the factitious conceptions, from which the synthetic definitions arise, is either that of exposition (of phenomena), or that of construction. The latter is the synthesis of conceptions arbitrarily formed, the former that of those formed empirically, that is, from given phenomena, as their matter (*conceptus factitii vel à priori vel per synthesisin empiricam*). The mathematical conceptions are the arbitrarily formed ones.

Scho. All definitions of the mathematical conceptions and—if definitions could always have place in empirical conceptions—of the conceptions of experience must then be synthetically framed. For, as to the conceptions of the latter species, for example, the empirical conceptions of water, of fire, of air and such like, we have not to dissect what lies in them, but to learn to know by experience what be-

longs to them. All empirical conceptions must therefore be considered as factitious ones, but whose synthesis is empirical, not arbitrable.

103.

Impossibility of empirically synthetic Definitions.

As the synthesis of the empirical conceptions is not arbitrable, but empirical, and as such never can be complete (because we may discover more and more marks of a conception by experience), they cannot be defined. *not provided; see § 105.*

Scho. None but the arbitrable conceptions then are capable of being defined. Such definitions of them as are not always possible, but necessary, and as must precede all that which is said by means of an arbitrable conception, might be named declarations, provided that we declare our thoughts by them or give an account of what we understand by a word. And that is the case with mathematicians.

104.

Analytical Definitions by the Dissection of Conceptions given à priori or à posteriori.

No given conceptions, whether given à priori or à posteriori, can be defined but by analysis. For

given conceptions cannot be made distinct but when their marks are rendered successively clear. If all the marks of a given conception are rendered clear, the conception is completely distinct; and if it does not comprise too many marks, it is precise, and from this a definition of the conception arises.

Scho. As we cannot be certain by any trial whether we have exhausted all the marks of a given conception by a complete analysis, all analytic definitions are to be held uncertain.

105.

Expositions and Descriptions.

All conceptions therefore cannot be defined, nor must they be so.

There are approximations to the definition of certain conceptions, which approximations are partly expositions, partly descriptions.

The expounding of a conception consists in the coherent (successive) representation of its marks provided that they are found by analysis.

The description of a conception is its exposition, provided that it is not precise.

Scho. 1. We can expound either a conception, or experience. The former is done by analysis, the latter by synthesis.

2. Exposition therefore has not place but with regard to given conceptions, which are rendered distinct by it; thereby it is distinguished from de-

claration, which is a distinct representation of factitious conceptions.

As it is not always possible to make the analysis complete; and as a dissection in general, must, ere it becomes complete, be incomplete; an incomplete exposition, as part of a definition, is a true and a useful exhibition of a conception. A definition never remains here but the idea of a logical perfection which we must endeavour to reach.

3. Description cannot take place but with respect to conceptions empirically given. It has not any determinate rules and contains nothing but the materials for definition.

106,

Nominal and Real Definitions.

By mere nominal definitions we understand those definitions, which contain the signification that we have chosen to give a certain name arbitrarily, and which therefore denote nothing but the logical being of its object or serve merely to distinguish it from other objects. Real definitions, on the other hand, are those definitions, which suffice to the cognition of the object, in point of its internal determinations, as they shew the possibility of it (the object) from internal marks.

Scho. I. When a conception is internally sufficient to distinguish a thing, it certainly is so externally; but it, when not internally sufficient,

may nevertheless be externally so in a certain reference, namely, in the comparison of the definite with other things. But the illimited external sufficiency is not possible without the internal.

2. Objects of experience admit of merely nominal definitions. The logical nominal definitions of given conceptions of the understanding are taken from an attribute or adjunct; the real definitions, again, from the essence of the thing, from the first ground of possibility. The latter therefore comprehend, what always belongs to a thing, its real essence. Merely negative definitions cannot be named real ones; because negative notes may, just as well as affirmative ones, serve for the distinction of a thing from other things, but cannot for the cognition of a thing as to its internal possibility.

In moral philosophy real definitions must always be sought for; and all our endeavours must be directed to that object. In the mathematics there are real definitions; for the definition of an arbitrary conception is always real.

3. A definition, when it gives a conception, by which the object can be exhibited *à priori* in the concrete is genetical; all the mathematical definitions are of this nature.

107.

Chief Requisites of Definition.

The essential and the universal requisites of the perfection of a definition in general, may be consi-

dered under the four main points of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality ;

1, as to quantity, with regard to the sphere of a definition, a definition and a definite (*definitum*) must be alternate conceptions, and consequently a definition neither wider, nor narrower, than its definite ;

2, as to quality, a definition must be an ample as well as a precise conception.

3, as to relation, a definition must not be tautological ; that is, the marks of a definite must, as its grounds of cognition, be distinct from it ; and finally,

4, as to modality ; the marks must be necessary and therefore not such as are added by experience.

Scho. The condition, That the generic conception and the conception of the specific distinction (*genus* and *differentia specifica*)* must make up the definition, holds but relatively to the nominal definitions in the comparison, and not to the real ones in the deduction.

108.

Rules for the Proving of Definitions.

In proving definitions four operations are to be

* The words, distinction and difference, are usually confounded, even in philosophical works. In a correct style however, the former is never used but when treating of the objects and of the operations of the understanding, the latter, but when of those of sense. T.

performed; it must be investigated whether a definition,

- 1, considered as a proposition, is true ;
- 2, as a conception, distinct ;
- 3, as a distinct conception, ample ; and,
- 4, as an ample conception, determinate, that is, adequate to the thing itself.

109.

Rules for the Framing of Definitions.

The very same operations, which are requisite to the proving of definitions, are to be performed in the framing of them. To this end then 1, seek true propositions, 2, seek those, relatively to whose predicate we do not always presuppose the conception of the thing, 3, collect several of them and compare them with the conception of the thing itself, whether they be adequate ; and 4 and finally, see whether the one mark does not lie in the other, or is not subordinated to it.

Scho. 1. It is hardly necessary to mention, that these rules hold relatively to analytical definitions only. As in that case we never can be certain of the analysis' having been complete, we must set forth a definition as an essay only, and but as if it were a definition. With this limitation we may use it as a distinct and a true conception and draw collaries from its marks. We may say, That, to which the conception of the definite agrees, the de-

inition agrees to, but, as the definition does not exhaust the whole definite, not conversely.

2. Using the conception of the definite in the definition; or laying the definite as a foundation in the definition, is defining by a circle (*circulus in definiendo*).

We now come to treat of the means of promoting the distinctness of conceptions with respect to their sphere.

II. *Promotion of the Perfection of Cognition by the logical Division of Conceptions.*

110.

Conception of the Logical Division.

Every conception contains under it a multifarious, provided that it is concordant; and provided that it is distinct also. The determination of a conception with regard to all the possible representations, which are contained under it with a proviso that they are opposed to one another, that is, distinct from one another, bears the name of the logical division of the conception. The superior conception is termed the divided conception (*divisum*), and the inferior conceptions are termed the members of division (*membra dividencia*).

Scho. 1. To dissect a conception and to divide it are therefore very distinct operations. By the dissection of a conception we see what is contained in it (by analysis); by the division we consider what

is contained under it. In this case we divide the sphere of the conception, not the conception itself. The division is therefore so far from being a dissection of a conception, that the members of division rather contain more in them, than the divided conception.

2. We ascend from inferior to superior conceptions and may afterwards descend from these to inferior ones—by division.

111.

Universal Rules of the logical Division.

In every division of a conception care must be taken,

1, that the members of division exclude one another or be opposed to one another; that they,

2, rank under a superior conception (*conceptum commune*), and that they,

3, collectively taken, make up the sphere of the divided conception or be equal to it.

Scho. The members of division must be separated from one another not by a mere contrary, but by a contradictory, opposition.

112

Codivision and Subdivision.

The various divisions of a conception, which are made with various views, are distinguished by

the name of codivisions ; and the division of the members of division is denominated a subdivision.

Scho. 1. A subdivision may be continued to indefinite ; but it may be comparatively finite. A codivision goes likewise to indefinite, especially in conceptions of experience ; for who can exhaust all the relations of conceptions ?

2. A codivision may be said to be a division according to the variety of the conceptions of the same object (the points of view), and a subdivision that of the point of view itself.

113.

Dichotomy and Polyotomy.

A division into two members goes under the appellation of dichotomy ; but it, when consisting of more than two, takes the name of polyotomy.

Scho. I. All polyotomy is empirical ; dichotomy is the sole division according to principles *à priori* ; by consequence the only primitive one. For the members of division must be opposed to one another and the contrary of every A is nothing more than *non A*.

2. Polyotomy, as in it a knowledge of the object is requisite, cannot be taught in logic. But dichotomy requires the principle of contradiction only, without knowing the conception, which we have a mind to divide, as to the matter. Polyotomy stands in need of intuition ; either intuition *à priori*, as in

the mathematics (for example, the division of conic sections), or empirical intuition, as in the description of nature (physiography). Yet the division according to the principle of the synthesis *à priori* has Trichotomy ; 1, the conception, as the condition, 2, the conditionate, and, 3, the deduction of the latter from the former.

114.

Various Divisions of Method.

As to method itself, in particular, in the elaboration and treatment of scientific cognition, there are several chief species of it, which we shall here adduce according to the following division :

115.

I. Scientific or Popular Method.

The scientific or scholastic method is distinguished from the popular in this, that it sets out from fundamental and elemental propositions ; the latter, again, from usual and interesting ones. That aims at solidity or profundity, and therefore removes every thing foreign ; this has entertainment in view.

Scho. These two methods then are distinguished as to the species, and not as to the mere propounding ; and popularity in the method is consequently distinct from that in the propounding.

116.

2. *Systematical or Fragmentary Method.*

The systematical is opposed to the fragmentary or rhapsodistical method. When one has thought according to a method, and when his method is then expressed in the propounding and the transition from one proposition to another distinctly made and delivered, he has treated a cognition systematically. Whereas, though one has thought after a method, but not arranged the propounding methodically, such a method is rhapsodistical.

Schö. The systematical propounding is opposed to the fragmentary, just as the methodical is to the tumultuary. Who thinks methodically may propound either systematically, or in a fragmentary way. The propounding, externally fragmentary, but methodical in itself, is aphoristical.

117.

3. *Analytic or Synthetic Method.*

The analytic method is contradistinguished to the synthetic. That begins with the conditionate and the founded and proceeds to the principles (*à principiatu ad principia*); this, on the other hand, goes from the principles to the consequences or from the simple to the compound. The former may be denominated the regressive (retrograde), the latter the progressive, method.

Scho. The analytic method is usually named the heuristical or that of invention or discovery, and the synthetic that of instruction. To the end of popularity the analytic method is more adequate; but to that of the scientific and systematical elaboration of cognition the synthetic, more so.

118.

4. *Syllogistic or Tabellary Method.*

The former is that method, according to which a science is propounded in a series or concatenation of syllogisms. The latter, that, according to which a system that is already finished is exhibited in its whole cohesion.

119.

5. *Acroamatic or Erotematic Method.*

The method, when one teaches only, is acroamatical; but, when the questions too, erotematical. The latter may be divided into the dialogical or Socratical and catechetical, accordingly as the questions are directed either to the understanding, or merely to the memory.

Scho. One cannot teach erotematically but by the Socratic dialogue, in which both master and scholar must question and answer one another reciprocally; so that it seems in it as if the scholar were himself the master. This dialogue instructs

by means of questions, by making the disciple acquainted with his own principles of reason, and by calling and fixing his attention to them. But one cannot teach by the common mode of catechising; he can only interrogate about that which he has taught acroamatically. Hence is the catechetic method adapted to empirical and historical knowledge only; but the dialogic, to cognitions of reason.

120.

Meditation.

By it reflection or methodical thinking or cogitation is understood. Meditation must accompany all reading as well as all learning; and to it it is requisite, that we should make previous inquiries, and then put our thoughts in order or methodize them, that is, conjoin them after a method.

APPENDIX.

A SKETCH OF THE *AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS* BY THE TRANSLATOR.

De mortuis nil nisi verum.

EMMANUEL KANT was born in Koningsberg, the metropolis of the kingdom of Prussia, on the twenty-second day of April in the year one thousand seven hundred and twenty-three* ; of low extraction ; but his parents, though obscure, were both virtuous and industrious.

His father (descendent of a Scotch family that spell their name with a C) was a saddler in a very small way ; our hero, consequently, not nursed in the silken lap of affluence, but himself the sole architect of his fortune.

* See page xliii of the Preface to the second edition of his Criticism on pure Reason.

“ Let high Birth triumph ! What can be more great ?
Nothing ——— but Merit in a low estate.”

He was taught to read and to write at a free-school; received, at the expense of his maternal uncle, a shoemaker, the rudiments of his academical education at Frederic's College; and, in the year one thousand seven hundred and forty, went to the university in his native city, where he was entirely bred, and from which, as he in his *Anthropology* informs us, he never travelled farther than to Pillaw once by water.

The early part of his life, like that of the lives of most men of deep learning and abstract science, having been passed in hard study and close application, yields but few materials and little variety of incident for the biographer.

His was originally intended for the church, studied divinity accordingly, and took orders.

His regular academical course finished, he began the world as a private tutor in a clergyman's family, and was afterwards appointed a titular governor to count Kaiserlingk's children; for, as we have been told, he had not the care of any of them, though nobody could be more capable of forming tender minds, or of instilling into them the principles and the love of wisdom and of virtue. Yet “the greatest abilities are not only not required for this office, but render a man less fit for it.”

As he was of a mild and amiable disposition, of

equal temper or good-humour, modest, of great equanimity, affable, well-bred, or of polished manners, cheerful, an agreeable facetious companion, fond of conviviality, "of the feast of reason and of the flow of soul," and, from extensive reading and an uncommonly retentive memory, possessed of an inexhaustible fund of anecdote, the count and the countess, amiable, elegant in manners, cultivated and enlightened themselves, in whose society, as well as in that of modest women in general, he took great delight, were naturally desirous of his entertaining and instructive conversation, conceived a friendship for him, generously became his patrons, and gave him that sinecure, partly with a view of enjoying the pleasure of his excellent society (for Kant was the vital principle or the enlivener of every society), partly that he might have sufficient leisure to cultivate his rare talents, his extraordinarily active, vigorous, penetrating, and comprehensive mind.

And he did not eat the bread of idleness or bury his talent, but prosecuted his studies with unwearied attention and indefatigable diligence. Having sedulously gone over the whole circle of the sciences and made himself master of them all, he found the mathematics and pure philosophy (logic and metaphysic) the most congenial to his cast of mind, and gave up the profession of theology, as a sphere too confined for the active exertion of his mental energy, for his wide range and great depth of thought.

His custom was to employ the morning and forenoon in study and writing, to withdraw early in the evening from society, and to amuse himself for an hour or two in reading sometimes history, memoirs and travels, sometimes biography, voyages and poetry, now and then a play, by way of relaxation, and even a good novel, such as Sir Charles Grandison, a work which he often read and praised much. He had an exquisitely delicate and a very correct taste for the fine arts, but neither a turn nor leisure for the acquirement of superficial accomplishments.

In the year one thousand seven hundred and fifty-six he took the degree of Master of Arts,* opened a class, and gave public lectures on the mathematics, on logic, and on the metaphysics. His delivery was both easy and graceful; he possessed the art not only of commanding the attention of his auditors, but of impressing his doctrines deeply in their minds; and his lectures on moral philosophy and on moral religion in particular were highly interesting and sublime.

In that situation, however, he, for all his talents both natural and acquired, was long eclipsed by a man of very inferior parts, whose name does not deserve to be here mentioned. But Kant's time was not lost; for his talents were continually expanding themselves, and he was constantly rumi-

* In Germany the degree of M. A. is a much greater dignity among the learned, than it is with us.

nating on his new system. It was (to use a somewhat florid allegory) a solar eclipse. And he, like the sun, shone forth at last in his full meridian splendour. His opponents "hid their diminished heads," and their opinions and doctrines were dispersed, and vanished like vapour. He alone illuminates the world with his beneficent rays.

At length our philosopher was called to fill the chair of wisdom, a station which his superior abilities and talents had so long merited, and which he afterwards graced so much and dignified. He, in the year one thousand seven hundred and seventy, was created doctor and regius professor of pure philosophy in the university of Königsberg.

And, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-six, the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin chose him one of their members. They no doubt intended to confer a mark of honor on the professor; but it was soon found, that his being a fellow of their society, celebrated though it justly is, redounded to their honor.

Having now reached the summit of his ambition, and wishing for nothing more than leisure to digest his critical system, "to gain the heights of science and of virtue," he refused several places of emolument and other dignities that were offered him.

So early as the year seventeen hundred and forty-seven he published his *coup d'essai*, THOUGHTS ON THE TRUE ESTIMATION OF THE LIVING POWERS; TOGETHER WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE POWER OF

BODIES IN GENERAL ; in which, he, by repudiating, at the age of four-and-twenty, the thoughts of these celebrated men, Leibnitz, Wolf, Bulfinger, the two Barnoullis, Herman and others, proves himself to be the most acute metaphysician and the ablest natural philosopher of his time. His motto is (from Seneca), *Nihil magis præstandum est quam ne pscorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes, non qua eundum sed qua it ur* . . .

No name, however famous, should it oppose the discovery of truth, is (says he) to be held of any value ; the track of reason is the only one for us to follow in.

That invective and personal attacks are not Kant's weapons the reader will see from these his concluding words : I have succeeded in perceiving a few errors in Leibnitz's theory, it is true, yet I am one of this great man's debtors ; for I should have effectuated nothing without the clue of the excellent law of continuity, for which we have this immortal discoverer to thank, and which is the only means of finding the way out of this labyrinth. In short, though the matter has fallen out in my favor, the share of honor that remains to me is so small, that I am not afraid of Ambition's demeaning herself so far as to grudge me it.

Both this work and his subsequent publications will shew, that the discovery of the latent truth after which the greatest masters of human knowledge sought long in vain has been reserved for him.

HIS GENERAL PHYSIOGONY AND THEORY OF THE HEAVENS, or an Essay on the Constitution of the mechanical Origin of the Universe according to Newton's Principles, appeared in the year one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five. In which work he evinces his profound astronomical knowledge, conjectures, with great probability, that there are beyond Saturn's orbit other planets more and more eccentric than Saturn, by consequence nearer and nearer the cometary property, and thus foretells, on theoretical grounds, what Herschel discovered six-and-twenty years after with the assistance of the telescope, the existence of Uranus (the Georgian planet or Herschel) and its satellites. Kant's theory with regard to Saturn's ring too is confirmed by Herschel's recent discoveries.

It cannot but be interesting to men of science to compare the construction of the heavens, which one great man has perceived, so to say, with the telescopic eye of his mind, according to the Newtonian laws from the original birth of the celestial bodies, with the construction of the heavens as another great man has exhibited it according to telescopic observations.

This publication, being rather dry and abstruse, was but little known at first; the celebrated Lambert is accused of having taken advantage of this circumstance; and that not without reason; for the very same theory of the systematical constitution of the universe, of the galaxy, of the nebule, &c. is

advanced in his *Cosmological Letters*, which he published in the year seventeen hundred and sixty-one, and with which he made so great a figure.

Kant himself, in one of his works, says, that the agreement of the thoughts of this ingenious man with those which I communicated to the public sixteen years ago, which agreement is to be perceived in the very smallest strokes, increases my presumption, that this delineation will hereafter receive more confirmation. *Sic redit ad dominum, &c.*

In the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three he presented the public with *THE ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD*. In this treatise, which is one of his dogmatical works (for even Kant was only a dogmatist till he reached the transcendental station in his later work, *CRITICISM ON PURE REASON*); in this extremely recondite treatise, wherein nothing but an argument (or ground of proof) in support of the demonstration of the existence of the Deity is pretended to, the greatest acuteness or subtilty, and all that which is possible to be performed by mere conceptions and by the theoretical mode of proof of the existence of that Being, will be found; in which speculative field nothing apodictically certain on this head can possibly be contained.

He here does not allow but of the possibility of two methods of proof of the existence of the All suffi-

cient Being, the Ontological and the cosmological. When logical exactness and completeness are in hand, the former mode of proof is the better, but, when comprehension to the common just conception, liveliness of impression, beauty, and the power of moving the moral springs of human nature are so, the preference is to be granted the latter.

But, as that proof is not to be found in this unbeaten path (the theoretical or speculative field), we must turn to the broad highway of practical reason, or, in other words, have recourse to the moral argument; for, as God is a moral being, the proof of his existence can only be a moral one. Though it is absolutely necessary to convince one's self of His existence, it is not equally necessary, that it should be demonstrated. Indeed it is not, for want of intuitive data, susceptible of that strictness which is requisite to the evidence of mathematical demonstration. Nor can it by any effort of the speculative use of our reason be confuted neither.

The teteological contemplations interspersed in this work are highly interesting and edifying, and have a great tendency to corroborate (the minds of men in general) in the belief in the Eternal Being. Kant's later doctrine and more profound sentiments on this the most important of all subjects are to be found in the aforementioned Criticism and in his other systematical works, wherein he, by rendering essential service to moral science, to the true en-

lightening of the human mind, and by consequence to the cause of truth and of virtue, proves himself a great benefactor to mankind.

He, in the year seventeen hundred and seventy, excited the attention of the thinking part of the public by his inaugural dissertation, *DE MUNDI SENSIBILIS ATQUE INTELLIGIBILIS FORMA ET PRINCIPIIS*; the most remarkable phenomenon in the philosophic hemisphere since Newton's *PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA*. It may be said, with great truth, that, in this work of Kant, which comprises the creative architectonic idea and complete foundation of his future system, the profundity of a Newton, the acumen of a Leibnitz, the solid argumentation of a Hume, and the systematic arrangement of a Wolf conspire to render it perfect. It alone entitles his statue to distinguished niches in the temples of Science and of Fame. "Others are fond of Fame, but Fame is fond of him."

He had attained the age of fifty-eight ere his *CRITICISM ON PURE REASON* made its first appearance in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one. This, the most abstract profound metaphysical work that ever was written, and which the Germans, by way of eminence, name, *The Criticism*, is unquestionably the triumph of intellect. It comprehends, in one octavo volume of eight hundred and eighty-four close-printed pages, his whole theoretical system, the complete investigation of the procedure of the sensitive faculty, of the understanding, and of the faculty of reason itself.

In it the wings of all false speculative philosophy that attempts to soar above the sphere of possible experience are effectually clipped. In it the doctrines of materialism, of atheism, of free thinking incredulity, and of unthinking superstition, all of which may be universally pernicious to society, as well as those of idealism and of scepticism, which are dangerous more especially to the schools and can hardly be ever communicated to the public in general, are quite overthrown.

This single publication, abstracting from his other works (*Metaphysic of Morals*; *Criticism on Judgment*; *Criticism on practical Reason*; &c.; all masterpieces), distinguishes this perspicacious metaphysician and subtile philosophical critic as both the ornament of his native country, and the pride of the republic of letters.* And history informs us, that Nature, though bountiful to the human race, is not so lavish of her favors, as to produce a man of such supereminence of mental powers every century.

His *METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF THE PHYSICS* were published in the year seventeen hundred and eighty-six. They contain the pure principles of Somatology. The metaphysic of corporeal nature is first treated of; then the mathematics are applied to the doctrine of bodies, which cannot become natural philosophy but by them. In this inimitable

* The late professor Beck of Rostock informed me, that Kant had made himself so much master of his subject before he printed this *Criticism*, that he neither corrected nor transcribed the manuscript of it, but sent it sheet by sheet as he wrote it to the press.

treatise he has fully exhausted the subject of the metaphysical somatology.

The table of the categories (not those of Aristotle, that trifling puerile enumeration of predicates but his own) he has used as the only scheme for the completeness of a metaphysical system.

He has reduced these (what he with modern names) elements to four heads: under the first which, motion, as a pure quantum, is considered to its composition, without any quality of what moveable, and this head is denominated *Physics*; under the second it (motion), as belonging to the quality of matter, is considered under the name of an originally motive power, and hence is this head distinguished by the appellation of *Dynamic*; under the third, matter with that quality is considered by its own motion in relation to itself, and this head is termed the *Mechanics*; and under the fourth the motion or the rest of matter is determined merely with reference to the mode of representation, modality, and the title of this head is *Phenomenology*.

On this great work, perhaps the most profound of all his works, none but men of science, of deep science, and the few who reason, can venture pronounce; to all others it will seem a mere *gymnasia*. This little octavo book of but one hundred and fifty-eight pages proves its eminent author to be the only man that ever possessed mathematical a

* *Amicus Aristoteles, sed magis amica veritas.*

metaphysical knowledge united in the highest degree, and that ever discursively reflected (philosophised) profoundly on the mathesis.

And thus much as to the first writings of this prince of mathematicians and of philosophers. A complete description or review of all his systematical works would alone fill a thick volume. But what has been here said may suffice to shew, that they are extant in Germany, and, it is to be hoped, will induce those, who do not think themselves already too knowing to stand in need of more knowledge, to study them. The task indeed is not easy, but it will reward the labour abundantly.*

Kant is the founder of the CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, so named to distinguish it from other systems or modes of philosophising, till it shall be universally allowed, that there cannot be but one (true) philosophy. As this vast system, the rich harvest of the constant study, reflection, meditation, and Herculean labour of some fifty years, and which embraces the whole sphere of philosophy, is now taught in all the protestant universities of Germany, and but

* To study this system effectually, it may be advisable to follow the plan, which Descartes holds so indispensable to the attaining of right insights, and which is this : To forget, during the study of a new doctrine, all the conceptions that one may have formerly acquired relatively to the same subject, and to set out on the road of truth without any guide but mere sane reason.

little known yet in Great Britain and Ireland, it cannot be improper to give a slight conception of it in this place.

It is, then, a new method of philosophising, which, distinct from all former methods, is founded in a most accurate dissection of the whole faculty of cognition, determining the utmost bounds of this faculty, and denominated **TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY**; from which mental anatomy all true philosophy must set out.

This modern method of philosophising has quite choked the weeds of all former systems and (to continue the figure) cleaned the ground of intellectual research. This assertion may seem somewhat exaggerated to those not much conversant in such perquisitions as these; but the destruction of all false systems is infallibly accomplished by just reasoning founded in an accurate and a deep philosophy of mind.

* It is interesting to know, that Hume's hint relative to the conception of the connexion of cause and of effect was what first roused Kant from what he calls a dogmatic slumber of many years, and gave occasion to this total reform in philosophy, by means of which reform that celebrated man's doubt, on which neither Reid, nor Beattie, nor Oswald, nor Priestly, nor any of their followers, could ever throw the least light, is fully resolved, not however with the aid of common-sense that they extol so much, but with that of pure reason after the method of the critical philosophising.

Whoever reads Kant's transcendental philosophy (contained in his *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics** and in his *Criticism on pure Reason*) with the requisite degree of attention and of reflection must allow, that his reputation of being the ablest anatomist that ever dissected the human mind is firmly established. He seems even to have fully exhausted his subject, and left nothing material for us to do, but to read, to understand, to admire, and to be grateful for his inestimably precious labours.

This profound transcendental philosophy is not only the most sublime, but the most useful of all sciences. Were it not laid as a foundation, no metaphysic at all were possible, we could recur to nothing for first principles, never reach, in the philosophic field, beyond empirical science, which, like the bust in La Fontaine's fable, has a fine head, but no brains.

It is however the most difficult and the most abstract of all science ; for what can be more so, than the reflex act of the mind, the turning of the intellectual eye inwards on its own operations ? A little learning is a dangerous thing ; drink deep or taste not of the Pierian spring. There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, and drinking deep sobers us again.

Beautifully and justly said by Pope ; for superfi-

* Translated into English by the author of this Sketch, and will soon be published.

cial knowledge elates or puffs up, but profound (by shewing the very limited stretch of our faculties, and that the most cultivated reason cannot, with regard to the essential ends of humanity, advance a single step farther, than the most common understanding) abates our pride or arrogance, and teaches us modesty and humility.

In this admirable system (in his Criticism on Judgment) quite a new theory of taste, of the beautiful, and of the sublime, of both nature and art, is advanced; and the doctrine of teleology, or of philosophical ends, handled after the most masterly method.

In the Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, the Criticism on practical Reason, and the Metaphysic of Morals, he treats of his system of moral philosophy which he divides into ethics and law, and is the first that lays down pure principles of morality.

In those incomparable works it is clearly evinced, that the Heteronomy of the arbitrament (that is, the dependence upon laws of nature, to follow some one incentive or inclination, when the will gives itself not the law, but the direction for the rational observance of pathological laws) never can comprise the universally legislative form, and not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, though the action, which results from the maxim of heteronomy, should be legal, even contrary to the principle of pure practical reason, consequently to the moral mindedness.

All the matter of practical rules ever depends upon subjective conditions, which yield it nothing but a conditional universality for rational beings, and all those conditions turn on the pivot of the principle of one's own happiness. The principle of happiness may afford maxims, but, even were the universal happiness the object, never can such ones, as are fit for laws of the will.

All the possible determinatives of the will are either merely subjective, and therefore empirical, or objective and rational; either external, or internal.

The following are all principles of heteronomy : education (according to Montaigne), the constitution (after Mandeville), the physical sense (according to Epicurus), the moral sense (after Hutcheson), perfection (according to the Stoics and Wolf,) and the will of the Deity (after Crusius and other theological moralists). All material principles are totally unfit for the supreme moral law.

In the aforementioned works it is likewise proved, that the Autonomy (the universal self-legislation) of the will is the only principle of all moral laws and of the duties suitable to them. The maxim of self-love (prudence) advises merely ; but the law of morality commands. Is there not however a great distinction between what is advisable for us to do, and what we are obliged to do? It is difficult and requires a knowledge of the world to know how to act on the principle of heteronomy ; but quite

easy to the most common understanding to know how to act on that of autonomy. In a word, The formal practical principle of pure reason is the only possible principle fit for practical laws (which make a duty of actions) and for the principle of morality in general.*

* This new system, which is really the victory of human reason, the author of this Sketch takes the liberty of recommending once more to the notice of the learned.—In a political point of view our insular situation is highly advantageous to us, but in a literary and scientific one, very hurtful. This, however, were our literati less supine, not (what foreigners perhaps not unjustly accuse them of being) so proud, and less national, might be obviated. Does not the commonwealth of learning embrace the whole world? Whatever conquests are made in the kingdom of truth, they belong to humanity in general. The Germans are as well acquainted with our literature as we ourselves, and do it the justice to admire it. But it is not so with us; we in general know but little of theirs, and are totally ignorant of their best philosophical works. For, unfortunately, nothing but the very refuse of the productions of the German press, with a few exceptions, is transplanted to our island. Formerly publishers and printers were men of letters, could judge for themselves, and were interested in science. It were well worth a British philosopher's while to learn German for the sole purpose of studying the critical philosophy; for that language, as it is a key to more science than either Greek or Latin, would certainly repay him fully for his time and labour. Mean-while, if I am fortunate enough to be instrumental towards transplanting the genuine seeds of that philosophy to this country, I shall enjoy the consciousness of contributing essentially to the dissemination of real science, and therefore of not

And in *The Religion within the Bounds of bare Reason*, a signally sublime publication, there is taught a purified philosophical doctrine worthy of the notice of enlightened rational beings. Kant, in this work, shews, that the New Testament, explained agreeably to established moral principles, contains a pure moral religion. No other can possibly stand the test of time or have a right to have its issue in the catholic or universal religion of man. Nothing but ignorance or monkish superstition can furnish confessors in the cause of any other form of belief; and this none but those influenced by selfish views and sectaries and bigots, or blind zealots, who are all deaf, or unwilling to listen, to the sacred dictates of reason or obligations of morality, can possibly deny.

Many divines by profession and all theological moralists, as they are heteronomists, make a use of reason that perverts it, and thereby, though not intentionally, subvert morality.* But the author of

having travelled in vain or of not being altogether a passive or useless member of society.

* By theological moralists we understand those who, previously assuming the existence of God, derive the moral law immediately from his will; by which procedure the universal self-legislative power of pure practical reason is quite destroyed. The moral theologist, on the other hand, on its indispensable condition, liberty, unfolds the moral law out of the universal reason of man, and postulates God and immortality as abso-

the great work under review distinguishes himself as not only a strict autonomist but a pure rationalist in matters of belief, or a moral theologian, and as the justest and most profound reasoner, as well as the most consequential and systematical writer of any of those, who have ever treated of the subjects of morality and of religion.

The critical philosophy perhaps has had more expositors, commentators, and epitomists during the space of twenty years, than the Platonic and the Aristotelian systems united have had during many centuries. It unquestionably fixes a grand epoch in both the annals of science and the history of the progress of the human understanding. And every unprejudiced and competent judge will join us with pleasure in paying this grateful tribute of praise (that "envy dare not flattery call") to the manes of the matchless founder of this noble system: That he, being undoubtedly the father of metaphysic as a science, and the discoverer as well as the first teacher of the doctrine of pure morality, and as no other man ever left posterity so valuable a legacy,

lately necessary conditions of the possibility of its fulfilment. The Ethics do not extend beyond the reciprocal duties of man and subsist by themselves even without the idea of the Supreme Being, but infallibly lead to, the very sublimation of morality, Religion, whose essence, subjectively considered, consists in the maxim of discharging our moral duties as Divine commandments, and which crowns all morality.

has a just right to be held the luminary of the learned world, and to bear the palm of science unrivalled perhaps for ever.

If it is a fact, that, objectively considered, there cannot be but one (true) philosophy, and it is a stubborn fact, that Kant's method of critical philosophising has totally overthrown all former philosophical systems, can any one, unacquainted with it, venture to dignify himself with the title of philosopher, in the proper sense of the word? If he presumes so to do, it must be through a happy ignorance indeed, and an overweening self-flattery. "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? There is more hope of a fool, than of him."

From what has already been said of Kant's temper or disposition of mind it may be easily gathered, that he, as to his manners or behaviour, was by no means a cynic, or a snarling churlish teacher of virtue, and, though he was in some essential points a stoic, had not the least taint of severity or moroseness. The austerity of the anachorite was not an ingredient in his composition, and he neither lived in a tub like the currish Diogenes, nor secluded himself from the world like a torpid monk, but habitually frequented the best company, of which he was the very soul, and well aware, that "happiness and

* The Cynics, or the followers of Diogenes, derived their name from the suburb of Athens called the Cynosarges, in which they taught.

true philosophy are of the social still, and smiling kind." Besides, he was constantly visited by all persons of rank, by all travellers of distinction, as well as by all men of eminence in every line, whose admiration he, by his hospitality, by his great knowledge of the world, and by his rich and edifying conversation on every topic, never failed to excite, from whom he always received the tribute of due esteem, and who were all proud of having had an opportunity of seeing and of conversing with so distinguished a character.

That our sublime master could sometimes unbend his mind in writing too, the following is a specimen : That the husband is destined to rule and the wife to obey, we, were it not sufficiently pointed out by nature, have St. Paul's authority for maintaining. I, says Kant, in one of his miscellaneous works, would, in the language of gallantry (yet not without truth), say, that the wife should rule and the husband govern. The conduct of the husband must shew, that he has the welfare of his wife above all things at heart. But, as he must know the situation of his affairs better, and how much money he can afford to spend, he, like a dutiful minister, first complies with the orders of his monarch, who thinks of nothing but pleasure and perhaps wishes to build a palace; only that at present there is no money in the treasury, that certain more pressing wants must be supplied, &c. ; so that her majesty may do whatever she pleases, but on this condition only, that her minister shall furnish her with the means.

And this biographical incident, as it evinces a noble independence of spirit, as well as a manly and inflexible firmness of mind that characterises the practical philosopher, and betrays a zealous champion in the cause of truth, morality, and religion, we conceive, deserves to be here recorded: The present king of Prussia's father and predecessor, by the instigation of a clerical hypocrite, sent for Kant, and desired, that he would retract some sentiments expressed in his work on moral religion.—Your majesty (answers he) may dispose of my person as you please. I am your majesty's faithful, obedient, respectful, and dutiful subject and servant. But no power on earth can control my thoughts or has a right to compel me to recant a single sentiment on any subject that flows from my reason or to deny or even but to conceal what I deem truth.—To the honor of the absolute monarch be it related, No farther interruption was ever given to the free publication of all the works of the Prussian Socrates.

His having led a single life adds another illustrious instance to lord Verulam's remark relative to bachelors: Certainly the best works, and those of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men. All Kant's pursuits were obviously of a metaphysical or intellectual nature. He devoted himself to the sciences entirely and to literature. But we, even in this light Sketch, have had a proof of his having made his more par-

ticular addresses to Philosophy, "the fair," whom he certainly has elevated to the very throne of reason.

Notwithstanding a very delicate constitutional frame of body (for he was by no means gifted with corporal qualities as with those of the mind),* and a life passed in laborious study and intense meditation, he, by means of going to bed early, and of rising betimes, of constant occupation, of temperance,† of regular exercise on foot, of tranquillity of mind, and of cheerful society, retained the use of his mental faculties, his intellectual activity and vigour, almost unimpaired till the age of seventy, and had attained the advanced period of life of eighty years and upwards before he, on the twelfth day of February in the year one thousand eight hundred and four, was seized with an apoplexy that occasioned his speedy dissolution, and numbered his freed spirit with the purified spirits that live for ever.

* He was of a little stature, his thorax or chest so narrow as scarce to leave room for the play of his lungs, and, when walking alone, in a thoughtful mood, stooped very much, especially in the decline of life.—The portrait sketched by Hopwood, which is the frontispiece to this work, is the copy of an engraving by Lips of Weimar from an original painting, a striking likeness of Kant at the age of seventy-one, by Wernet of Berlin.

† The only circumstance peculiar to Kant's diet, is, that he made but one meal a day, his dinner; a habit, which, by the way, we do not think conducive to longevity.

While Kant stood upon the verge of this world, Death, that king of terrors to the guilty, was not armed with any thing terrific, but the prince of peace, to him. He made the awful transition from time to eternity, from this corporeal earthly scene to the intelligible world, with philosophical serenity or composure of mind, with the dignity peculiar to a wise man, with the calmness, fortitude and resignation of a virtuous mind deeply penetrated with a firm belief of reason in the Supreme Intelligence, and in a future state, the life spiritual, or the prolongation of our moral existence to infinite. "Virtue alone has majesty in death."

On that melancholy occasion the whole city of Koningsberg, lamenting the decease of so excellent a man, by which they conceived that they sustained a national and an irreparable loss, went into deep mourning, and people of all ranks and of all ages in town and from the neighbourhood, bewailing this sad catastrophe and with settled sorrow in their countenances, flocked promiscuously to his interment, which was more like the pompous sepulture of a proud emperor, than the plain funeral of an humble philosopher.

Soon after that mournful event a fine medal in honor of his great worth and uncommon endowments was struck in Berlin; it has on the one side his image and name with the year of his nativity, and on the reverse Pallas is represented sitting and holding an owl in her right hand, with this motto,

Altius volentem arcuit ; an allegorical designation of his having marked out proper boundaries to the field of empirical science, determined the sphere of speculative philosophy, or restrained the merely speculative use of reason to the objects of possible experience.

———“ What boots it o’er thy hallow’d dust
To heap the graven pile or laurel’d bust ?
Since by thy hands, already rais’d on high,
We see a fabric tow’ring to the sky.”

The true criticism on his moral character, as well as the most sublime panegyric that can be made on him, is, That he earnestly and stedfastly endeavoured to practise what he professed, to make the moral law, the great comprehensive rule of duty, the spring of his actions. For, his life was, so to say, a comment or illustration to his pure doctrine, and almost exemplified it, or was led as nearly up to it, consequently he, by precept and by example, came as near the idea of a sage, or of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the frailty inherent in the human nature allows. So that he gives us a conspicuous proof of the feasibility of acting (as far perhaps as a mortal is capable of acting) on pure moral principle ; by his active, useful, and immaculate life he teaches us how to live, by his invaluable instruction and moral lessons how to grow wiser and better, and by his

memorable death how to die. *Quid virtus et quid sapientia possit, utile proposuit nobis exemplar Kantien.*

The way to excel unquestionably is, *optima quæque exempla et imitandum proponere*, yet it, in strict propriety, is not the conduct of any man, how good soever it may be, but the moral law itself by which we should strive to direct our actions or to regulate our lives. Not the conduct of man as it is, therefore, but the idea of what it ought to be, can be a pattern for imitation, or set up as the standard of moral judgment or comparison.

But, as we in general are neither so good nor so bad as our friends or our enemies usually represent us, as the virtue or moral goodness of the best of us is but relative, for absolute perfection does not fall to the lot of man in this transitory life, as no human portrait can be painted without some shade, we have made every possible inquiry among those envious of Kant's well-earned fame and "hating that excellence they cannot reach," (for he had no other enemies, but was esteemed and beloved by every body who was acquainted with him) to find out a spot in his reputation, or character in the opinion of the world, and all that they can lay to his charge is, that his economy bordered on avarice, or sordid parsimony. But even this imputation his friends deny, say it is an aspersion, and maintain, that his rigid frugality or strict economy in early life was the effect of urgent necessity, but

that, at a later period, he, when possessed of the means, did not suffer his increase of fortune to contract or to harden his heart (for an ample fortune is sometimes apt to contract and to harden the heart), but, so far from wanting brotherly love, was generous on proper occasions, beneficent to the honest industrious poor, not however “before men, to be seen,” out of vanity or ostentation, but from a sense or motive of duty, bestowed his charity in private, “denied them nothing but his name,” and that his principles were not only laid down in his head, but written and settled in his heart. For, as he was a man of a good heart, his benevolence was active, and his sympathy or fellow-feeling warm, but always regulated or governed by his understanding, always ruled by his reason, which superior faculty it was the study of his whole life to cultivate, and to exercise freely on all subjects and on all occasions, to the utmost of his power. *O Virum Sapientia sua simplicem, et Simplicitate sua sapientem ! O Virum utilem sibi, suis, Reipublicæ, et humano Generi !*

In fine, it is easy to foretell, that a grateful posterity, edified and enlightened by the critical philosophy, and not biassed by the jealousy or rivalry but too prevalent among contemporary authors, will, when Kant's illiberal opponents and their superficial writings shall be buried in utter oblivion, and time shall have allayed envy, embalm

him in their remembrance, and, actuated by a generous emulation only, not fail of acknowledging his great merit, of doing his invaluable works full justice, and of bearing his memory due respect.

THE END.

ERRATA.

P. 10 l. 30 *after* faculty *insert* T. —p. 12 l. 29 *after* as it, *insert* as—p. 16 l. 22 *read* Logic is a science of reason not as to the mere form, but the matter;—l. 28 and 29 *for* on *read* according to—p. 30 l. 22 and 23 there should not be a paragraph—p. 34 l. 24 *read* Pherecydes of Syros—p. 38 l. 7 *read* $\sigma\tau\omicron\alpha$ —p. 48 l. 10 *after* general *insert* a comma—p. 53 l. 18 *after* methods *insert* a comma—l. 24. *after* genius *insert* a comma —p. 59 l. 7 *after* branch *insert* a comma—p. 73 l. 29 *read* which *and* *erase* the comma *after* of—p. 76 l. 14 *for* is *read* are—p. 85 l. 25 *after* both *insert* of—p. 93 l. 28 *read* presagement—p. 94 l. 15 *after* rest *insert* in this—p. 100 l. 30 *read* perspecting—p. 108 l. 10 *read* prejudices—p. 117 l. 23 *after* ourselves *insert* distinctly—p. 125 l. 5 *insert* a star *after* Conceptions—p. 132 l. 17 *read* abstract—p. 133 l. 19 *erase* the comma *after* being—p. 135 l. 8. *erase* the comma *after* distinguished—p. 162 l. 5 *after* in *insert* in—p. 174 l. 1 *read* the subject (in the conclusion)—p. 177 l. 9 *after* him ; *insert* T.)—p. 212 l. 17 *for* the *read* he—p. 216 l. 17 *for* His *read* He—p. 201 l. 24 *after* concrete *insert* a comma—p. 205 l. 9 *after* conception *insert* a semi-colon—l. 11 *after* tautological *insert* a comma—p. 206 l. 17 *for* he *read* are—p. 222 l. 23 *read* subtilty—l. 30 *read* All-suffi—p. 223 l. 1 *after* Being *insert* a colon *and* *read* Cosmological—p. 244 l. 11 *read* Kant's—p. 223 l. 4 *read* Bernouillis—l. 9 *insert* a comma *after* eundum—p. 222 l. 10 *after* dominum *dele* the comma—p. 240 l. 9 *after* hands *dele* the comma—p. 233 l. 27 *after* hand, *read* unfolds the moral law, on its indispensable condition, liberty, out &c.—p. 234 l. 24 *after* man *insert* a comma—p. 183 l. 16 *read* Kaims'—

PROLEGOMENA.

PROLEGOMENA
TO EVERY FUTURE
METAPHYSIC,

WHICH CAN APPEAR AS A SCIENCE;

FROM THE GERMAN

OF EMMANUEL KANT, M.A.

DOCTOR AND LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF PURE PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF KONINGSBERG, AND MEMBER OF THE
ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF BERLIN :

BY JOHN RICHARDSON,

*AUTHOR OF A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OF PROOF FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, AND INTO THE THEODICY.*

London :

PRINTED FOR W. SIMPKIN AND R. MARSHALL, STATIONERS' COURT,
LUDGATE-STREET.

1819.

C O N T E N T S.

	<i>Page.</i>
<i>On that which is peculiar to all metaphysical Cognition ..</i>	17
<i>Of the Sources of Metaphysic</i>	10
<i>Of the only Sort of Cognition, which can be termed me-</i> <i>taphysical.....</i>	18
<i>On the Distinction of Analytic and of Synthetic Judgments</i>	16
<i>The common Principle of all Analytic Judgments is the</i> <i>Proposition of Contradiction.....</i>	19
<i>Synthetic Judgments require another Principle, than that</i> <i>of Contradiction</i>	26
<i>Is Metaphysic possible?</i>	28
<i>How is Cognition from pure Reason possible?</i>	33
<i>How are pure Mathematics possible?</i>	40
<i>How are pure Physics possible?</i>	62
<i>Logical Table of Judgments</i>	76
<i>Transcendental Table of the Conceptions of the Under-</i> <i>standing, or of the Categories</i>	77
<i>Pure physiological Table of the universal Principles of</i> <i>Natural Philosophy</i>	77
<i>How is Nature itself possible?</i>	100
<i>Appendix to pure Physics</i>	108

CONTENTS.

	<i>Page.</i>
<i>On the System of Categories or Predicaments</i>	108
<i>Post Predicaments</i>	109
<i>How is Metaphysic in general possible?</i>	115
<i>Dialectic of pure Reason</i>	124
<i>Psychological Ideas, and Paralogisms</i>	125
<i>Cosmological Ideas, and Antinomies</i>	133
<i>Theological Idea, and transcendental Ideas</i>	149
<i>On the Determination of the Bound of pure Reason</i> ..	153
<i>Solution of the general Question of the Prolegomena,</i>	}
<i>How is Metaphysic possible as a Science?</i>	177
<i>On what can be done to realize Metaphysic as a Science</i> ..	187
<i>Review of a Judgment on the Criticism, which (judg-</i> <i>ment) precedes Investigation</i>	189
<i>Proposal for such an Investigation of the Criticism as the</i> <i>Judgment can follow</i>	200

ERRATA.

Page vii line 8 *after something dele the comma*—p. xi l. 8 *after own insert that and after hint insert a comma and which*—p. xiv l. 1 *read overlooked*—p. 18 l. 17 *after ignavum insert a comma and read præsepibus*—p. 24 l. 15 *after conceive dele the comma*—p. 25 l. 8 *after which insert (position)*—p. 28 l. 16 *after cognition insert or that*—p. 30 l. 18 *dele which*—p. 60 l. 8 *after but insert a comma*—p. 72 l. 1 *read tain*—p. 97 l. 22 *for is read it*—p. 100 l. 12 *for serve read answer*—p. 121 l. 1 *for physico read psycho*—p. 122 l. 21 *after explanation read is*—p. 144 l. 19 *read ideas*—p. 151 l. 9 *read conceptions*—p. 152 l. 15 *read systematical*—p. 155 l. 1 *read reason only and dele the comma after reason*—p. 178 l. 19 *for assert read say*

PREFACE.

THESE prolegomena are not for the use of learners, but for future teachers, and not intended to serve them for the purpose of arranging the propounding of an existing science, but for first of all discovering this science itself.

There are men of letters, whose only philosophy is the history of philosophy (as well of ancient as of modern). For them these prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those, who exert themselves to draw from the sources of reason, shall have finished their work, and then is the time for them to give an account of what has happened to the world. Else nothing can be said, which in their opinion has not been already said, and in fact this may hold good as an infallible presagement of every thing future; for, as the human understanding has, for many centuries, roamed in various ways among innumerable objects, it is not difficult to find something old that bears some resemblance to every thing new.

My design is, to convince those, who think it

worth their while to occupy themselves in the metaphysics, that it is indispensably necessary to set aside their present labour, to consider every thing hitherto done as undone, and above all things first to put the question, Whether such a science as metaphysic is but possible ?

If it is a science, how comes it that it does not, like other sciences, acquire universal and permanent approbation? If it is not, how does it happen, that it, under the appearance of a science, incessantly leads its votaries to plume themselves on their insight, and amuses the human understanding with never ceasing, but never fulfilled hopes? Whether we betray our knowledge or our want of knowledge, therefore, something certain with regard to the nature of this cognition hitherto falsely held a science, must be made out; for it is impossible that it should remain any longer on this footing. It is strange that, whilst every other science is making constant advances towards perfection, metaphysic, which is said to be wisdom itself, whose oracle every body consults, constantly turns on the same spot without advancing a single step. And it has lost its adherents very much, for we do not perceive, that those, who feel themselves able enough to shine in other sciences, are disposed to risk their fame in it, in which every one, who is ignorant of all other subjects, takes upon himself to pronounce a decisive judgment; because in this country (Germany) there

remain, as if nothing, which should give occasion either to apprehend, or to hope for, a near alteration, had happened.

I however venture to foretell, that the reader of these prolegomena, who thinks for himself, will not only doubt of what he has hitherto taken for the science, but by and by be fully convinced, that a science of this nature could not exist without complying with the demand here made, and upon which it depends, and, as this has never been done, that the metaphysics do not yet exist as a science. And, as the inquiry after them can never cease,* because the interest of the universal reason of man is too intimately interwoven with them, he will allow, that a total reform or rather a new birth of them, according to a hitherto quite unknown plan, and how much soever it may for a time be opposed, unavoidably impends.

Since the essays of Locke and of Leibnitz or rather since the origin of the metaphysics, as far as their history reaches, no event more decisive of their fate, than the attack which David Hume made on them, has happened. He has given us no light in this sort of cognition, but he struck a spark, by which, had it met with a susceptible tinder, whose

* Rusticus expectat, dum defluat annis: at ille

Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

Hor.

burning could have been kept up and increased, a light might have been obtained.

Hume sets out chiefly from a single but a weighty conception of metaphysic, that of the connexion of cause and of effect (and of course of their consequent conceptions of power and of action), and requires of reason, which pretends to have begotten it, to give him an account why it thinks, that something, can be so constituted that, when it is laid down, something else must thereby be necessarily laid down likewise; for that the conception of cause means. He proves incontrovertibly, that it is totally impossible for reason to conceive of such a conjunction *à priori* and from conceptions, for this comprises necessity; but we cannot discover why, because something is, something else must likewise be of necessity, and how the conception of such a connexion *à priori* can be introduced. Hence he infers, that reason entirely deceives itself in this conception, takes it falsely for its own child, as it is nothing but a bastard of the imagination which, impregnated by experience, has brought certain representations under the law of association, and substitutes a subjective necessity, that is, habit, thence arising, for an objective insight. He hence concludes, that reason has not a faculty of thinking of connexions of this sort even in the general; because its conceptions were in that case mere fictions, and all its cognitions pretended to subsist

à priori nothing but falsely stamped common experiences ; which amounts to this, that there are no metaphysics and can be none.*

His conclusion, though precipitate and wrong, is at least founded in investigation ; and this investigation is of sufficient moment to have induced men of metaphysical heads and exercised in abstract reasoning to unite themselves, in his life time, in order to solve the problem, in the sense he propounded it, if possible more happily ; by which means a total reform of the metaphysics must have been soon made.

But, unfortunately for them, he was understood by none. It is painful to see how his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and at last even Priestly, so entirely miss the point of his problem, and, while they always take that, which he doubts of, for

* For all that Hume himself terms this destructive philosophy metaphysics, and holds them in great estimation. Metaphysics and morals, says he, form the most considerable branches of science. Mathematics and natural philosophy are not half so valuable. This acute man attended here to the negative use only, which the moderation of the exaggerated pretensions of speculative reason would have, in order totally to annul so many endless and persecuting disputes, which confuse the human species ; but he lost sight of the positive harm, which arises from depriving reason of the most important prospects, according to which only it can point out to the will the highest aim of all its aspirations.

granted, but, on the other hand, prove with vehemence and for the most part with great petulance or insolence that, which never entered into his mind to doubt of, mistake his hint for improvement so much, that every thing remains as it was, as if nothing at all had happened. The question is not whether the conception of causation is right, useful, and relatively to the whole cognition of nature indispensable, for of this Hume never harboured a doubt; but whether it is thought of *à priori* by reason, and in this manner has internal truth independent of all experience, and consequently more extensive utility, which is not limited to objects of experience merely: on this subject Hume wanted information, and, as he himself tells us, always kept his mind open to instruction, if any one would vouchsafe to bestow it upon him. The origin of this conception only, not the indispensableness of its use, was the subject in hand; had that been but discovered, the conditions of its (this conception's) use, and of the sphere, in which it can be valid, would have developped themselves spontaneously.

But the antagonists of that celebrated man must, in order to do justice to the problem, have penetrated very deep into the nature of human reason; which had been irksome and not easy for them to do. They therefore found out a more convenient means of giving themselves an air of importance

without the least insight, that of an appeal to common-sense. It certainly is a great gift of heaven to possess common-sense. But it must be evinced by facts, by reflecting and by reasoning well on what one thinks of and says, but not, when one has nothing sensible to advance in his justification, by appealing to common-sense as an oracle. When insight and science are exhausted, and not till then, to appeal to common sense, is one of the most subtle discoveries of modern times, by which the most shallow prater can boldly enter the lists and cope with a man of the most profound reason. As long however as, there is a small remainder of insight that help-in-need will not be had recourse to. And it, when brought to light, is nothing but an appeal to the judgment of the multitude, at whose applause the philosopher blushes, but in which the popular witting triumphs and glories. But I should think, that Hume could lay just as good a claim to common-sense, as Beattie, and over and above to that, which he certainly did not possess, a critical reason, which sets limits to common-sense, that it may not lose itself in speculations or, when these only are on the carpet, not desire to decide on any thing; because it cannot vindicate itself with regard to its principles; for in that manner only does it remain a sound understanding. The chisel and mallet suffice to cut a piece of wood, but a finer implement, the burin, must be used for engraving. Thus is sound understanding, as well as speculative, useful,

but each in its own sphere ; that, when judgments, whose immediate application is found in experience, are in agitation, but this, when we have to judge in the general, from mere conceptions, for instance, in the metaphysics, in which what is commonly, but often *per antiphrasin*, named sound understanding, has no judgment whatever.

(I freely own it was Hume's hint that first roused me from a dogmatic slumber of many years, and gave quite a new direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy.* I was very far from listening to him with regard to his inferences, which he only drew because he did not represent to himself the whole of his problem, but touched on a part of it only, which, without taking the whole into consideration, can yield no satisfaction. When we begin from a grounded, though not an executed thought, which is left us by another, we may hope to carry it farther, than the acute man, whom we have to thank for the first spark of this light, can.

I therefore tried first if the Hume's scruple could not be universally represented, and soon found,

* Theoretical knowledge, when it refers to such an object or to such conceptions of an object as we cannot reach by any experience, becomes Speculative. mT.

that the conception of the connexion of cause and of effect is by no means the only one, by which the understanding thinks of connexions of things *a priori*, much less that the metaphysics entirely consist of it. I endeavoured to assure myself of their number, and, as this succeeded with me, according to my wishes, from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these conceptions, when I was certain, that they are not, as Hume is of opinion, derived from experience, but have their origin in the pure intellect. This deduction, which seemed impossible to my perspicacious predecessor, and which, though every body freely used the conceptions without asking upon what their objective validity was grounded, never struck any one but him, was the most difficult task that could ever be undertaken for the behoof of the metaphysics, and what still increased my embarrassment is, that no metaphysic, had any been any where in existence, could afford me the least assistance; because that deduction must constitute its (metaphysic's) possibility. Having succeeded in the solution of this problem not only in a particular case, but with a view to the whole faculty of pure reason; I could take sure though never but slow steps in order finally to ascertain completely and on universal principles the whole sphere of pure reason, its (reason's) bounds as well as its matter; which is what the metaphysics require in order to erect their system according to a sure plan,

But I am apprehensive, that the execution of Hume's problem in its greatest possible extension (the Criticism on pure reason), will have the same fate as the problem itself had when it was first represented. It will be ill judged, because it will not be understood; it will not be understood, because the public in general will be inclined to turn over the leaves of the book, but not to study it thoroughly; and they will not take this trouble, because the work is dry, obscure, repugnant to all usual conceptions, and over and above prolix.* I must say, that I did not expect complaints on account of the want of popularity, amusement, and ease, from a philosopher, when I was inquiring into the very existence of a cognition held of great value, indispensable to humanity, and which cannot be otherwise made out, than agreeably to the strictest rules of scholastic punctuality, which popularity may in process of time follow, but with which the beginning must never be made. As to a certain obscurity, however, which is in part occasioned by the prolixity of the plan, wherein the main points, upon which every thing in the research depends, cannot

* As the Criticism on pure Reason, the author's masterpiece, which contains the complete science of the criticism on the faculty of pure reason, will in all probability never be translated into English, it were well worth a philosopher's while to learn German for the sole purpose of studying this incomparable work in its native language. It would be of more use to him, than all his Greek and Latin. T.

well be over-looked ; the complaint on that account is just, and this I shall endeavour to obviate in these Prolegomena.

That work, which exhibits the faculty of pure reason in its whole sphere and bounds, always remains the foundation, to which the Prolegomena as pre-exercitations only refer ; for the criticism on pure reason must, as a science, subsist systematically and completely in its smallest parts before we can think of metaphysic's making its appearance or even of indulging a faint hope for it.

The public has already been long accustomed to see old worn-out cognitions supported by separating them from their former conjunctions, by fitting them with a systematical dress in one's own fashion, but under new titles ; and most readers will anticipate nothing else of that Criticism. But these Prolegomena will convince them, that it is quite a new science, of which nobody had ever conceived the thought before, of which even the mere idea was unknown, and for which nothing of any former data but the hint Hume's doubt gave could be used, which doubt however afforded no presension of a possible formal science of this nature ; but, on the contrary, he, to put his vessel in safety, run it ashore (on the strand of scepticism), where it might have lain and rotted, had not I given it a pilot, who, furnished with a complete chart and a compass, can,

on sure principles of the art of navigation, which are taken from the knowledge of the globe, conduct it safely wherever he pleases.

To go to a new science which is totally distinct from every other, and the only one of its sort, with the prejudice or preconceived opinion, that one can judge of it by means of his formerly acquired opiniative cognitions, though they are just those whose reality must be doubted of, produces nothing but that one thinks he sees every where what he formerly knew, because the expressions may perhaps be similar, only that every thing must seem to him very distorted, repugnant to common sense, and a mere jargon ; because he does not lay the foundation in the thoughts of the author, but in his own way of thinking, which is become natural to him by long habit. But the prolixity of the work, if it is grounded in the science itself and not in the style, the unavoidable dryness, and the scholastic punctuality, are properties, which may be extremely advantageous to the thing itself, but must needs be hurtful to the book.

Few possess the happy talent of writing in so subtile and at the same time so charming a manner, as David Hume, or at once so profoundly and so elegantly as Moses Mendelssohn ; but I flatter myself that, had my only object been to sketch a plan and to leave the finishing of it to others, and had I

not had the good of the science which has kept me so long employed at heart, I too could have written in a popular style ; and besides, much perseverance and not a little self-denial were requisite to postpone the temptation of an earlier favourable reception to the prospect of a late but lasting approbation.

Plan-making is for the most part a luxurious and an ostentatious employment of the mind, by which one, by requiring what he cannot perform himself, by blaming what he cannot improve, and by proposing where that which he is ignorant of is to be found, gives himself an air of creative genius, though something more is necessary to a proper plan of a universal criticism on reason, than may be presumed, if it shall not, as it usually does, become a mere declamation of pious wishes. But pure reason is a sphere so much separated from every other, so thoroughly connected in itself, that no part of it can be touched without moving all the other parts, and nothing can be effectuated without having previously assigned to every one its place and its influence on the others, because, as there is nothing without the sphere that can direct our judgment within it, the validity and the use of every part depend upon the relation, in which it stands to the others in reason itself, and, as in the structure of the members of an organized body, the end of each member cannot be derived but from the complete conception of the whole. Hence may it be said of

a criticism of this sort, that it, if it is not completed entirely and in the very least elements of pure reason, never is to be depended upon, and that either every thing or nothing of the sphere of this faculty must be determined or made out.

But, though a mere plan, which might precede the criticism on pure reason, would be unintelligible, not to be depended upon, and useless; it on the other hand is so much the more useful when it follows this criticism. For we are thereby enabled to see the whole at one view, to prove one by one the chief points, upon which every thing depends in this science, and to arrange many things relative to the propounding better, than could be done in the first sketch of the work.

I now lay before the public a plan of that sort, which may, subsequently to the completed work, be treated after the analytic method, as the book itself must be composed after the synthetic, in order that the science may exhibit to view all its articulations, as the organization of a very particular cognitive faculty, in its natural conjunction. And let him, who still finds these *Prolegomena* obscure, recollect, that it is not just necessary for every body to devote himself to the study of metaphysic, that there is many a talent, which succeeds perfectly well in useful and even profound sciences that approach nearer intuition, but which cannot succeed in researches by

merely abstract conceptions, and that one in such a case must turn his thoughts to some other object of pursuit. But he, who undertakes to judge of the metaphysics, nay, to write a treatise on them, must absolutely answer the demands made here, whatever way it be done, whether by adopting my solution, or by refuting it, and putting another in its place—for he cannot dismiss it—and finally the so much decried obscurity (the common cloak of one's own indolence or stupidity) is not without its utility; as all those, who in regard to all the other sciences observe a cautious silence, speak in a masterly manner and boldly decide in questions of metaphysic, because their ignorance of them distinctly contrasts not the science of others, but genuine critical principles, and of whom we therefore may say (with Virgil) *ignavum fucos, pecus à prasepibus arcent*.

PROLEGOMENA

TO EVERY FUTURE

METAPHYSIC

WHICH CAN APPEAR AS A SCIENCE.

ON WHAT IS PECULIAR TO ALL METAPHYSICAL
COGNITION.

§ I.

Of the Sources of the Metaphysics.

IF we would exhibit a cognition as a science, we must previously be able exactly to ascertain that which is distinctive in it, what it has in common with no other science, of course that which is peculiar to it; otherwise the bounds of all the sciences would run into one another, and none of these, as to their nature, be profoundly treated.

Whether this peculiarity consists in the difference or distinction either of the object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the mode of cognition, or of some if not of all of these points together, thereupon the idea of the possible science and of its territory first depends.

In the first place, as to the sources of a metaphysical cognition, it lies in their very conception, that they cannot be empirical. The principles of this cognition therefore (to which not only its fun-

damental propositions, but its fundamental conceptions belong), must never be taken from experience ; for it is not physical, but metaphysical cognition, that is, cognition lying beyond, or out of the reach of, experience. Consequently neither external experience, which constitutes the source of natural philosophy, nor internal, which constitutes the groundwork of empirical psychology, will lie as a foundation to it. It therefore is cognition *à priori*, or from pure intellect and pure reason.

But it in that would not be distinguished from the pure mathematics ; it must therefore be named pure philosophical cognition ; but I must beg leave to refer the reader to the Criticism on pure Reason, where the distinction of these two sorts of use of reason is represented in a clear and satisfactory manner.* And so much for the sources of metaphysical knowledge.

2.

On the only sort of Cognition, which can be named metaphysical.

a.

On the Distinction of Synthetic and of Analytic Judgments in general.

(METAPHYSICAL cognition contains nothing but

* Philosophical or discursive cognition is that from conceptions ; but Mathematical, that from the construction, or the intuitive exhibition, of conceptions. See Kant's Logic. T.

judgments *à priori*, for that which is peculiar to its source requires it.) But whatever origin judgments may have or, as to their logical form, of whatever nature they may be, there is a distinction between them, as to the matter, by means of which they are either merely explanatory, and add nothing to the cognition, or enlarging, and increase the given cognition; the former may be termed analytic judgments, the latter synthetic ones.

Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate but what is really conceived of in the conception of the subject, though not so clearly and with equal consciousness. If we say, 'All bodies are extended,' we have not enlarged our conception of body in the least, but resolved it, as extension had been, though not expressed, actually thought of in that conception previously to the judgment; the judgment by consequence is analytical. Whereas the proposition, 'Some bodies are heavy,' as it contains in the predicate something, which is not actually conceived of in the universal conception of body, enlarges our cognition by adding something to our conception, and hence must be denominated a synthetic judgment.

b.

The common Principle of all analytic Judgments is the Proposition of Contradiction.

All analytic judgments rest entirely upon the pro-

position of contradiction, and are as to their nature cognitions *à priori*, whether the conceptions, which serve for matter to them, are empirical or not. For, as the predicate of an affirmative analytic judgment was previously conceived of in the conception of the subject, it cannot be denied of it without a contradiction, in the same manner its contrary is, conformably to the proposition of contradiction, necessarily denied of the subject in an analytic but negative judgment. The propositions, 'Every body is extended,' and 'No body is unextended (simple),' are of the same nature.

And just on that account all analytic propositions, though their conceptions are empirical, are judgments *à priori*, for instance, Gold is a yellow metal; for in order to know this I have no occasion for any other experience, than my conception of gold, which contains, that this body is yellow and a metal; for this constitutes my conception, and I have nothing to do but to dissect it, without looking for any thing out of it.

c.

Synthetic Judgments require another Principle, than the Proposition of Contradiction.

THERE are synthetic judgments *à posteriori*, whose origin is empirical; but there are of them, which are certainly *à priori*, and consequently

arise from the pure understanding and pure reason. Both however agree in this, that they never can arise from the principle of analysis, the proposition of contradiction, only; they require quite another principle, though they must, from whatever principle it may be, always be derived conformably to the proposition of contradiction; for nothing must be contrary to this position, though every thing cannot just be derived from it. I shall first arrange the synthetic judgments in classes.

1. Judgments of experience are always synthetical. For it were absurd to ground an analytic judgment upon experience, as we need not go beyond our conception to form the judgment, and therefore have no occasion for a testimony of experience for it. That a body is extended, is a proposition, which is established *à priori*, and not a judgment of experience. For, before we have recourse to experience, we have all the conditions of our judgment in the conception, from which we can extract the predicate according to the position of contradiction, and thereby become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, which necessity experience would not teach.

2. All mathematical judgments are synthetical.

This proposition, though it is incontrovertibly certain and will be of great importance to us by and by, seems hitherto to have totally escaped the observations of the anatomists of human reason, yes, to be directly opposed to all their conjectures. For, as all the conclusions of the mathematicians are

found to proceed according to the position of contradiction (which procedure the nature of every apodictical certainty requires), people persuaded themselves; that the principles too are known from this position, in which persuasion they erred very much; for a synthetic proposition can by all means be known according to the position of contradiction, but by the presupposition of another synthetic proposition only from which it can be inferred, but never in itself.

It must first be observed, that mathematical propositions are always judgments *à priori* and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be gathered from experience. But, should this not be granted me; very well; I shall limit my proposition to the pure mathematics, whose very conception informs us, that they contain nothing empirical, but pure cognition, or that *à priori*, merely.

It might at first sight be thought, that the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, is a merely analytic one, which flows from the conception of a sum of seven and of five according to the position of contradiction. But, when it is more closely considered, it is found, that the conception of the sum of seven and of five contains nothing more than the union of both numbers in a single one; by which it is not at all thought what this single number that comprehends both is. The conception of twelve is by no means thought of by our conceiving merely of that union of seven and of five, and, let us dis-

sect our conception of such a possible sum ever so long, we shall never meet with twelve in it. We must go beyond these conceptions and take to our assistance the intuition, which corresponds to one of them, one's five fingers, for instance, or (like Segner in his Arithmetic) five points, and thus add by degrees the unities of the five given by intuition to the conception of seven. Consequently one really enlarges his conception by the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, and superadds to the former conception a new one, which is not thought of in that; that is, the arithmetical proposition is always synthetical; of which we are more sensible when somewhat greater numbers are taken; as it is then evident, that, however we may twist our conception, we, without taking intuition to our aid, can never find the sum by means of the mere dissection of our conceptions.

As little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. That a straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition. For our conception of straight contains nothing of quantity, but a quality only. The conception of the shortest is therefore quite superadded, and cannot be taken from the conception of the straight line by any dissection. Intuition, by means of which only the synthesis is possible, must of course be called in to our assistance here.

A few other principles, which geometers assume, are analytical and rest upon the position of

contradiction, but serve, as identical propositions, only for the concatenation of the method and not as principles; for example, $a = a$, the whole is equal to itself or $(a + b) > a$, that is, the whole is greater than its part. And even these, though they hold according to mere conceptions, are only admitted in the mathematics because they can be exhibited intuitively. What commonly makes us believe here, that the predicate of such apodictical judgments lies in our conception, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the ambiguity of the expression. We ought, for instance, to conceive a certain predicate as added to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conceptions. But the question is not what we ought to conceive, as added to the given conception, but what we conceive in it actually, though obscurely only, and it is obvious, that the predicate adheres to those conceptions of necessity, not immediately, but by means of an intuition, which must be superadded.

3.

Scholion to the general Division of Judgments into analytical and synthetical.

THIS division is with regard to the criticism on the human understanding indispensable, and hence deserves to be classical in it; otherwise I do not see, that it can be of any considerable use elsewhere. And this strikes me to be the reason of

'dogmatical philosophers,' who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in the metaphysics themselves, but not out of them, in the laws of pure reason in general, neglecting this division, which seems to present itself spontaneously, and of the celebrated Wolf or his acute successor Baumgarten's seeking the proof of the position of sufficient ground, which is manifestly synthetical, in the position of contradiction. Whereas I find in Locke's Essay on the human Understanding a hint of this division. For, in the third head of the fourth book, after mentioning the various connexions of the representations in judgments and their sources, the one of which he places in the identity or the contradiction (analytic judgments), and the other in the existence of the representations in a subject (synthetical judgments), he allows, that our knowledge (*à priori*) of the latter is very little and almost nothing at all. But every thing he says of this sort of cognition is so vague and so little reduced to rules, that we need not wonder if it was the occasion of nobody, not even of Hume's taking propositions of this sort into consideration. For so general and yet so determinate principles we do not learn easily of others, who conceive of them but obscurely. One must be first led to them by his own reflection, when he finds them where he certainly would not have first met with them; because the authors themselves do not so much as know, that such an idea forms the basis of their

own observations. Those, who never think for themselves, possess nevertheless the perspicacity to see every thing, after it is shewn them, in that, which was formerly said, though nobody could see it before.

4.

Is Metaphysic possible?

WERE metaphysic, which could maintain itself as a science, actual ; could one say, here is metaphysic, you have only to learn it, and it will convince you irresistibly and immutably of its truth ; this question would be unnecessary, and nothing would remain but another, which concerns more a trial of our acumen, than the proof of the existence of the thing itself, and which is, How is it possible, and how does reason make the beginning to attain it ? In this case human reason has not been successful. We cannot open a single book, as we can a Euclid, and say, here is metaphysic, here you will find the chief end of this science, the knowledge of a Supreme Being, and of a future world, evinced on principles of pure reason. Many propositions, which are apodictically certain and have never been disputed, may be shewn us ; but they are all analytical, and regard more the materials for building the metaphysics, than the enlarging of cognition, which however is our real design with them. But, though you point out synthetic propositions (for in-

stance, the principle of sufficient ground), which you have never proved from mere reason, by consequence, as it was your duty, *à priori*, but which we willingly grant you; you, when you have a mind to use them for your chief end, make so feeble and so unsafe assertions, that one species of metaphysic has at all times contradicted another in respect either of the assertions themselves, or of their proofs, and thereby destroyed their claim to a permanent approbation. The endeavours to bring this science to pass were no doubt the first cause of so early a scepticism, a cast of mind, in which reason proceeds so violently against itself, that it never could, but in despair of satisfaction with regard to its most important views, have allowed that to arise. For long before philosophers began to question nature methodically, one had questioned nothing but his own separate reason, which in some measure was exercised by common experience; because reason is always present with us, but the laws of nature must commonly be sought with great labour, and thus did metaphysic swim on the top, like foam, yet in such a manner that, when it, which was drawn from the source, disappeared, like it, another immediately appeared upon the surface, when it was always embraced by a few enthusiasts; others, instead of seeking at the bottom for the cause of this phenomenon, thought themselves so wise with it, as to laugh at the useless labour of those.

That which is essential and distinguishes the pure mathematical cognition from all other cognition *à priori* is, that it arises absolutely not from conceptions, but always by the construction of conceptions (Criticism page 713). Consequently, as the mathematics in their propositions must go beyond the conception to that which the intuition corresponding to it contains; their propositions neither can nor should arise by dissection of the conceptions, that is, analytically, and hence are collectively synthetical.

But I cannot avoid remarking the disadvantage, which the neglect of this easy and seemingly insignificant observation has occasioned philosophy. Hume, as he felt the call worthy of a philosopher to cast his eye on the whole field of pure cognition *à priori*, in which human understanding pretends to so great possessions, inadvertently cut off from it a whole and indeed its chief province, the pure mathematics, imagining that their nature and, so to say, their constitution depend upon quite another principle, that of contradiction entirely, and though he has not made the division of the propositions so formally and so generally, as I have done here, or under the same denomination, it is just as much as if he had said, the pure mathematics contain analytical propositions only, but the metaphysics synthetical ones *à priori*. In that he errs very much, and this error has been productive of decisively disadvantageous consequences to his whole concep-

tion." For, had he not done that, he would have enlarged his question relative to the origin of our synthetic judgments far beyond his metaphysical conception of causation, and extended it to the possibility of the mathematics *a priori* also; for this science he must needs assume alike synthetical. But then he could not have by any means founded his metaphysical propositions upon mere experience, because he would have equally subjected the axioms of the pure mathematics to experience; but to have done which he was a man of too great penetration. The good society, in which metaphysic would have then been, had secured it from the danger of bad treatment, for the attacks, which were made on this science, must have affected that also; but which neither was nor could be his opinion; and thus this acute philosopher must have been drawn into considerations similar to these, in which we are at present engaged, but which would have infinitely gained by his inimitably fine style.

All metaphysical judgments are synthetical. Metaphysical judgments however must be distinguished from those belonging to the metaphysics. Among these there are a great many analytical, but they constitute the means only to metaphysical judgments, to which the end of the science is entirely directed, and which always are synthetical. For, when conceptions belong to the metaphysics, for instance, that of substance, the judgments, which arise from their mere dissection, likewise belong of

necessity to the metaphysics, for example, substance is that which exists as subject only, and by means of more such like analytic judgments we endeavour to approach towards the definition of conceptions. But as the analysis of a conception of the pure understanding (such as metaphysic contains) is not accomplished in any other way, than the dissection of every other empirical conception which does not belong to metaphysic (for instance, air is an elastic fluid, whose elasticity is not destroyed by any known degree of cold), the conception, but not the analytical judgment, is in a peculiar manner metaphysical; for this science has something particular and peculiar to it in the generation of its cognitions *à priori*; which must therefore be distinguished from that, which it has in common with all other cognitions of the understanding; for example, the proposition, All that which is substance in things is permanent, is a synthetic and a peculiarly metaphysical one.

When the conceptions *à priori*, which constitute the matter of metaphysic and the materials for building it, have been previously collected agreeably to certain principles, the dissection of these conceptions is of great value; and they can, as a particular part (as it were as *philosophia definitiva*), which contains merely analytic propositions belonging to metaphysic, be propounded separately from all the synthetic propositions, which constitute metaphysic itself. For these dissections in fact are of

considerable use no where but in metaphysic, that is, in regard to the synthetic propositions, which shall be engendered from those first dissected conceptions.

The conclusion of this paragraph then is, that metaphysic has in strict propriety to do with synthetic propositions *à priori*, and these only constitute its end, for which they certainly require various dissections of their conceptions, by consequence analytic judgments, but whereby the procedure is nothing else than in every other mode of cognition, in which we merely seek to render our conceptions distinct by dissection. But the begetting of cognition *à priori* as well as to intuition as to conceptions, and finally synthetic propositions *à priori* in the philosophical cognition, make up the essential matter of metaphysic.

Tired therefore at once of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, and of scepticism, which promises us nothing at all, not even the quiet state of an allowed ignorance, called on by the importance of a cognition which we stand in need of, and rendered diffident by long experience with regard to every cognition, which we believe we possess or which offers itself under the title of pure reason to us, there remains but one critical question according to whose answer we can arrange our future procedure, Is metaphysic possible? But this question must be answered not by sceptical objections to certain assertions of an actual metaphysic (for we do

not admit of it yet), but from the as yet only problematical conception of a science of this sort.

In the Criticism on pure Reason I have treated this question synthetically, made inquiries into pure reason itself, and endeavoured in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its (reason's) use according to principles. This labour is difficult, and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, of which no data without reason itself form the basis, and reason therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to unfold the cognition from its original germes. Prolegomena are designed for pre-exercitations; they are intended more to point out what we have to do, if possible, to realize a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon something already known as certain, and from which we can set out with confidence, and ascend to the sources not yet known, and whose discovery will not only explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources. The methodical procedure of prolegomena, especially of these designed to prepare for future metaphysic, is consequently analytical.

But it happens fortunately, that, though we cannot assume, that metaphysic is actual as a science, we can say with truth, that certain pure synthetic cognitions *à priori*, the pure mathematics and the pure physics, are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly acknowledged to

be partly apodictically certain by bare reason, partly by general consent from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some, at least incontestable, cognitions *à priori*, and need not ask if they be possible (for they are real), but how they are possible, in order to be able from the principle of the possibility of the given ones to deduce the possibility of all the others.

5.

How is Cognition from pure Reason possible?

WE have already seen the great distinction of analytic and of synthetic judgments. The possibility of analytic propositions may be very easily comprehended; for they are entirely founded in the position of contradiction. And the possibility of synthetic propositions *à posteriori*, that is, those which are gathered from experience, do not require a particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There remains therefore nothing to us but synthetic propositions *à priori*, whose possibility must be sought or investigated; because they must depend upon another principle, than that of contradiction.

But we have no occasion first to seek the possibility of propositions of that sort here, that is, to inquire if they are possible. For there are enough of them actually given with undoubted certainty, and, as the method, which we at present use, is

analytical, we shall make the beginning with the assertion, that synthetic cognition of pure reason is possible; but we must then inquire into the ground of the possibility, and ask, how this cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, the sphere and its bounds. The proper problem expressed with scholastic precision, and upon which all depends, consequently is:

How are synthetic Propositions à priori possible?

For the sake of popularity I have expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry after cognition from pure reason, and which I could do for this once without detriment to the sought insight, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysic and its sources, the reader, I hope, will, after the hint formerly dropped, always remember that, when we here speak of cognition from pure reason, we do not mean the analytic, but always the synthetic.*

* When knowledge gradually advances certain expressions, which have been used since the infancy of science, cannot but be found insufficient and inadequate. The analytic method, provided that it is opposed to the synthetic, is very distinct from a complex of analytic propositions: it signifies only that we set out from what is sought as if it were given, and mount to the only conditions, on which it is possible. In this method we often make

Upon the solution of that problem the standing or the falling of metaphysic and consequently its existence totally depend. Let any one make assertions with ever so much appearance of truth with regard to it, if he has not been previously able to answer that question in a satisfactory manner, I have a right to say, that it is all vain groundless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and pretend, as it were, to create cognitions *à priori* by not only anatomizing given conceptions, but giving out connexions, which do not rest upon the principle of contradiction, and which you are of opinion you perspect quite independently of all experience; how do you come to this, and how will you justify yourself on account of such pretensions? To appeal to the consent of the universal reason of man, cannot be allowed you; for that is a testimony, which only depends upon public report.

Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi. HORACE.

As indispensable however as the answer to this question is, it is at the same time as difficult, and though the principal reason of its not having been attempted long ago to be answered is this, that it

use of nothing but synthetic propositions, as in the mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive (retrograde) method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of logic too is distinguished by the name of analytic, which is the logic of truth and opposed to the dialectic, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical.

never occurred to any body, that such a thing could be asked, there is yet another reason, that a satisfactory answer to this single question requires a much more constant, a more profound, and a more laborious reflection, than ever the most diffuse work of the metaphysics, which on their first appearance promised immortality to their author, did. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects on what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and hold it insolvable and, were there not actually pure synthetic cognitions *à priori*, totally impossible ; which really happened to David Hume, though he did not near represent to himself the question in such universality, as is done here and must be done if the answer shall be decisive of all metaphysic. For, how is it possible, says that great man, that, when a conception is given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, and in such a manner as if this necessarily belonged to that ? Nothing but experience can furnish us with connexions of that sort (thus did he infer from that difficulty, which he held impossibility), and all that imaginary necessity or, what is the same thing, cognition *à priori* held so, is nothing but a long habit of finding something true, and hence of holding the subjective necessity objective.

If the reader should complain of the difficulty and the labour, which I occasion him by the solution of this problem, let him endeavour to do it

himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then acknowledge the obligation he lies under to him, who has undertaken for him a work of so profound research, and rather betray some wonder at the facility, with which, considering the nature of the thing, the solution has been made, especially as it has cost a labour of many years in order to be able to solve this problem in its whole universality (in the sense, in which the mathematicians take this word, sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytic form, as the reader will find it here.

All metaphysicians consequently are solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, How are synthetic cognitions *a priori* possible? For in the answer to it the only credential, which they must shew when they have any thing to bring us in the name of pure reason, consists; if however they do not possess it, they can expect nothing else than to be, without farther inquiry, dismissed by reasonable people, who have already been so often deceived.

If they on the other hand would not carry on their business as a science, but as an art of persuasion more wholesome and better suited to the universal understanding of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the discreet language of a rational belief, they will grant, that they are not allowed even so much as to conjec-

ture that, not to mention to know any thing, which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but to assume something (not for the speculative use, for they must give it up, but for the practical only) that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner only can they bear the name of useful and of wise men, the more they renounce that of metaphysicians ; for these will be speculative philosophers, and as, when judgments *à priori* are in question, superficial probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is pretended to be known *à priori*, is just thereby announced as necessary), they cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, their assertion must be science, or it never is any thing at all.

It may be said, that the whole transcendental philosophy,* which necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, only in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy ; for, what goes by its name is, correctly speaking, a part of metaphysic ; but that science is intended first to constitute the possibility of this, and must therefore precede all metaphysic. And it is not surprising, that a whole science, deprived of all assistance from

* See the Appendix to Kant's Logic translated from the German ; in which this philosophy is explained. T.

other sciences and consequently quite a new one in itself, is necessary to answer a single question sufficiently when its solution is combined with trouble and difficulty, nay, even with some obscurity.

As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytic method, in which we presuppose, that cognition from pure reason is possible; we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition (as it only is under consideration here), the pure mathematics and the pure physics, for none but these can exhibit objects intuitively to us, consequently if there should occur in them a cognition *a priori*, which shews truth, or the harmony of the cognition with the object, in the concrete, that is, its reality, we could proceed from it to the ground of its possibility in the analytic way. This lightens the business much, in which the universal considerations not only are applied to facts, but even set out from them, instead of which they must in the synthetic procedure be totally derived in the abstract from conceptions.

But, in order to rise from these real and at the same time grounded pure cognitions *a priori* to a possible metaphysic as a science, which we are seeking, it is necessary for us to comprehend that, which occasions it, and as a merely naturally given, though on account of its truth not an unsuspected, cognition *a priori* lies as a foundation to that science, the elaboration of which without any critical inquiry into its possibility is commonly denominated metaphysic,

in a word, to comprehend the predisposition of nature to such a science in our chief question, and thus will the transcendental main question, divided into four other questions, be gradually answered :

1. *How are pure mathematics possible ?*
2. *How are pure physics possible ?*
3. *How is metaphysic in general possible ?*
4. *How is metaphysic as a science possible ?*

It may be seen, that the solution of those problems, though it is chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Criticism,* has something particular, which deserves attention by itself, and which is, to seek the sources of given sciences in reason itself, in order thereby to know something *a priori* of this their faculty, to investigate and to measure it by means of the fact itself; by which these sciences themselves gain, if not with regard to their matter, as to their right use, and, while they procure light to a higher question relative to their common origin, at the same time give occasion to illustrate their own nature better.

6.

How are pure Mathematics possible?

HERE is now a great and a certain cognition, which has at present a wonderful sphere, and be-

* The Criticism on pure Reason is called in Germany *Kritik* the Criticism. T.

speaks hereafter an unbounded extension, which carries with it thoroughly apodictical certainty, that is, absolute necessity, which of course rests upon no ground of experience, consequently is a pure production of reason, and over and above completely synthetical; but how is it possible for human reason to bring to pass a cognition of this nature totally *à priori*? Does not this faculty, as it neither bottoms, nor can bottom upon experience, presuppose some one ground of cognition *à priori*, which lies deeply hidden, but which might manifest itself by these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently investigated?

7

But we find, that all mathematical cognition has this peculiar to it, that it must previously exhibit its conception by intuition *à priori*, an intuition which consequently is not empirical, but pure; a means, without which the mathematics cannot take a single step; hence their judgments are always intuitive; whereas philosophy can be satisfied with discursive judgments, or those from mere conceptions, and illustrate its doctrines by intuition, but never derive them from it. This observation on the nature of the mathematics gives us a clew to the first and chief condition of their possibility, which is, that some pure intuition or other, in which all their conceptions can be exhibited or, as it is named, constructed, in the concrete, and yet *à priori*, must

form their basis. If we can find out this pure intuition and the possibility of such a one, it may be easily explained from it how synthetic propositions *à priori* are possible in the mathematics, and consequently how this science itself is possible; for, as the empirical intuition makes it possible without difficulty for us to enlarge our conception, which we form to ourselves, of an object of intuition by new predicates, which intuition itself presents, synthetically by experience, the pure intuition does it likewise, only with this difference, that, in the latter case, the synthetic judgment is *à priori* certain and apodictical, but, in the former, only *à posteriori* and empirically certain; because this contains only that which is met with in the casual empirical intuition, but that, what must be met with in the pure one of necessity, as it, as intuition *à priori*, is inseparably conjoined with the conception before all experience or single perceptions.

8.

But the difficulty seems in this step rather to increase than to lessen. For the question now is, How is it possible to represent any thing immediately *à priori*? An intuition is a representation as it immediately depends upon the presence of the object. Hence does it seem impossible originally to represent immediately, or by intuition, *à priori*, because intuition would in that event have place without

either a formerly present, or a present object to refer to, and by consequence could not be intuition. Conceptions are of that nature, that we can easily form some of them *à priori*, namely, those, which contain nothing but the thinking of an object in general, without finding ourselves in an immediate relation to the object, for instance, the conceptions of quantity, of cause, &c. but even these require, in order to give them signification, a certain use in the concrete, that is, application to some one intuition, by which an object of it is given us. But how can the intuition of the object precede the object itself?

9.

Were intuition of such a nature, as to represent things as they are in themselves, no intuition *à priori* would have place, it (intuition) were always empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given me. Indeed it is even then incomprehensible how the intuition of a present thing should give me to know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot be infused into my power of representation; but, granting the possibility of that, an intuition of that sort would not have place *à priori*, that is, before the object should be represented to me; for without that no ground of the reference of my representation to it can be excogitated; it would then need to rest upon inspiration. It therefore is only

possible in one way for my intuition to precede the reality of the object, and to have place as cognition *à priori*: when it (the intuition) contains nothing but the form of the sensitivity, (*sensualitas*),* which precedes in me all the real impressions, by which I am affected by objects. For I can know *à priori*, that objects of sense can only be represented by intuition agreeably to this form of the sensitive faculty. Hence it follows, that propositions, which regard this form of sensual intuition only, are possible and valid for objects of the senses, as also conversely, that intuitions, which are possible *à priori*, can never regard other things, than objects of our senses.

10.

Consequently it is only the form of the sensual intuition, by which we can immediately represent things *à priori*, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves, and this presupposition is, if synthetic propositions *à priori* shall be granted as possible or, in case they are really met with, their possibility comprehended and previously determined, absolutely necessary.

Space and time are the intuitions, which the pure mathematics lay as the foundation to all their cognitions and judgments, which appear at once apo-

* See this word explained in Kant's Logic. T.

dictical and necessary ; for the mathematics must first exhibit all their conceptions by intuition, and the pure mathematics by pure intuition, that is, construct them, without which (as they can proceed not analytically, by dissection of conceptions, but synthetically) it is impossible for them to take a single step ; for if pure intuition is wanting to them, there is nothing in which the matter for synthetic judgments *à priori* can be given them. Geometry builds upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic brings to pass its conceptions of number by the addition of the unities in time, and the pure mechanics especially cannot bring to pass their conceptions of motion but by means of the representation of time. Both representations however are only intuitions ; for if we leave out of the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations (motion) all, which is empirical, or what belongs to sensation, space and time still remain, and which are therefore pure intuitions that lie as a foundation to those *à priori*, and hence can never be left out themselves, but just by their being pure intuitions *à priori* prove, that they are mere forms of our sensitivity, which must precede all empirical intuition, that is, perception of real objects, and conformably to which objects can be known *à priori*, but only as they appear to us, or as apparitions or phenomena.

11.

This problem is therefore solved. The pure ma-

thematics, as synthetical cognition *à priori*, are only possible by their referring to no other objects than those of the senses; to whose empirical intuition a pure one (of space and of time) lies as a foundation *à priori*, and can do so because this intuition is nothing but the mere form of the sensitive faculty, which precedes the real appearance (the phenomenon) of the objects by its making them in fact first of all possible. Yet this faculty of representing immediately *à priori* regards not the matter of the phenomenon, that is, what is sensation in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical, but its form, space and time. Should it be in the least doubted, that they are determinations adhering by no means to things in themselves, but to their relation to the sensitivity; I should be glad to be informed how it can be found possible to know *à priori*, and of course before all acquaintance with things, or previously to their being given us, how their intuition must be constituted; which however is the case here with space and with time. But that is comprehensible the moment both are held nothing more than formal conditions of our sensitive faculty, but the objects merely phenomena; for then the form of the apparitions or phenomena, that is, the pure intuition can by all means be represented *à priori*, that is, from ourselves.

12.

In order to add something by way of illustration

and in confirmation, we need only attend to the usual and the indispensable procedure of geometers. All proofs of the thorough equality of two given figures (when the one can be completely put in the place of the other) amount at last to this, that they cover one another; which is evidently nothing else, than a synthetic proposition resting upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be given purely, or *à priori*, otherwise that proposition could not hold as apodictically certain, but would have empirical certainty only. It could only be said, that it is always remarked so, and it holds but as far as our preception reaches. That the complete space (which is itself no longer any boundary of another space) has three dimensions, and space itself cannot have more, is built upon the proposition, that not more than two lines can cut one another at right angles in one point; but this proposition cannot by any means be evinced from conceptions, but rests immediately upon pure intuition, or that *à priori*, because it is apodictically certain; that it can be required to draw a line or to continue a series of alterations (for example, spaces passed by motion) to indefinite, we presuppose a representation of space and of time, which can only attach to the intuition, namely, provided that it in itself is bounded by nothing; for from conceptions it could not be inferred. Consequently the mathematics are really built upon pure intuitions, which make their synthetic and apodictically valid propositions

possible, and hence does our transcendental deduction of the conceptions of space and of time explain at the same time the possibility of the pure mathematics, which may, without a deduction of that sort, and without our assuming, 'that every thing which can be given our senses (the external in space, the internal in time) is immediately represented by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself,' be granted, but can by no means be perspected.*

13,

Those, who cannot yet alter their opinion of space and of time's being real qualities that adhere to things in themselves, may exercise their acumen on the following paradox, and, when they have in vain attempted its solution, free from prejudices for a few moments at least, presume, that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of our sensual intuition perhaps may be well founded.

When two things are quite similar in all the parts, which can be known in each apart (in all the determinations pertaining to quantity and to quality), it must follow, that the one can in all cases and references be put in the place of the other without this substitution's occasioning the least perceptible difference. That in fact is the case with plane figures in geometry; but various spherical

* See Kant's Logic for the meaning of this word. T.

ones shew, notwithstanding that complete internal congruence, one of such a nature in the external relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other, for instance, two spherical triangles of both hemispheres, which have one arc of the equator for a common base, may be quite equal, as to the sides as well as the angles, so that nothing is to be found in the one, when it is alone and completely described, that does not lie at the same time in the description of the other, and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other (upon the opposite hemisphere), and here is then an internal difference of both triangles, which difference no understanding can hold to be internal, and which only manifests itself by the external relation in space. But I shall give more usual cases, which can be taken from common life.

What can have a greater resemblance to my hand or to my ear, and in every part be more alike, than their image in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left, and the image or reflection of the right ear is a left one that never can supply the place of the other. Here there are no internal differences which any understanding could conceive; and yet the differences are internal as far as the senses teach, for the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right, notwithstanding all the equality and similarity of both (they are

not congruent, the glove of the one hand cannot be used for the other. What is the solution of that? Those objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would cognise* them, but sensual intuitions, that is, phenomena, whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, to our sensitive faculty. Of this space is the form of the external intuition, and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of the external relation to the whole space, of which that is a part (to the relation to the external sense), that is, the part is only possible by the whole; which has place never relatively to things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but to bare phenomena. And hence cannot we render the difference of similar and of equal but of incongruous things (for instance, snails rolled up contrary to all sense) intelligible by any one conception, but by the relation to the right and the left hand, which relation goes immediately to intuition.

SCHOLIUM I.

The pure mathematics, and particularly pure geometry, cannot have objective reality but on condition of their referring to objects of sense only, in regard to which the principle, that our sensual re-

* This word too is explained in Kant's Logic. T.

presentation is a representation by no means of things in themselves, but of the way in which they appear to us, is established. Hence it follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the determinations of a mere creature of our feigning fancy, and therefore cannot be referred with certainty to real objects, but that they necessarily hold of space, and consequently of all that may be met with in it, because space is nothing else, than the form of all the external phenomena, in which alone objects of sense can be given. Sensitivity, whose form geometry builds upon, is that, upon which the possibility of the external apparitions or phenomena rests; these therefore can never contain any thing but what geometry prescribes to them. It would be quite otherwise if the senses should represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by any means follow from the representation of space, which the geometrician lays as a foundation *a priori* with all the properties of space, that all that together with what is thence inferred must be so in nature. The space of the geometrician would be held a mere fiction, and no objective validity ascribed to it; because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with the image, which we make spontaneously and previously of them. But if this image or rather this formal intuition is the essential property of our sensitivity, by means of which only objects are given us, and this sensitivity represents not things

in themselves, but their phenomena, it is very easy to be comprehended and at the same time indisputably proved, that all the external objects of our sensible world must necessarily accord with the propositions of geometry with the greatest punctuality, because the sensitivity by means of its form of external intuition (or of its original mode of representation, space) about which the geometrician is occupied, first of all makes those objects possible as mere phenomena. It will always remain remarkable in the history of philosophy, that there was a time, when mathematicians themselves, who were philosophers too, began to doubt not of the rightness of their geometrical propositions, as far as they regard space, but of the objective validity and of the application of this conception itself and of all its determinations to nature, as they were apprehensive, that a line in nature, might consist of physical points, consequently true space in the object might consist of simple parts, though the space, which the geometrician has in thought, can by no means consist of them. They did not know, that this space in thought makes the physical space, that is, the extension of matter itself, possible; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form* of our sensitive power of representation; and that all objects in

* Or an original procedure. T.

space are mere phenomena, that is, not things in themselves, but representations of our sensual intuition, and, as space, as the geometrician conceives of it, is exactly the form of the sensual intuition, which we find *a priori* in us, and which contains the ground of the possibility of all the external phenomena (as to their form), these must necessarily and precisely agree with the propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any feigned conception, but from, the subjective substratum of all the external phenomena, the sensitivity itself. In this and in no other way can the geometrician be secured from all the cavil or chicanery of superficial metaphysicians on account of the undoubted objective reality of his propositions, how surprising soever it may seem to those, as they do not recur to the sources of their conceptions.

SCHOLIUM II.

All that is given us as an object, must be given us by intuition. All our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding represents nothing immediately, but reflects only. And as the senses, as we have just shewn, never and in no point give us to know things in themselves, but phenomena, which are mere representations of the sensitivity, 'all bodies together with space, in which they are, must be held nothing but mere representations in us, and exist

nowhere else, than merely in our thoughts.' Is not this manifest idealism?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we believe we perceive by intuition, are nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which in fact no object without these corresponds. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses without us are given us, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, but their phenomena, that is, the representations, which they occasion in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I certainly grant, that there are bodies without us, that is, things, which though it is quite unknown to us what they are in themselves, we know by the representations, which their influence on our sensitivity procures us, and to which we affix the denomination of a body, which word therefore signifies merely the phenomenon of that object which is unknown to us, but not the less real. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.

That, without detriment to the actual existence of external things, it may be said of many of their predicates, that they belong not to the things in themselves, but to their phenomena, and have no proper existence without our representation, is what had been generally assumed and granted long before Locke's time, but has since been more so. Heat, colour, and taste, for instance, belong to these. But that I can besides these number, from weighty

causes, the other qualities of bodies also, which are named primary ones, extension, place, and in general space, with all which adheres to it (impenetrability or materiality, figure, &c.), among mere phenomena, not the least ground of inadmissibility can be adduced; and as little as he, who admits colours not as properties of the object in itself, but as modifications of the sense of seeing, can on that account be named an idealist, as little can my system be named idealistical merely, because I find, that all the properties, which constitute the intuition of a body, belong merely to its phenomenon; for the existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in the real idealism, but it is shewn, that we cannot cognise at all by the senses how it is in itself.

I should be glad to know of what nature my assertions would need to be in order not to contain an idealism. Without doubt I would need to say, that the representations of space are not only perfectly conformable to the relation, which our sensitivity has to the objects, for that I have said, but quite similar to them; an assertion, with which I can combine as little sense as I can with this, that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of vermillion, which excites this sensation in me.

SCHOLIUM III.

Hence may be very easily obviated an easily for-

seen but a nugatory objection, ' that by the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned to a mere appearance.'¹¹ After having first spoiled all philosophical insight into the nature of the sensual cognition by placing the sensitivity merely in a confused mode of representation,* according to which we still cognise things as they are, only without having the faculty of bringing every thing in this our representation to a clear consciousness; whereas we have proved, that the sensitivity consists not in the logical distinction of clearness or of obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself, as sensual cognition represents things not at all as they are, but in the way in which they affect our senses, and consequently that by them phenomena only, not things themselves, are given the understanding for reflection: From that necessary correction it will appear, that an objection, arising from an unpardonable and almost an intentional misunderstanding, to my system, is started, as if it turned all the things of the sensible world to mere apparition.

When a phenomenon is given us, we are still quite free in our judgment of the thing from it. That (the phenomenon) depends upon the senses, but this judgment upon the understanding, and the question is, only, whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the difference

* The author alludes here to Leibnitz's system, which he easily refutes. T.

between truth and a dream is not made out by the quality of the representations, which are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but by their connexion according to those rules, which determine the coherence of the representations in the conception of an object, and if they can subsist together or not in experience. And it is not the fault of the phenomena when our cognition takes appearance for truth, that is, when intuition, by which an object is given us, is held a conception of the object or of its existence of which the understanding only can think. The diurnal rotation of the earth on its axis represents the sun in motion to us, and in this representation there is neither falsehood nor truth, because, as long as we hold it nothing but appearance, we do not judge of the objective quality of the sun's motion. But as, when the understanding is not attentive to prevent this subjective mode of representation's being held an objective one, a false judgment can easily arise, we say, the sun appears to move; it is not the senses however which are charged with the appearance, but the understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment of the phenomenon.

In this manner, if we do not reflect on the origin of our representations, and connect our intuitions of the senses, whatever they may contain, in space and in time, according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition in an experience, a deceitful appearance or truth can arise accordingly as we are neg-

ligent or careful ; that regards entirely the use of sensual representations in the understanding, and not their origin. Just so, when I hold all the representations of the senses together with their form, space and time, nothing but phenomena, and space and time mere forms of the sensitivity, which are not to be met with out of it, and make use of these representations in reference to possible experience only, there is nothing therein that can lead to error, nor the least false appearance contained in my holding them mere phenomena ; for they can for all that cohere right according to rules of truth in experience. Thus do all the propositions of geometry hold of space as well as of all the objects of the senses, consequently in regard to all possible experience, whether I consider space either as a mere form of the sensitivity, or as something cleaving to the things themselves ; though I can in the former case only comprehend how it is possible to know those propositions of all the objects of the external intuition *à priori* ; every thing else with regard to all possible experience remains just as if I had not differed from the common opinion.

But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my conceptions of space and of time, which I cannot avoid doing when I give them out for qualities which adhere to things in themselves (for what can prevent my letting them hold of the very same things, of whatever nature my senses may be, and whether suited to them or not ?), a great error, which

rests upon an appearance, may arise, as I give out what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition of things and sure for all objects of sense, and consequently holds of all possible experience, for universally valid, because I refer it to things in themselves, and do not limit it to conditions of experience.

My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, so far from reducing the whole sensible world to a mere appearance, is rather the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions, that which the mathematics propound *à priori*, to real objects, and of preventing its being held mere appearance; because without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and of time, which we take from no experience, and which lie in our representation *à priori*, are mere chimeras of our brain or not, to which no object whatever corresponds, at least adequately, and consequently whether geometry itself is or is not a mere illusion, whereas we have been able to shew its unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere apparitions or phenomena.

These my principles, because they make phenomena of the representations of the senses, are, secondly, so far from turning the truth of experience to mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which

the metaphysics have hitherto been deceived, and led to the childish endeavour, to catch at bubbles, while phenomena, which are mere representations, were taken for things in themselves, which error gave occasion to the remarkable antinomy of reason that I shall mention by and by, and which is destroyed by the single observation, ‘that phenomenon, as long as it is used in experience, produces truth, but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience and consequently becomes transcendent, nothing but mere illusion.’

As I therefore leave the things, which we represent to ourselves by sense, their reality, and only limit our sensual intuition of these things to this, that they represent, in no point, even not in the pure intuitions of space and of time, any thing more than merely phenomena of those things, but never their quality in themselves, this is not a thorough appearance feigned by me as belonging to nature, and my protestation against all thought of an idealism is so strong and obvious as even to seem superfluous, if there were not incompetent judges, who, while they may be willing to have an old name for every deviation from their perverted though common opinion, and never judge of the spirit of philosophic denominations, but cling to the letter only, are ready to put their own conceit in the place of well determined conceptions, and thereby to twist and to distort them. For, my having given this my theory the name of a trans-

cendental idealism, cannot authorize any body to confound it with the empirical idealism of Descartes (though it is only a problem, on account of whose insolvableness every one is, in his opinion, at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because it never can be answered in a satisfactory manner) or with the mystical and extravagant idealism of Berkeley (against which and other similar chimeras our Criticism rather contains the proper antidote). For, this idealism so named by me concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which however constitutes idealism in the received sense), for it never entered into my mind to doubt of them, but the sensual representation of things, to which space and time especially belong, and of these, consequently of all phenomena in general, I have only shewn, that they are not things (but mere original modes of representation), and not determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word, transcendental, which with me means 'a reference of our cognition never to things, but to the cognitive faculty,' should obviate this misconception. And, rather than it should give farther occasion to it, I recall this name and now term this my idealism the critical. But if it in fact is a repudiable idealism to convert real things (not phenomena) to mere representations, by what denomination shall we distinguish that idealism, which conversely makes things of mere representations? It, in my opinion, may be called the *dreaming* idealism,

in contradistinction to the former, which may go by the name of the *extravagant* idealism, both of which would have been prevented by my *critical* idealism.

14.

How are pure Physics possible?

NATURE is the existence of things, provided that it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never cognise them either *à priori*, or *à posteriori*. Not *à priori*, for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, as this never can be done by the dissection of our conceptions (analytic propositions), because we do not want to know what is contained in our conception of a thing (for that belongs to its logical being), but what is in the reality of the thing superadded to this conception, and by which the thing itself is determined in its existence without our conception. Our understanding, and the only conditions, on which it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform themselves to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they would therefore need to be previously given us in order to gather these determinations from them, but they then were not cognised *à priori*.

And a cognition of the nature of things in themselves *à posteriori* would be impossible. For, if experience shall teach us laws, under which the existence of things ranks, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity without our experience. Experience, it is true, teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must exist so of necessity and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach the nature of things in themselves (noumena).

15.

We however are actually possessed of a pure natural philosophy in which are propounded, *à priori* and with all the necessity requisite to apodictical propositions, laws, under which nature ranges itself. I need only call in the testimony of that propædæutic of the physics, which, under the title of the universal science of nature, precedes all the physics (which are founded upon empirical principles). In it the mathematics applied to phenomena, and merely discursive principles (or those from conceptions), which constitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature, may be found. But there are several things in it, which are not quite pure and independent of the sources of experience: such as the conception of motion, that of impenetrability (upon which the empirical conception of matter rests), that of inertness and many

others, which preclude the possibility of its being denominated quite a pure science of nature; besides, it refers to objects of the external sense only, and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict signification, for it must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense (the object of the physics as well as psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of those universal physics there are a few, which really have the universality, we require, for instance, the propositions, that the substance is permanent, and that all, which happens, is always previously determined by a cause according to constant laws, &c. These are actually universal laws of nature, which subsist totally *à priori*. By consequence there is in fact a pure natural philosophy, and the question now is, how is it possible?

16.

The word nature still assumes another signification, which determines the object, whereas it (nature) in the above mentioned sense denotes the legality only of the determinations of the existence of things in general. Nature then considered *materialiter* is the complex of all the objects of experience. And it only is the subject in hand; for things, which never can be objects of experience, if they should be cognised as to their nature, would oblige us to

have recourse to conceptions, whose meaning could never be given in the concrete (by any one example of possible experience), and of whose nature we would need to form for ourselves conceptions, whose reality, that is, whether they really refer to objects, or are mere creatures of thought, could not be decided. The cognition of what cannot be an object of experience were hyperphysical, and the subject of present discussion is nothing of that description, but the cognition of nature, whose reality can, though it is possible *à priori* and precedes all experience, be confirmed by experience.

17.

That which is formal of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the legality of all the objects of experience, and, provided that it is cognised *à priori*, their necessary legality. But it has been just shewn, that the laws of nature never can be cognised* *à priori* in objects if they are considered not in reference to possible experience, but as things in themselves. But, as we have already said, our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves (from whose internal properties we totally abstract), but to things as objects of possible experience, and

* In our language we can only express the German verbs *kennen* and *erkennen* by the word, to know, which is too vague for philosophy. See Kant's Logic. T.

whose aggregate is what we distinguish by the appellation of nature. And now I ask whether, when the possibility of a cognition of nature *à priori* is in question, it is better to arrange the problem thus: how is it possible to cognise *à priori* the necessary legality of things as objects of experience? or thus: how is it possible to cognise *à priori* the necessary legality of experience itself relatively to all its objects in general?

When brought to light, the solution of the problem, represented whether in the one or in the other way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which properly constitutes the point of the question), entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under which alone a cognition of experience of things is possible, hold of these things, as objects of a possible experience (but not of them as things in themselves, which are not taken into consideration here). It is quite to the same purpose whether I say: without the law, that, when an event is perceived, it is always referred to something that precedes, which it follows according to a universal rule, a judgment of perception never can hold as experience; or whether I express myself thus: all, which experience teaches that it happens, must have a cause.

It is however better to chuse the first formule. For, as we can *à priori* and previously to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions, on which only an experience with regard to them is

possible, but never of what laws they in themselves may, without reference to possible experience, be subject to, we cannot study the nature of things *à priori* otherwise, than by investigating the conditions and the universal (though subjective) laws, under which only such a cognition as experience (as to the mere form) is possible, and determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of experience; for, if I should chuse the second formula, and seek the conditions *à priori*, on which nature as an object of experience is possible, I should easily fall into misunderstanding, and fancy, that I had to speak of nature as a thing in itself, and then seek in vain for things, nothing of which is given me.

Consequently the only objects of our research here are experience and the universal conditions given *à priori* of its possibility, and thence we have to determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. I think I shall be understood, that I here mean not the rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for they give to presuppose experience, therefore not how we (by experience) can learn of nature the laws, for these were not then laws *à priori*, and would not yield us pure science of nature, but how the conditions *à priori* of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources, from which all the universal laws of nature must be drawn.

18.

We then must in the first place observe, that, though all judgments of experience are empirical, that is, have their ground in the immediate perception of the senses, all empirical judgments are not conversely judgments of experience on that account, but that, besides the empirical and in general besides that given the sensual intuition, particular conceptions must still be superadded, conceptions, which have their origin quite *à priori*, in the pure understanding, and under which every perception must be first of all subsumpted and then can by their means be turned to experience.

Empirical judgments, provided that they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; but those, which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judgments of perception. The latter do not stand in need of any pure conception of the understanding, but of the logical connexion of perceptions in a thinking subject. But the former always require, besides the representations of the sensual intuition, particular conceptions originally begotten in the understanding,* and which give occasion to the objective validity of the judgment of experience.

* They in fact are original dissections or acts of the understanding itself. T.

All our judgments are first of all mere judgments of perception, they hold merely for us, that is, for our subject, and we give them afterwards only a new reference, that to an object, and are willing, that it shall always hold for us or for every body ; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments of the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else, than its necessary universal validity. And conversely when we have reason to hold a judgment necessarily universally valid (which rests never upon the perception, but upon the pure conception of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumpted), we must hold it objective also, that is, that it may express not merely a reference of the perception to a subject, but a quality of the object ; for there would be no ground for the judgments of others necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord, and hence they must all agree among themselves.

19.

Objective validity therefore and necessary universal validity (for every body) are alternate conceptions, and though we do not know the object in itself, we, when we consider a judgment as commonly valid and consequently necessary, understand by it the objective validity. By this judg-

ment we cognise the object (though it remains unknown how it is in itself) by the universally valid and necessary connexion of the given perceptions, and, as this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object (for this is impossible), but from the condition of the universal validity of the empirical judgment, which, as already said, rests never upon empirical, nay, in general sensual conditions, but upon a pure conception of the understanding. The object in itself always remains unknown; but when by the conception of the understanding the connexion of the representations, which are given our sensitivity of the object, is determined as universally valid, it (the object) is determined by this relation, and the judgment is objective.

To illustrate that the following instances: that the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter,* are merely subjectively valid judgments.

* I freely grant, that those examples do not represent such judgments of perception, as ever can become judgments of experience, even though a conception of the understanding should be superadded, because they refer merely to sensation, which every body knows to be merely subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become objective; I had only a mind for the present to give an example of the judgment that is merely subjectively valid and contains in itself no ground for universal validity and thereby for a reference to the object. An example of the judgments of per-

I by no means require, that I or every other person shall always find it as I do, they only express a reference of two sensations to the same subject, to me, and that only in my present state of perception, and consequently do not hold of the object ; such judgments I have named those of perception. Judgments of experience are of a quite distinct nature. What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must always teach me and every one, and its validity I do not limit to the subject or to his state at the time. Hence do I pronounce all such like judgments objectively valid, as, for instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only, I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But, if I would have it named a judgment of experience, I require this connexion to stand under a condition, which makes it universally valid. It is therefore my will, that I and every body should always conjoin of necessity the same perceptions under the same circumstances.

20.

We shall consequently be obliged to anatomize experience in general, in order to see what is con-

ception, which become judgments of experience by superadded conceptions of the understanding, will be given in the next paragraph.

tained in this production of the senses and of the intellect, and how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is the intuition of which we are conscious to ourselves, that is, perception, which pertains merely to the senses. And in the next place judging also (which belongs merely to the understanding) pertains thereto. But this may be twofold, either, first, whilst I merely compare the perceptions and conjoin them in a consciousness of my state, or, secondly, when I conjoin them in a consciousness in general. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and so far of subjective validity only, it is merely a connexion of the perceptions in the state of my mind without reference to the object. Hence it is not, as it is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in a consciousness by means of judging; there arises thereby no universal validity and necessity of the judgment, on whose account alone it can be objectively valid and experience.

Quite another judgment therefore precedes before perception can become experience. The given intuition must be subsumpted under a conception, which determines the form of judging in general relatively to intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in a consciousness in general, and thereby procures universal validity to empirical judgments; a conception of this nature is a pure conception of the understanding *à priori*, which does nothing

but determine for an intuition the way in general, in which it can serve for judging. The conception of cause is such a one, as determines the intuition, which is subsumpted (or ranged) under it, for example, that of air relative to judging in general, the conception of air serves with regard to expansion in the relation of the antecedent to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The conception of cause then is a pure conception of the understanding, which is totally distinct from all possible perception, and only serves to determine that representation, which is contained under it, relatively to judging in general, by consequence to make a universally valid judgment possible.

Ere a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, it is requisite, that the perception should be subsumpted under a conception of the understanding such as we have been describing; for instance, air ranks under the conception of cause, which determines the judgment of it relatively to expansion as hypothetical.* But this ex-

* In order to have a more easily understood example, take the following: 'When the sun shines upon the stone, it grows warm.' This judgment, how often soever I and others may have perceived this effect, is a mere judgment of perception and contains no necessity; perceptions are usually conjoined in this manner only. But if I say, 'the sun warms the stone,' I super-add to the perception the conception of the understanding of cause, which necessarily connects with the conception of sunshine that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes of neces-

pansion is thereby represented not as merely belonging to my perception of the air in my state or in more of my states or in the state of perception of others, but as belonging thereto of necessity, and this judgment, 'the air is elastic,' becomes universally valid, and first of all a judgment of experience by certain judgments preceding, by which the intuition of air is subsumpted under the conception of cause and of effect, and they (the judgments) thereby determine the perceptions not merely respectively to one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general (here the hypothetical), and in this way render the empirical judgment universally valid.

If all ones synthetic judgments are dissected, if they hold objectively, it will be found, that they never consist of bare intuitions, which are merely connected, as they are commonly held to be, by comparison in a judgment, and that they would be impossible were not a pure conception of the understanding superadded to the conception drawn from the intuition, under which conception these are subsumpted, and in this manner first of all connected in an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of the pure mathematics in their most simple axioms are not excepted from this condition. In the principle, 'the straight line is the shortest

sity universally valid, consequently objective and from a perception is converted to experience.

between two points,' we presuppose, that the line is subsumpted under the conception of quantity, which certainly is not a bare intuition, but has its seat in the understanding only, and serves for the purpose of determining the intuition (of the line) with regard to the judgments, which may be given of it relatively to its quantity, the plurality (as *judicia pluraliva*),* as by them it is understood, that much of the homogeneous is contained in a given intuition.

21.

In order therefore to shew the possibility of experience provided that it rests upon pure conceptions of the understanding *à priori*, we must first represent what belongs to judging in general, and the various points of the understanding in it, in a complete table; for the pure conceptions of the understanding, which are nothing more than conceptions of intuition in general if these are in re-

* I would rather the judgments, which are termed *particularia* in logic, should be thus named. For the word particular contains the thought, that they are not universal. But when I begin from the unity (in single judgments) and proceed to the totality, I cannot yet join any reference to the totality: I think of the plurality only without totality, not of its exception. This distinction, if the logical points shall form the basis of the pure conceptions of the understanding, is necessary; in the logical use, however, the old name may remain.

gard to the one or the other of these points determined for judgments in themselves, by consequence necessarily and in a universally valid manner, will fall out exactly parallel to them. And by that means the principles *à priori* of the possibility of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all perceptions are (on certain universal conditions of intuition) subsumpted under those pure conceptions of the understanding.

Logical Table of Judgments.

1.

As to Quantity.

Universal,
Particular,
Single.

2.

As to Quality.

Affirmative,
Negative,
Indefinite.

3.

As to Relation.

Categorical,
Hypothetical,
Disjunctive.

4.

As to Modality.

Problematical,
Assertive,
Apodictical.

Transcendental Table

of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
of the Categories.

1.

As to Quantity.

Unity (the Measure),
Plurality (the Quantum),
Totality (the Whole).

2.

As to Quality.

Reality,
Negation,
Limitation.

3.

As to Relation.

Substance,
Cause,
Commerce.

4.

As to Modality.

Possibility,
Existence,
Necessity.

Pure Physiological Table

of the universal Principles of the Physics.

1.

Axioms
of Intuition.

2.

Anticipations
of Perception.

3.

Analogies
of Experience.

4.

Postulates
of empirical Thinking
in general.

22.

In order to comprise all that has hitherto been said in one conception, it is first necessary to recall to the reader's mind, that the question here is not the origin of experience, but that which lies in experience. The former pertains to the empirical psychology, and would even in it never be sufficiently unfolded without the latter, which belongs to the criticism on cognition and particularly to that on the understanding.

Experience consists of intuitions, which pertain to the sensitivity, and of judgments which are entirely an office of the understanding. But those judgments, which the understanding forms entirely from sensual intuitions, are by far not judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in the sensual intuition, but in the other the judgments express what experience in general, consequently not what the bare perception, whose validity is merely subjective, contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to the sensual intuition and the logical connexion of it (after it has been made universal by comparison) in a judgment something that determines the synthetic judgment as necessary and hereby as universally valid, and this can be nothing else, than that conception, which represents the intuition with regard to one

form of judgment rather than another as determined in itself, the conception of that synthetic unity of intuitions, which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments.*

23.

The sum of the foregoing subject is this: the business of the senses is to represent immediately; that of the understanding, to think. But thinking is, uniting representations in a consciousness. This union either arises merely relatively to the subject, and is casual and subjective, or has place absolutely, and is necessary or objective. The union of representations is a consciousness in the judgment. Thinking therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, when representations are referred to a consciousness in a subject only and united in him, or objective, when they are united in a consciousness in general, that is, necessarily so. The logical points of all judgments are so many modes of uniting representations in a consciousness. But if they serve for conceptions, they are conceptions of the necessary union of those in a consciousness, by consequence prin-

* By Function the unity of the act of ranging various representations under a common one is understood. T.

ciples of objectively valid judgments. The union in a consciousness is either analytical, by the identity, or synthetical, by the composition and the addition of various representations to one another. Experience consists in the synthetic connexion of phenomena (perceptions) in a consciousness, provided that this (connexion) is necessary. Hence are all the pure conceptions of the understanding those, under which all perceptions must previously be subsumpted ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid.*

24.

Judgments, provided that they are merely con-

* But how does this proposition, 'that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions,' agree with my proposition so often inculcated, that experience, as cognition *a posteriori*, can afford casual judgments only? When I say, that experience teaches me something, I never mean but the perception that lies in it, for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on the stone, and consequently the proposition of experience always is so far casual. That this warming necessarily follows the shining of the sun, is contained in the judgment of experience (by means of the conception of cause), but that I do not learn by experience, but conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addition of the conception of the understanding (of cause) to perception. How perception attains this additament, may be seen in the Criticism itself in the section of the Transcendental Judgment.

sidered as the condition of the union of given representations in a judgment, are rules. These rules, if they represent the union as necessary, are rules *à priori*, and, if none, from which they are derived, are above them, principles. And as, in regard to the possibility of all experience, when in it nothing but the form of thinking is considered, no conditions of the judgments of experience are above those, which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, under pure conceptions of the understanding, which render the empirical judgment objectively valid, these conceptions are the principles *à priori* of possible experience.

The principles of possible experience are at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be cognised *à priori*. And thus the problem, which lies in the second question before us, 'How are pure physics possible?' is solved. For that which is systematical, what is required for the form of a science, is perfectly to be met with here, because, besides the above mentioned formal conditions of all the judgments in general, consequently of all the rules in general, which logic affords, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical system, and the conceptions grounded thereupon, and which contain the conditions *à priori* of all synthetic and necessary judgments, just on that account a transcendental system, and, finally the principles, by means of which all phenomena are subsumpted under

these conceptions, a physiological system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical cognition of nature, makes this first of all possible, and hence may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature, the physics, or natural philosophy.

25.

By the first* of those physiological principles all phenomena, as intuitions in space and in time, are subsumpted under the conception of Quantity, and it is so far a principle of the application of the mathematics to experience. By the second that which is empirical, sensation, which denotes what is real of phenomena, is not directly subsumpted under the conception of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the object corresponding to it in both; but there is between reality (representation of sensation) and the null or nought, that is, the total void of intuition in time, a distinction, which has a quantum, as between every given degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of heat and of entire cold, between every degree of heat

* The three following paragraphs will not be well understood without seeing what the Criticism itself says on the subject of principles; they may however be of service in shewing what is universal in them and in fixing the attention to the main points.

viness and of absolute lightness, between every degree of the filling of space and of the quite empty space, less and less degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between a consciousness and the total unconsciousness (psychological obscurity) less and less degrees have place; hence is no perception that should evince an absolute want possible, for instance, no psychological obscurity that cannot be considered as a consciousness, which is only counterbalanced by another stronger, and thus in all cases of sensation, on which account the understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the Quality of the empirical representations (phenomena,) by means of the principle, 'that they collectively, consequently the real of all phenomenon, have a degree;' which is the second application of the mathematics (*mathesis intensorum*) to natural philosophy.

26.

With regard to the Relation of phenomena, and entirely in respect to their existence, the determination is not mathematical, but dynamical, and never objectively valid, consequently never fit for experience when it does not rank under principles *à priori*, which make the cognition of experience relative to phenomena first of all possible. Hence phenomena must be subsumpted either under the conception of substance, which is the foundation of

all determination of existence as a conception of the thing itself, or, secondly, if a succession is met with among the phenomena, that is, an event, under the conception of an effect with reference to a cause, or, lastly, provided that the simultaneousness or co-existence shall be known objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience, under the conception of commerce (action and reaction), and thus do principles *a priori* form the basis of objectively valid empirical judgments, that is, of the possibility of experience if it shall connect objects, as to existence, in nature. These principles are the laws of nature, which may be termed dynamical.

And finally the cognition of the agreement and the connexion not so much of the phenomena among themselves in experience, as their relation to experience in general, belongs to the judgments of experience, which relation unites either their agreement with the formal conditions, which the understanding cognises, or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception, or both in one conception, consequently contains possibility, reality, and necessity according to universal laws of nature; which constitutes the physiological doctrine of method (distinction of truth and of hypotheses and the bounds of the certainty of the latter).

27.

The third table of principles drawn from the

nature of the understanding itself after the critical method shews a perfection in itself, in which it raises itself far above every other, which has hitherto, though in vain been tried or may for the future be tried of the things themselves in a dogmatical way, by executing all synthetic principles *à priori* completely and on a principle, the faculty of judging in general, which constitutes the essence of experience in regard to the understanding, so that we can be certain, that there are no more such like principles (a satisfaction, which the dogmatical method never can afford); yet this is not near the greatest merit of this table.

Attention must be bestowed on the ground of proof, or argument, which discovers the possibility of this cognition *à priori*, and at the same time limits all similar principles to a condition, which, if it shall not be misunderstood and shall be farther enlarged in the use, must never be lost sight of, and which is, that, as the original sense, which the understanding affixes to these principles, will have it, they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in general provided that it is subjected to laws *à priori*. Consequently I do not say, that the thing in itself comprises a quantum, its reality a degree, its existence connection of accidents in a substance, and so on; for nobody can prove that; because such a synthetic connexion from mere conceptions, in which all reference to sensual intuition on the one side, and all connexion of it in

a possible experience on the other, are wanting, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of the conceptions in these principles then is, 'That all things stand of necessity *à priori* as objects of experience only under the afore mentioned conditions.'

And hence follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these principles, That they are not referred directly to phenomena and their relation, but to the possibility of experience of which phenomena constitute the matter only, not the form, that is, to objectively and universally valid synthetic propositions, in which judgments of experience distinguish themselves from those of perception. This takes place by this, that phenomena, as mere intuitions, which take up a part of space and of time, rank under the conception of quantity, which unites their multifarious *à priori* according to rules synthetically, that, if the perception contains sensation besides intuition, between which sensation and null, that is, its totally vanishing, a transition by diminishing always has place, what is real of the phenomena must, if it does not take up any part of space or of time, have a degree,*

* Heat and light are in a small space (as to the degree) just as great as in a great one ; in like manner the internal representations, pain, consciousness in general, whether it lasts a short or a long time, is, as to the degree, not less. Hence is the quantum here in a point and in a moment just as great as in every

but yet the transition to it from the empty time or space is only possible in time, consequently sensation, though it, with regard to that, in which it is specifically distinguished from other sensations, can never be cognised *à priori*, can, in a possible experience in general, as a quantum of perception be intensively distinguished from every other multifarious; whence then the application of the mathematics to nature is, in regard of the sensual intuition, by which it (nature) is given us, first made possible and determined.

But the reader must give the most attention to the mode of proof of the principles which occur under the denomination of analogies of experience. For, as these do not regard, like the principles of the application of the mathematics to natural philosophy in general, the generation of intuitions, but the connexion of their existence in an experience, and this can be nothing but the determination of the existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone it (this existence) is objectively valid, consequently experience; the proof

space of time however great. Degrees are therefore greater not however in the intuition, but as to the mere sensation, and can only be estimated as quanta by the relation of 1 to 0, that is, by every one of them's being able to decrease by indefinite intermediate degrees to vanishing or to increase from null through indefinite points to a determinate sensation in a certain time. (*Quantitas qualitatis est gradus*).

does not go to the synthetic unity in the connexion of things in themselves, but of perceptions, and of these not in regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the relation of the existence in it, according to universal laws. These universal laws, therefore, if the empirical determination in the relative time shall be objectively valid, consequently experience, comprise the necessity of the determination of the existence in time in general (consequently according to a rule of the understanding *à priori*). I can say nothing more prolegomenous on this subject, than to recommend to the reader, who has been long habituated to hold experience a merely empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence does not reflect, that it goes much farther than these extend, as it gives empirical judgments universal validity and for that purpose requires a pure unity of the understanding, which precedes *à priori*, to pay great attention to this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view.

28.

This is now the proper place to remove the Hume's doubt. He justly maintains, that we can by no means perspect by reason the possibility of causation, that is, of the reference of the existence of a thing to the existence of something else, which

is necessarily laid down by that. I add, that we perspect just as little the conception of subsistence, that is, of necessity in this, that a subject lies as a foundation to the existence of things, which subject cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing, nay, that we cannot even form a conception of the possibility of such a thing (though we can point out examples of its use in experience), as also, that this very incomprehensibility affects the commerce of things, as it cannot be perspected by reason how from the state of a thing an inference of the state of quite another thing without it, and reciprocally, can be drawn, and how substances, every one of which has its own separate existence, should depend upon one another of necessity. But I am very far from holding these conceptions taken merely from experience, and the necessity, which is represented in them, feigned, and mere apparition, with which long habit deceives us; on the contrary, I have sufficiently shewn, that they and the principles from them are firmly established *a priori*, or previously to all experience, and have their undoubted objective rightness, but indeed with regard to experience only.

Though I have not the least conception of such a connexion of things in themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as causes, or stand

in commerce with others (as parts of a real whole), and can just as little conceive of such properties in phenomena as phenomena (because those conceptions contain nothing that lies in the phenomena, but that which the understanding alone must think of); I have a conception of such a connexion of the representations in our understanding, and in judgments in general, a conception that representations belong in one sort of judgments as subject in reference to predicate, in another as ground in reference to consequence, and in a third as parts, which constitute together a whole possible cognition. Besides, I cognise *a priori* that, without considering the representation of an object with regard to the one or the other of these points as determined, I can have no cognition that holds of the object, and, if I should occupy myself about the object in itself, there were not a single mark possible, by which I could cognise, that it is determined in either of these points, that is, belongs to the conception either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation to other substances) of commerce, for I have no conception of the possibility of such a connexion of existence. But the question is not how the thing in itself, but how the cognition of experience of things in respect to these points of judgments in general is determined, that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and shall be subsumpted under those conceptions of the understanding. And there it is clear, that I completely

perspect not only the possibility, but the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under these conceptions, that is, of using them for principles of the possibility of experience.

30.

In order to bring Hume's problematical conception (this his *crux metaphysicorum*), the conception of cause, to the test, there is in the first place given me *à priori*, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general, to use one given cognition as a ground and another as a consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that one certain phenomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment and, for instance, to say, if the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows warm. Here there is not yet a necessity of connexion, consequently not a conception of cause. But I proceed and say, that that proposition, which is merely a subjective connexion of perceptions, must, if it shall be a judgment of experience, be considered as necessary and universally valid. And a proposition of that sort is, 'the sun is by its light the cause of the heat.' That empirical rule is now considered as a law, and that as holding not merely of phenomena, but of them for the behoof of a possible experience which

requires thoroughly and therefore necessarily valid rules. I consequently perspect the conception of cause, as a conception necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience and of its possibility as a synthetic union of perceptions in a consciousness ; but I do not at all perspect the possibility of a thing as a cause, because the conception of cause denotes a condition not of things, but of experience, which experience cannot be but an objectively valid cognition of phenomena and of their succession provided that the preceding can be conjoined with the following according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.

31.

And hence the pure conceptions of the understanding, if we quit objects of experience and would refer these conceptions to things in themselves (noumena), have no signification whatever. They serve, so to say, only to spell phenomena, that we may be able to read them as experience ; the principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, only serve our understanding for the use of experience ; farther they are arbitrable conjunctions, without objective reality, and we can neither cognise their possibility *à priori*, nor confirm their reference to objects or make it intelligible by any one example ; because no examples can be taken but from some one possible experience, and conse-

quently the objects of those conceptions can be met with nowhere else, than in a possible experience.

This complete solution of the Hume's problem therefore preserves to the pure conceptions of the understanding their origin *à priori*, and to the universal laws of nature their validity, as laws of the understanding, yet in such a manner, that their use is limited to experience, because their possibility has its ground only in the reference of the understanding to experience; but not in such a manner that they are derived from experience, but that it is derived from them, which quite converse mode of connexion never occurred to Hume:

The following result of all our foregoing inquiries flows from this: 'that all synthetic principles *à priori* are nothing more than principles of possible experience,' and can never be referred to things in themselves, but to phenomena, as objects of experience. And hence can the pure mathematics as well as the pure physics never be referred to any thing more, than mere phenomena, or what, as it is derived from these principles, must always be possible to be represented by some one possible experience.

32.

And thus we have at last something determinate, upon which we can depend in all metaphysical un-

dertakings, which hitherto have boldly enough but always blindly gone beyond every thing without distinction. It never struck dogmatical thinkers, that the aim of their exertions should be set up so short, and not even those, who, proud of their opiniative sane reason, went with conceptions and principles of pure reason, which are legitimate and natural but destined for the mere use of experience, in quest of insights, to which they knew no determinate bounds, nor could they know any, because they never either had reflected or were able to reflect on the nature and even on the possibility of so pure an understanding.

Many a naturalist of pure reason (by whom I understand him, who has confidence enough in himself to decide in matters of metaphysic without any science) may pretend, that he, long ago, by the vaticinating spirit of his sane reason, not only presumed but attained a perfect knowledge of that, which is propounded here with so much preparation or, if he rather chuses, with prolix pedantic pomp, 'that we with all our reason never can reach beyond the field of experience.' But as he, when he is questioned about his principles of reason one by one, must grant, that there are many of them which he has not taken from experience, and which are of course independent of it and valid *à priori*, how and on what grounds will he then limit the dogmatist and himself, who make use of these conceptions and principles beyond all possible ex-

perience, just because of their being cognised independently of it. And even he, this adept of sound reason, is not so sure, for all the easily acquired wisdom which he arrogates to himself, not to fall insensibly beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras. And he commonly is deeply enough immersed in them, though he, by popular language, in which he gives out every thing for either probability, rational presumption, or analogy, gives a colour to his groundless pretensions.

33.

Since the oldest times of philosophy scrutators of pure reason have, besides the beings of sense, or phenomena, which make up the sensible world, conceived of particular beings of the understanding, or noumena, which constitute an intelligible world, and, as they (these scrutators), which may be easily forgiven in an uncultivated age, held phenomenon and mere appearance the same, granted creatures of the understanding only reality.

In fact, when we, as is reasonable, consider objects of sense as mere phenomena, we hereby allow at the same time, that they bottom upon a thing in itself, though we know it not as to its internal nature or essence, but as to its phenomenon, that is, the way, in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding there-

fore, just by its assuming phenomena, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we can say, that the representation of such beings as form the substrata of phenomena, consequently of mere beings of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable.

And our critical deduction by no means excludes beings of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the esthetic to this, that they shall not extend to all things, by which extension every thing would be turned to mere phenomenon, but that they shall only hold of objects of a possible experience. Hereby then creatures of the understanding are only granted with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception, and which is, 'that we know nothing at all determinate of these pure creatures of intellect, nor is it possible for us to know any thing of them, because our pure conceptions of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere creatures of sense, and, the moment we quit these, not the least signification remains to those conceptions.'

34.

There is in fact something captious or ensnaring in our pure conceptions of the understanding with regard to the temptation to a transcendental use ; for that use, which goes beyond all possible experi-

ence, I term transcendental. Our conceptions of substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, are quite independent of experience, and contain no phenomenon of sense, of course seem in fact to refer to things in themselves, noumena, but, what still corroborates this presumption, comprise a necessity of determination in themselves, which experience never equals. The conception of cause contains a rule, according to which one state follows another necessarily; but experience can only shew us, that one state of things often and, to say the most, commonly follows another, and therefore yields neither strict universality, nor necessity.

Hence the conceptions of the understanding seem to have too much sense and matter for the mere use of experience to exhaust all their determinations, and thus the understanding insensibly erects for itself, beside the house of experience, a much more extensive building, which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought, without once taking notice that it has lost itself with its otherwise right conceptions beyond the bounds of their use.

35.

Two important, nay, quite indispensable, though extremely dry investigations have therefore been necessary. In the one (*Criticism* p. 137) it is shewn,

that the senses furnish not the pure conceptions of the understanding in the concrete, but the scheme for their use, and the object conformable to it is met with only in experience (as the production of the understanding from materials of the sensitivity). In the other (Criticism p. 235) it is shewn, that, notwithstanding the independence of our pure conceptions of the understanding and of our principles upon experience, yes, the seemingly greater sphere of their use, nothing whatever can be thought of by them without the field of experience, because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions ; but as there is no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensitivity, those pure conceptions, as they cannot be exhibited by any means in the concrete, are totally without meaning, consequently all these noumena, together with their complex, an intelligible world,* are nothing but

* Not (as the usual expression is) intellectual world. For cognitions are intellectual by the understanding, and refer to our sensible world too ; but objects, if they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to which none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed intelligible. But as some one possible intuition must correspond to every object, we would need to conceive of an understanding that represents things immediately ; but of such a one we have not the least conception and by consequence not of the beings of the understanding, the objects of its reference.

representations of a problem whose object in itself is possible, but whose solution is, from the nature of our understanding, totally impossible, as our understanding is not a faculty of intuition; but that of the connexion of given intuitions in an experience, and that experience must therefore contain all the objects of our conceptions, but without it no conceptions, as there is no intuition for their basis, have any signification.

36.

The imagination may perhaps be forgiven if it sometimes roams, that is, does not keep carefully within the limits of experience, for it is at least animated and invigorated by so free a flight, and it is always easier to moderate its boldness, than to stimulate it or to relieve its languor. But the understanding never can be forgiven for roaming instead of thinking; for upon it alone all assistance to set bounds, when it is necessary, to the extravagance of the imagination, rests.

But it (the understanding) begins with that very innocently and modestly. It first purifies the elementary cognitions, which inhere in it previously to all experience, but yet must always have their application in experience. It gradually quits these limits, and what should prevent its doing so, as it has quite freely taken its principles out of itself

and now it goes first to newly excogitated powers in nature, and soon after to beings without nature, in a word, to a world, for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting to us, because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly, and is, though not confirmed, never refuted, by experience. And that is the reason of young thinkers' being so partial to the metaphysics in the genuine dogmatical way, and often sacrificing to them both their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better employed.

But it can serve no purpose to try to moderate those fruitless endeavours of pure reason by all sorts of hints of the difficulties of the solution of questions so occult, of complaints of the limits of our reason, and of degradation of affirmations to mere conjectures. For, if their impossibility is not distinctly shewn, and the self-cognition of reason does not become true science, in which the field of its right use is, so to say, distinguished with geometrical certainty from that of its wrong and vain use, those fruitless efforts will never be fully set aside.

37.

How is Nature itself possible?

THIS question, which is the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever touch, and to

which, as its boundary and completion it must be carried, contains two questions.

First ; How is nature in the material sense, or as to intuition, nature considered as the complex of phenomena, how are space, time, and that, which fills both, the object of sensation, in general possible ? The answer is, By means of the quality of our sensitivity, according to which it (the sensitivity) is affected, in the way peculiar to it, by objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally distinct from those phenomena. This answer is given in the Criticism itself, in the Transcendental Esthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution of the first chief problem.

Secondly ; How is nature in the formal sense, nature as the complex of the rules, under which all phenomena, if they shall be conceived of as connected in an experience, must rank, possible ? The answer can be nothing but this, It is only possible by means of the quality of our understanding, according to which all those representations of the sensitivity are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar way of our thinking, that is, by rules, and by their means experience, which is to be quite distinguished from the insight into the objects in themselves, is possible. This answer is given in the Criticism itself in the Transcendental Logic, and, in these Prolegomena, in the course of the solution of the second chief problem.

But how this peculiar property of our sensitivity itself or that of our understanding and of, its basis and that of all thinking, the necessary apperception,* is possible, cannot be farther resolved or answered, because we stand in need of it again and again for all answering and for all thinking of objects.

There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of experience, but the legality in the connexion of phenomena, that is, nature in general, we cannot learn to know by any experience, because experience itself requires laws, upon which its possibility bottoms *à priori*.

The possibility of experience in general, therefore, is at the same time the universal law of nature and the principles of the former (experience) are the very laws of the latter (nature). For we do not know nature but as the complex of the phenomena, that is, of the representations in us, and hence can take the law of their connexion nowhere else, than from the principles of their connexion in us, that is, from the conditions of the necessary union in a consciousness, which union constitutes the possibility of experience.

Even the main proposition, 'that universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognised *à priori*,' naturally leads to the proposition, 'that the supreme legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, that is,

* Self-consciousness the author terms Apperception too. T.

in our understanding, and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience, but conversely nature, as to its universal legality, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie in our sensitivity and in our understanding ;' for how were it otherwise possible to know *à priori* these laws, as they are not rules of analytic cognition, but true synthetic enlargements of cognition ? That necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of the possibility of nature, can only have place for two reasons: either these laws are taken from nature by means of experience, or, *vice versa*, nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as the mere universal legality of experience. The former is contradictory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be cognised *à priori* (that is, independently upon all experience), and laid as a foundation to all empirical use of the understanding, consequently the latter only remains.*

* Crusius alone knows of a middle way: that a Spirit, who can neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But as false principles are often laid down, of which circumstance the system of this man gives not a few examples, we, for want of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious are involved in a great dilemma in the use of a principle of this sort, as we never can know to a certainty what the Spirit of truth or the father of lies may leave instilled into us.

But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, relatively to which we always presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of nature, which, without particular perceptions' lying as a foundation, contain merely the conditions of their necessary union in an experience, and relatively to the latter nature and possible experience are quite the same, and, as in this the legality depends upon the necessary connexion of phenomena in an experience (without which we cannot cognise any object of the sensible world) consequently upon the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first surprising, but is not the less certain, when I relatively to the latter say, 'That the understanding does not draw its laws (*à priori*) from nature, but prescribes them to it.'

38.

We shall illustrate this in appearance hazarded proposition by an example, which will shew, that laws, which we discover in objects of the sensual intuition, especially when they are cognised as necessary, are held by us such as the understanding has placed in them, though they are similar in all points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience,

If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this figure unites so many arbitrable determinations of space in it in a universal rule, we

cannot avoid attributing a nature to this geometrical thing. Two lines, which cut at once one another and the circle, divide themselves, by whatever chance they may be drawn, always so regularly, that the right angle from the parts of the one line is equal to that from those of the other. The question now is, 'does this law lie in the circle or in the understanding,' that is, does this figure, independently of the understanding, contain in itself the ground of this law, or does the understanding, whilst it has agreeably to its conceptions (according to the equality of the diameters) constructed the figure itself, lay the law of the radii's cutting one another in geometrical proportion in it? We, when we follow the proofs of this law, soon perceive, that it can be derived from the condition only, which the understanding lays as a foundation to the construction of this figure, and which is that of the equality of the diameters. But, if we enlarge this conception, to pursue farther the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws, and consider the circle as a conic section, which of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections, we shall find, that all the radii, which cut one another within the ellipsis, parabola and hyperbola, always do it in such a manner, that the right angles from their parts are not equal, it is true, but always bear equal relations to one another. If we still proceed farther, to the funda-

mental doctrines of physical astronomy, a physical law of the reciprocal attraction diffused over all material nature presents itself, the rule of which attraction is 'that it conversely decreases with the square of the distances from every attracting point, as the spheres, in which this power diffuses itself, increase,' which law seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things, and hence is usually propounded as cognisable *à priori*. As simple as the sources of this law are, as they merely rest upon the relation of spheres of different diameters, its consequences are so excellent with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not only all possible orbits of the celestial bodies in sections of cones, but such a relation of these bodies among one another, are the result, that no other law of attraction, than that of the inverse quadrate ratio of the distances, can be excogitated as fit for a cosmical system.

Here then is nature that rests upon laws, which the understanding cognises *à priori* and chiefly from the universal principles of the determination of space. And the question now is, Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding learn them by its merely endeavouring to find out the pregnant sense that lies in space, or do they inhere in the understanding and in the way, in which it determines space on the conditions of the synthetic unity to which its conceptions collectively amount? Space is something so uni-

form and with regard to all particular properties so undeterminate, that we shall certainly not seek a store of the laws of nature in it. Whereas that, which determines space to the form of a circle or to the figures of a cone and of a sphere, is the understanding, provided that it comprises the ground of the unity of their constructions. The mere universal form of intuition, which is termed space, is therefore the substratum of all intuitions determinable on particular objects, and in it the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies; but the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding, and on the conditions, which lie in its own nature, and thus the understanding, as it comprehends all phenomena under its own laws, and thereby brings first of all to pass *à priori* experience (as to its form), by means of which all that, which can only be cognised by experience, is subjected to its laws of necessity, is the origin of the universal order of nature. For the subject of present discussion is not the nature of things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions as well of our sensitivity as of the understanding, but nature, as an object of possible experience, and in this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience possible, occasions, that the sensible world is either not an object of experience, or nature.

39.

APPENDIX TO THE PURE PHYSICS.

Of the System of the Categories.

Nothing can be more to be wished for by a philosopher, than to be able to derive the multifarious of the conceptions or of the principles, which had previously exhibited themselves in a dispersed manner to him by the use which he made of them in the concrete, from a principle *à priori*, and to unite every thing in this way in one cognition. Formerly he believed only, that those things, which remained to him after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among one another to constitute a particular sort of cognitions, were completely collected, but it was only an Aggregate; at present he knows, that just so many, neither more nor fewer, can constitute the mode of cognition, and perspects the necessity of his division; which is a comprehending, and now he has first of all a System.

To look in common cognition for conceptions, which do not bottom upon any particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of experience, in which they as it were constitute the mere form of connexion, gives to presuppose not a greater reflection nor more insight, than to look in a language

for rules of the actual use of the words in general, and thus to collect elements for a grammar (and in fact both researches are very nearly related), yet without being able to give a reason for each language's having just this and no other formal quality, and still less for just so many, neither more nor fewer, of its formal determinations in general's being to be met with

Aristotle collected ten pure elementary conceptions under the name of categories.* To those, which are named predicaments too, he found himself obliged afterward to add five postpredicaments,† some of which however (*prius, simul* and *motus*) lie in those; but this rhapsody could not but be considered, and deserve approbation, more as a hint for future searchers, than as a regularly executed idea, and hence it has, in the present more enlightened state of philosophy, been rejected as quite useless.

Having long reflected on the pure elements of human cognition (those which contain nothing empirical), I have at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elemental conceptions of the sensitivity (space and time) from those of the understanding. By that means the 7th, 8th, and 9th categories are excluded from that list.

* 1 *Substantia*. 2 *Qualitas*. 3 *Quantitas*. 4 *Relatio*. 5 *Actio*. 6 *Passio*. 7 *Quando*. 8 *Ubi*. 9 *Situs*. 10 *Habitus*.

† *Oppositum*. *Prius*. *Simul*, *Motus*. *Habere*.

And the others were of no service to me ; because there was not a principle, on which the understanding could be fully investigated, and all its functions, whence its pure conceptions arise, determined fully as to number and with precision.

But, in order to find out such a principle, I looked round me for an act of the understanding, which comprises all the other acts, and distinguishes itself, by various modifications only or points, in reducing the multifarious of representation to the unity of thinking in general, and have found this act of the understanding to consist in judging. The work of logicians lies now before me ready, though not yet quite free from wants, by which work I am enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding, but which are undetermined in regard to all objects. I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general or rather to the condition, to determine judgments as objectively valid, and there arose the pure conceptions of the understanding, whose number I have fully ascertained, and which constitute our whole cognition of things from pure intellect. I in justice have distinguished them by their old denomination, categories ; by which I have reserved for myself the liberty of completely superadding all the conceptions derivable from those, by connexion whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the phenomenon (space or time) or with its matter, provided that it is not yet empirically determi-

ned (the object of sensation in general), under the name of predicabilia,* the moment a system of transcendental philosophy, for whose behoof I at present am only engaged in the criticism on reason itself, shall come to pass.

But the essential in this system of categories, by which it distinguishes itself from that old rhapsody, which proceeds without any principle, and why it only deserves to be considered as pertaining to philosophy, consist in this: that by means of it the true signification of the pure conceptions of the understanding and the meaning of their use can be precisely determined. For it is obvious, that the ancient categories are nothing by themselves but logical functions, but as such do not constitute the least conception of an object, but stand in need of sensual intuition for a basis, and then only serve to determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as to all functions of judging, relatively to them, thereby to procure to them universal validity, and by means of them to make judgments of experience in general possible.

Nothing of such an insight into the nature of the categories, as limits them at the same time to the

* For instance, the predicabilia of power, of action, and of suffering, are subordinated to the category of causality; those of presence, and of resistance, to that of commerce; and those of beginning, and of ending, and of alteration, to the predicaments of modality. T.

mere use of experience, ever occurred either to their first author, or to any one of his successors; but without this insight (which exactly depends upon their derivation or deduction), they are quite useless and a miserable list of names, without explanation or rule of their use. Had the ancients ever conceived of an insight of this sort, doubtless the whole study of the pure cognition of reason, which, under the name of metaphysics, has for many centuries spoiled many a good head, would have reached us in quite another shape, and enlightened the understanding of men, instead of exhausting it, as has actually been done, in obscure and in vain researches, and rendering it unfit for true science.

This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematical, and affords a direction or clew how and by what points of inquiry every metaphysical contemplation must, if it shall be complete, be made; for it exhausts all the points of the understanding, to which every other conception must be reduced. And in that manner the table of principles took its origin, of the completeness of which (table) we cannot be certain but by the system of categories, and even in the division of the conceptions which must go beyond the physiological use of the understanding (Criticism p. 344 and 415) it is the very same clew, which, as it must always be carried through the same firm points determined *à priori* in the human

understanding, always forms a closed circle, which leaves not a doubt but the object of a pure understanding or conception of reason, provided that it is weighed philosophically and on principles *à priori*, can in this way be completely cognised.* I cannot refrain from making use of this guidance with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, the various distinction of the conceptions of something and of nothing, and to bring to pass

* Many curious observations may be made on the table of the categories, for instance. 1, that the third arises from the first and the second conjoined in one conception, 2, that in those of quantity and of quality there is merely a progress from the unity to the totality or from something to nothing (for this purpose the categories must stand thus : reality, limitation, total negation), without *correlata* or *opposita*, whereas those of relation and of modality carry the latter with them, 3, that, as in logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others, the category of substance is that of all conceptions of real things, 4, that, as the modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so by the modal conceptions a determination to things is not superadded, and so on. Such observations as these are of great use. If besides we enumerate all the predicabilia, which we can take pretty completely out of any good ontology (for example, Baumgarten's) and order them in classes under the categories, in which operation we must not neglect to superadd as complete a dissection of all these conceptions as possible; there will arise a merely analytical part of metaphysic, which does not contain a synthetic proposition, and which might precede the second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and its completeness contain not only utility, but, by means of what is systematical in it, over and above, a certain beauty.

accordingly the following regular and necessary table of the division of the conception of Nothing (for the division of Something follows of itself):

Nothing

as

1.

An empty Conception without an Object,
ens rationis (a noumenon).

2.

An empty Object of a Conception,
nihil privativum (a shadow).

3.

An empty Intuition without an Object,
ens imaginarium (pure space).

4.

An empty Object without a Conception,
nihil negativum (a rectilineal figure of two sides).

And this system, like every other true one founded in a universal principle, shews its use, which cannot be held in sufficient estimation, in this, that it excludes all foreign conceptions, which might otherwise slip in between those pure conceptions of the understanding, and determines the place of every cognition. Those conceptions, which I under the name of conceptions of reflection have likewise ordered according to the clew of the categories in a table, mix themselves in ontology, without leave or legal claim, among the pure conceptions of the understanding, though these are conceptions of connexion, and thereby of the objects themselves, but those of the mere comparison only of given conceptions, and hence are of quite another

nature and use ; by my legitimate division (Criticism p. 260) they are separated from this mixture. But the use of that separated table of the categories is still more obvious, if we, as we shall presently do, separate the table of the transcendental conceptions of reason, which are of quite another nature and origin, than those conceptions of the understanding (and hence must have quite another form), from them ; which so necessary separation has never yet been made in any one system of metaphysic, and could not be done for want of a particular system of categories.

40.

How is Metaphysic in general possible?

NEITHER the pure mathematics nor the pure physics had any occasion for such a deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and certainty ; for the former rest upon their own evidence, and the latter, though arisen from pure sources of the understanding, upon experience and its thorough confirmation, which latter testimony they cannot quite refuse and dispense with ; because they, with all their certainty, never can, as philosophy, equal the mathematics. Neither of these sciences therefore stood in need of this research for itself. It however was necessary for the sake of another science, metaphysic.

Metaphysic has to do not only with conceptions

of nature, which always find their application in experience, but with pure conceptions of reason, which never can be given in any one possible experience, consequently with conceptions, whose objective reality (that they are not mere chimeras), and with assertions, whose truth or falsity cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience, and this part of metaphysic is just that, which constitutes its essential end, to which every thing else is only a means, and thus does this science require a deduction of that sort on its own account. The present third question therefore relates as it were to the kernel of metaphysic and what is peculiar to it, the occupation of reason merely about itself, and, whilst it (reason) broods on its own conceptions, the acquaintance with objects, which is supposed to arise immediately from these conceptions, without standing in need of the mediation of experience for that purpose or in general being able by means of it (experience) to attain that acquaintance.*

Without resolving this question reason never satisfies itself. The use of experience, to which reason

* If we can say, that a science is real, at least in the idea of all men, as soon as it is made out, that the problems, which lead to it are laid before every body by the nature of human reason, and hence are many though faulty essays on it always unavoidable, we must likewise say, that metaphysic is subjectively (and indeed necessarily) real, and therefore we justly ask, how it is (objectively) possible.

limits the pure understanding, does not fulfil reason's own whole destination. Every single experience is only a part of the whole sphere of its territory, but the absolute whole of all possible experience is itself not experience, and yet a necessary problem for reason, for whose mere representation it requires quite other conceptions, than those pure ones of the understanding, whose use is only immanent, that is, refers to experience, provided that it can be given, whereas the conceptions of reason extend to the completeness, that is, the collective unity of all possible experience and thereby beyond every given experience, and become transcendent

As the understanding stands in need of categories (or predicaments) for experience, reason contains in itself the ground of ideas, by which I mean necessary conceptions, whose object cannot be given in any experience. The latter are inherent alike in the nature of reason, as the former in that of the understanding, and, if those carry with them an appearance, which can easily mislead, it is inevitable, though it can certainly be 'kept from misleading.'

As all (false) appearance consists in holding the subjective ground of the judgment objective, a self-cognition of pure reason is, in its transcendent use, the sole preservative from the aberrations, into which reason falls when it misapprehends its destination, and refers that, which only regards itself

and its guidance in all immanent use, transcendently to the object in itself (the noumenon).

41.

The distinguishing of ideas, that is, of pure conceptions of reason, from categories, or pure conceptions of the understanding, as cognitions of a quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a part for the groundwork of a science which contains the system of all these cognitions *à priori*, that, without this separation, metaphysic is absolutely impossible or at most an irregular bungling attempt to erect an edifice without a knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose. Had the Criticism on pure Reason done nothing but point out that distinction the first, it had thereby contributed more to the illustration of our conception and the guidance of the inquiry in the field of metaphysic, than all the vain efforts to solve the transcendent problems of pure reason, which (efforts) philosophers have hitherto made, without ever surmising, that they were in quite another field, than that of the understanding, and hence classed conceptions of the understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the same species.

42.

All pure cognitions of the understanding have this peculiar to them, that their conceptions can

refer to experience and their principles be confirmed by it ; whereas neither the transcendent cognitions of reason can,* as to their ideas, be referred to experience; nor can their propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it ; hence can the error, which slips in perhaps by that means, be discovered by nothing but pure reason itself, but which discovery is very difficult ; because this very reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable appearance can be limited not by any objective and dogmatical researches of the things, but by subjective one of reason itself as a source of ideas.

43.

In the Criticism on pure Reason it was always my greatest object, how I could not only carefully distinguish the sorts of cognition, but derive conceptions belonging to each of them alone from their common source, in order that I not only could, by my being informed whence they descend, determine their use with safety, but should have the never yet surmised, but incalculable advantage of cognising the completeness in the enumeration, the classing, and the specification of the conceptions *à priori*, con-

* The reader will need to attend well to the distinction between Transcendent and Transcendental. The latter signifies the possibility of cognition or of its use *à priori*. T.

sequently according to principles. Without that metaphysic is nothing but a rhapsody, in which one never knows whether that which he possesses is sufficient, or whether and where something may be still wanting. We indeed can only have that advantage in pure philosophy, but of it it constitutes the very essence.

As I have found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it is quite natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason; for when once these pure conceptions of reason (the transcendental ideas) are given, they could not, if they shall not be held innate, well be met with any where else, than in the same act of reason, which, if it regards merely the form, constitutes that which is logical of the syllogisms of reason, but, if it represents the judgments of the understanding relatively to the one or to the other form *à priori* as determined, transcendental conceptions of pure reason.

The formal distinction of the syllogisms of reason renders their division into categorical and hypothetical and disjunctive necessary. The conceptions of reason founded in them contain therefore, in the first place, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial), secondly, the idea of the complete series of conditions, and thirdly, the determination of all conceptions in the idea of a complete

complex of the possible.* The first idea is physiological, the second cosmological, the third theological, and, as all the three give occasion to a dialectic, yet every one in its own way, the division of the whole dialectic of pure reason into its paralogism, its antinomy, and its ideal, is founded therein, by which deduction we may rest quite sure, that all the claims of pure reason are completely represented here, and that not a single one can be wanting; because the faculty of reason itself, whence they all take their origin, is thereby completely investigated and all its functions are fully ascertained.

44.

In this contemplation in general it is still remarkable, that the idea of reason is not, as the categories are, of service to us for the use of the understanding in regard to experience, but with respect

* In disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility, relatively to a certain conception, as divided. The ontological principle of the thorough determination of a thing in general (one of the possible opposite predicates belongs to every thing) which is at the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments, bottoms upon the complex of all possibility, in which the possibility of every thing in general is considered as determined. This serves for a small illustration of the above-mentioned proposition: that the act of reason in disjunctive ratiocinations is as to the form the same as that, by which it brings to pass the idea of a complex of all the reality which that which is positive of all the predicates opposed to one another contains in itself.

to that use quite dispensable, nay, even contrary, and an impediment to the maxims of the cognition of reason of nature, but yet necessary in another view still to be determined * Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena ; for we cannot render the conception of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience in a sensual manner, consequently in the concrete, and therefore it is, with regard to all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, quite empty, and cannot serve for any principle of the explanation of that, which internal or external experience supplies. And the cosmological idea of the beginning of the world or of its eternity (*à parte ante*) can be of just as little service to us for the explanation of an event in the world itself. And finally we must, agreeably to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanation of the arrangement of nature, which is drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; because this mode of explanation not natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment, that our argument is exhausted. The use of those ideas, therefore, is quite distinct from that of those categories by which and the principles built upon them experience itself becomes first of all possible.

* Our author alludes here to a practical view. To all, which is possible through moral liberty, he applies the word Practical. T.

But our difficult analytic of the understanding would, if we had nothing else in view than the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in experience, be quite superfluous; for reason discharges its office, as well in the mathematics as in the science of nature, quite sure and well without any of this subtile deduction; our Criticism therefore unites the conceptions of the understanding with those of pure reason for a purpose placed beyond the use of experience of the understanding, which we have already said is in this consideration totally impossible, and without an object or meaning. But yet there must be harmony between that which belongs to the nature of reason and what belongs to that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly confuse it.

The solution of that question is as follows: Pure reason has not in its ideas particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, in view, but requires only completeness of the use of the understanding in the coherence of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions and of objects. It (reason), however, in order to represent that (completeness) to itself determinately, conceives of such a one, as the cognition of an object whose cognition is relatively to those rules completely determined, but which object is only an idea, for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the under-

standing as near the completeness, which that idea denotes, as possible.

45.

Observation previous to the Dialectic of pure Reason.

WE have (in par. 33 and 34) shewn, that the purity of the categories from all mixture of sensual determinations can decoy reason to extend their use, quite beyond all experience, to things in themselves, though as these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense in the concrete, they, as merely logical functions, can represent a thing in the general, but not give by themselves alone a determinate conception of any one thing. Such hyperbolical objects now are those, which are distinguished by the appellation of noumena, or pure beings of the understanding (or rather beings of thought), such as, for example, substance, but which is conceived of without permanency in time, or a cause, but which does not act in time, and so on, when predicates, that only serve to make the legality of experience possible, are applied to them, and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of intuition, on which only experience is possible, by which means those conceptions lose all signification again.

But there is no danger of the understanding's spontaneously making an excursion so very wan-

tonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. But when reason, which cannot be fully satisfied with any use of experience of the rules of the understanding, as it is always conditional, requires completion of this chain of conditions, the understanding is forced out of its sphere in order partly to represent objects of experience in so extended a series, as no experience can grasp, partly even with a view to complete it (the series) to seek totally without it noumena, to which it can fasten that chain and thereby finally, once independent of conditions of experience, make its hold as it were complete. It is the transcendental ideas, which, though they, according to the true but hidden ends of the determination of nature of our reason, may aim not as transcendent conceptions, but at illimited extension of the use of experience, entice the understanding by an unavoidable appearance to a transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be brought to keep within the bounds of experience by any resolution, but can be limited by scientific instruction only and with difficulty.

46.

I. *Psychological Ideas.**

It has been long observed, that in all substances

* *Vide Criticism* p. 341, where the paralogisms of reason are cleared up. T.

the subject itself, that which remains after all the accidents or adjuncts (as predicates) are separated from it, consequently that which is substantial itself, is unknown to us, and various complaints of these limits of our insight have been made. But it must be well attended to, that the human understanding is to be blamed not for not being able to know the substantial of things, that is, to determine it by itself only, but rather for its requiring to cognise it, being a mere idea, determinately, like a given object. Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its subject that belongs to it, and for this subject, which is of necessity nothing but a predicate again, its subject, and so on to indefinite (or as far as we reach). But hence it follows, that we can hold nothing, at which we can arrive, a last subject, and that the substantial itself never can be thought of by our understanding, how deep soever it may penetrate, and even if all nature were unveiled to it; because the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking of every thing discursively, that is, representing it by conceptions, and consequently by mere predicates, to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence are all the real properties, by which we cognise bodies, mere accidents or adjuncts, even impenetrability, which we can never represent to ourselves but as the effect of a power the subject of which is wanting to us, not excepted.

It should seem as if we in the consciousness of

ourselves (the thinking subject) had this substantial in an immediate representation; for all the predicates of the internal sense refer to me, as subject, and I cannot be conceived of as the predicate of any other subject. The completeness in the reference of the given conceptions as predicates to a subject, therefore, does not seem here to be merely an idea, but the object, the absolute subject itself, given in experience. But this expectation is disappointed. For the (pronoun) I is not a conception,* but the denotation of the object of the internal sense, provided that we do not cognise more of it by any predicate, consequently it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing, and just as little can it be a determinate conception of an absolute subject, but is, as in all other cases, only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject. Yet this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative principle, totally to destroy all materialistical explanation of the internal phenomena of our soul) gives occasion by a very natural misunderstanding to a very specious argument, in order, from this opiniative cognition of

* Were the representation of the apperception (denoted by the pronoun) I a conception, by which any thing should be thought of, it could be used as a predicate of other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more, than the feeling of an existence without the least conception and only the representation of that, to which all thinking stands in relation (*relatione accidentis*).

the substantial of our thinking being, to infer its nature, with the proviso that the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of experience.

47.

But, though this thinking self (the soul) should, as the last subject of thinking, which cannot be represented any more as the predicate of another thing, be termed a substance; this conception, if its durability, as that, which renders the conception of substances in experience pregnant, cannot be proved, remains quite empty, and of no consequence.

But durability can be evinced never from the conception of a substance, as of a thing in itself, but for the behoof of experience only. That is sufficiently shewn by the first analogy of experience (in the Criticism p. 132) and, if any body will not yield to this proof, let him try himself whether it will succeed, from the conception of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing, to prove, that its existence is thoroughly permanent, and that it, neither in itself nor by any one cause of nature, can have a beginning or an end. These synthetic propositions *à priori* can be evinced never in themselves, but in reference to things only as objects of a possible experience.

48.

If therefore we from the conception of the soul

as a substance would infer her permanence: this can hold of her for the behoof of possible experience only, not as a thing in itself and above all possible experience. But life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience; by consequence we cannot conclude the permanence of the soul but in life, for the death of man is the end of all experience; but what concerns the soul as an object of experience, provided that the contrary is not evinced, is the question in hand. The permanence of the soul therefore can be evinced, during the life of man only (the proof of which proposition would be superfluous), but not after his death (the subject of present inquiry), for this universal reason, that the conception of substance, if it shall be considered as necessarily conjoined with the conception of permanency, can be so according to a principle of possible experience only and consequently for the behoof of experience only.*

* It in fact is very remarkable, that metaphysicians have always passed carelessly over the principle of the permanence of substances without ever attempting a proof of it; beyond a doubt because they, the moment they began it with the conception of substance, found themselves divested of all proofs. The common understanding, which was very sensible that, without this presupposition no union of the perceptions in an experience is possible, supplied this want by a postulate; for from experience itself it never could draw this principle, partly because the substances cannot be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions, that the matter can always be met with undiminished, partly because the principle contains necessity, which is always

49.

And that something real without us not only corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can likewise be proved as a connexion never of things in themselves, but for the behoof of experience : Is as much as to say, that it certainly admits of a proof that there is something empirical, by consequence as a phenomenon in space without us ; for we have nothing to do with other objects, than those, which belong to a possible experience ; because objects, which cannot be given us in any experience, are nothing to us. That, which is immediately represented in space, is empirical without me, and, as space together with all the phenomena, which it contains, belongs to the representations, whose connexion according to laws of experience

the sign of a principle *à priori*. They then boldly applied this principle to the conception of soul as a substance, and concluded of a necessary continuance of the soul after the death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from death by dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this principle, but which discovery requires deeper researches, than they were ever inclined to make, they would have seen, that that law of the permanence of substances has place for the behoof of experience only, and hence can hold of things, only provided that they shall be cognised and conjoined with others in experience, but never independently of all possible experience, and consequently not of the soul after death.

evinces their objective truth, as well as the connexion of the phenomena of the internal sense does the reality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense), I am conscious to myself by means of the external experience as well of the reality of bodies, as of external phenomena in space, in the same manner as I am, by means of the internal experience, of the existence of my soul in time, which (soul) I do not cognise but as an object of the internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and whose being in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena,* is unknown to me. The Cartesian idealism does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming; and the legality as a criterium of the truth of the former, from the want of rule and the false appearance of the latter. In both space and time are presupposed as conditions of the existence of objects, and it is asked, only, if the objects of the external senses, which we while we are awake put in space, are actually to be met with in it, as the object of the internal sense, the soul, is actually in time, that is, if experience carries with it sure criteria of distinction from imagination. The doubt may now be easily removed here, and we always do remove it in common life by our investigating the connexion of the phenomena in both according to universal laws of experience, and not being able, when the represen-

* Their intelligible substratum. T.

tation of the external things thoroughly agrees therewith, to doubt of their constituting true experience. The material idealism, in which phenomena are considered as phenomena according to their connexion in experience only, may likewise be very easily removed, and it is just as sure an experience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that I myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in time): For the conception 'without us,' signifies the existence in space only. But as the (pronoun) I, in the proposition, 'I am,' means not only the internal intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, as body does not only the external intuition (in space), but the thing in itself, which is the foundation of this phenomenon; the question, 'whether bodies (as phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies out of my thoughts,' may without any hesitation be denied in nature; but the question, 'whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (soul according to the empirical psychology) exist out of my power of representation in time is by no means of a distinct nature, for it must likewise be answered in the negative. And in this manner every thing, when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The formal (or transcendental) idealism actually annuls the material or Cartesian. For space, if it is nothing but a form of my sensitivity, is as a representation in me just as real as I myself am, and nothing more than the empirical truth of the

phenomena remains for consideration. But, if that is not the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing out of us, not all the criteria of experience without our perception can ever prove the reality of these objects without us.

50.

II. *Cosmological Ideas.**

THIS production of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable phenomenon, and the most powerful of all means of rousing the philosopher from his dogmatic slumber, and of exciting him to undertake the arduous task of the criticism on reason.

I term this idea cosmological, because it never takes its object but from the sensible world, and does not use any other, than that, whose object is an object of sense, and consequently is so far immanent; not transcendent, and therefore not yet an idea; whereas, conceiving of the soul as a simple substance, is the same as conceiving of such an object (the simple) as cannot be represented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea enlarges the connexion of that which is conditionate with its condition (whether this connexion is mathematical or dynamical) so much, that experience never can equal it, and therefore is with regard to this point always an

* *Vide Criticism p. 405.*

idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any one experience.

51.

In the first place, the use of a system of categories is so obvious and so distinct here, that, even if there were no other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently shew its indispensableness in the system of pure reason. There are only four of the transcendental ideas, as many as classes of categories; in every one of which however they refer to nothing but the absolute completeness of the series of conditions of a given conditionate. And conformably to these cosmological ideas there are only four dialectic assertions of pure reason, which, as they are dialectical, thereby prove, that to every one of them, on however specious principles of pure reason it may be made, another contradicting it stands opposed to it, which opposition, as not all the metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction can prevent it, compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself. This antinomy, which is not arbitrarily excogitated, but founded in the nature of human reason, by consequence unavoidable and never ceasing, contains the following four theses together with their antitheses :

1.

Thesis.

The World had and has, as to Time and Space,
a Beginning (has Bounds).

Antithesis.

The World is, as to Time and Space,
infinite.

2.

Thesis.

Every Thing in the World is
simple.

Antithesis.

There is nothing simple, but every Thing is
composed.

3.

Thesis.

In the World there are Causes through
Liberty.

Antithesis.

There is no Liberty, but all is
Nature.

4.

Thesis.

In the Series of the Causes of the World there is somewhere
a necessary Being.

Antithesis.

There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in that Series
All is casual.

52. a.

This is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no other instance of which can be shewn in any other use of reason. If we, as it is commonly done, represent to ourselves the phenomena of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their conjunction as prin-

ciples holding universally of thing in themselves and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay, without our Criticism, unavoidably the case; there arises an unexpected opposition, which never can be removed in the common dogmatic way; because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be evinced by equally clear, evident and irresistible proofs—for I pledge myself for the rightness of all these proofs—and reason therefore sees itself at variance with itself, a state, at which the sceptic rejoices, but which must bring the philosopher to reflection and give him uneasiness.

52. b.

We may bungle in various ways in metaphysic without even being apprehensive of being detected of untruth. For, if we do but not contradict ourselves, which in synthetic, though quite feigned propositions it is very possible to do, we, in all cases, in which the conceptions, that we connect, are mere ideas, which cannot be given (as to their whole matter) in experience, never can be refuted by experience. For, how can we make out by experience if the world is from eternity or had a beginning, if matter is divisible to infinite or consists of simple parts, these conceptions cannot be given in any even the greatest possible experience, nor consequently can the wrongness of the positive or of the negative proposition be discovered by this test.

The only possible case, in which reason reveals against its will its secret dialectic, which it falsely gives out for dogmatic, is that, when it grounds an assertion upon one universal acknowledged principle, and from another alike acknowledged infers, with the greatest rightness of consequence, quite the contrary. This case is actual here with regard to four natural ideas of reason, whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions on the other, each with right consequence from universally acknowledged principles, arise, and thereby manifest the dialectic appearance of pure reason in the use of these principles, which appearance must needs else be for ever hidden.

This is therefore a decisive attempt, that must necessarily discover an error for us, which lies hidden in the presuppositions of reason.* Two propositions contradicting one another cannot be both false, except when the conception, upon which both bottom, is itself contradictory, for example,

* I therefore wish, that the critical reader may make this antinomy his chief study, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions, and to force it to self-trial. Every proof, which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I oblige myself to be answerable for, and thereby to shew the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. If the reader is once brought by this rare phenomenon to recur to the proof of the presupposition upon which it bottoms, he will feel himself constrained to investigate the first foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me.

the propositions, 'a quadrangular circle is round, and a quadrangular circle is not round,' are both false. For, as to the former, it is false, that the said circle is round, because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is not round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For, the logical mark of the impossibility of a conception consists in this, that under its (the conception's) presupposition two contradictory propositions are at the same time false, by consequence, as no third one can be conceived of between them, nothing at all can be thought of by that conception.

52. c.

The two first antinomies, which I denominate mathematical, because their business is the addition or the division of the homogeneous, are founded in a similar contradictory conception; and hence I explain how it happens, that the thesis, as well as the antithesis of both, is false.

When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things in themselves, because I know nothing of them, but of things as phenomena, that is, of experience, as a particular way of cognising objects, which man alone is gifted with. But I must not say of what I conceive of in time or in space, that it in itself, and without these my thoughts, is in space and in time; for in that case I would contradict myself; because space and time, together with the phenomena in them, are nothing ex-

isting in itself and without my representations, but themselves modes of representation only, and it is palpably contradictory to say, that a mere mode of representation exists without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist in experience only; whereas to give them an existence subsisting by itself* without experience or before it, is as much as to represent to ourselves, that experience is actual without experience or before it.

If I inquire after the quantum of the world, as to space and time, it is equally impossible to all my conceptions to say, that it is infinite, as it is; that it is finite. For neither of them can be contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite space, or of an infinite passed time, is, according to the bounding of the world by an empty space or a previous empty time, not possible; these are only ideas. This quantum of the world, which is determined in either the one or the other way, must therefore lie in the world itself separated from all experience. But this assertion contradicts the conception of a sensible world, which is only a complex of the phenomena whose existence and connexion have place only in the representation of experience, because it (experience) is not a thing in itself, but a way of representation. Hence it follows, that, as the conception of an absolutely

* Absolutely. T.

existing sensible world is contradictory in itself, the solution of the problem concerning its quantum is, whether it is attempted positively or negatively, always false.

The same holds of the second antinomy that relates to the division of phenomena. For they are mere representations, and the parts exist merely in their representation, consequently in the division, that is, in a possible experience, in which they are given, and that (the division) reaches only as far as this (experience) reaches. To assume, that a phenomenon, *exempli gratia*, that of a body, contains in itself before any experience all the parts, which nothing but possible experience can ever reach, is as much as to give a mere phenomenon, which can exist only in experience, at the same time an existence previous to experience, or to say, that mere representations exist before they are met with in the power of representation, which assertion, and consequently every solution of the misunderstood problem, whether it is maintained in it, that bodies consist in themselves either of infinitely many parts, or of a finite number of simple parts, are contradictory or absurd.

53.

In the first (the mathematical) class of the antinomy the falseness of the presupposition consists in representing what is contradictory (a phenomenon as a thing in itself) as possible to be united in one

conception. But, as to the second (the dynamical) class of antinomy, the falseness of the representation in it consists in representing what can be united as contradictory, by consequence, as in the former case, both assertions opposed to one another are false, in this case, on the other hand, both of those, which are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding, can be true.

Relatively to the mathematical connexion homogeneity of that which is connected (in the conception of quantity) is necessarily presupposed, but this presupposition is by no means requisite to the dynamical. When the quantum of what is extended is in question, all the parts must be homogeneous among themselves and with the whole ; whereas, in the connexion of cause and of effect, homogeneity may likewise be met with, but it is not necessary ; for the conception of causality (by means of which something is laid down by something quite distinct from it) at least does not require it.

If the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in themselves, and the aforementioned laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves, the contradiction is unavoidable. And, if the subject of liberty is, like other objects, represented as mere phenomenon, the contradiction can be just as little avoided, for the same is at once affirmed and denied of one object in the same sense. But the necessity of nature is referred merely to phe-

nomena, and liberty merely to things in themselves, or noumena, and though both species of causality, how difficult soever or impossible it may be to render that of the latter sort comprehensible, are assumed or granted, no contradiction arises.

Every effect (as a phenomenon) is an event, or something that happens in time, which must, according to the universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause (a state of it), which it follows agreeably to a constant law. But this determination of the cause to causality must likewise be something that happens, or takes place; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession between it and the effect could be conceived. The effect, as well as the causality of the cause, would have always been. Among phenomena therefore the determination of the cause to effectuate must have its origin, and consequently be, as well as its effect, an event, which must again have its cause, and so on, and therefore the necessity of nature must needs be the condition, on which the efficient causes are determined. Whereas liberty, if it shall be a property of certain causes of phenomena, must, respectively to these, as events, be a faculty of beginning them of its own accord (*sponte*), that is, without the causality of the cause itself's needing to begin, and hence without its standing in need of any other ground's determining its beginning. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not rank under time.

determinations of its state, that is, not be a phenomenon, that is, must be assumed as a thing in itself (a noumenon), but the effects, as phenomena only.* If we can think of such an influence of the beings of the understanding on phenomena without a contradiction, necessity of nature will adhere to all connexion of cause and of effect in the sensible world, but, on the other hand, liberty be granted that cause, which is itself not a phenomenon (though grounded upon it). Nature therefore and liberty can without a contradiction be attributed to the very same thing, but in a distinct reference, at one time as a phenomenon, at another as a thing in itself (*in se*), or a noumenon.

* The idea of liberty has place only in the relation of the intellectual, as cause, to the phenomenon, as the effect. Hence we cannot attribute liberty to matter in regard to its incessant action, by which it fills its space, though this action takes place according to an internal principle. We can just as little find a conception of liberty suitable to pure beings of the understanding, for instance, God, provided that his action is immanent. For his action, though independent upon external determining causes, is determined in his eternal reason, by consequence in the divine nature. It is only, if something shall begin by an action, consequently the effect be to be met with in the series of time, of course in the sensible world (for example, the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the causality of the cause must likewise begin itself or whether the cause can, without its causality's beginning itself, produce an effect. In the former case the conception of this causality is a conception of the necessity of nature, in the latter, that of

We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connexion with its subjective determining grounds, that are the causes of nature of its actions, and is so far the faculty of a being that belongs himself to phenomena, but is referred to objective grounds, that are merely ideas, provided they can determine this faculty, which connexion is expressed by the word, ought. This faculty is named reason, and, if we consider a being (man) entirely according to this objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as a sensitive being, but this property is that of a thing in itself, whose possibility, how the (word) ought (which however has never yet taken place) determines its activity, and can become the cause of actions, whose effect is a phenomenon in the sensible world, we cannot possibly comprehend. Yet the causality of reason is liberty with regard to the effects in the sensible world, provided that objective grounds, which are themselves idea, are considered as determining relatively to liberty. For its actions in that case depend not upon subjective conditions, consequently not upon those of time, and of course not upon the laws of nature, which serve to determine it (nature), because grounds of reason give actions the rule universally, according

liberty. From which the reader will see, that, as I explain liberty as the faculty of beginning an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the conception, which is the problem of the metaphysics.

to principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time or space.

What I adduce here holds as an example only for the purpose of intelligibility, and does not necessarily belong to our question, which must, independently of the properties, which we meet with in the real world, be decided from mere conceptions.

It can without a contradiction be said, that all the actions of rational beings, if they are phenomena (to be met with in any one experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, merely respective to the rational subject and his faculty of acting agreeably to bare reason, are free. For, what is required for the necessity of nature? Nothing farther than the determinableness of every event of the sensible world according to constant laws, consequently a reference to cause as phenomenon; whereby the thing in itself, what forms the substratum, and its causality remain unknown. But I say, that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the cause of the effects of the sensible world from reason, consequently through liberty, or whether he does not determine these on grounds of reason. For, if the former is the case, the action is performed according to maxims, whose effect as phenomenon is always conformable to constant laws; if the latter is so, and the action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensitivity, and in both cases the effects cohere according to

constant laws ; and more we do not require for the necessity of nature, nay, more we do not know of it neither. But in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free, in the latter the effects run according to mere laws of nature of the sensitivity, because reason does not exercise any influence on it (the sensitivity); but reason itself is not determined on that account by the sensitivity, and therefore free in this case too. Liberty, therefore, is not of any hindrance to the law of nature of phenomena, not is this law of any detriment to the liberty of the practical use of reason, which stands in conjunction with things in themselves, as determining grounds.

And thus practical (moral) liberty, or that liberty, in which reason has causality according to objectively determining grounds, is saved, without the necessity of nature's receiving, with regard to the very same effects, as phenomena, the least detriment. And this may be serviceable for the illustration of what we had to say concerning transcendental liberty and its union with the necessity of nature (in the same subject, but not taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes, respective to the determining grounds, is always a first beginning, though the same action is in the series of phenomena nothing but a subaltern beginning, which must be preceded by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is itself determined

in the same manner by another immediately preceding; so that we, in rational beings or in general in beings, provided that their causality is determined in them as things in themselves, can, without falling into a contradiction with the laws of nature, conceive of a faculty of beginning of its own accord a series of states. For the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a relation of time; in this case that which determines the causality does not, as to time, precede the action, because such determining grounds represent not a reference of objects to sense, by consequence not to causes as phenomena, but determining causes, as things in themselves, which do not rank under conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the causality of reason, can be considered, at once as a first beginning, in respect to the series of phenomena, and yet as a merely subordinated beginning, and, without a contradiction, in that consideration, as free, but in this (as it is merely phenomenon) as subjected to the necessity of nature.

As to the fourth antinomy, it is removed in the same way as the collision of reason with itself in the third. For, if the cause as a phenomenon is only distinguished from the cause of the phenomena, provided that it can be thought of as a thing in itself, both propositions can perfectly subsist together, the one, that no cause of the sensible world (according to similar laws of causality), whose

existence is absolutely necessary, has place, the other, that this world is nevertheless conjoined with a Necessary Being as its cause (but in another way and according to another law); which incompatibility of propositions entirely rests upon this misunderstanding: extending what holds of phenomena merely to things in themselves, and in general mixing both in one conception.

54.

And this is the erection and the solution of the whole antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its principles to the sensible world, the former of which alone (the mere erection) will be of considerable use in promoting the knowledge of human reason, though the solution should not yet satisfy the reader fully, who has to combat a natural but a false appearance here, which has been but recently represented to him and which he hitherto had always held true. For this result of it is at least unavoidable: that, as it is quite impossible, as long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for the things in themselves, and not for, what they in fact are, mere phenomena, to prevent this opposition of reason to itself, the reader is thereby necessitated once more to undertake the deduction of all our cognition *a priori* and the proof of that, which I have already given of it, in order to come to a decision on them.

More I do not require at present ; for if he in this occupation shall have once reflected deeply enough on the nature of pure reason, the-only conceptions, by which the solution of the antinomy of reason is possible, will be sufficiently familiar to him, without which circumstance I cannot expect full approbation even from the most attentive reader.

55.

III. *Theological Idea.**

THE third transcendental idea, which affords matter for the most important, but, if it is made only speculatively, transcendent and just thereby dialectic use of reason, is the Ideal of pure reason. As reason in this case does not, as with the psychological and the cosmological ideas, begin from experience, and is misled by the mounting or gradation of grounds to strive, if possible, after the absolute completeness of their series, but quite breaks off, and descends from mere conceptions of that which would constitute the absolute completeness of a thing in general, consequently by means of the idea of a fully perfect Being, to the determination of the possibility and therefore of the reality of all other things ; the mere presupposition of a Being, who is conceived of not in the series of experience, yet for

the behoof of experience, for the sake of the comprehensibleness of its connexion, order and unity, that is, the idea, is easier to be distinguished from the conception of the understanding here, than in the former cases. Hence the dialectic appearance, which is occasioned by our holding the subjective conditions of our thinking objective ones of the things themselves and a necessary hypothesis for the satisfaction of our reason a dogma, can be easily exhibited to view ; and, as what the Criticism says of the pretensions of transcendental theology is intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to add on the subject.

56.

GENERAL SCHOLION

on the transcendental Ideas.

THE objects, which are given us by experience, are in many respects incomprehensible to us, and many questions, to which the law of nature leads us, when they are carried to a certain height but always conformably to the laws of nature, admit of no answer, for instance, how substances attract one another. But, if we entirely quit nature or, in the progress of its connexion, go beyond all possible experience, and by consequence dive into mere ideas, we cannot say, that the object is incomprehensible to us, and that the nature of things lays insolvable problems before us ; for we have

then not to do with nature or in general with given objects, but with conceptions, which have their origin in our reason entirely, and with mere creatures of thought, relatively to which all the problems that must needs arise from their conception can be solved, because reason by all means can give and must give a full account of its own procedure.* As the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological ideas are nothing but pure conception of reason, which cannot be given in any experience, the questions, which reason asks us relatively to them, are put to us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction, and must collectively be capable of being sufficiently answered, and which answer is given by shewing, that they are principles of bringing our use of the understanding to thorough agree-

* And therefore Platner in his Aphorisms perspicaciously says, "If reason is a criterium, not any conception, which is incomprehensible to human reason, can be possible.—Incomprehensibility has place in that which is real only. In it the incomprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the acquired ideas."—It therefore seems paradoxical but is not surprising to say, that in nature there is much incomprehensible, (for example, the faculty of generation), but if we mount still higher and even go beyond nature, every thing becomes comprehensible again to us; for we then quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in experience, because it (the law) is its (reason's) own production.

ment, completeness, and synthetic unity, and so far hold of experience only, but of it on the whole. But, though an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the only idea of a whole of cognition according to principles in general is that whole, which can afford the cognition a particular sort of unity, that of a system, without which our cognition is nothing but patchwork, and cannot be used for the chief end (which never can be but the system of all ends); but I do not here mean the practical,* but the chief end of the speculative use of reason.

The transcendental ideas therefore express the peculiar destination of reason as a principle of the systematic unity of the use of the understanding. But, if this unity of the mode of cognition is considered as if it adhered to the object of cognition, if it, which is merely regulative, is held constitutive, and if we should persuade ourselves, that we can by means of these ideas enlarge our cognition far beyond all possible experience, consequently in a transcendent manner as it (this unity) only serves to bring experience in itself as near completeness as possible, that is, to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience; this is a mere misunderstanding in the judgment of the proper destination of our reason and of its principles, a dialectic, which partly confuses the experi-

* The moral. T.

ence-use of reason, and partly sets reason at variance with itself.

CONCLUSION.

On the Determination of the Boundary of pure Reason.

57.

AFTER all the clearest proofs, which we have already given, it were absurd for us to hope to cognise more of any one object, than belongs to the possible experience of it, or to lay the least claim to the cognition of any one thing which we do not assume to be an object of possible experience, so as to determine it according to its quality, or how it is in itself; for how could we accomplish this determination, as time, space, and the conceptions of the understanding, and still more all the conceptions formed by empirical intuition, or perception, in the sensible world, have no other use, nor can have any other, than to make experience possible, and if this condition is not made even of the pure conceptions of the understanding, they do not determine any one object, and have no meaning whatever.

But it on the other hand were yet a greater absurdity if we should not allow of any things in themselves, or had a mind to give out our experience for the only possible mode of cognition of things,

by consequence our intuition in space and in time for the only possible intuition, and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding, consequently would have principles of the possibility of experience held universal conditions of things in themselves.

Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible experience merely, could in consequence of that become transcendent even, and the limits of our reason be given out for limits of the possibility of things themselves, as Hume's dialogues can serve us for an example of it, if a careful criticism did not guard the bounds of our reason even with respect to its empirical use, and set a term to its great pretensions. Scepticism originally arose from the metaphysics and their licentious dialectic. At first it might, merely to favor the experience-use of reason, give out every thing that transcends this use for deceitful and null, but by degrees, when it was perceived, that it is the very same principles as are used for experience, which insensibly, and, as it seemed, with the same right, lead still farther, than experience extends, and thus a beginning was made to doubt even of the propositions of experience. But there is no danger in that; for the same understanding no doubt will always assert its rights; a particular confusion, however, arose in the science that cannot determine how far and why only so far and not farther reason is to be trusted, but this confusion can be cleared up by a formal deter-

mination of the boundary of our use of only reason, drawn from principles, and all relapse prevented for the future.

It is true, we cannot, beyond all possible experience, give a determinate conception of what a thing in itself may be. But yet we are not at liberty to refrain entirely from the inquiry after this conception; for experience never satisfies reason fully; it (experience), in the answering of questions, refers us farther and farther, and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their full solution; circumstances that every one may gather from the dialectic of pure reason, which therefore has its good subjective ground. Who can bear, that we should attain at once a clear consciousness of the nature of our soul, and a conviction, that her phenomena cannot be materialistically explained, without asking what the soul is, and, if no conception of experience suffices for the purpose, assuming a conception of reason (that of a simple material being) merely for that behoof, though we cannot by any means shew its objective reality? Who can satisfy himself with the mere cognition of experience in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the quantum of the world, of liberty or of the necessity of nature, as every answer given on principles of experience always begets a fresh question, which likewise requires to be answered, and thereby clearly shews the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to the satisfaction of reason? Finally,

who is it that sees, in the thorough contingency and dependence of all that, which he can think of and assume according to principles of experience only, the impossibility of stopping at them, and does not feel himself impelled by necessity, notwithstanding all interdiction from losing himself in mere ideas, to seek, beyond all the conceptions which he can vindicate by experience, tranquillity and contentment in the conception of one Being whose idea in itself, as to the possibility, we cannot perspect, or have the least insight into, though it cannot be confuted neither, because of its relating to a mere being of the understanding, but without which (idea) reason must needs remain for ever dissatisfied.

Bounds (relatively to extended beings) always give to presume a space, which is met with without a certain determinate place, and incloses it ; limits do not require that, but are mere negations, which affect a quantum, if it has not absolute completeness. But our reason, as it were, sees a space round it for the cognition of things in themselves, though it (reason) never can have determinate conceptions of them, and is limited to phenomena only.

As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, no determinate bounds of it can be thought of. In the mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits, but not of bounds, that is, that something, at which it can never arrive, lies without it, but not that it will be anywhere completed itself in its internal progress. The

enlarging of the insights in the mathematics, and the possibility of more and more discoveries or inventions go to infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by constant experience and its union by reason. But limits must not be mistaken here, for the mathematics refer to phenomena only, and what cannot be an object of sensual intuition, such as the conceptions of the metaphysics and of moral philosophy are, lies entirely without their sphere, and they can never lead to it; but they by no means stand in need of it. It is therefore not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences, and, so to say, a point or line of contact. Natural philosophy will never discover to us the internal of things, that is, what is not phenomenon, but yet can serve for the chief ground of explanation of phenomena; but it does not require this for its physical explanations; yes, if such grounds should be offered (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they should be refused and not used in the progress of its explanations, on the contrary, these explanations must never be grounded but upon that, which as an object of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into coherence with our real perceptions according to the laws of experience.

But metaphysic leads us in the dialectic essays of pure reason (which are not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but to which the nature of

reason itself excites) to bounds, and the transcendental ideas, by their not admitting of being rendered current, and by their never being capable of being realized, serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use of reason, but the way to determine them, and that is the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought forth metaphysic, as its darling, whose generation, like every other in the world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an original germe, which is wisely organized for great ends. For metaphysic is, perhaps more than any other science, placed in us, as to its fundamental strokes, by nature itself, and cannot be considered as the production of a voluntary choice or as a casual enlargement in the progress of experience (from which it quite separates itself).

Reason, for all its conceptions and laws of the understanding, which are sufficient to it for the empirical use, consequently within the sensible world, finds of itself no satisfaction by that ; for it, by questions recurring again and again to infinite, is deprived of all hope of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas, which have that completion in view, are these problems of reason. But it sees clearly, that the sensible world cannot contain this completion, and consequently all those conceptions, which serve entirely for understanding it, space and time, and all that which we have adduced under the name of pure conceptions of the under-

standing, can just as little. The sensible world is nothing but a chain of phenomena connected according to universal laws, it therefore has not any subsistence by itself, it is not the thing in itself, and by consequence refers of necessity to that, which contains the ground of this phenomenon, to beings, which cannot be cognised merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. In the cognition of them reason can hope to see its desire of completeness satisfied in the progression only from the conditionate to its conditions.

We (in 33. and 34.) have shewn the limits of reason with regard to all cognition of mere beings of thought, at present, as the transcendental ideas make the progress towards them possible for us, and only when we shall have been led, as it were, to the contact of the full space (of experience) with the empty (of which we can know nothing, that of the noumema), can we determine the bounds of pure reason; for in all bounds there is something positive (for example, a superficies is the boundary of the corporeal space, yet itself a space, a line, which is the boundary of the superficies, a point the boundary of the line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits contain mere negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough after we have found that beyond them there still lies something (though we can never cognise what it is in itself). For the question now is, what is the office of our reason in this connexion

of that, which we know, with that, which we do not know, and never shall know? This is a real connexion of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will always remain so), and, if what is not known should not become known in the least—which knowledge we in fact cannot hope for—the conception of this connexion must be capable of being determined and rendered distinct.

We shall therefore conceive of an immaterial being, of an intelligible world, and of a Supreme of all beings (merely noumena), because in them only, as things in themselves, reason meets with that completion and satisfaction, which it never can hope for in the derivation of phenomena from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually refer to something discrepant from them (by consequence totally heterogeneous), as phenomena always give us to presume a thing in itself relatively to them, whether we cognise it better or not.

But, as we can never cognise these beings of intellect according to what they are in themselves, that is, determinately, yet must assume them relatively to the sensible world, and connect them with it by reason, we are able to think at least of this connexion by means of such conceptions as express their relation to this world. For if we represent to ourselves a creature of the mind by nothing but pure conceptions of the understanding, we thereby really represent nothing determinate to ourselves,

consequently our conception has not any signification; but it, if we conceive of it by properties taken from the sensible world, is not a being of the mind, but thought of as one of the phenomena and belongs to the sensible world. Let me give you the conception of the Supreme Being for an instance?

The deistical conception is quite a pure conception of reason, but which represents only a thing that contains all reality, without being able to determine any one reality; because for that purpose the example would need to be taken from the sensible world, in which case we should have to do always with an object of sense only, not with something quite heterogeneous, which cannot be an object of sense. For I would attribute to it understanding, for instance; but I have not a conception of an understanding but that, which is the same as mine, one that intuitions must be given to by the senses, and which is occupied in reducing the unity of consciousness to rules. But then the elements of my conception would always be phenomena; I however would just by the insufficiency of the phenomena be necessitated to go beyond them to the conception of a being which neither depends upon phenomena, nor is interwoven with them as conditions of its determination. But if I separate the understanding from the sensitivity in order to have a pure understanding; nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without intuition, by which form

alone I can cognise nothing determinate, by consequence not an object. For that purpose I would need to think of another understanding, which should represent objects immediately, but of which I have not the least conception; because the human understanding is discursive, and cannot cognise or acquire knowledge but by means of universal conceptions. And the very same happens to us if we attribute a will to the Supreme Being; for we have this conception only by drawing it from our internal experience; but in this generation our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we stand in need of bottoms of course upon sensitivity, which circumstance is totally repugnant to the conception of the Supreme Being.

Hume's objections to deism are weak, and reach nothing but the proofs, never the proposition of the deistical assertion itself. But they with regard to the theism, which will be brought about by a stricter determination of our there merely transcendent conception of the Supreme Being, are very strong, and, accordingly as this conception is formed, in certain (in fact, in all common) cases irrefragable.* He always adheres to this, that by the mere conception of an original being, to which we apply no other than ontological predicates (eternity, ubiquity, omnipotence), we think of nothing deter-

* Transcendental theology, when it only is allowed, is termed Deism, but if natural theology also is assumed, Theism. T.

minate, but properties that can yield a conception in the concrete must be superadded; it is not enough to say, that it is the cause, but we must say, what sort of a nature its causality is of, perhaps that of an understanding and of a will; and then begin his attacks on the thing itself, theism, as he had previously directed his battery against the grounds of proof of deism only, which procedure however does not occasion much danger. All his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds inseparable from theism, and makes it absurd in itself, but if the former were omitted, the latter would fall with it, and nothing remain but a deism, of which nothing can be made, which is of no use to us, and which cannot serve for any foundation of religion or of morals. If this unavoidable nature of anthropomorphism were certain, let the proofs of the existence of a Supreme Being be what they will, and all granted, the conception of this Being could never be determined by us without involving ourselves in contradictions.

If we connect with the command, to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason, the command, which is in appearance repugnant to it, to proceed to conceptions that lie without the field of the immanent (empirical) use, we shall be sensible, that both can subsist together, but exactly at the Boundary or verge of all allowed use of reason only; for this belongs as well to the field of experience, as to that of the beings of thought, and we are

thereby taught at the same time how those so remarkable ideas serve merely for the determination of the boundary of human reason, on the one hand not to extend cognition of experience unboundedly, so that nothing more, than merely world should remain for us to cognise, and yet, on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds of experience, and to think of judging of things beyond them, as things in themselves.

But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment to the relation merely, which the world may have to a Being, whose very conception lies beyond all the cognition of which we are capable within the world. For we then do not appropriate to the Supreme Being any of the properties in themselves, by which we represent objects of experience to ourselves, and thereby avoid the dogmatic anthropomorphism, but we attribute them to his relation to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns the language only, not the object itself.

If I say, that we are necessitated so to consider the world, as if it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I actually say nothing more, than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer, as the sensible world (or all that, which constitutes the substratum of this complex of phenomena) does to the Unknown, whom I therefore do not cognise by this as he is in

himself, but as he is to me or with regard to the world, of which I am a part.

58.

Such a cognition is that according to analogy, which does not signify, as the word is commonly taken, an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of two relations between quite dissimilar things.* By means of this analogy, however, there remains a conception of the Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out every thing that could determine him absolutely or in himself; for we determine him re-

* There is an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of the motive powers: I never can do any thing to another without giving him a right to do the same to me on the same conditions; as no body can act with its motive power on another body without thereby occasioning the other to act as much against it. Right and motive power are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation there is a full similarity. By means of a similarity of this sort then I can give a conception of the relation of things, which are absolutely unknown to me. For instance, the promotion of the fortune of children = a bears the same relation to the love of parents = b, as the welfare of the human species = c does to that which is unknown in God = x, and which we name love; not as if it had the least similarity to any human inclination, but because we can lay down its relation to the world in a manner similar to that which things of the world bear one another. But the conception of relation in this case is a mere category, the conception of cause, which has nothing to do with sensitivity.

spectively to the world and by consequence to us, and more is not necessary to us. The attacks, which Hume makes upon those, who would determine this conception absolutely by taking the materials for so doing from themselves and the world, do not reach us; and he cannot reproach us with nothing's remaining if we should be deprived of the objective anthropomorphism of the conception of the Supreme Being.

For, if we are but granted at first (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo grant Cleanthes) the deistical conception of the First Being, as a necessary hypothesis, in which conception this Being is thought of by the merely ontological predicates of substance, of cause, &c. (as it must be done, because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions, which are always conditional again, cannot without that have any satisfaction, and which can be done without falling into anthropomorphism, that transfers predicates from the sensible world to a Being quite distinct from the world, as those predicates are mere categories, which, as they do not give a determinate conception of him, thereby give a conception, which is not limited to any conditions of sensitivity); nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a causality by reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to theism, without being forced to attribute to him himself this reason, as a property adhering to him. For, as to the former, it is the only possible way of making the use of reason, in regard

to all possible experience, accordant with itself in the highest degree throughout the sensible world, if we even assume again a Supreme Reason as a cause of all the connexions in the world : such a principle must be thoroughly advantageous to it, but can hurt it nowhere in its use of nature ; and, secondly, reason is thereby not transferred as a property to the First Being in himself, but to his relation to the sensible world and therefore anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For nothing is considered here but the Cause of the form of reason, which form is met with every where in the world, and reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, provided that he contains the ground of this form of the world, but according to analogy only, that is, provided that this expression shews the relation only, which the Supreme Cause that is unknown to us has to the world, in order to determine every thing in it conformably to reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from using the property of reason for the purpose of conceiving by means of it not of God, but of the world in such a manner, as is necessary, in order to have the greatest possible use of reason with regard to it according to a principle. We thereby acknowledge, that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and even incogitable in a determinate way as to what he is in himself, and are thereby kept, on the one hand, from making a transcendent use of our conceptions, which we have from reason as an efficient cause (by means of the

will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by properties, which never can be taken but from the human nature, and from losing ourselves in gross and extravagant conceptions, and, on the other hand, from deluging the contemplation of the world, according to our conceptions of human reason, which we transfer to God, with hyperphysical modes of explanation, and making it lose its proper destination, according to which it should be a study of mere nature by reason, and not a presumptuous derivation of the phenomena of nature from a Supreme Reason. The expression suitable to our feeble conceptions is, that we conceive of the world as if it descended, as to its existence and internal determination, from a Supreme Reason, by which conception we partly cognise the quality, which belongs to it (the world) itself, yet without pretending to think of determining the cause of it in itself, and partly place the ground of this quality (of the form of reason in the world) in the relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose.*

* I say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause is with regard to the world that, which human reason is with regard to its works of art. Thereby the nature of the Supreme Cause remains unknown to me: I compare its effect only (the order of the world) which is known to me and its conformity to reason to the effects of human reason that I know, and hence term that reason, without attributing to it on that account what I understand in

And thus the difficulties, which seem to oppose theism, disappear by conjoining with the Hume's principle, 'not dogmatically to carry the use of reason beyond the field of all possible experience,' another principle, which he quite over-looked, 'not to consider the field of experience as that, which limits itself in the eye of our reason.' The Criticism on pure Reason shews here the true middle way between the dogmatism, which Hume combats, and the scepticism, which he would introduce, not a middle way like other middle ways that one finds adviseable to determine himself as it were mechanically (something from the one and something from the other), and by which nobody is informed of a better, but such a one, as can be exactly determined on principles.

59.

At the beginning of this subject I make use of the type of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to its use which is suitable to it. The sensible world contains merely phenomena, which are not things in themselves, which (noumena) therefore the understanding must, because of its holding the objects of experience mere phenomena, assume. In our reason both are comprised together, and the question is, how does rea-

man by the same denomination, or any thing else known to me, as its property.

son proceed to bound the understanding relatively to both fields? Experience, which contains all that belongs to the sensible world, does not bound itself; it never reaches but from one conditionate thing to another. That, which shall limit it, must lie quite without it, and this field is that of the pure beings of the understanding. But this so far as the determination of the nature of these beings is concerned, is an empty space for us, and so far we, if dogmatically determined conceptions are considered, cannot go out of the field of possible experience. But, as a boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that, which lies within it, as to the space that lies without it or a given complex, it is a real positive cognition, which reason acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary, yet so as not to seek to pass it; because it there finds for itself an empty space, in which it can conceive of forms of things, but not of things themselves. But the bounding of the field of the understanding by something, which is otherwise unknown to it, is however a cognition, which still remains to reason at this station, and by which it is neither shut up within the sensible world, nor roams without it, but, as belongs to the knowledge of a boundary, limits itself to the relation of that, which lies without it, to that which is within it.

Natural theology is a conception of that sort at the boundary of human reason, because it (reason) is obliged to look beyond this boundary for the idea

of a Supreme Being (and, in the practical reference, for that of an intelligible world too), not in order to determine any thing relatively to this mere being of the understanding, consequently out of the sensible world, but in order to guide its own use within it according to principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity, and for this behoof to make use of its reference to a self-sufficient reason, as the cause of all these connexions, but by this means not merely to feign a being for itself, but, as without the sensible world something thought of by the pure understanding only must necessarily be to be met with, to determine this something in this way only, though but according to analogy.

And in this wise remains our aforementioned proposition, which is the result of the whole Criticism: 'that reason by all its principles *à priori* never teaches us any thing more, than objects of possible experience and even of these nothing more, than what can be cognised in experience;' but this limitation does not prevent its (reason's) leading us to the objective boundary of experience, 'to the reference to something, which itself must not be an object of experience, but the chief ground of all experience, without however teaching us any thing of it in itself, as it (reason) instructs us relatively only to its own complete use, which is directed to the highest ends, in the field of possible experience. But that is all the utility, which can be rea-

sonably wished for in this case, and with which we have reason to be satisfied.

60.

And thus we have fully exhibited metaphysic as it is actually given in the predisposition of nature of human reason, and in that, which constitutes the essential end of its elaboration, according to its subjective possibility. As we however have found, that this merely natural use of this predisposition of our reason, if a discipline of it (reason) which is only possible by a scientific criticism, does not bridle it and set limits to it, involves it in transcendent, partly merely seeming, partly jarring dialectic syllogisms, and besides this subtilizing metaphysic may be dispensed with relatively to the promotion of the knowledge of nature, yes, is even disadvantageous to it; there still remains a problem worthy of inquiry, and which is, to find out the ends of nature, at which this predisposition to transcendent conceptions in our reason may be aimed, because every thing that lies in nature must be originally placed in it for some useful purpose.

An inquiry of this nature is difficult: and I acknowledge, that it is conjecture only, like all that which I can say relatively to the first ends of nature, and which may be allowed me in this case only, as

the question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical judgments, but the predisposition of nature to them, and therefore lies, without the system of metaphysic, in anthropology.

When I ponder all the transcendental ideas, whose complex constitutes the real problem of natural pure reason, which compels it (reason) to quit the mere contemplation of nature, and to transcend all possible experience and in this endeavour to bring to pass that (whether it is knowing or reasoning) which bears the name of metaphysic, I think I perceive, that the aim of this predisposition of nature is, to free our conception from the fetters of experience and the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far, as at least to see opened for it a field, which contains merely objects for the pure understanding, which objects no sensitivity can reach, not with the view of speculatively occupying ourselves about them (because we cannot find ground to stand upon), but, in order that practical principles, which, without finding a scope of that sort for their necessary expectation and hope, could not spread themselves to the universality, which reason unavoidably requires in the moral view.

And I find the Psychological Idea, how little insight soever I may have by it into the nature of the human soul, which is pure and raised above all conceptions of experience, shews the insufficiency at least of these distinctly enough, and thereby leads

me away from materialism, as a conception, which is not fit for any explanation of nature, and over and above confines reason in the practical view. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism, which nature by itself will sufficiently give out. Finally, as all necessity of nature in the sensible world is always conditional, as it always gives to presuppose dependence of things upon others, and the unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause discrepant from the sensible world, but its causality again, were it merely nature, could never render the existence of the casual as its consequent comprehensible, reason frees itself by means of the Theological Idea from the fatalism, as well of a blind necessity of nature in the coherence of nature itself, without a first principle, as in the causality of this principle itself, and leads to the conception of a cause by liberty, consequently of a Supreme Intelligence. In this manner do the transcendental ideas serve, if not to instruct us positively, to annul the rash assertions of Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thereby to afford scope for the moral ideas without the field of speculation ; and this, I should think, should in some measure explain that predisposition of nature.

The practical utility, which a merely speculative science may be of, lies without the bounds of this

science, can therefore be considered as a scholion merely, and does, like all scholions, not belong as a part to the science itself. This reference however lies at least within the bounds of philosophy, especially of that philosophy which draws from the pure sources of reason, wherein the speculative use of reason in metaphysic must necessarily have unity with the practical use of reason in moral philosophy. Hence does the unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, considered in metaphysic as a predisposition of nature, deserve to be explained not as an appearance merely, which requires to be solved, but as an arrangement of nature as to its end, when it is possible, though this office, as supererogatory, cannot in justice be assigned to metaphysic in the proper sense.

The solution of the questions which continue from page 647 of the Criticism to page 668, would need to be held a second scholion, which however has a greater affinity with the matter of metaphysic. For there certain principles, which determine *à priori* the order of nature or rather the understanding, which seeks its (nature's) laws by experience, are laid down. They, as they spring from mere reason, which cannot be considered, like the understanding, as a principle of possible experience, seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience. But, whether that agreement rests upon this, that, as nature does not adhere to the phenomena in themselves or to their source, the sensitivity in itself, but

is to be met with in its (the sensitivity's) reference only to the understanding, the thorough unity of the use of the understanding for the behoof of a collective possible experience (in a system) cannot belong to the understanding but with reference to reason, and by consequence experience is mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason, may be farther weighed by those, who have a mind to trace the nature of reason, even without its use in metaphysic, to render a history of nature in general systematical even in the universal principles; for this problem I have represented as important, but not attempted its solution, in the book itself.*

And thus have I accomplished the analytic solution of the main question proposed by myself, 'How is metaphysic in general possible?' by ascending from that, where the use of metaphysic is actually given, at least in the consequences, to the grounds of the possibility of this science.

* It was always my constant design by the Criticism to neglect nothing that can bring the inquiry into the nature of pure reason, though it should be ever so deeply hidden, to completeness. Every body may afterward carry his research as far as he pleases, when it is only pointed out to him what may yet remain to be undertaken, for this office may reasonably be expected from those, who have made it their business to take a survey of this whole field, in order to deliver it over to others afterward for future cultivation and division at pleasure. And to that both the scholions, which will hardly recommend themselves by their driness to amateurs, and hence are added for connoisseurs only, pertain.

SOLUTION
OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE
PROLEGOMENA.

How is Metaphysic possible as a Science?

METAPHYSIC, as a predisposition of nature of reason, is real, but by itself only (as the analytic solution of the third principal question evinces) dialectical and illusory. To think of taking principles from it, and in their use to follow the natural, but on that account not the less false appearance, can therefore never produce science, but vain dialectic art, in which the one school vies with or may excel the other, but neither of them can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation.

In order that it as a science may be able to lay claim not only to a fallacious persuasion, but to insight and to conviction, a criticism on reason itself must exhibit the whole stock of conceptions *à priori*, their division according to the various sources of the sensitivity, of the understanding, and of reason, together with a complete table of them, and the dissection of all these conceptions, with all that which can be thence inferred, and then especially the possibility of the synthetic cognition *à priori*, by means of the deduction of these conceptions, the principles of their use and finally its bounds, but all in a complete system. Criticism therefore, and it alone, contains in itself the whole well pro-

ved and approved plan, yes, even all the means of execution, whereby metaphysic can be brought about as a science ; it by other ways and other means is impossible. The question here therefore is not so much how that business is possible, as how to set it on foot, and to induce men of good heads to quit the hitherto perverted and fruitless elaboration for one that is not fallacious, and how a union of that sort may be made the most conducive to the common end.

This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted criticism, will be for ever sick of all dogmatic jargon, on which he out of necessity formerly fed, because his reason wanted something, and could find nothing better for its support. Criticism stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools, as chymistry does to alchymy or as astronomy to judiciary astrology. I venture to assert, that nobody, who has read this work attentively and understands the principles of the Criticism even but in these Prolegomena, will ever return to that old and sophistical seeming science ; but will rather with a certain delight look forward to metaphysic, which now is by all means in his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which can for the first time afford lasting satisfaction to reason. For it is a preference, upon which of all possible sciences metaphysic is the only one that can with certainty count, that it can be brought to completion and to the permanent

state, in which it cannot be altered, and is not capable of any augmentation by new discoveries; because reason here has not the sources of its cognition in the objects and their intuition (by which it cannot be informed of any thing more), but in itself, and, when it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty completely and determinately against all misunderstanding, nothing that pure reason can cognise *à priori*, nay, what it can but ask on grounds, remains. The sure prospect of a knowledge so determinate and so closed has a particular charm in it, though we should set aside all the advantages (of which I hereafter shall yet speak).

All false art, all vain wisdom lasts its time; for it destroys itself at length, and its highest culture is at the same time the moment of its fall. That, with regard to metaphysic, that moment is come, is proved by the state, into which it, for all the zeal, with which all other sciences are prosecuted, is fallen among all learned nations. The old arrangement of the university-studies still preserves its shadow, a single academy of sciences occasions now and then by prizes a few essays to be made in it (metaphysic), but it is no longer numbered with well founded sciences, and let any one judge himself how a man of parts, who should be dubbed a great metaphysician, would receive the compliment, which might be well-meant, but is scarcely envied by any body.

But, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatic metaphysic is undoubtedly arrived, much is still wanting, to be able to say, that the period of its regeneration is arrived by means of a profound and a finished criticism on reason. All transitions from one inclination to another contrary one pass through the state of indifference, and this point of time is the most dangerous for the author, but, in my opinion, the most favorable for the science. For, when by a total separation of former conjunctions the party spirit is extinguished, the minds are in the best state for gradually listening to proposals for a conjunction according to another plan.

When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in the field of criticism, and afford the universal spirit of philosophy, which philosophy seems in the speculative part to be in want of food, an object of discourse, which is new and bespeaks much, I can represent to myself beforehand, that every one, whom the thorny path, in which I have led him in the Criticism has put out of humour and tired, will ask me, upon what I found this hope. My answer is, 'upon the irresistible law of necessity.'

That the mind of man will at any time give up metaphysical researches entirely, is as little to be expected, as that we, not to be always breathing impure air, should rather chuse to put a final stop to breathing or respiration. Metaphysic will therefore be always in the world, and what is more, every

one, especially every man of reflection, will possess it, which, for want of a public standard, every body will cut for himself in his own way. What has hitherto been named metaphysic, cannot give satisfaction to any reflecting mind, but it is quite impossible to forego it entirely, a criticism on pure reason must therefore be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want, which is still something more than a mere desire of knowledge.

Ever since I have known criticism, when I have finished reading a book of metaphysical contents, which, by the determination of conceptions, by variety, order, and an easy style, was not only entertaining but edifying, I have not been able to refrain from asking, Has this author advanced metaphysic a single step? The learned men, whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the culture of the powers of the mind, will, I hope, forgive me for saying, that I have never been able to find, that either their essays or mine, which are of less consequence (though self-love may speak in their favour), have advanced the science in the least, and for this very natural reason, that the science did not then exist, and cannot be composed by piecemeal, but its germ must be fully preformed in the criticism on pure reason. But, in order to prevent all misconception, what has been already said must be recalled

to mind, that by the analytic treatment of our conceptions the understanding indeed gains a great deal, but the science (of metaphysic) is not the least promoted, because these dissections of conceptions are nothing but the materials, of which science is first built. Let the conceptions of substance and of accident or adjunct be ever so finely anatomised and determined ; that is very good as a preparation for some future use. But, if we cannot prove, that in all which exists, the substance endures, and that the accidents or adjuncts only vary, the science is not advanced in the least by all that dissection. Metaphysic hitherto has never been able to prove *à priori* either that proposition, or that of sufficient reason, or still less any one more composed, as, for instance, one belonging to psychology or to cosmology or any one synthetic proposition ; by all that analysis therefore nothing is effectuated, nothing obtained or forwarded, and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the times of Aristotle, though the preparations for it are, since the clew to synthetic cognitions has been found, undoubtedly much better made, than they formerly were.

If any one thinks himself insulted, he may easily annul this accusation by producing a single synthetic proposition belonging to metaphysic, which (proposition) he can prove, for I will, only when he has performed this, grant that he has really ad-

vanced the science; even should that proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more equitable, and, in the (infallibly certain) event of non-performance, no pretension juster, than that of maintaining, 'that hitherto metaphysic has never existed as a science.'

But there are two things, which, in case the challenge should be accepted of, I must forbid: the one, the toys of probability and of conjecture, which are suited as little to metaphysic, as to geometry, and the other, the decision by means of the divining wand of sound understanding, which every one does not wave, but which accommodates itself to personal properties.

For, as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in metaphysic, a philosophy from pure reason, to think of grounding their judgments upon probability and upon conjecture. Every thing that is cognised *à priori*, is thereby given out as apodictically certain, and must therefore be proved so. We might just as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures; for as to the *calculus probabilium* of the latter, it does not contain probable, but quite certain cases which, on given homogeneous conditions, must, in the sum of all possible cases, infallibly happen conformably to the rule, though it is in respect to every single accident not sufficiently determined. Conjectures (by means of induction and of analogy) can be

suffered in empirical natural philosophy only, yet in such a manner, that the possibility at least of what we assume must be quite certain.

The appeal to the sound understanding, when conceptions and principles are not given out so far as they hold with regard to experience, but so far as they are valid even without the conditions of experience, is, if possible, still more absurd. For what is the sound understanding? It is the common understanding (or what is usually named common-sense), provided that it judges right. But what is the common understanding? It is the faculty of the cognition and of the use of rules in the concrete, in contradistinction to the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of the cognition of rules in the abstract. The rule, 'that all which happens, is determined by means of its cause,' the common intellect can hardly understand, and never can perspect or have an insight into it thus in the general. It therefore requires an example from experience, and, when it hears, that this rule means nothing but what it has always known, it, when a pane is broken or a kitchen-utensil missing, understands the principle and grants it. Common understanding therefore is of no use but so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are present in it *à priori*) confirmed by experience, consequently to perspect them *à priori*, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon

of common sense. But the province of metaphysic is entirely confined to the latter species of cognition, and it is certainly a bad sign of a sound understanding to appeal to the testimony of common sense, which has not a judgment here, and on which one looks down only except when he is pressed, and can find no other advice or assistance in his speculation.

It is an evasion, which those false friends of common sense (who occasionally praise it highly, but usually despise it) are wont to make use of, when they say, that there must at last be a few propositions, which are immediately certain, and of which there is occasion to give not only no proof, but no account at all, because we otherwise could never have done with the grounds of our judgments; but for the proof of this right (or moral faculty) they never can adduce (except the principle of contradiction, but which is not sufficient to shew the truth of synthetic judgments) any thing else undoubted, which they can immediately ascribe to the common understanding, than mathematical propositions, for instance, that twice two make four, that between two points there is one straight line only, and many others. But these are judgments very distinct from those of metaphysic. For in the mathematics I myself can by my thinking make (construct) all that, which I represent to myself as possible by a conception: I add to the two the other two, one by one, and make myself the number four, or I draw

in thought from one point to another all sorts of lines, and can draw one only, which is like itself in all its parts (the equal as well as the unequal). But I cannot, by my own power of thinking, draw, from the conception of a thing, the conception of something else, whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, but must call in the assistance of experience, and, though my understanding furnishes me *à priori* (yet never but in reference to possible experience) with the conception of such a connexion (of causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the conceptions of the mathematics, by intuition, *à priori*, and shew all its possibility *à priori*, but this conception, together with the principles of its application, always requires, if it shall hold *à priori*—as is requisite in metaphysic—a justification and a deduction of its possibility, because it cannot be otherwise known how far it holds, and whether it can be used in experience only or out of it. In metaphysic, then, as a speculative science of pure reason, we can never make an appeal to common sense, but may do so, when we are forced to quit it (metaphysic) and to give up all pure speculative cognition, which must always be science, and consequently metaphysic itself, and its instruction (on certain occasions), and when a belief of reason only is found possible for us, and sufficient to our want (and perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself). For the shape of the thing then is quite altered. Metaphysic must be science not only in gross,

but in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing ; because it, as a speculation of pure reason, has a footing nowhere else than in universal insights. Out of it, however, probability and a sound understanding may be used to advantage and justly, but on quite peculiar principles, whose importance always depends upon the reference to the practical.

And that is what I hold myself warranted in requiring for the possibility of metaphysic as a science.

APPENDIX.

On what can be done to realize Metaphysic as a Science.

As no means hitherto used have attained this end (realizing metaphysic as a science), which without a preceding criticism on pure reason never will be attained, it may reasonably be presumed, that the essay on it, which is here presented to the public, will be submitted to an exact and careful scrutiny or review, if it is not thought more adviseable to give up all pretensions to metaphysic, in which case, if the learned but remain true to their purpose, nothing can be said against it. If we take the course of things as it really is, not as it ought to be, there are two sorts of judgments, one judgment, which precedes investigation, and such a one as this is in our case that, in which the reader from his own metaphysic pronounces a judgment on the Cri-

ticism on pure Reason (which first of all inquires into the possibility of metaphysic), and another judgment, which is subsequent to the investigation, in which the reader is enabled to set aside for awhile the consequences of the critical researches that are repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysic, and first of all proves the grounds, whence those consequences are derived. Were that, which common metaphysic propounds, demonstratively certain (like geometry, for instance), the former way of judging would hold; for, if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths, those principles are false, and without any farther inquiry to be repudiated. But, if metaphysic has not a stock of indisputably certain (synthetic) propositions, and perhaps even that there are a number of them, which, though as specious as any, are in their very consequences in collision with one another, and no sure criterium of the truth of really metaphysical (synthetic) propositions is to be met with in it; the previous way of judging cannot obtain, but the investigation of the principles of the Criticism must precede all judgment on its value.*

* It is to be hoped, that whoever has read as far as this in these Prolegomena with the necessary degree of attention will allow, that the tribute of praise paid the author in the Sketch of his Life annexed to the English translation of his Logic is not exaggerated, but just and due; and that whoever shall study his Metaphysic of Morals will be convinced of his fully meriting

REVIEW OF A

Judgment on the Criticism, which (judgment) is antecedent to Investigation.

A judgment of this nature is to be met with in the Gottingen Review of the 20th of January 1782.*

When a work, whose author is perfectly master of its subject, and has assiduously thought for himself throughout the composition of it, falls into the hands of a reviewer, who on his part is perspicacious enough to select the points, upon which the merit or the demerit of the publication depends, does not stick to words, but enters into the spirit of the thing, and does not sift the principles only, from which the author set out, the strictness of the judgment may displease him, but the public is indifferent, for it gains by it; and the author himself may be satisfied to have an opportunity of correcting or of illustrating his observations timely reviewed by a good judge, and in this manner, when he thinks he

the eulogy bestowed on him relatively to that pure doctrine also, of which he unquestionably is the father and was the first teacher. T.

* If I remember right professor Garve is the author of this review of the Criticism. At least I am certain, that he is an antagonist of our philosopher, but whom he easily overcomes not by invective or by declamation, but by close argument. But, Envy's snakes will continue to hiss and to spit their venom during the lives of this great man's present contentents. T.

is in the right at bottom, to remove the stumbling stone, which might afterward be hurtful to his work.

I am in quite another situation with my reviewer. He seems not to have the least knowledge of the real object of the inquiry in which I am (luckily or unluckily) engaged, and, whether it is want of patience to read a prolix work through with attention, or ill humour occasioned by a threatened reform of a science which he thought himself master of long ago, or, what I unwillingly presume, a really limited conception that deprives him of the ability of ever reflecting beyond the sphere of his school-metaphysics; in a word, he runs through a long series of propositions, relatively to which nothing, without knowing their premises, can be thought, expresses here and there his censure, of which the reader as little sees the reason, as understands the propositions, to which it is directed, and which therefore can neither be of use to the public for information, nor do me the least injury in the estimation of judges; for which reasons I should have passed over this review in silence, had it not given me occasion to make a few illustrations, which may guard the reader of these Prolegomena in a few cases against misconception.

But the reviewer, that he may have a point of view, in which he can display the whole work in a manner the most disadvantageous to the author, without needing to trouble himself with any one particular inquiry, both begins and ends with saying,

that "this work is a system of the transcendent (or, as he translates it, higher)* idealism."

At the first sight of this aim I discovered, that a review would be produced pretty nearly in the same manner as if any one, who has never heard or seen any thing of geometry, should find a Euclid and, were he asked to give his opinion of it, should, after having turned over the leaves and perceived many figures, say, 'this work is a systematical introduction to drawing; the author makes use of a particular language to give obscure and unintelligible precepts, which can accomplish nothing more in the end, than what every body can bring about by a good natural measure of the eye.'

Mean time let us see what sort of an idealism it is, which, though it is far from constituting the soul of the system, pervades my whole work.

* By no means the higher. High or lofty towers, and the metaphysically great men, who are like them, as there is commonly a great deal of wind about both, are not for me. My place is the pregnant bathos of experience, and the word transcendental, whose meaning, so repeatedly shewn by me, has not been so much as understood by the reviewer, signifies not what goes beyond all experience, but what precedes it (*à priori*), but is destined to nothing more, than to make cognition of experience possible. When these conceptions transgress experience, their use is termed transcendent, which is distinguished from the immanent use, that is, that use which is limited to experience. All misconstruction of this sort is sufficiently obviated in the work itself; but the reviewer finds his interest in misconstruction.

The proposition of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formule : ' all cognition by sense and experience is nothing but mere appearance, and truth is in the ideas of the pure understanding only and of pure reason.'

Whereas the principle, which thoroughly governs and determines my idealism, is : ' all cognition of things from mere pure understanding or mere reason, is nothing but appearance, and truth is in experience only.'

But this is the very contrary of that idealism in the proper sense ; how came I then to use this word in quite an opposite view, and how did the reviewer happen to see it every where ?

The loosing of this knot rests upon what he might have easily gathered from the context had he had a mind. Space and time, together with all that, which they contain, are not things or their properties in themselves, but belong merely to their phenomena ; so far I am of one profession with those idealists. But they and Berkeley especially, look upon space to be a mere empirical representation, which, like the phenomena in it, is known to us, together with all its determinations, only by means of experience or perception ; I, on the other hand, shew, that space (as well as time, which Berkeley does not attend to) together with all its determinations, can be cognised by us *à priori*, because it, as well as time, is, as a pure form of our sensitivity,

present in us before all perception or experience, and makes all sensual intuition, and by consequence all phenomena possible. Hence it follows, that, as truth rests upon universal and upon necessary laws, as its criteria, experience with Berkeley cannot have any criteria of truth, because the phenomena of experience are grounded (by him) upon nothing *à priori*, whence then it follows, that it is nothing but mere appearance, whereas, with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe *à priori* to all possible experience its law, which affords at the same time the sure criterium to distinguish in it (experience) truth from appearance.*

My idealism (more properly named the critical) is therefore of a peculiar nature. It subverts the common idealism, and by it all cognition *à priori*, even that of geometry, first of all obtains objective reality, which without this my evinced ideality of space and of time cannot be maintained even by

* The idealism, which is properly so named, has always an extravagant view, and cannot have any other, but mine is for the purpose of comprehending our cognition *à priori* of the objects of experience, a problem, which hitherto has not been solved, nay, not so much as proposed. By it all the extravagant idealism, which (as may be so early seen as in Plato) from our cognitions *à priori* (even those of geometry) always concludes another intuition than that of the senses (an intellectual intuition), falls, because it never occurred to any body, that the senses should represent immediately *à priori* too.

the most zealous realists. In this state of affairs I wish to prevent all misunderstanding by altering the name of my conception ; but it cannot well be entirely changed. I have therefore requested leave to denominate it, for the future, the formal, and still better the critical idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley and the sceptical of Descartes.

I find nothing farther remarkable in the judgment on my book. The reviewer judges through and through in gross, a manner, which is prudently chosen, because one thereby betrays neither his knowledge, nor his want of knowledge ; a single judgment in detail, if it, as reasonable, had concerned the main question, would have discovered my error, and perhaps the measure of his insight too in this sort of research. But, it is not so ill excogitated an artifice, in order betimes to take away the desire of reading the book itself from those readers, who are in the habit of forming a conception of books for themselves from reviews, to mention in one breath a multitude of propositions after one another, which, torn out of the cohesion with their arguments and their illustrations (especially as these are so antipodal to all school metaphysics), could not but seem nonsensical, to wear out the patience of the reader to disgust, and, when we have been once made acquainted with the subtile proposition, ‘ that constant appearance is truth,’ to conclude with the rough yet paternal lesson, “ To

what purpose the opposition to the received language, to what purpose then and whence the idealistical distinction?" A judgment, which places all that is peculiar to my book, as it was formerly said to be metaphysically heretical, in a mere innovation of language, and clearly proves that the anonymous reviewer, who erects himself into my judge, does not understand a word of the book, nay, even himself well.*

He however speaks like a man, who must be conscious to himself of superior and important insights, but which he still keeps concealed; for nothing that could give a claim to such a strain has lately come to my knowledge with regard to metaphysic. But he does very wrong to withhold his discoveries from the world; for there are beyond a doubt others, as well as I, who in all that which has been beautifully written on this subject for a long time past

* The reviewer generally fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the truth of experience to dreaming, he is not aware, that I am alluding to the known *somnio objective sumto* of the Wolfian philosophy; which is merely formal, and by which the difference of sleeping and of waking is not considered, and cannot be so in a transcendental philosophy. Besides, he calls my deduction of the categories and the table of the principles of the understanding "commonly known principles of logic and of ontology expressed in an idealistical manner." The reader needs only see what is said on this subject in these Prolegomena to be convinced, that a more miserable and even a historically falser judgment could not be given.

can find nothing that has thereby carried the science a footstep farther. Pointing definitions, furnishing lame proofs with new crutches, either mending the old dress of metaphysic, or giving it a fashionable cut, all that may be easily done, but that the world does not require. It is sated with metaphysical assertions; the possibility of this science, the sources, from which certainty in it may be drawn, and certain criteria to distinguish the dialectic appearance of pure reason from truth, are required. The reviewer must possess the key to that, else he would never have spoken in so high a strain.

But I suspect, that that want of the science perhaps never entered into his thoughts, for he would otherwise have directed his judgment to that point, and even an unsuccessful essay on so weighty an affair had acquired some credit with him. If that is the case, we are good friends again. Let him reflect as profoundly on his metaphysic as he pleases, nobody shall disturb him in his meditations, only of that, which lies without the sphere of metaphysic, its source that is to be found in reason, he cannot judge. But that my suspicion is not without foundation, I prove by his not saying a word of the metaphysic of the synthetic cognition *à priori*, which is the very problem, upon whose solution the fate of metaphysic entirely rests, and which is the sole aim of my Criticism (as well as of these Prolegomena). The idealism, which he runs his head against, and which he sticks at, is only adopted in

the system as the sole means of solving that problem (though it is confirmed on other grounds), and he should have shewn either that that problem is not of the importance which I deem it (in these *Prolegomena*), or that it cannot be solved by any conception of phenomena or in any other better way ; but of that I do not find a single word in the review. He therefore understands nothing of my book, and perhaps nothing of the spirit and of the essence of metaphysic itself, unless, as I should rather presume, the hurry of a reviewer, angry at the difficulty of struggling with so many impediments, occasioned his throwing a disadvantageous shade on the work before him, and rendered it unknown to him in its fundamental strokes.

It is not so easy for a review, let the writers of it be ever so competent and carefully chosen, to maintain its reputation in the field of metaphysic, as in other fields. Other sciences and knowledge have their standards. The mathematics have theirs in themselves, history and theology in profane and in sacred books, natural philosophy and medicine in the mathematics and in experience, jurisprudence has its in law-books, and even matters of taste have theirs in the patterns of the ancients. But for judging of that which is termed metaphysic the standard must be first found (and I have essayed to determine it as well as its use). But, till this is accomplished, what is to be done when writings of this sort must be judged of? If they are of the

dogmatic nature, whatever is done, the one will not play the master long over the other without being in his turn supplanted or pushed from the stage by another. But, if they are of the critical nature not with a view to other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judging cannot be yet adopted, but must be first of all sought for; compatibility must, notwithstanding objection and blame, lie at the bottom, because the necessity is common, and the want of requisite insight makes a juridically deciding authority not allowable.

But, in order to tie this my judgment at the same time to the interest of the community, I have to propose an essay, which is decisive of the way in which all metaphysical researches must be directed to their common end. It is nothing else than, what mathematicians have always done in order in a competition to make out the preference of their methods, challenging my reviewer to shew in his way any one principle, which is maintained by him, to be really metaphysical, that is, synthetical and cognized *à priori* from conceptions, and one that can be the least dispensed with, as, for instance, the principle either of the durability of the substance, or of the necessary determination of the events of the world by their cause, and, as is requisite, on grounds *à priori*. If he cannot do that (and silence is confession), he must allow, that, as metaphysic is nothing at all without an apodictical certainty of propositions of this sort, its possibility or its impos-

sibility must above all things be first made out in a criticism on pure reason, consequently he is bound either to acknowledge that my principles of the Criticism are right, or to prove their invalidity. But, as I see before hand, that, however supinely he may have hitherto relied upon the certainty of his principles, he, when the matter is brought to a strict test, will in the whole sphere of metaphysic not find a single principle with which he can boldly come forward, I will grant him the most advantageous condition that can be expected in a competition, and which is, to take the *onus probandi* off of him, and to put it upon my own shoulders.

In these Prolegomena and in my Criticism there are eight propositions, two and two of which are always repugnant to one another, but each of them belongs of necessity to metaphysic, and which must be either assumed or refuted (though there is not one of them that has not in its time been adopted by some philosopher or other). The reviewer is free to chuse any one of these eight propositions he pleases, and to assume it without proof, with which I shall dispense ; but one only (for loss of time would be equally hurtful to him and to me), and then to attack my proof of the antithesis. If I can save it, and shew in this way that, on principles, which every dogmatic metaphysician must acknowledge, the contrary of the proposition adopted by him can be proved just as clearly, it is thereby established, that there is in metaphysic a hereditary fault, which cannot be ex-

plained, and not removed but by mounting to its place of nativity, pure reason itself, and thus either my Criticism must be adopted, or a better one put in its place, it therefore studied; which is the only thing that I at present require. If I on the other hand cannot save my proof, a synthetic proposition *à priori* according to dogmatic principles stands fast on the side of my opponent, my accusation of the common metaphysic is therefore wrong, and I submit to acknowledge, that his censure of my Criticism is just (though that would be far from being the consequence). But for that purpose it would, methinks, be necessary for him not to remain incognito, because I do not see how I could otherwise avoid, instead of one problem from adversaries who are anonymous and yet not called on, being honored or assailed with several problems.

PROPOSAL

*for an Investigation of the Criticism,
which the Judgment can follow.*

I am obliged to the learned world for the silence, with which they have for a considerable time honored my Criticism; for this proves at least a delay or suspension of judgment, and therefore affords some presumption that, in a work that quits all common methods and pursues a new one, which is not so easily understood, but may perhaps contain something, by which an important, but at present dead

branch of human cognition, may acquire new life and fertility, by consequence a carefulness not to break off and to destroy the yet young scion by a hasty judgment. In the Gotha Review I have just seen a proof of a judgment deferred or suspended on similar grounds, whose solidity (without taking my suspicious praise into consideration) every reader will perceive of himself from the intelligible and unsophisticated representation of a part belonging to the first principles of my work.*

And, as a prolix work cannot possibly be immediately judged in the gross by a cursory reading, I propose to prove it piece by piece from its foundation, and for this purpose to use these Prolegomena as a general sketch, with which the work, itself may be occasionally compared. This proposal, if it had nothing more at bottom, than my fancy of importance, which vanity usually lends all one's own productions, were indiscreet, and would deserve to be rejected with displeasure. But the affairs of all speculative philosophy are at the point of death, though human reason adheres to them with continual inclination, which, only because of its being incessantly deceived, tries at present, though in vain, to turn itself to indifference.

In our thinking age it is not unlikely, that many

* Professor Reinhold, formerly of Iena, now of Kiel, is the author of the work alluded to here, but which he has not continued through the whole Criticism. T.

men of merit should embrace every good occasion to contribute to the common interest of reason which enlightens itself more and more, if there is but some hope of thereby attaining the end. The mathesis, natural philosophy, law, the arts, even moral philosophy and such like, do not fill the mind entirely ; there still remains a place in it, which is marked out for the mere pure and speculative reason, and whose void compels us to seek, in appearance, employment and entertainment, but at bottom dissipation only, in gew-gaws and playthings, or even in extravagance, in order to deafen the troublesome call of reason which, conformably to its destination, requires something that may absolutely satisfy it, and not merely put it in activity for the behoof of other designs or for the interest of the inclinations. Hence a contemplation, which is merely employed in this sphere of reason subsisting by itself, because in it all other knowledge and even all ends must concentrate and unite in a whole, has, I have reason to presume, a great charm for every body who has but tried thus to enlarge his conceptions, and, I may safely say, a greater, than any other theoretical knowledge, and which one would not willingly exchange for it.

I propose these Prolegomena, not the work itself, for the plan and the clew of the investigation ; because I even at present am very well satisfied with the Criticism, as to the matter, the order and the method, and the care that was bestowed on every

proposition, in order to weigh and to try it exactly before I left it (for it was a work of years to satisfy myself fully not only of the whole, but sometimes of a single proposition only in regard to its sources), but with my propounding in a few sections of the elemental doctrine, for example, the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding or that of the paralogisms of pure reason, I am not fully satisfied, because a certain prolixity in it prevents distinctness, instead of which, what these *Prolégomena* say with regard to these sections, may be laid as a foundation to the review.

The Germans are praised for possessing the faculty of carrying that, to which constancy and presevering diligence are requisite, farther in these respects, than other nations. If that opinion is well founded, an opportunity of bringing a work to completion, and of confirming that favorable opinion, offers here, the happy issue of which work, in which all thinking men are equally interested, but which hitherto has not succeeded, is scarcely to be doubted; especially as the science, to which it relates, is of so peculiar a sort, as to admit of being brought at once to its full completeness and to that permanent state, than which it cannot be carried farther in the least, and neither increased nor even but altered by later discovery (the dress by here and there increased distinctness or affixed use in every respect I do not consider as belonging to this), an advantage, which no other science has or can

have, because none concerns a cognitive faculty so completely insulated, independent of others and unmixed with them. And the present moment, as the learned in Germany hardly know at present in what to employ themselves besides the sciences, which are usually termed useful, does not seem unfavorable to this my expectation, so that it is not a mere play, but a business, by which a permanent end is accomplished.


To find out the means of uniting the endeavours of the learned after that end, I must leave to others. I however do not expect of any one merely to follow my propositions, nor even flatter myself with the hope of it, but, let attacks, repetitions, limitations or confirmation, enlargement and complement, as it happens, contribute their part, if the matter is only searched to the bottom, a system, if not mine, that can be a legacy to posterity, for which they will have reason to be thankful, cannot fail any longer of being brought to pass.

When we are first of all only convinced of the rightness of the principles of the Criticism, what sort of a metaphysic can be expected in consequence of it, and how metaphysic needs by no means seem poor and degraded to a sorry figure by the false feathers' being pulled out of it, but in another respect can appear richly and decently equipped; were two prolix to shew here; but other great advantages, which such a reform would be productive of, are very obvious. Common metaphysic, by

seeking out the elemental conceptions of the pure understanding, in order to make them distinct by dissection and determinate by explanations, was useful. Thereby it was a culture for reason, however it might afterwards chuse to dispose of itself; but that was all the good which metaphysic did. But that its merit it destroyed again by favoring conceit or arrogance by rash assertions, sophistry by subtle evasions and embellishment, and superficiality by the facility of getting over the most difficult problems with a little school philosophy, which superficiality is the more seducing, the more it has the choice of adopting something on the one hand of the language of science, and on the other of that of popularity, and is thereby every thing to all men, but in fact nothing at all. Whereas by criticism the standard, by which knowledge can be distinguished with certainty from seeming knowledge, is given our judgment, and this criticism by being brought to its full exercise in metaphysic, grounds a way of thinking, which afterward extends its salutary influence to every other use of reason, and first infuses the true philosophic spirit. And the service, which it does theology, by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation and thereby putting it fully in safety from all the attacks of such an opponent, certainly is not to be undervalued. For common metaphysic, though it promised theology much aid, could not afterward fulfil that promise, and besides did, by calling to its as

sistance the speculative dogmatic, nothing else, than arm enemies against itself. Fanaticism, which in an enlightened age cannot spring up but when it conceals itself behind a school metaphysic, by whose auspice it can venture, so to say, to speak at once like a madman and rationally, is driven from this its last lurking-hole by the critical philosophy, and, more than all that, it cannot but be important to a teacher of metaphysic to be able with universal assent to say, that what he propounds is at length science, and a real service is thereby rendered the commonweal.

THE END



Feuerbach

C. Kant

D. Hume

AN ENQUIRY,
CRITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL,
INTO THE
GROUNDS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD,
AND INTO THE
THEODICY,
A SEQUEL TO
THE LOGIC AND PROLEGOMENA,
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF
IMMANUEL KANT,

BY

JOHN RICHARDSON,

MANY YEARS A STUDENT OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY,

LONDON:

PRINTED IN 1819, BUT NOW FIRST PUBLISHED.

MDCCCXXXVI.

PREFACE.

THIS treatise, which is composed not only after the method, but on the very principles, of Kant's critical philosophy, contains an investigation of the various arguments that act on conviction, and are inductive to the only degree of holding-true relative to the proposition of the being of a Moral Author of the world, which is possible to human reason; it obviates or clears up difficulties also regarding the supreme wisdom, that is, the holiness, the goodness, and the justice, of the Deity; and from the context of these subjects the inferences the most necessary and useful to mankind are

drawn. And themes more recondite, of more difficult discussion or of more importance to humanity, cannot well be proposed.

As to the arduous task of evincing the existence of God, which we have undertaken to perform in this work, we shall previously touch here on the nature of the evidence which the desideratum is capable of, on how far the quesitum can be found, or on the degree in which we are able to hold it true, and on the only possible methods of obtaining a solid proof of the existence of the Supreme Being.

Either to treat these sublime subjects according to a popular method or by declamation (an address to the feelings and the passions) or by touching the moral springs of human nature, or to furnish lame proofs with new crutches, were both superficial and nugatory, and certainly could not do these subjects and proofs justice.

As these subjects in general are purely metaphysical, the method must be scientific or strictly systematical, and the language scholastic, of course the inquiry will be profound, dry and abstruse, and require great care, even on the part of those exercised in similar perquisitions, not to let their attention wander ; to others, those not conversant in pure science, the whole will, at first sight, seem a mere jargon, and the book, as it has not cost the author little study, will naturally require not a little on their part too.*

The historical testimony, which is given us in the scriptures, or the proof adduced

* Kant's *Logic* and his *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics* are the natural and indispensable pre-exercitations to the study of this *Critical Inquiry* ; and the author takes the liberty of mentioning to the reader, that, if these works (which have been lately translated from the German and are sold by Simpkin & Marshall) are not previously studied, this *Inquiry* cannot but seem a mere gallimatia to him.

à posteriori in physical teleology and in physicotheology, cannot yield what is required, in the first instance, of this pure cognition that lies, *à priori*, in the universal reason of man, and which must be unfolded out of it.

The conception of God, and even the conviction of his existence, cannot be found but in pure reason, can emanate from it only, and can come to us first neither by inspiration, nor by any given account, however authentic, how great soever the sanction of authority. Were we to experience an immediate representation, or intuition, of God, in such a way as nature, as far as we know it, cannot afford us, a conception of him must serve for a guide to ascertain whether this apparition or phenomenon coincide with all that is requisite to characterize a Divinity.

Though we cannot comprehend how it is

possible, that any phenomenon should exhibit, even but as to the quality, that which can be thought of only but never represented immediately ; this much at least is clear, that, only to judge whether what appears to us, acts on our sense either externally or internally, be God, we must compare it with our idea of him, and thereby prove it, not whether it be adequate to this idea, but whether it is not repugnant to it.

And even if nothing repugnant to this idea should be found in all, by which what appears to us immediately discovers itself to us ; this apparition, phenomenon, intuition, immediate revelation, or however we may chuse to term an exhibition of this sort, never can prove the existence of a Being whose conception, if it shall not be vague, or loosely determined, and thereby liable to the mixture of every possible conceit, requires infinitude, as to the quantum, for the distinction from all creatures, but to which

conception no experience whatever or intuition can be equal or adequate, and consequently the existence of a Being of this nature never incontrovertibly evinced.

Of the existence of the Supreme Being, then, nobody can be first convinced by any one intuition ; the belief of pure reason must precede, and then certain phenomena or revelations may give occasion to investigate if we be justified in holding that, which speaks or exhibits itself to us, a Godhead, and to confirm this belief accordingly.

If therefore the just right of reason to speak the first on subjects which regard supersensible things, or noumena, as the existence of God and the future world, is disputed, a wide door is opened to all fanaticism and superstition, nay, to atheism itself.*

* A little philosophy, says lord Verulam, makes a man an atheist ; a great deal converts him to religion.

By consequence there is but one method of evincing the existence of the Deity, that *à priori*, or from pure reason ; a discursive proof, which, though not productive of strict (mathematical) evidence, will no doubt yield us philosophical certainty ; and it is the absolute possibility of things only, which can make the proposition of a Being of all beings possible to us. In it therefore the theoretical proof of this existence must be sought, which proof, should it not amount to a strictly demonstrative one, will be found to afford a sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief, so as to confirm and rivet conviction. And not all the data of both reason and experience can ever enable us to change this pure belief to knowledge ; because the ground for holding-true is subjective merely, a necessary want of reason, and ever will remain so while we are men, only to presuppose or assume, not to demonstrate, this existence.*

* Though we should not be able to support sufficient-

But we are far from entertaining so high an opinion of the use of the present treatise, as if the most momentous of all our cognitions, and the fundamental principle of all (moral) religion, ‘there is a God,’ were doubtful and in danger without the aid of deep metaphysical researches.

Providence hath not willed, that our insights highly necessary to happiness should rest upon the subtilty of fine-spun ratiocinations, but immediately delivered these insights over to the natural common understanding, which, if not confused by false art, does not fail of leading us to the true and the useful, provided that we stand in the greatest need of them. Hence this use of sane reason, which is itself within the limits of common insights, gives sufficiently

ly by objective reasons or to evince to a geometrical certitude the cardinal proposition, There is a God ; we positively maintain previously, that it is irrefragable ; for whence can the insight necessary to refutation be taken ?

convincing proofs of the existence and attributes of the Deity.

Though the demonstration and the precision of strictly determined conceptions or regularly connected syllogisms of reason should be wanting to the subtile inquirer; we cannot avoid investigating this demonstration, to see whether it may not be discovered. By which means we may obtain something complete and distinctly comprehended in this most weighty cognition. But, in order to reach this aim, we must embark on the obscure unfathomable ocean of metaphysic; we however trust that, with the assistance of the compass of pure practical reason, we shall be able to pilot our vessel and to conduct our reader safely to the desired port.*

What we shall attempt in the theoretical part of this treatise therefore is, an argu-

* To prevent all error from ambiguity or misunderstanding (for misconstruction or logomachy we do not expect), we shall develop and explain every concep-

ment for the demonstration of the being of God, which argument we conceive to be the only infallible speculative one, and which, together with the subsequent (morally) practical part of this work, we respectfully lay before metaphysicians, moral philosophers and theologists, not theological moralists, who teach moral laws, which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but those, who are impressed with a practical conviction of his existence, which is founded in moral laws, and whom we distinguish by the appellation of moral theologists, the best qualified for

tion of consequence as we go along. Metaphysic then is, 'philosophy from pure reason or on the first principles of human knowledge.' It is the completion of all culture of reason, and the most sublime, as well as the most useful, of all sciences. Its grand objects are, Moral Liberty, the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul, which, strictly speaking, and as the sequel will shew, are not feigned but indispensable postulates of reason in its (morally) practical use. An illiterate man has not a conception of his ignorance of this science ; because he has not the least conception of the science itself.

judges, yes, the only competent ones, of these very abstract philosophic themes, from whom we, instead of the *odium theologicum* of former dark superstitious times, naturally look for that candour and justice, which at once distinguish and adorn a thinking, reasoning and enlightened age.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

	Page
<i>ON all the possible Grounds of Proof for the Existence of God by speculative Reason</i>	17
<i>Cosmological Argument rejected</i>	19
<i>The Ontological Argument the only complete one</i>	25
<i>No intuitive Data for strict (mathematical) Demonstration</i>	29
<i>Degrees of Holding-true</i>	30
<i>Moral Liberty espoused</i>	32
<i>And the consequent Repudiation of the Necessity of Nature relative to the human Mind</i>	33

PART THE FIRST.

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

<i>Existence, Being, or absolute Reality</i>	52
<i>Possibility</i>	54
<i>It is absolutely impossible that Nothing should exist</i>	56
<i>Necessity, and Conception of Casuality</i>	57
<i>An absolutely necessary Being exists</i>	58
<i>The necessary Being is Single</i>	58
<i>The necessary Being is Simple</i>	59
<i>The necessary Being is Immutable and Eternal</i>	60
<i>The necessary Being comprises the Supreme Reality</i>	60
<i>The necessary Being is a Spirit</i>	60
<i>There is a God</i>	63

PART THE SECOND.

SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

<i>Transcendental Theology</i>	65
<i>Ontotheology and Cosmotheology</i>	66
<i>Natural Theology</i>	67
<i>Conception of Speculation</i>	69
<i>An Ideal or Prototype</i>	76
<i>The Supreme Being remains, to the barely speculative Use of Reason, a mere Ideal</i>	76

PART THE THIRD.

TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

	Page
<i>Conception of Teleology</i>	79
<i>Physicoteleology</i>	79
<i>Conception of an End</i>	79
<i>Principle of the internal Fitness in organized Beings</i>	80
<i>Answerableness to the End</i>	80
<i>Ethicoteleology</i>	81
<i>Formula of the Moral Law</i>	82
<i>The Chief physical Good in the World</i>	82
<i>Happiness, Morality, and Maxim</i>	83

PART THE FOURTH.

MORAL ARGUMENT.

<i>Practical Philosophy</i>	85
<i>Immanent Use of Reason</i>	86
<i>Postulates of practical Reason</i>	87
<i>Conception of Duty, and Moral Liberty</i>	87
<i>God, and Immortality</i>	87
<i>Paralogisms and Antinomy of Reason</i>	88
<i>Transcendental Ideal</i>	89
<i>Conception of Virtue</i>	92
<i>The Chief Good</i>	93
<i>A Motive, and a Spring</i>	102
<i>Prudence the Maxim of Self-love</i>	104
<i>Conception of Religion</i>	108
<i>Conception of Wisdom</i>	110

PART THE FIFTH.

MORAL THEOLOGY.

<i>Conception of Ethicotheology</i>	117
<i>What can we know? What ought we to do? and What may we hope for?</i>	118
<i>Ideal of the Chief Good</i>	124
<i>The Kingdom of Grace or a Moral World</i>	125
<i>Moral Theology leads to Monotheism</i>	127
<i>Moral Theology is of a merely immanent Use</i>	132

CONTENTS.

xix

PART THE SIXTH.

PHYSICOTHEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

	Page
<i>Conception of Physicotheology</i>	133
<i>Ways of Soaring to the Knowledge of God by Contem- plations on Nature</i>	133
<i>This Method cannot serve for Proving an Author of Mat- ter itself</i>	138
<i>Its Errors should be corrected</i>	138

PART THE SEVENTH.

TESTIMONY OF REVELATION.

<i>Moses' Testimony of the immediate Revelation of God by himself</i>	153
<i>Testimony of Jesus Christ</i>	
<i>according to</i> { <i>St. Matthew</i>	154
<i>St. Mark</i>	155
<i>St. Luke</i>	156
<i>St. John</i>	156

PART THE EIGHTH.

THE THEODICY.

<i>Its Conception</i>	159
<i>Difficulties concerning the Supreme Wisdom, or the Holi- ness, the Goodness and the Justice, of the Deity obvi- ated or removed</i>	160

PART THE NINTH.

REVIEW OF THE ONTOLOGICAL, OF THE COSMOLOGICAL AND OF THE PHYSICOTHEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS.

<i>Review of the Ontological Proof</i>	188
<i>Review of the Cosmological Proof</i>	199
<i>Review of the Physicotheological Proof</i>	214

PART THE TENTH.

INFERENCES THE MOST NECESSARY AND USEFUL TO MANKIND DRAWN FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE FOREGOING SUBJECTS.

	225
<i>The Proof of the Existence of God must be a moral Proof</i> ..	225
<i>The Absurdity and the Perniciousness of Materialism</i>	227

	Page
<i>The Fertility of the Idea of Liberty</i>	228
<i>The Ethics and Theology infallibly lead to, the very Sublimation of Morality, Religion</i>	240
<i>God is All-sufficient</i>	244
<i>Doctrine of the Gospel of Divine Origin</i>	249
<i>Christ the Founder of the first true Church</i>	250
<i>God the Author of all true Religion and the Legislator of all the moral Duties incumbent on Man</i>	251
<i>The Knowledge of God concealed from Man for very wise Purposes</i>	255
<i>A moral Belief in God more salutary, and all, which is good for Man</i>	256
<i>The cognitive Faculty of Man wisely proportioned to his moral Destination</i>	257
<i>Conclusion</i>	262

ERRATA.

Page 33 line 4 for sublime read glorious—l. 6 *delete* the prospect and insert that—l. 16 after causality insert a comma—p. 34 l. 2 for they are insert it is—l. 4 after causality insert a comma—l. 6 insert the before things—l. 8 read relation—l. 29 for never begins by read would nowhere begin of and *delete* (absolutely)—p. 35 l. 1 for is read were and after causality insert therefore—l. 5 *delete* take it (liberty) and insert exclude him and read law—p. 37 l. 1 after liberty insert a (—l. 15 read occasioning—l. 17 after pleasure insert a),—l. 13 *delete* the parenthesis () —p. 40 l. 19 for is read was—l. 20 after and insert is—l. 22 read determined—l. 24 after himself insert and according to which, after sensitivity, insert he imputes and after phenomenon insert to himself.†—p. 41 l. 12 for plaintiff read accuser—l. 16 for habits acquired read habit contracted—for a read the—l. 19 for it insert this habit—p. 42 l. 6 *delete* would as and insert still wish it to be thought, that—l. 7 *delete* this sort of —l. 9 after comprehensible insert a),—*delete* be held necessitarians),—and after right *delete* but, and insert because reason,—p. 43 l. 3 for occasional circumstances read causes—p. 63 l. 23 for words read his works—p. 65 l. 18 after only insert a comma—p. 67 l. 2 after and *delete* the—l. 10 after latter *delete* the comma—p. 76 l. 29 insert a *—p. 96 l. 27 for object read objective law—p. 104 l. 19 for turn read fall and for sorry read sorrowfully—p. 88 l. 15 read representation—p. 113 l. 18 for convenience read liking—p. 114 l. 18 after one insert perceivable—l. 19 *delete* to be foreseen—l. 20 for possible to be seen by insert comprehensible to—l. 29 and read No-ologist—p. 153 l. 19 after know insert a comma—p. 157 l. 23 read heart-cheering—p. 168 l. 28 insert a comma after admiration—p. 164 l. 31 insert a comma after duty—p. 166 l. 13 insert a before Being—p. 167 l. 1 read chooses—p. 182 l. 24 read Wouldst—p. 204 l. 17 after inferring insert & comma—p. 205 l. 12 read a real—p. 187 l. 6 for EIGHTH read NINTH—p. 137 l. 6 for is read are—p. 254 l. 18 for gravitation read gravity

INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE we enter on the various points of our main subject, it may not be improper to make a few observations on the following essential topics: the theoretical or speculative arguments for the being of the Deity, strict demonstration or evidence, holding-true, the defence of moral liberty, and the consequent rejection of the necessity of nature with regard to the human mind.

THE conviction of the great truth, ‘there is a God,’ if it shall have the highest degree of certainty, has this peculiar to it, that it can be attained in one way only; and this treatise will perhaps have the merit of constraining the philosophical endeavours to unite in a single argument, or ground of proof, in order to correct the errors, which may have crept in, rather than to repudiate it, the mo-

ment the philosopher is convinced, that no choice among similar proofs is possible.

In order to evince what is here advanced, we must not lose sight of what is required to be performed, to prove, or sufficiently to make good on objective grounds, the existence not of a very great and perfect first cause, but of the Supreme Being; the existence not of one or more of them, but of one only, and this not on great grounds of probability, but with evidence.

No theoretical arguments for the existence of God can be taken but either from the conceptions of the understanding (or notions) of the merely possible, or from the experience-conceptions of the existing. In the former case we either from the possible as a ground infer the existence of God as a consequence, or from the possible as a consequence infer the existence of God as a ground. And in the latter case either we argue from that, whose existence we experience, merely to the existence of a first and an independent cause, and, by means of the dissection of this conception, to its divine properties, or from that, which experience teaches, we immediately infer as well the existence as its properties.*

* Experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions, or representations with consciousness.

If, from the conception of the barely possible as a ground, existence as a consequence shall be inferred, existence must, by the dissection of this conception, be to be therein found; for there is not any other deduction of a consequence from a conception of the possible, than by means of the logical solution, or of analysis. Then existence however would need to be comprehended as a predicate in the possible. But, as we shall shew, that this comprehension is by no means the case, a proof of the truth which we are treating of, is impossible in this way.

The celebrated Descartes' proof is built upon this ground. A conception of a possible thing, in which all true perfection united is represented, is previously excogitated. It is then supposed, that existence too is a perfection of things, and therefore the existence of a fully perfect Being is inferred from his possibility. We might, in the same way, from the conception of every thing that is represented as perfect in its kind, for instance, from a perfect cogitable world, conclude its existence. But, as this mode of proof has already been sufficiently confuted by others, we shall refer to our method of proof only, by which it will appear, that existence is not at all a predicate, of course not one of perfection, and therefore that, from an explanation, which contains an arbitrable assemblage of various predicates, in order to form the conception of any one possible thing, the existence of this thing, and consequent-

ly the existence of God too, never can be concluded.

Whereas the inference of the existence of God as a ground from the possibilities of things as consequences, is of a nature quite distinct. The inquiry here is, whether some one existing thing must not be presupposed, that something may be possible, and whether that existence, without which no internal or absolute possibility can have place, does not comprise such properties, as we conjoin in the idea of the Godhead.* In this case it is obvious, that we, if we do not presuppose the existence of that which is possible on certain conditions only, cannot infer an existence from the conditional possibility; for this possibility gives to understand, only that something cannot exist but in certain connexions, and the existence of the cause is shewn, only with a proviso that the consequence exists, but here it must not be gathered from this existence; hence such a proof, if it have place at all, cannot be made but from the internal possibility. Besides, it is obvious, that it must arise from the absolute possibility of all things in general. For it is the internal possibility itself only of which it is to be

* An Idea is a conception of reason, which is without the reach of all possible experience; and to this precise philosophical Platonic sense we invariably adhere throughout this work; for the meaning of this word is too vague in our language. See Kant's Logic, page 126.

known, that it gives us reason to presuppose some one existence, and not the particular predicate, by which one possible thing is distinguished from another ; for the distinction of the predicate has place in what is merely possible too, and never denotes any thing existing. The existence of the Deity, therefore, must be concluded from the internal possibility of all that is cogitable.

The proof, by which we, from the experience-conceptions of what exists, are to come at the existence of a first and an independent cause according to the rules of the casual inferences, and, from this cause, by the logical dissection of the conception, at its properties, which denote a Divinity, is likewise celebrated, and held in great repute especially by the Wolfian school ; but it also is quite impossible. We grant, that, as far as the proposition, ‘ When something exists, there exists something too that does not depend upon any other thing,’ the inference is regular, we likewise grant, that the existence of any one thing or of more things which are not farther any effects of another thing, is well evinced. But the second step to the proposition, ‘ that this independent thing is absolutely necessary,’ is, as it must be taken by means of the principle of a sufficient ground or reason, which principle is still disputed, less sure ; we however do not hesitate to subscribe to every thing as far as this. Consequently something exists of absolute necessity.

From this conception of the absolutely necessary Being, now, his attributes of absolute perfection and of unity are to be derived. But the conception of absolute necessity, which lies as a foundation here, may be taken in a twofold point of view. In the one, which we shall term the logical necessity, it may be shewn, that the contrary of that thing in which all perfection or reality is to be met with, is inconsistent, and therefore that Being, whose predicates are all truly affirmative, is the only one absolutely necessary in existence. And as, from the very same thorough union of all reality in one Being, it is to be inferred, that he is a single one, it is clear, that the dissection of the conception of the necessary will rest upon grounds, on which we must be able to infer conversely, that That, in which all reality is, exists of necessity. Not only this mode of inference is impossible, but it is particularly deserving of notice, that in this way the proof is not erected upon the conception of experience, which is presupposed without any use's being made of it, but the same as the Cartesian proof from conceptions entirely, in which the existence of a being is fancied to be found either in the identity, or in the repugnance, of the predicates.*

* Those are the principal points upon which we proceed. If we make the necessity of a conception consist in its contrary's being absurd, and then maintain, that the infinite is of the same nature, it is quite unnecessary to presuppose the existence of the necessary Being, as it flows from the conception of the infinite.

As to the proof, by which the existence of God, together with his attributes, is inferred from experience-conceptions of existing things, it is of quite a distinct nature. This proof is not only possible, but extremely deserving of being by united endeavours advanced to the requisite perfection. The things of the world, which are manifested to our senses, shew as well distinct marks of their contingency, as, by the greatness, the order and the harmony of their arrangement, which shine forth every where, proofs of a rational Author of great wisdom, power, and goodness. From the great unity in so immense a whole it may be gathered, that there is one Author only of all these things, and though geometrical strictness is wanting to all these inferences, they unquestionably contain so much energy, as never to leave a man of sense a moment in doubt about rules, which the natural sound understanding observes.

From what has already been said it may be collected, that, if we would conclude from conceptions of possible things, no other argument for the existence of God, than that, by which the internal possibility of all things is considered as something

Nay, this presupposed existence is quite idle in the proof itself. For, as in its progress the conceptions of necessity and of infinitude are considered as alternate or reciprocal ones, infinitude is actually inferred from the existence of the necessary; because the infinite (alone) exists of necessity.

that gives to presuppose some one existence, is possible. As also that, if the inference from what experience teaches us of existing things shall rise to the same truth, the proof of the existence as well as of the quality of the Supreme Cause cannot be given but by the properties perceived in the things of the world and the casual order of the universe. The former method of proof we shall distinguish by the name of the Ontological, and the latter by that of the Cosmological.

In our humble opinion this cosmological proof is as old as the reason of man. It is so natural, so engaging, and enlarges our reflection so much with the progress of our insights, that it must last as long as there exists any where a rational creature, who wishes to partake of the noble contemplation of knowing God by his works. In this respect the endeavours of Derham, Nienwentyt, and many others, though they sometimes betray much vanity in giving all sorts of physical insights or even chimeras a venerable semblance by the signal of religious zeal, do human reason honor.

Notwithstanding all these excellencies, however, this mode of proof is always incapable of mathematical certainty and exactitude. We can conclude of some one incomprehensibly great author only of that stupendous whole which is displayed to our senses, but not of the existence of the absolutely

perfect being. It is the greatest probability in the world, that there is one first cause only, but this conviction wants much in point of the fulness which defies the most daring sceptical rage. This occasions that, when we have not any other reason for judging of the existence of the cause, than what the effects give us, we cannot conclude of more or of greater properties in this cause, than we just find necessary to understand the degree and the quality of the effects.

We know of much perfection, greatness, and order in the world, and can infer nothing more from them with logical strictness, than that their cause must possess much understanding, power, and goodness, but by no means that he is omniscient, omnipotent, &c. It is an immense whole, in which we perceive much unity, and thorough connexion, and we can with great reason gather therefrom, that there is but one Author of it. But we must be modest enough to allow, that we do not know all, which is created, and hence to judge, that what is known to us, gives us a glimpse of one Author only, whence we presume, that what is unknown to us, is of the same nature; which is very reasonably conceived, but does not conclude regularly or legitimately.

Whereas, if we do not flatter ourselves too much, our projected ontological proof seems to be capable

of that strictness which is requisite to a demonstration, and to perform all that is possible by mere conceptions. Were it however the question, Which of the two is in general the better? we should answer, If logical accuracy and completeness are considered, the preference is to be granted the ontological, but, if comprehension to the common right conception, liveliness of impression, beauty, and the power of moving the moral springs of human nature are required, the cosmological proof certainly. And, as it doubtless is of more consequence to animate men in general with high feelings, which are productive of noble activity, while the sane understanding is convinced, than to instruct with carefully abstracted syllogisms of reason so as to satisfy the finer speculation, the preference of the general utility is, if we must be sincere, not to be refused the cosmological proof.

It is, therefore, not a flattering artifice, courting the approbation of others, but sincerity and truth, when we willingly grant such a display of the important knowledge of God and his attributes, as Reimarus gives in his book on Natural Religion, the preference of utility above every other proof, in which more attention is bestowed upon logical strictness, and consequently above ours. For without taking into consideration the value of that work and other works of this author, which consists in an unartificial use of a sound and fine reason, such

grounds have really a great power of proof, and excite more intuition, than the logically abstracted conceptions, though the latter give to understand the object more exactly. Those, by moving, or exciting the feelings, are the best adapted to induce persuasion; but these, by influencing by close argument, conviction.

But, as a scrutinizing understanding, when it has once fallen upon the track of investigation, is not satisfied till all around it is light, and, if we may so express ourselves, till the circle, which surrounds its question, is fully described, we trust no one will hold an endeavour, which, like the present, is used on the logical accuracy in a cognition of such moment, useless and superfluous, especially as there are many cases, in which, without such care, the application of our conceptions would remain unsafe and doubtful.

From the reasons adduced we presume the reader is fully satisfied, that the four excogitable arguments, which we have reduced to two chief sorts, the Cartesian and the Wolfian or that, which is given from the experience-conception of existence by means of the resolution of the conception of an independent thing, are false and totally impossible, that is, not that they do not prove with the requisite strictness, but, in fact, that they do not prove at all.

And we have already shewn, that the proof,

which concludes the existence and attributes of the Godhead from the properties of the things of the world, contains a strong and beautiful argument, only that it (the proof) is by no mean capable of the strictness of demonstration.

Nothing now remains but that either no cogent speculative proof of this existence is possible, or it must rest upon our ontological argument. As the possibility of a proof, or of a sufficient support by objective reasons, is absolutely the subject of present inquiry, nobody will maintain the former, and the consequence falls out conformably to what we have shewn.

There is but one God, and one argument only, by which it is possible to be convinced of his existence with the perception of that necessity which absolutely renders all opposition vain and ineffectual. A judgment, to which even the quality of the object could immediately lead. All other things, which exist any where, might not exist. The experience of casual things cannot therefore yield an insuperable argument for knowing from them the existence of that which it is impossible that it should not exist. The distinction of the Divine existence from that of other things lies in this only, that the denying of his existence is nothing at all.

The internal possibility, the essence of things, is

that, whose annulling destroys or annihilates all that is cogitable. In this absolute possibility therefore or essence of things the sole mark of the existence of the Being of all beings consists. In it then let us seek the argument ; for it is absolutely necessary for us to convince ourselves of the existence of God, and which we most certainly can fully do even without the aid of (geometrical) demonstration.

WERE a speculative proof of this existence with the requisite strictness of demonstration in any way possible, it could not but be found by our ontological method. But, as an apodictical proof can, by its being intuitive only, be called *Demonstration*, and as we, in this question, cannot have intuitive data for the construction of our conceptions ; mathematical certainty, that is, *Evidence* (in the strict sense), cannot be obtained, however apodictically certain, or how sufficient soever to full conviction, the acroamatical (discursive) proof* may otherwise be and, as we in the sequel shall shew, absolutely is.†

IN our understanding Holding-true is an event,

* This method of proof is thus named, because it (the proof) cannot be given but by mere words (the object in thought).

† Philosophy we may explain to be The science of reason from conceptions. But the Mathematics are The science of reason from the construction of conceptions, that is, their intuitive exhibition.

which may rest upon objective grounds, and yet requires subjective causes in the mind of him, who judges of it. If it is valid for every body, provided that he has but reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and holding-true is then termed Conviction. But it, if it has its grounds in the particular quality of the subject only, bears the name of Persuasion.

Holding-true, or the subjective validity of a judgment, in reference to conviction (which holds objectively also), has these three degrees: opining, believing, and knowing. Opining is a subjective as well as an objective holding-true with consciousness. Is it subjectively sufficient only, but held objectively insufficient? it is denominated Believing. And the subjectively as well as the objectively sufficient holding-true is termed Knowing. The subjective sufficiency is named Conviction (for myself); but the objective, Certainty (for every body).

In judgments from pure reason it is by no means allowed to opine. For, as they are not supported by grounds of experience, but every thing must be cognised *à priori*, where every thing is necessary, the principle of connexion requires both universality and necessity, by consequence full certainty, otherwise no guide to truth whatever is to be met

with.* Hence it were absurd to opine in pure mathematics; we in them must either know, or refrain from all judging. The principles of morality are of the same nature; on the mere opinion, that something is allowed, we must not venture on an action, but know, that it is allowed (*quod dubitas ne feceris*).

Whereas, in the transcendental use of reason, opining is too little; but knowing, too much.† In a speculative view therefore we cannot judge here; because subjective grounds of holding-true, such as those that can produce a belief, deserve, as they can neither be supported free from all empirical assistance, nor communicated to others in an equal measure, no approbation in speculative questions.

The theoretically insufficient holding-true never can be called believing but with a practical view. This practical view is that either of ability, or of morality; the former for voluntary and casual ends, but the latter for absolutely necessary ones. That may be distinguished by the denomination of the pragmatistical, but this is the moral, belief.†

* Pure knowledge, or that *à priori*, is such as we take out of ourselves, and consequently has place independently of all experience; but Empirical knowledge, that *à posteriori*, or which is possible by experience only.

† Our way of attaining the cognition of objects if they shall

But, as we, though we relatively to an object can undertake nothing, and the holding-true therefore is merely theoretical, can in many cases imagine and conceive of an undertaking for which we, if there were a means of making out the certainty of the thing, are of opinion to have sufficient grounds, there is in merely theoretical judgments an analogon of the practical, to whose holding-true the word believing is suitable, and which we may name the Doctrinal Belief. If it were possible to make it out by any experience, I would wager all I possess in the world, that there are inhabitants in some one of the planets which we see. Hence I say, that I am not merely of opinion, but have a strong belief (on whose rightness I would risk many advantages of life), that there are inhabitants in other worlds.

As the conception of Liberty is, in fact, the only one of all the ideas of pure speculative reason, which affords us a great enlargement in the supersensible field, though in regard to the practical cognition only, and as there are still many, who think they can explain this liberty on empirical principles, like every other faculty of nature, and consider it as a psychological property, whose explanation depends upon a more exact investigation of the nature of

be possible *à priori*, we (beg leave to) term Transcendental. See Kant's Prolegomena.

the soul merely and of the springs of the will, and as nothing but a transcendental predicate of the causation of a being that belongs to the sensible world, and thus destroy the sublime opening, which we have by pure practical reason by means of the moral law, and which is the prospect of an intelligible world, by the realizing of the otherwise transcendental conception of liberty together with the moral law itself, which absolutely does not admit of any empirical determinative, or ground of determination; it cannot be improper or unnecessary here to adduce some arguments with a view to obviate this illusion, and to exhibit empiricism (or materialism) in all the nakedness of its superficiality.*

The conception of causality as Necessity of Nature, in contradistinction to the causality as liberty,

* Transcendental (absolute) Liberty (as to its negative conception) is, The independence of the arbitrament upon determining causes of the sensible world. But the positive conception of the liberty of the arbitrament is, The faculty of pure reason to be absolutely practical. The moral law is the condition, on which we can first of all become conscious to ourselves of liberty which, as the condition of the moral law, is without doubt its *ratio essendi*, but this law the *ratio cognoscendi* of liberty. For, were not the moral law first thought of distinctly, we should never hold ourselves entitled to assume such a thing as liberty (though it is not inconsistent to do so). But were there no liberty, the moral law would not be to be met with in us; for, as aforesaid, it is possible on the condition of liberty only.

regards the existence of things, only provided that they are determinable in time, consequently as apparitions or phenomena, in opposition to their causality as things in themselves (*in se*), or as noumena. If the determinations of the existence of things in time are taken for those of things in themselves (which is the usual mode of representation) the necessity in the causal relations cannot be in any way united with liberty. They are opposed to one another in a contradictory manner. For, from the former it follows, that every event, consequently every action, which precedes at any moment, is necessary on the condition of that which was in the foregoing time. But, as the time past is not any longer in our power, every action, which we perform, must be necessary on determining grounds, which are not in our power, that is, we are, at the moment of our action, never free. Nay, were we to assume our whole existence to be independent of any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that the determinative of our causation, even of our whole existence, should not be out of us, this assumption would not convert this necessity of nature in the least to liberty. For, at every moment we are always subject to the necessity of nature, to be determined to act by that, which is not in our power, and the *à parte priori* indefinite series of events, which we never continue but according to a predetermined order, never begins by itself (absolutely),

is a continual chain of nature, and our causality never liberty.*

If we therefore would attribute liberty to a being, whose existence is determined in time, we cannot, so far at least, take it (liberty) from the laws of the physical necessity of all the events in his existence, by consequence of his actions; for that were as much as to deliver him over to blind chance. But, as this law of nature inevitably regards all the causation of things provided that their existence is determinable in time, liberty, if this were the way of our representing to ourselves the existence of these things in themselves, would need to be rejected as a conception void and impossible. Consequently, if we are to save it, there is no other way, than to attribute the existence of a thing, if it is determinable in time, therefore the causality according to the necessity of nature, to phenomena only, but liberty to the very same being as a thing in itself (or a noumenon). And that, if both conceptions repugnant to one another are at once maintained, must be done; but in the application, when they

* Nature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditionate laws, consequently heteronomy to reason. The supersensible nature of the very same beings again is their existence according to laws, which are independent of every empirical condition, by consequence belong to the autonomy of pure practical reason.

are united in the same action, and this union itself is wanted to be explained, great difficulties, which seem to make a union of this sort impracticable, may be raised.*

If we say of a theft, which has been committed, that it, according to the physical law of causality, is a necessary consequence of the determinatives of the preceding time, and it is impossible that it could have been avoided; how then can the judgment according to the moral law make an alteration in this, and allow us to presuppose, that it could have been avoided, because the law says, that it ought to have been so, that is, how can that be, at the same moment and with respect to one and the same action, named quite free, which, at the same time and in the same respect, is subject to an inevitable necessity of nature? To seek an evasion in this, that nothing but the way of the determinative of one's causation according to the law of nature is adapted

* It is beyond doubt paradoxical to make at once a noumenon of a person as the subject of liberty and, relatively to nature, a phenomenon in his own empirical consciousness. But the union of causation as liberty with causation as mechanism of nature, the former of which stands fast by the moral law, and the latter by the law of nature, in one subject, man, is impossible without representing him, with reference to liberty, as a noumenon, but to the law of nature, as a phenomenon, that in the pure consciousness, but this in the empirical. Without which representation the inconsistency of reason in this question is unavoidable.

to a comparative conception of liberty, according to which that, whose determining ground of nature lies internally in the agent, is sometimes called a free action, for instance, that which a projected body, in free motion, performs, when the word liberty is used, because it (the body), whilst in flight, is not impelled by any thing external, or as we call the motion of a watch a free one, because it (the watch) moves its hands itself, and therefore they need not be externally moved, in the same way the actions of men, though they are necessary by the grounds of determination that precede in time, are named free, because they are (internal) representations produced by our own powers,* and desires thereby generated according to occasional circumstances, and consequently actions effected at our own pleasure; is a miserable resource, by which a few still deceive themselves, and are of opinion to have solved, with a little gallimatia, this difficult problem, at whose solution philosophers have laboured in vain for centuries, and which therefore is not just likely to be found at the very surface.

Upon the inquiry after that liberty, which must be laid as a foundation to all moral laws, and to the imputation conformable to them, it does not at all

* Representation is internal determination of our mind in any relation of time in general. See Kant's *Logic* for the scale of representation.

depend whether the causality determined according to a law of nature is necessary on grounds of determination, which lie either in the subject, or out of him, and in the former case whether it is determinatives by instinct, or those thought of by reason, when these determining representations, by the acknowledgment of these very men themselves, have their foundation in time and in the foregoing state, and this again in another preceding, &c. whether these grounds of determination are internal, whether they have psychological and not mechanical causation, that is, produce actions by representations, and not by corporal motion, they are always determinatives of the causality of a being provided that his existence is determinable in time, consequently on conditions of the foregoing time's making necessary, which therefore, when the subject is to act, are no longer in his power, and which by consequence carry with them psychological liberty (if we will use this word for a mere internal concatenation of representations of the mind), but necessity of nature, therefore do not leave any transcendental liberty, which must be conceived of to be independence upon all that is empirical and consequently upon nature in general, whether it is considered as an object either of the internal sense, merely in time, or of the external senses, at once in space and in time, without which liberty (in the latter (transcendental) proper sense), which only is practical *à priori*, no moral law, nor any imputation according

to it, is possible. For which reason all necessity of the events in time according to the physical law of causality, may be named the Mechanism of Nature, though we are not thereby to understand, that the things, which are subject to it, must be real material machines. We consider nothing here but the necessity of the connexion of the events in a series of time, as it (this connexion) is unfolded according to the law of nature, whether the subject, in which this flux happens, is named a material automaton, in which the machinery acts by matter, or (according to Leibnitz) a spiritual one, by representations, and the liberty of our will, if it were nothing but the latter (perhaps the psychological and comparative, not the transcendental, that is, the absolute), would at bottom be nothing better, than the liberty of a jack which, when once wound up, goes of itself.

In order to remove the seeming contradiction between the mechanism of nature and liberty in one and the same action in the case before us, we must recall to the reader's mind, what metaphysic teaches us, that the necessity of nature, which cannot consist with the liberty of the subject, adheres to the determinations of that thing merely which ranks under conditions of time, therefore to that only of the agent as a phenomenon, consequently with a proviso that determinatives of every one of his actions lie in what belongs to the preceding time and

are no longer in his power, (with which his deeds already done, and the character thereby determinable to him in his own eyes, as a phenomenon, must be numbered).* But the very same subject, who, on the other hand, is conscious to himself of himself as a thing *in se*, considers his existence, if it is not subject to conditions of time, and himself as determinable by laws only, which he gives himself by reason, and in this his existence nothing is antecedent for him to his determination of will, but every action, and in general every determination of his existence changing conformably to the internal sense, even the whole succession of his existence, as a sensitive being, are in the consciousness of his intelligible existence to be looked upon to be consequences only, but never determinatives of his causality as a noumenon. In this consideration the rational being may justly say of every illegal action, which he commits, that, though it, as a phenomenon, is sufficiently determined in the foregoing time and so far indispensable, he could have omitted it; because it, with all the past that determines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of his character which he gives himself, as a cause independent of all sensitivity, the causation of this phenomenon.†

* Character is a moral consequential way of thinking according to invariable maxims.

† As sensuality, which originally signified (and in Latin still signifies) the sensitive faculty, has degenerated into the vul-

With that the judgment of the wonderful faculty in us which we name conscience perfectly agrees. Let a man use as much ingenuity, as he pleases, to figure to himself, that an illegal conduct, which he recollects, was an unpremeditated mistake, a mere negligence or unguardedness, which one never can totally avoid, consequently to be something, in which he was carried away by the stream of the necessity of nature, and to declare himself inculpable with regard to it, he finds, that the advocate, who speaks in his favor, can by no means silence the plaintiff in him when he is conscious to himself, that he, at the time that he did wrong, was of a sane mind, that is, had the use of his liberty, and yet he explains to himself his transgression from certain ills, from habits acquired by a gradual neglect of attention to himself, to that degree, as to consider it (his transgression) as a natural consequence of it, but without his being able to guard himself against self-blame and the reproach which he fixes on himself. Upon that then the regret or repentance on every remembrance of an action long committed is grounded; a painful sensation occasioned by a moral mindedness, which is so far practically void, as it cannot serve to undo what is

gar meaning of a ruling inclination to sensual enjoyment, we ask leave to substitute for it the word Sensitivity.

† Conscience is, A consciousness that is an absolute duty; or it may be defined to be, The moral judgment judging itself. And Consciousness is, activity of the mind in joining the multifarious of representation according to a rule of its unity.

done, and even absurd (as Priestly, a genuine consequentially proceeding necessitarian or fatalist, explains it to be, and in consideration of this candour deserves more approbation, than those, who, while they maintain the mechanism of the will in fact, but the liberty of the will with words only, would as they comprise this sort of liberty in their syncretistical system, yet without making the possibility of such an imputation comprehensible, be held necessitarians), but, as pain, quite right, but, when the law of our intelligible existence (the moral law) is in question, does not allow of distinction of time, and inquires only if the event, as a fact, belongs to the person, but, then always connects the same internal sensation, or feeling, with it morally, whether it is done at present, or was done long ago.* For the life of the senses has in regard to the intelligible consciousness of one's existence (to liberty) the absolute unity of a phenomenon, which life, provided that it contains phenomena of the mindedness merely that regards the moral law (of the character), must be judged not according to the necessity of nature, which belongs to it as a phenomenon, but according to the absolute spontaneity of liberty. And we may grant, that, if it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into the cast of mind of a man, as it ap-

* A Person is that subject, whose actions are capable of imputation. And a judgment, by which a person is considered the author (*causa libera*) of an action, is termed Imputation.

pears by internal as well as external actions, that every even the least spring of them, and the external occasional circumstances acting on it, should be known to us, we might calculate the future conduct of a man with the certainty that we can a solar or a lunar eclipse, and yet maintain thereby, that he is a free agent. Were we capable of another view (than is bestowed upon us, instead of which we are gifted with the conception of reason), and of intellectual intuition, we should become sensible, that this whole chain of phenomena depends, in respect to all which can concern the moral law only, upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself, of whose determination no physical explanation can be given. In the room of this intuition the moral law assures us of this distinction of the reference of our actions, as phenomena, to the sensible being of our subject from that, by which this sensible being itself is referred to the intelligible substratum in us.—In this respect, which is natural though inexplicable to our reason,* judgments, which, passed with all conscientiousness, yet seem, at the first view, to be quite repugnant to all equity, may be vindicated. There are cases, in which men, from their very infancy, and in spite of all the advantages of such an education as is salutary to others, betray so early

* Reason, as the faculty of the unity of the rules of the understanding under principles, is a pure, active, spontaneous, mental power ("the best gift of heaven").

depravity, in which they continue to increase till their years of manhood, that they are held innate villains, and, as to the way of thinking, totally incorrigible and not capable of amendment, but, as to their conduct, judged in the same way, yes, they (the children) find this reproach equally well founded, as if they, notwithstanding the hopeless natural quality of their minds ascribed to them, should remain just as responsible as every other person. This could not take place if we did not presuppose, that all which springs from man's arbitrament (no doubt like every intentionally performed action), has its ground in a free causality, which, from early youth, expresses its character in its phenomena (actions) that, because of the uniformity of conduct, make known a coherence of nature, which however does not render the bad quality of the will necessary, but is rather the consequence of voluntarily adopted bad and immutable principles that make him so much the more worthless only and punishable.

But there is yet another difficulty in the way of liberty if it shall be united with the mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the sensible world. A difficulty which, even admitting every thing that we have already discussed, still threatens liberty with a total overthrow. But in this danger there is a circumstance that affords a hope for a happy issue of the defence of liberty, and which is,

that the same difficulty bears much more forcibly (in fact, as we shall soon see, only) upon the system, in which the existence determinable in time and in space is held the existence of things in themselves, and does not oblige us to depart from our chief presupposition of the ideality of time as the mere form of sensual intuition, by consequence as a mere mode of representation, which is peculiar to the subject as belonging to the sensible world, but requires the way of this union only to be explained.*

If it is allowed us, that the intelligible subject in regard to a given action can be free, though he as a subject who, belonging to the sensible world, is in respect to it mechanically conditionate, it seems that we, the moment we assume, that God, as the universal original Being, is the cause of the existence of the substance (a proposition, which never can be relinquished without giving up the conception of him as the Being of all beings, together with

* Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of representing ourselves and our internal state immediately. It is the formal condition *à priori* of all phenomena in general.

Space, as to its transcendental exposition, is nothing but the form of all the phenomena of the external senses, that is, the only subjective condition of the sensitive faculty, on which external intuition is possible to us. See Kant's *Prolegomena* on this head and on the subject of moral liberty.

his all-sufficiency, upon which every thing in theology depends), must grant, that the actions of man have their determining ground in that which is totally out of his own power, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from man, upon whom his (man's) existence and the whole determination of his causality entirely depend. In fact, were the actions of man, as they belong to his determinations in time, determinations of him not as a mere phenomenon, but as a thing in itself, liberty could not be saved. Man were a puppet or an automaton, made and wound up by the Supreme Master of all the works of art, and self-consciousness would make a thinking automaton of it, in which however the consciousness of its spontaneity, were it held liberty, would as it only deserves to be comparatively so named, be nothing but illusion; because the proximate determining causes of its motion, and a long series of them up to their determining causes, are internal, but the last and the highest one of them is found entirely in the hand of another. Hence we cannot conceive how those, who still continue to consider time and space as determinations belonging to the existence of things in themselves, can avoid the fatality of human actions or, when they so directly (as the in other respects so acute Mendelssohn does) admit both as conditions only necessarily belonging to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not to that of the Infinite Being, give an account how they are entitled to

make such a distinction or avoid the contradiction which they are guilty of when they consider the existence in time as a determination necessarily adhering to finite beings in themselves, as God is the cause of this existence, but cannot be that of time (or of space) itself (because it must be presupposed to be the necessary condition *à priori* of the existence of the things), consequently his causality in respect to the existence of these things, even as to time, must be conditional, by which conclusion all the contradictions to the conceptions of his infinity and of his independence must inevitably occur. Whereas it is quite easy for us to distinguish the determinative of the Divine existence, as independent of all the conditions of time, in opposition to that of a being of the sensible world, as the existence of a being in itself, from that of a thing as a phenomenon. Hence, if this ideality of time and of space is not assumed, nothing remains but Spinozism, in which space and time are essential determinations of the Original Being himself, but the things depending upon him (therefore we) not substances, but accidents inhering in him; because, if these things exist as his effects in time merely, which is (in this case) the condition of their existence in itself, the actions of these beings must be his actions, which he performs somewhere or at some time. Hence Spinozism, for all the absurdity of its fundamental idea, concludes much more soundly, than can be done according to the theory of the creation,

when beings assumed as substances and existing in themselves in time are considered as effects of a Supreme Cause, and yet not of him and his action, but by themselves, or absolutely, as substances.

The solution of the above-mentioned difficulty is briefly and clearly accomplished in the following way: If the existence in time is a mere sensual mode of representation of thinking beings in the world, by consequence does not regard them as things in themselves, the creation of these things is that of things in themselves; because the conception of a creation does not belong to the sensual mode of representation and causation, but can be referred to noumena only. Consequently, when we say of beings of the sensible world, that they are created, we consider them so far as noumena. Therefore, as it would be absurd to say, that God is a creator of phenomena, it were equally so to say, that he, as the Creator, is, though the cause of the existence of the agent (as a noumenon), that of the actions in the sensible world, of course as phenomena. If it is possible (when we assume the existence in time to be something that holds with regard to phenomena merely, not to things in themselves) to maintain liberty without detriment to the physical mechanism of the actions as phenomena, agents' being creatures cannot make the least alteration in it, because the creation regards their intelligible, not their sensible, existence, and therefore cannot

be considered as the determinative of the phenomena; but which would, if the beings of the world should exist as things in themselves in time, when the Creator of the substance would be the Author of all the machinery also in it, fall out quite otherwise.

Of so great moment, therefore, is the separation of time (as well as of space) from the existence of things in themselves, or of noumena !

It may however be said, that the solution of the difficulty here propounded is very difficult itself, and scarce susceptible of a clear exhibition. But, is any other that has ever yet been attempted easier, or will any other that ever may be attempted be easily understood? It might rather be said, that the dogmatical teachers of metaphysic have betrayed more cunning than sincerity in concealing this knotty point as much as possible, in the hope that, if they should never speak of it, no one would easily think of it.* If a science shall be improved, all the

* By Dogmatism we understand The presumption of succeeding with a pure cognition from conceptions (the philosophical cognition) according to principles, which reason has long used without inquiring into its title to them and into the way of its attaining them, that is, without our having previously dissected the whole cognitive faculty, or acquired a sufficient knowledge of the philosophy of the human mind.

difficulties must be exposed to view, and even those, which lie in its way in ever so hidden a manner, searched after ; for every one of them requires a remedy, which cannot be found without affording the science an increment whether to the sphere, or to precision ; by which operation therefore the very impediments become means of promoting the solidity of the science. Whereas the difficulties, if they are intentionally concealed or palliatives only prescribed for them, sooner or later never fail of breaking out into incurable evils, which kill the science by turning it to a total scepticism.

HAVING premised this much, and laid the solid foundation requisite to our high dynamical superstructure, we can now go on safely with our work, and shall proceed to what we deem the only possible methods of proof of the existence of the Deity, and first to the only speculative one *à priori*, which, if a merely theoretical or speculative proof of an existence of this sort be possible, is conclusive.*

* What refers to the determination of an object or of its conception, is named Theoretical. But all, which is possible through liberty, is termed (morally) Practical. And what is theoretical, if it refers to that which is not within the sphere of possible experience, becomes Speculative.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.

PART THE FIRST.

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

EXISTENCE is by no means a predicate or determination of any one thing. This proposition, how strange soever it may seem, is right. Yet we are in the habit of using the word existence as a predicate, and may continue so to do safely and without danger of errors as long as we would not derive it (existence) from merely possible conceptions, but which we usually do when we have a mind to prove the absolutely necessary existence. For we then look in vain among the predicates of a possible thing of this sort, existence certainly is not of the number. But it, in the case in which it occurs

as a predicate in the common use of speech, is a predicate not so much of the thing itself, as of the thought which we conceive of it. The reader however will not be able to judge sufficiently of what we have now advanced but when he shall have reflected on that which follows.

Existence is the absolute laying down of a thing, and thereby distinguished from every predicate, which is always laid down by way of reference merely to another thing. The conception of laying down is quite simple, and identical with that of Being in general. Something may be laid down in a relative way or rather the reference (*respectus logicus*) of something thought of as a mark of a thing, and then being, that is, the laying down of this reference, is nothing but the copulative conception in a judgment. Is not only this reference, but the thing in itself, absolutely laid down, considered? this being is the same as existence or absolute Reality.

So simple is this conception, that we can say nothing more on its development, than to recommend to the reader to be careful not to confound it with the relations, which things bear their marks.

When we perspect,* that our whole cognition

* See this word explained in Kant's Logic.

ends at last in insolvable conceptions, we comprehend, that there must be some which are almost insolvable, that is, where the marks are but very little clearer and simpler, than the thing itself.* This is the case with our explanation of existence. We willingly acknowledge, that by it the conception of the explained thing becomes distinct but in a very small degree. But the nature of the object in reference to the faculty of our understanding does not admit of a higher degree. And the subject in hand is of such a nature, that we must either quite despair of ever attaining a certain demonstration of it, or take the trouble of resolving its conceptions into their very atoms.

Can we say, that there is more in existence, than in bare possibility? To answer this question we must distinguish what is said in it, and how it is said. As to the former, in an actual thing there is nothing more laid down, than in a merely possible one, for all the determinations and predicates of the actual thing, may likewise be found in its mere possibility; but as to the latter, more is certainly laid down by the actuality or reality. For, if we ask how all this is laid down in the bare pos-

* Cognition is an objective perception, and either Intuition, which has an immediate reference to the object and is single, or Conception, which has a mediate one to it by means of a mark that may be common to several things.

sibility, we perceive, that it has place relatively to the thing itself only, that is, when there is a triangle, there are three sides, an enclosed space, three angles &c. or rather the reference of these determinations to such a thing, as a triangle, is merely laid down, but if it exists, all this is absolute, that is, the thing itself together with these references, consequently more, is laid down. In order therefore to comprise in so subtile a representation all which can obviate confusion, we say, that there is nothing more laid down in an existing thing, than in a merely possible one (for then its predicates are the subject), but more is laid down by something existing, than by something barely possible; for that refers to the absolute laying down of the thing itself. In the mere possibility the thing itself is not laid down, but mere references of something to something according to the principle of contradiction are, and it remains established, that existence is, in strict propriety, not a predicate of any one thing.

We now proceed to treat of the Internal Possibility provided that we relatively to it presuppose an existence. All that is contradictory in itself is internally impossible. This, though it should be left undetermined whether it be a true explanation, is a true proposition. In this contradiction however it is clear, that something must stand in a logical opposition to something, that is, deny what is affirm-

ed of the very same thing. This repugnance we denominate the formal of incogitability or impossibility; the material, which is hereby given and which stands in this opposition, is something in itself, is real, and can be conceived of. The subject here is not of any other possibility or impossibility, than the internal or absolute.

The internal possibility of all things presupposes some one existence. It, from what we have already said, may be distinctly understood, that the possibility ceases not only when an internal contradiction, such as the logical one of impossibility, is to be met with, but when nothing material, no datum for thinking, exists. For then nothing cogitable is given, but all which is possible is something that can be cogitated, and to which the logical reference belongs agreeably to the principle of contradiction. If all existence is annulled, nothing is absolutely laid down, nothing at all is given, nothing material to any one cogitable thing, and all possibility vanishes entirely. There is not an internal contradiction in the negation of all existence. For there it is required, that something should be at once laid down and nullified, but here nothing is laid down, and it cannot be said, that this annulling involves an internal contradiction. But it is inconsistent, that any thing possible, and yet nothing real, should exist; because if nothing exists, nothing cogitable is given, and it is then absurd to think of any thing

possible. In the dissection of the conception of existence we have shewn, that being or laying down absolutely, when these words are not used to express the logical references of predicates to objects, is precisely identical with existence. Consequently to say, that nothing exists, is as much as to say, that there is nothing at all ; and it is palpably contradictory to add, that notwithstanding, that something is possible.

It is absolutely impossible, that nothing at all should exist. That, by which all possibility in general is annulled, is absolutely impossible. For these are synonymous expressions. By that which is inconsistent or absurd the formal of all possibility, the agreement with the principle of contradiction, is destroyed ; hence that which is inconsistent or absurd is absolutely impossible. But this is not the case when we have to consider the total annihilation of all existence. For herein, as we have already said, there is not an internal contradiction. But by that, by which the material of all that is possible and the data to it are annulled, all possibility is annulled. Now this happens by the annulling of all existence, therefore, if all existence is annulled, all possibility is so likewise. By consequence the proposition, 'it is absolutely impossible that nothing at all should exist,' is true.

All possibility is given in something real either as

a determination in it, or as a consequence of it. We have to shew of all possibility, of every one in particular, that it gives to presuppose something real whether one thing, or several things. This reference of all possibility to any one existence may be twofold. Either the possible is not cogitable but with a proviso that it is itself real, and then the possibility is given in that which is real as a determination; or it is possible because something else is real, that is, its internal possibility is given, as a consequence, by another existence. The sequel will throw more light on this subject.

That, whose contrary is in itself impossible, is absolutely necessary. This is an undoubtedly right nominal explication. But, if we ask, upon what does it depend, that the nonexistence of a thing is absolutely impossible? that is what we want, the real explication, which only can be somewhat serviceable to our purpose. All our conceptions of the Internal Necessity, in the properties of possible things, of whatever sort they may be, amount to this, that the contrary is inconsistent. But, were the absolutely necessary existence the subject under consideration, we should not succeed well in understanding any thing of it by the same criterion. Existence, we have often said, is not a predicate, and the annulling of existence not that of a predicate, by which something in a thing could be nullified, and an internal contradiction arise. The annulling

of an existing thing is a total annulling of all that could be laid down by the existence of this⁷ thing. The logical relations between a thing, as a possible thing, and its predicates, remain nevertheless. But those are quite distinct from the absolute laying down of a thing together with its predicates; wherein existence consists. The necessity in the predicates of possible conceptions may be termed the logical; but that necessity, whose chief ground, existence, we are scrutinizing, is the absolute real necessity.*

An absolutely Necessary Being exists. All possibility rests upon the presupposition of something real, wherein and by which all that is cogitable is given. Hence a certain reality, whose annulling would annul all internal possibility, exists. But that, whose annulling destroys or annuls all possibility, is absolutely necessary. Consequently Something exists in an absolutely necessary way.

The necessary Being is Single. As the necessary Being comprises the first real ground of all

* Hence may be easily abstracted the conception of Casualty, which, as to its nominal explanation, is, That whose contrary is possible. Whereas, in the real sense, That whose nonexistence is to be thought of, that is, whose annulling does not annul all that is cogitable, is casual or contingent.

other possibility, nothing else is possible but by its being given by him as a ground. Every other thing therefore can exist as a consequence only of him, and the possibility and the existence of all other things depend upon him. But any thing which is itself dependent does not comprise the first real ground of all possibility, and by consequence is not absolutely necessary. More than One thing therefore cannot be absolutely necessary.

The necessary Being is Simple. That nothing composed of many substances can be an absolutely necessary being is obvious as follows: Let us suppose, that there is but one of his parts absolutely necessary, the others are possible by him as consequences only, and do not belong to him as collateral parts. Put the case, that more or all of them are necessary; this is repugnant to his unity, which the former proposition evinces. Consequently nothing remains but that every one apart must exist casually, but all together in an absolutely necessary manner. But that is impossible; because an aggregate of substances cannot have more necessity in existence, than belongs to the parts, and as none belongs to them, their existence being casual, that of the whole also is casual. By consequence the First Ground of the internal possibility cannot be divided among different substances.

The Necessary Being is Immutable and Eternal. As even his own and every other possibility vindicate us in presupposing his existence, no other mode of his existence is possible, that is to say, the Necessary Being cannot exist in various ways. All, which exists, is thoroughly determined; now, as this Being is possible, only because he exists, not any possibility of him has place unless he in fact exists; he therefore is not possible in any other way, than as he actually is. Consequently he cannot be determined or altered in any other way. His nonexistence is absolutely impossible, of course both his origin and his end are so, by consequence he is eternal.

The Necessary Being comprises the Supreme Reality. As the data for all possibility must be to be met with in him either as its determinations, or as consequences, which are given by him as the first real Ground, we perceive, that all reality is in one way or other comprehended by him. And these very determinations, by which this Being is the Supreme Ground of all other possible reality, place in him the greatest real properties that ever can belong to a thing.

The Necessary Being is a Spirit. We have already proved, that he is a simple substance, and that not only all other reality is given by him as a ground, but that he possesses all the reality that can

be contained as a determination in a being. Now, that thereto the properties of an understanding and of a will also belong, various proofs may be adduced. For, in the first place, both are true realities, and both can subsist with all possible reality in a being; which latter circumstance we, though it cannot well be brought to that distinctness, which logically perfect proofs require, find ourselves compelled to grant by an immediate judgment of intellect.

In the second place, the properties of a spirit, understanding and a will, are of that nature, that we cannot conceive of any reality which, were they wanting, could sufficiently supply their place. And, as these properties are such as are susceptible of all reality, and belong to possible realities, intellect and a will and all the reality of spiritual nature in others must be possible by the Necessary Being as a ground, but which are not found in himself as a determination. Otherwise the consequence would be greater, than the ground itself. For it is certain that, if the Supreme Being himself has not understanding and a will, every other being, who is endowed with these properties by Him, must, notwithstanding that he is dependent and has many other wants of power &c., be superior to Him in point of reality in the greatest degree with respect to these properties. But, as the consequence cannot surpass the ground, understanding and a will

must as properties be inherent in the Necessary Simple Substance, that is, He is a Spirit.

And in the third place, order, beauty, perfection in all that is possible, gives occasion to presuppose a Being, either in whose properties these references are founded, or at least by whom the things are, conformably to these references, possible on a chief ground. But the Necessary Being is the sufficient real Ground of all other things which are possible besides him, consequently that property, by which, agreeably to these references, every thing besides him can become actual, must be to be met with in him. But it should seem, that, if a will suitable to the understanding is not presupposed, the ground is not sufficient for the external possibility, for order, beauty, and perfection. These properties must therefore be attributed to the Supreme Being.

Every one knows, that, for all the grounds for the production of plants and of trees, regular flower gardens, shrubberies and allies are possible by an understanding only which designs them and by a will which executes them. All potency or productive power, as well as all other data for possibility, is, without an understanding, insufficient to complete the possibility of this order and regularity.

From one of the grounds here adduced or from them collectively the proof, that the Necessary Being must have an intellect and a will, of course

be a Spirit, may be deduced ; and we are satisfied, that the argument is complete.

Something exists of absolute necessity. This is single in its being, simple in its substance, a spirit in its nature, eternal in its duration, immutable in its quality, all-sufficient with regard to all that is both possible and real. **THERE IS A GOD.**

The argument, which we have used in this method of proof, and which we conceive to be the only possible theoretical one for a demonstration of the being of God, is entirely established upon the possibility of something. Consequently it is a mode of proof which can be made perfectly *a priori*. Neither our existence, nor that of other spirits, nor that of the corporeal world, is presupposed. It in fact is taken from the internal mark of absolute necessity. We in this way know the objective reality or the existence of this Being from that which actually constitutes his absolute necessity, by consequence quite (if we may be allowed the word) genetically.

All the proofs of the existence of this Being possible to be given by words, supposing that they prove ever so strictly, which they certainly do not do, never can render the nature of this necessity comprehensible. Merely from something's existing in an absolutely necessary way it is possible,

that something is a first cause of other things; but from something's being a first, that is, an independent, cause, it follows, that, if the effects exist, they must exist, but not that they exist in an absolutely necessary way.

As it from this ontological argument shines forth, that all the essence of other things and the real of all possibility are founded in this Single Being, in whom the highest degree of intellect and of a will, the greatest possible ground, must be met with, and as in a Being like this every thing must be in the greatest possible accordance, it may be concluded, that, as a will always bottoms upon the presupposition of the internal possibility of the thing itself, the ground of possibility, that is, the essence of God, will be in the greatest harmony with his will, not as if he were the ground of the internal possibility by his will, but because the very same eternal nature, which has the reference of a ground to all the essence of things, has that of the supreme desire also to the greatest consequences thereby produced, and the latter cannot be productive but by the presupposition of the former. Therefore the possibilities of things themselves, which are given by the Divine Nature, will agree with his great desire. But in this agreement goodness and perfection consist. And, as they accord with one, unity, harmony and order are to be met with in the very possibilities of things.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.

PART THE SECOND.

SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

IF by Theology we understand the knowledge of the First Being, it is that either from mere reason (*theologia rationalis*), or from revelation. The former, of whose object we conceive either by pure reason merely, by means of nothing but transcendental conceptions (*ens originarium, realissimum, entium*), and term Transcendental Theology, or by a conception, which we borrow from nature (the nature of our soul), as the Supreme Intelligence, and must denominate Natural Theology.

He, who allows a transcendental theology only

is named a Deist; but he that assumes a natural theology too, a Theist. The former grants, that we can know the existence of an Original Being by mere reason, but our conception of whom, as a Being, who possesses all reality but whom we cannot determine more strictly, is transcendental only.* And the latter maintains, that reason is able more strictly to determine, according to the analogy with nature, the object, as a Being, who, by intellect and by liberty, contains in himself the fundamental ground of all other things. The one represents to himself, therefore, by such a Being, a Cause of the world (whether by the necessity of his nature, or by liberty, remains undecided); and the other, an Author of the world.

Transcendental Theology is that by which we think either to derive the existence of the First Being from an experience in general (without determining more closely any thing with regard to the world, to which it belongs), and is called Cosmotheology, or to know this existence by mere conceptions without the least assistance from experience, and is denominated Ontotheology.

* All cognition, which is occupied not so much about objects, as our way of attaining the cognition of them in general, provided that it shall be possible *à priori*, we term Transcendental; which word we never use but in this its strict philosophical sense, and therefore cannot be misunderstood.

In Natural Theology we conclude the existence and the attributes of an Author of the world from the quality of the things, the order and the unity that are found in this world ; in which theology a twofold causality and its rule, nature and liberty, must be assumed. Hence it ascends from this world to the Supreme Intelligence, as the principle either of all natural, or of all moral, order and perfection. In the former case we distinguish it by the name of Physicotheology, and in the latter, by that of Ethicotheology.*

As we are habituated to understand by the conception of God not a blind working eternal nature merely, as the root of things, but a Supreme Being, who by an understanding and by liberty is the Author of all things, and in this conception only we are interested ; we might, in strictness, refuse the deist all belief in God, and leave him nothing but the affirmation of an original being as the first cause. But, as nobody should, because he does not venture to maintain a thing, be accused of wanting to deny it, it is milder and juster to say, that the deist be-

* Not theological Ethics, for they contain moral laws, which flow from the assumption of God. Whereas Moral Theology springs from a conception of His existence, which has its foundation in moral laws, and consequently in the autonomy (self-legislation) of pure reason in its practical use. See ' A Sketch of Kant's Life and Writings,' annexed to the English translation of his Logic.

lieves in a God, but the theist in a living God (*Summam Intelligentiam*). We shall now seek out the possible sources of all these essays of reason.

It may suffice here to explain the Theoretical cognition as that, by which we know what exists, and the Practical that cognition, by which we represent to ourselves what ought to exist. Consequently the theoretical use of reason is that, by which we cognise *à priori* (as necessary) that something is; but the practical use, that, by which it is cognised *à priori* what ought to be. If either that something is, or that it ought to be, is indubitably certain, but conditional only, a certain determinate condition can be either absolutely necessary to it, or presupposed as voluntary only and casual. In the former case the condition is postulated (*per thesin*), but in the latter supposed (*per hypothesin*). As there are practical laws, which are absolutely necessary (the moral ones), we must, if they indispensably require the presupposition of any one existence as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, postulate this existence; because the conditionate, from which the inference goes to this determinate condition, is itself cognised *à priori* to be absolutely necessary. We shall afterward shew of the moral laws, that they require us not only to presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but, as they are in another view absolutely necessary, to postulate it justly though practically

only; for the present however we shall not pay any attention to this mode of inference.

As, when the question is of that merely which is (not of what ought to be), the conditionate, which is given us by experience, is not to be thence cognised to be absolutely necessary, but serves as a respective or relative necessary only or rather as a needful, but in itself and *à priori* arbitrable presupposition for the reason-cognition of the conditionate. Is then the absolute necessity of a thing in the theoretical cognition to be known? it can be so *à priori* from conceptions only, but never as a cause, in reference to a thing, which is given by experience.

A theoretical cognition, if it refers to an object or to conceptions of an object, which cannot be reached by any experience, is Speculative. It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which does not refer to any other object or predicate of nature, than can be given by possible experience.

The principle of inferring a cause from what happens (the empirical casual as an effect) is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of the speculative cognition. For, if we abstract from it as a principle, which contains the condition of possible experience in general, and, by leaving out every thing empirical, exclude it from the casual in

general, there does not remain the least vindication of a synthetic proposition of this sort in order thence to see how we can refer from any thing that exists to something quite different or distinct from it (named the cause);* nay, the conception of a cause loses, like that of the casual, in a mere speculative use, all the meaning, whose objective reality can be rendered comprehensible in the concrete.

When we from the existence of the things in the world conclude their cause, this operation does not belong to the natural, but to the speculative, use of reason; because the former refers not the things themselves (the substances), but that which happens, therefore their states, as empirically casual, to some one cause; to say, that the substance itself (matter) is casual, as to its existence, must needs be a merely speculative cognition of reason. And if the subject on the carpet were the form of the world only, the way of its (the world's)

* In all judgments, in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought of, this relation is possible in a twofold way. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained in this conception A (cryptically); or B, though it stands in connexion with the conception A, lies quite without it. In the former case we name the judgment Analytical; but in the latter, Synthetical. 'All bodies have extension,' is an example of that; 'Some bodies are heavy,' one of this. See 'Kant's Prolegomena to Metaphysic,' in which this subject is profoundly handled.

conjunction and its alteration, and we should thence infer a cause, which is totally distinct from the world, this judgment again would be a judgment of merely speculative reason; because the object here is not that of a possible experience. But then the principle of causation, which holds within the field of experience only, and without it is of no use, nay, has not any signification, would be entirely taken away from its destination.

We maintain, that all the endeavours of a merely speculative use of reason with regard to theology, are quite fruitless and as to their internal quality totally void, and that the principles of its natural use by no means lead to any theology, consequently, unless moral laws are laid as a foundation or used as a guide, there cannot be any theology of reason. For all the synthetic principles of the understanding are of immanent (domestic) use; but to the cognition of a Supreme Being a transcendent use of them, to which our intellect is not adapted, is requisite.* If the empirically valid law of causality shall lead to the Original Being, he must belong

* By the expression, Immanent Use, we mean that use which is confined to objects of possible experience; but by that of Transcendent use, that which extends directly to what never can be an object of possible experience. So that transcendent must be well distinguished from transcendental. In the critical philosophy these words are by no means synonymous.

to the series of the objects of experience ; but he himself would then be, like all phenomena, conditional. And if the leap over the bounds of experience by means of the dynamical law of the reference of effects to their causes, were allowed ; what conception could that procedure afford us ? Far from one of a Supreme Being ; because experience never yields us the greatest of all possible effects (which should bear testimony of their cause). If it should be allowed us, merely in order not to leave a void in our reason, to supply this total want of full determination by an idea of the supreme perfection and of the original necessity ; this may be granted us through favor, but cannot be demanded as a right of an irresistible proof. The physicotheological proof, therefore, may, perhaps, by connecting speculation with intuition, give energy to other proofs (if there are any) ; but it by itself rather prepares the understanding for theological cognition, and gives it a direct and natural bent to it, then shews its ability to complete the work.

Hence it may be seen, that transcendental questions allow of transcendental answers only, that is, those from pure conceptions *à priori*, without the least empirical admixture. But the question here is obviously synthetical and requires an enlargement of our cognition, beyond all the bounds of experience, to the existence of a Being that shall

correspond to our mere idea, which no experience can ever equal. But metaphysic teaches us, that no synthetic cognitions *à priori* are possible but by their expressing the formal conditions of a possible experience, and all principles by consequence are of an immanent validity only, that is, they refer to objects of empirical cognition entirely, or phenomena.* And therefore by a transcendental procedure with regard to the theology of barely speculative reason nothing is accomplished.

But if any one should prefer doubting of every new adduced proof to his being deprived of the persuasion of the weight of arguments so long in use; he cannot, if he is asked how and by what light he ventures to fly beyond the field of all possible experience by the power and on the wings of mere ideas, avoid answering, and justifying himself. Of new proofs or of the corrected labour of old ones we beg to be spared the trouble. For, though there is not much choice among them, as all merely speculative proofs will be found at last to terminate in a single one, the ontological, and we therefore need not be afraid of being much burdened with the fruitfulness of the dogmatic champion of that senseless reason; and though we, without fancying ourselves very warlike, will not refuse the challenge to

* A system of cognition *à priori* from mere conceptions is termed Metaphysic. See Kant's Prolegomena.

detect the fallacy or sophism in every attempt of this sort, and thereby to render his pretension vain; the hope of better luck with those, who are once habituated to dogmatical persuasions, will never be fully relinquished, and we hold to the sole just request, that they shew, universally and from the nature of the human understanding together with all other fountains of knowledge, how the beginning is to be made to enlarge our cognition totally *à priori* and to extend it to where not any possible experience and consequently no means suffice to secure to a conception excogitated by ourselves its objective reality. However the understanding may have attained this conception, the existence of its object cannot be found analytically in it; because the cognition of the existence of the object consists just in this object's being absolutely laid down out of the thought. But it is totally impossible spontaneously to quit a conception, and, without following the empirical connexion (by which phenomena only are given), to attain the discovery of new objects and of transcendent beings (noumena).

But, though reason in its merely speculative use is by far not sufficient to the great design of reaching the existence of a Supreme Being; it is of great service in it in rectifying the knowledge of this existence in the event of its being elsewhere obtained, in making it consistent with itself and with every other intelligible view, and in purifying

it from all, which might be repugnant to the conception of a First Being, and from all mixture of empirical limitations.

Transcendental theology, notwithstanding all its insufficiency, remains of important negative use, and is a constant censure of our reason when it is occupied about mere ideas only, which, just because they are ideas, do not admit of any other scale, than a transcendental one. For, if once, in another, perhaps a practical reference, the presupposition of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being as the Supreme Intelligence should maintain its validity without dispute; it would be of the greatest consequence precisely to determine this conception, as that of a necessary and real Being, on its transcendental side, and to clear away what is contrary to the Supreme Reality, what belongs to the mere phenomenon (to anthropomorphism in the wider sense), as well as to obviate all opposite assertions, whether they are atheistical, deistical, or anthropomorphistical; which in a critical treatment of this sort is very easy; because the same grounds, on which the inability of human reason with respect to the maintaining of the existence of a Being of this nature is laid open, necessarily suffice to prove the unfitness of every opposite assertion. For whence could any body, by mere speculative reason, take the insight, either that there is not a Supreme Being as the Fundamental Ground of all, or that none of the proper-

ties, which we, as to their consequences, represent to ourselves to be analogous with the dynamical realities of a thinking being, belong to him,* or that they, as belonging to him, must be subject to all the limitations, which the sensitivity unavoidably imposes upon the intelligences, whom we know by experience.

The Supreme Being therefore remains, to the barely speculative use of reason, a mere Ideal, but a faultless one,† the transcendental object of a conception which closes and crowns all human cogni-

* Analogy signifies the perfect resemblance of two relations between quite dissimilar things.

† An Ideal, or a transcendental prototype, is the representation of a single being as adequate to an idea. Virtue and human wisdom in its whole purity are ideas. But the sage (of the Stoics) is an ideal, that is, a man, who exists in thought only, but who is fully congruous to the idea of wisdom. Theophany* makes of the idea of Plato an idol, which cannot be revered or worshipped but in a superstitious manner. Whereas theology, which issues from conceptions of our own reason, sets up an ideal, which, as it springs from the most sacred of duties independent of theology, compels us to adoration. As the idea gives the rule, the ideal serves in a case of this sort for the archetype of the thorough determination of the ectype, and we have no other rule of our actions, than the conduct of this divine man in us, by which we can compare, judge, and thereby improve ourselves, though never attain it.

See this word explained in 'The Elements of a System of Education according to the critical Philosophy,' by the author.

tion, a conception, whose objective reality can, in this way, be neither proved, nor refuted; and, if there should be a moral theology, which can supply this want, transcendental theology, hitherto problematical only, will then, by the determination of its conception and the incessant censure of reason often enough illuded by the sensitivity and not always accordant with its own ideas, evince its indispensableness. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence out of the world (not as soul of the world), eternity, without conditions of time, omnipresence or ubiquity, without conditions of space, omnipotence &c. are merely transcendental predicates, and hence the least conception of them, which every theology stands so much in need of, cannot be taken but from the transcendental field.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
GROUNDS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE THIRD.
TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS.

TELEOLOGY is the way of judging of the objects of nature on a particular principle, or that of considering nature as a system of ends.* It naturally divides into the physical and the moral.

PHYSICOTELEOLOGY furnishes an argument sufficient for our theoretically reflecting judgment to assume the existence of an Intelligent Cause of the world.†

An End (*fnis*), as to its transcendental determination (without presupposing any thing empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure), is the object of a conception provided that this (the conception) is considered as the cause of that (the object), the real ground of its possibility.

† We cannot exhibit the proposition, There is an Intelligent

For we cannot conceive of and render comprehensible to ourselves the answerableness to the end, which must be laid as a foundation to our cognition of the internal possibility of many things of nature, but by representing to ourselves them and the world in general to be productions of a Great Efficient.*

But it were too daring in us to judge, that, in nature, if we could penetrate to its very principle in the specification of its universal and known laws, there does not lie hidden a sufficient ground for the possibility of organized beings† without ascribing a design to their generation (therefore in the mere mechanism of nature); for how can we know it? Probabilities, when judgments of pure reason are the subject, have no weight.

We can by no means judge objectively, either

First Being, but subjectively, for the use of our judgment in its reflection on the ends in nature, which ends cannot be conceived of on any other principle, than that of an intentional causality of a First Cause.

* The causality of a conception in regard to its object is denominated The answerableness to the end (*forma finalis*).

† The principle of the judgment on the internal answerableness to the end in organized beings, as well as its definition, is, An organized production of nature is that, in which every thing is reciprocally an end and a means. Nothing in it is in vain, to no end, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature.

positively or negatively, of the proposition, Whether a Being acting on intentions and as the cause (consequently as the author) of the world forms the substratum to what we justly name ends of nature ; only this much is sure, that, if we are to judge from the introspections granted us by our own nature (from the conditions and the limits of our reason); we absolutely can lay nothing else, than an Intelligent Being, as a supersensible substratum to the possibility of those ends of nature ; which is conformable to the maxim of our reflecting (teleological) judgment, by consequence to a ground that is subjective only, but adhering incessantly to the human species.

But we find in ourselves and still more in the conception of a rational being endowed with liberty (his causality) an ETHICOTELEOLOGY also, but which, as the reference to the end in ourselves *à priori* can, together with its law, be known determinately, consequently to be necessary; requires for this behoof an intelligent cause without us for this internal answerableness to the end, as little as we have occasion, in what we find answerable to the end (for all possible exercise of art) in the geometrical properties of figures, to look without them for a supreme understanding dispensing to them these properties.

But moral teleology leads us to seek (out of the world) an Intelligent Supreme Principle for that re-

ference of nature to what is moral in us, in respect to the moral (internal) legislation and its possible execution, as answering the end.

The moral law* as the formal reason-condition of the use of our liberty binds us by itself (absolutely), without depending upon any one end as the material condition ; but it determines us *à priori* an end, to aspire to which it obliges us, and this end is, The chief good in the world possible through liberty.

Happiness (or the satisfaction of all our inclinations) is the subjective condition, on which man (and, according to all our conceptions, every rational finite being) can, under that law, propose a scope to himself.†

Consequently HAPPINESS is the chief physical good possible in the world, and, as much as in us lies to be promoted as an end ; on the objective

* The formula of this Law may run thus : ‘Act on that maxim only, which thou canst will to become a universal law.’—This holy law, which has always been in the minds of all men, or interwoven with their very moral existence, is a categorical (inconditional) imperative, that is, a practical rule, by which an action casual in itself is made necessary, and, simple as it seems to be and sublimely simple as it really is, ranks as the chief principle of all morality.

† A final end or a Scope is that end, which does not stand in need of any other as the condition of its possibility.

condition of the accordance of man with the law of MORALITY as the worthiness of being happy.*

But it is impossible for us, with all our faculty of reason, to represent to ourselves these two requisites of the scope proposed to us by the moral law, as connected by mere causes of nature and adequate to the idea of this scope, therefore the conception of the practical necessity of an end of this sort by the application of our powers does, if we do not connect with our liberty any other causality (as a means) than that of nature, not agree with the theoretical conception of the physical possibility of effecting it (the end).

We by consequence must assume a moral Cause (an Author) of the world, in order to propose a scope to ourselves suitably to the moral law ; and, so far as the latter is necessary, so far (that is, in the same degree and on the same ground) the former is of necessity to be assumed. **THERE IS A GOD.**

This powerful moral argument is designed not to give any objectively valid proof of the existence of the Supreme Being, not to prove to the unbeliever,

* The harmony of the maxim of our actions with the moral law is termed Morality.

that there is a Deity; but that, if he shall think in a morally consequential way, he must adopt this assumption among the maxims of his practical reason.*—Nor is it intended to be said by it, that it is necessary to morality to assume the happiness of all the rational beings of the world suitably to their morality; but that that (happiness) is necessary by this (morality). Consequently it is an argument subjectively sufficient for moral beings.

* A Maxim is a subjective principle of action. The supreme moral law is the objective one, or a principle for all rational beings.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE FOURTH.
MORAL ARGUMENT.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY is that, whose object is not nature, but the liberty of the arbitrament; and every body has it in himself though but obscurely.

What is not possible by the theoretical (the speculative) use of reason (which is occupied about objects of the mere cognitive faculty and easily passes its bounds (those of experience) among unattainable objects, and is therefore denominated, by the critical philosopher, transcendent), is accomplished by its practical (moral) use that is oc-

cupied about determinatives of the will,* which is a faculty of either producing objects corresponding to the representations, or determining itself to bring those to effect (whether the physical faculty is sufficient or not), that is, its causality.† For in this case reason can suffice to the determination of the will at least, and has always objective reality, if willing only is in question. And this use of reason the critical philosopher terms immanent.

The POSTULATES of pure reason proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate, but a law, by which reason determines the will mediately, which will, just by its being so determined, requires, as a pure one, those necessary conditions of the observance of its precept. These postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but presuppositions or assumptions in a necessary practical view, which

* The Will may likewise be defined thus: The faculty of determining its causality by the representation of rules.

† That, of which no adequate example can be given by experience, is Transcendent.—When the sciences advance to perfection more words, than those that sufficed in their infancy, become absolutely necessary; and we trust, that we shall not be found guilty of either affectation of novelty, idle innovation, or neology. The author could not find words better adapted to express his meaning, and, as circumlocution always weakens a philosophical subject very much, he hopes his coinage will not be unacceptable to men of science; for, if this book shall be found to enlarge moral science, these words are indispensable.

enlarge speculative cognition, give the ideas of speculative reason in the general (by means of their reference to the practical) objective reality, and entitle it (reason) to conceptions, even but to maintain whose possibility it otherwise could not have pretended.*

These postulates are Immortality, Liberty, positively considered (as the causality of a being provided that he belongs to the intelligible world), and the Existence of God. The first flows from the practically necessary condition of the adequateness of the duration to the completeness of the fulfilling of the moral law†; the second, from the necessary presupposition of the independence upon the sensible world and of the determination of one's will according to the law of an intelligible world; and the third, from the necessity of the condition of the

* A Postulate is a practical imperative given *à priori*, and its possibility not capable of any explanation (and consequently not of any proof). We therefore postulate not things, nor in general the existence of any one object, but the maxim (the rule) of the action of a person.—If it is a duty to act with a view to a certain end (the chief good),† we must be entitled to assume, that the only conditions, on which the performance of this duty is possible, and though they are supersensible and we not able (in a theoretical consideration) to acquire a cognition of them, exist.

† The necessity of an action out of reverence for the moral law is termed Duty or moral obligation.

intelligible world's being the chief good by the pre-supposition of the Supreme Self-sufficient Good.*

The view of the chief good as well as the pre-supposition of its objective reality flowing from it, which view is necessary by the reverence for the moral law, leads then by postulates of practical reason to conceptions, which speculative reason can propound as problems, but not solve.

It, in the first place, leads to that, in whose solution speculative reason can be guilty of nothing but Paralogisms (to immortality), because it wants criteria of durability to complete the psychological conception of a last subject (which is of necessity attributed to the soul in the self-consciousness), and thereby to give it the real representation of a substance; which practical reason effectuates by the postulate of a duration requisite to the adequateness to the moral law in the chief good, as the whole end of practical reason;

It, in the second place leads to that, of which speculative reason contains nothing but Antinomy, whose solution it cannot find but in a conception

* Virtue and happiness are the elements of the chief good in a person, and happiness distributed in the most exact proportion to morality (as value of the person and his worthiness of being happy) constitutes the chief good in a possible world.

problematically cogitable, but as to its objective reality not evincible and determinable by it, and which is the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it by means of the postulate of liberty (whose reality it evinces by the moral law, as the law of an intelligible world, to which speculative reason can point only, but not determine its conception);

And it, in the last place, affords signification to that, which speculative reason can conceive of, but must leave undetermined as a mere transcendental Ideal, the theological conception of the First Being (in a practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the object of a will determined by that law), as the Supreme Principle of the chief good in an intelligible world by a moral legislation invested with power in it.

But is our cognition actually enlarged in such a way by pure practical reason, and is that, which to the speculative field is transcendent, in the practical immanent? Certainly, but in a practical view only. For we thereby know neither the nature of our soul, nor the intelligible world, nor the Supreme Being, as they are in themselves, but have only united their conceptions in the practical conception of the chief good as the object of our will, and quite *à priori*, by pure reason, but by means of the moral law only, and in reference to it mere-

ly, in regard to the objects which it commands. But we have thereby no insight how liberty is even but possible, and how we can represent to ourselves this sort of causality theoretically and positively, but that such a one is postulated by the moral law and for its behoof. The other ideas are of the same nature, and no human understanding will ever discover the grounds of their objective reality, nor will any sophistry ever deprive even the most common (uninstructed) man of the conviction of their being true conceptions of reason.

A want of reason in its speculative use leads to hypotheses only, but that of pure practical reason to postulates; for in the former case we rise from what is derived as high in the series of grounds as we choose, and stand in need of an original ground not in order to give that which is derived (for instance, the casual or contingent conjunction of the things and of the alterations in the world) objective reality, but in order to satisfy completely our investigating reason with regard to them. We thus see order and answerableness to the end before us, and require, with a view to assure us of their reality, not to proceed to speculation, but, in order to explain them, to presuppose or assume a Godhead, as their cause; when, as from an effect the conclusion of a determinate, especially so exactly and so completely determined a, cause, as we have to think of in a Godhead, is always unsafe and wavering, a pre-

supposition of this sort cannot be carried farther, than to the degree of, for us men, the most reasonable opinion.

Whereas a want of pure practical reason is founded in a duty, to make something (the chief good) the object of our will, in order to promote it with all our might; but by which we must presuppose its possibility, consequently the conditions, liberty, God, and immortality; because we can neither prove nor refute these by our speculative reason.* This duty is founded in a law, quite independent of these three presuppositions, proved apodictically by itself and named the moral law, and so far does not stand in need of any other support by a theoretical opinion either of the internal quality of things, or of the secret aim of the order of the world, or of a Governor directing it, in order to oblige us in the perfect way to unconditionally legal actions. But the subjective effect of this law, the mindedness,† adequate to it and necessary by it, promoting the practically possible chief good, gives to presuppose at least, that this good is possible, else it were practically impossible to strive after

* By pure reason's being practical we mean determining the will immediately.

† By Mindedness (*animus*) we understand the internal principle of maxims or the first subjective ground of their adoption.

a conception, which is at bottom empty and without an object.

These postulates regard the physical only or metaphysical, in a word, the conditions, lying in the nature of things, of the possibility of the chief good, but in behalf not of a voluntary speculative view, but of a particularly necessary end of the will of pure reason, which will does not chuse in this case, but obeys an inflexible commandment of reason, which has its ground objectively, in the quality of things, as they must be universally judged of by pure reason, and is not founded in inclination, which in no way entitles us to assume, for the behoof of what we wish for on merely subjective grounds, directly the means thereto or even the object, to be possible.

This is therefore a want in an absolutely necessary view, and warrants its presupposition not only as an allowed hypothesis, but as a postulate in a practical view; and, granting that the pure moral law, as a commandment (not as a rule of prudence), firmly binds every body, the man of virtue* (the honest man) may say, 'I am willing, that there should be a God, and, besides the connexion of nature, an existence in a pure intelligible world, and

* The moral strength of the will of a man in the discharge of his duty, is named Virtue.

that my duration should be infinite, I maintain the belief in them, and will not be deprived of it; for this is the only thing, in which my interest, as I must relinquish nothing of it, infallibly determines my judgment, without paying attention to reasonings, how little soever I may be able to answer them or to oppose to them more specious ones.'

Again; as to the first part of the chief good, morality, the moral law gives us a commandment merely, and to doubt of the possibility of this constituent, would be as much as to doubt of the moral law itself. But, as to the second part of this object, the happiness thoroughly adequate to that worthiness, the possibility of granting it in general requires by no means a commandment, for theoretical reason itself has nothing to object to it; only the way, in which we are to think of such a harmony of the laws of nature with those of liberty, has in it something, with regard to which a choice belongs to us; because theoretical reason decides nothing on this head with apodictical certainty, and, in respect to it, there may be a moral interest which determines the issue.

We have already said, that, according to a mere course of nature in the world, a happiness strictly adequate to the moral value is held impossible, and therefore that the possibility of the chief good, from this quarter, cannot be granted but on the pre-

supposition of a Moral Author of the world. We have reserved the limitation of this judgment to the subjective conditions of our reason intentionally, in order not to make use of it till the way of this holding-true should be more strictly determined. In fact this impossibility is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible to make comprehensible to itself, according to a mere course of nature, a connexion, so exactly adequate and so answerable to the end, between two events of the world happening according to so distinct laws; though it (reason) cannot, as is the case with every thing else suitable to the end in nature, prove, that is, sufficiently maintain on objective grounds, its impossibility according to universal laws of nature.

But a ground of decision of another sort now presents itself, in order, in the wavering state of speculative reason, to turn the scales. The commandment of promoting the chief good is founded objectively (in practical reason), and its possibility in general objectively (in theoretical reason that has nothing against it).* But the way, in which we are to represent this impossibility to ourselves, whether according to universal laws, without a

* It is *à priori* (morally) necessary to produce the chief good through the liberty of the will, and the condition of the possibility of the chief good must therefore rest upon grounds of cognition *à priori*.

wise Author ruling nature, or on his presupposition only, reason cannot decide objectively. A subjective condition of reason presents itself here; the only way theoretically possible for reason, as well as the only way suitable to morality (which is subject to an objective law of reason), to conceive of the exact harmony of the kingdom of nature with the kingdom of morals, as the condition of the possibility of the chief good. And, as the promotion of this good, consequently the presupposition of its possibility (but only in obedience to practical reason), is necessary, and the way, in which we are to think of it as possible, is in our option, in which however a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a Wise Author of the world; the principle, which determines our judgment in this option is subjectively, but, as a want and a means of promoting that which is objectively (practically), necessary, the ground for a maxim of holding-true in a moral view, that of a pure practical belief of reason. And this is a view, which, as it is free and advantageous to morality, and besides, as a determination of our judgment, agreeing with the theoretical want of reason, to assume that existence and to lay it as a ground for the farther use of reason, arises from the moral mindedness itself; and which can, even with the well-minded, sometimes waver but never fall into unbelief.

In order to enlarge a pure cognition practically, a design must be given *à priori*, that is, an end, as an object (of the will), which, independently of all theological principles, is represented by an imperative (a categorical one)* determining the will immediately, as practically necessary, and that is here the chief good. But this (as we have already said) is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions (for which, as they are conceptions of pure reason, or ideas, no corresponding intuition, consequently, in the theoretical way, no objective reality, can be found), those of liberty, of immortality, and of God. The possibility of these objects of pure speculative reason, the objective reality, which this use of reason cannot secure to them, is therefore postulated by the practical law, which commands the existence of the chief good possible in a world; by which operation then the theoretical cognition of a pure reason by all means receives an increase, which however consists in these for it otherwise problematical (merely cogitable) conceptions' being now declared in an affirmative way only to be such as real objects belong to; because practical reason inevitably requires this existence for the possibility of its practically absolutely necessary object of the chief good, and

* An Imperative means (in the critical philosophy) an objective law of liberty.

theoretical reason thereby entitles us to presuppose them.

But the enlargement of theoretical reason is not that of speculation, that is, in order in a theoretical view to make a positive use of it. For, as nothing more is thereby performed by practical reason, than that those conceptions are proved to be real, and actually have their (possible) objects, but nothing of their intuition is thereby given us (which circumstance cannot be required), not any synthetic proposition is possible by this their granted reality. Consequently this opening helps us to the enlargement of this our cognition in regard to the practical use of pure reason, but not in the least in a speculative view.

The aforementioned three ideas of speculative reason are not cognitions in themselves ; yet they are (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible. By a categorical practical law, they, as necessary conditions of the possibility of that which this law commands to make one's object, receive objective reality, that is, we are shewn by this law, that they have objects, without however being able to point out how their conception refers to an object, and that is not yet a cognition of these objects ; for we cannot at all thereby judge of them synthetically or ascertain their application theoretically, by consequence cannot make any

theoretical use of reason whatever of them, in which strictly speaking, all its (reason's) speculative cognition consists. But yet the theoretical cognition, though not of these objects, of reason in general, is thereby so far enlarged that objects are by the practical postulates given these ideas by a merely problematical thought's thereby receiving first of all objective reality. It is therefore an enlargement not of the cognition of given supersensible objects, but of theoretical reason and its cognition with regard to the supersensible in general, provided that it (theoretical reason) is obliged to grant, that there are objects of this sort, yet without being able to determine them more closely, consequently to enlarge this cognition of the objects (which are given it by no means on a practical ground, but for a practical use), for which increase therefore pure theoretical reason, to which all these ideas are transcendent and without an object, has to thank its pure practical faculty only. In this (practical field) they, by their being grounds for the possibility of realizing the necessary object of pure practical reason (the chief good), are immanent and constitutive, as without this they are transcendent and merely regulative principles of speculative reason, which impose upon reason not to assume a new object beyond experience, but to bring its (reason's) use in experience nearer completion.

But reason, when it is once possessed of this in-

crement, will, as speculative reason (properly speaking for the safety of its practical use only), negatively, that is, with a view not to enlargement, but to illustration, begin its operations with these ideas in order to prevent, on the one hand, anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or the seeming enlargement of those conceptions by opined experience, and on the other, fanaticism, which by supersensible intuition or such like things promises us feelings; all which are impediments to the practical use of pure reason, and whose prevention therefore belongs by all means to the enlarging of our cognition in the practical view, but we must allow at the same time, that reason in the speculative view has thereby gained nothing. In a word, speculative limitation and practical enlargement of pure reason bring it first of all into that relation of equality in which reason in general can be fitly used; so that the way of wisdom, if it shall be safe, neither impracticable nor leading astray, must, with us men, inevitably pass through the field of science, of its (this way's) leading to this aim however we cannot be convinced but after its completion.

The moral law (as aforesaid) leads to the practical problem, which, without any mixture of sensual springs,* is prescribed by pure reason merely,

* A Spring (*elater animi*) is a subjective ground of appetition.

and which is the necessary completeness of the first and principal part of the chief good, morality, and, as this (problem) cannot be fully solved but in an eternity, to the postulatam of immortality. This very law must likewise lead to the possibility of the second constituent of the chief good, the happiness adequate to this morality,* alike disinterestedly as before, from mere impartial reason, to the presupposition of the existence of a cause adequate to the effect, that is, must postulate the existence of God, as necessarily belonging to the possibility of the chief good (which object of our will is necessarily conjoined with the moral legislation of pure reason).† And this coherence we shall exhibit in a convincing way:

Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world, with whom, in the whole of his existence, every thing goes to both his wish and his will, and therefore depends upon the harmony of nature

* Virtue and Happiness are the two specifically quite distinct elements or constituents of the Chief Good.

† The ideas of God and of the immortality of the soul are not conditions of the moral law, but those of the necessary object of a will determined by this universal rule of duty, that is, of the merely practical use of our pure reason. Or they are conditions of the application of the morally determined will to its object given it *à priori* (the chief good). See Kant's *Logic and Prolegomena* on this subject.

with his whole end, and with the essential determinative of his will. Now the moral law, as a law of liberty, commands by determinatives, which must be quite independent of nature and its agreement with our appetitive faculty (as springs); but the rational agent in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. In the moral law therefore there is not the least ground for a necessary coherence between the morality and a happiness proportioned to it of a being belonging as a part to the world, and therefore depending upon it, who cannot on that account be by his will the cause of this nature, and by his own power make it, as to his happiness, thoroughly accordant with his practical principles. But in the practical problem of pure reason, that is, the necessary endeavour after the chief good, such a coherence is postulated as necessary; we ought to strive to promote the chief good (which therefore must be possible). The existence of a Cause of all nature, distinct from nature, and which contains the ground of this coherence, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is consequently postulated. But this Supreme Cause must contain the ground for the agreement of nature not only with a law of the will of rational beings, but with the representation of this law, provided that they lay it down as the supreme determinative of the will, therefore not with morals as to the form merely, but with their (rational

beings') morality as their motive,* that is, with their mindedness.

By consequence the chief good in the world is possible, only provided that a Supreme Nature, who has a causality suitable to the moral mindedness, is assumed. But a being, who is capable of actions according to the representation of laws, is an intelligence (a rational being); and the causality of a being according to this representation of laws, his will. The supreme cause of nature, therefore, if it must be presupposed for the chief good, is a Being who, by an understanding and a will, is the Cause (consequently the Author) of nature, that is, God. *Ergo* the postulate of the possibility of the chief derived good (of the best world) is also that of the possibility of a chief original Good, or of the existence of God. Now it is a duty for us to promote the chief good, consequently not only a right, but a necessity conjoined as a want with duty, to presuppose the possibility of this chief good, which, as it has place on the condition of the existence of God only, inseparably conjoins the presupposition of this Existence with duty, that is, 'it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.'

It is to be here observed, that this moral necessity

* A Motive is an objective ground of volition

is subjective, that is, a want, and not objective, that is, a duty ; for there cannot be a duty to assume the existence of a thing (as this regards the theoretical use of reason only). Nor is it understood by this, that the assumption of the existence of God is necessary as a ground of all obligation in general (for this entirely depends upon the autonomy of reason itself). To duty nothing belongs here but the work for the producing and the promoting of the chief good in the world, the possibility of which can therefore be postulated, but which our reason does not find otherwise cogitable, than on the presupposition of the Supreme Intelligence, assuming whose existence, therefore, is conjoined with the consciousness of duty, though this assumption belongs to theoretical reason, in regard to which alone it, considered as a ground of explanation, may be termed a hypothesis, but, in reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral law (the chief good), a belief, yes, a belief of pure reason ; because merely pure reason (as to its theoretical as well as practical use) is the fountain, from which it springs.

From this deduction it may be comprehended why the Greek schools never could accomplish the solution of their problem of the practical possibility of the chief good ; because they never made but the rule of the use which the will of man makes of its liberty its sole ground sufficient for itself alone,

without, as they thought, standing in need of the existence of God for it. They, by establishing the principle of morals independently of this postulate, by itself, from the relation of reason alone to the will, and consequently by making it (this principle) the supreme practical condition of the chief good, did right; but it was not on that account the whole condition of its possibility.

The Epicureans adopt quite a false principle of morals, that of happiness, for the supreme one, and put a maxim of free choice, according to every one's own inclination, in the place of a law; but in this they proceed in a way consequential enough, for they degrade their chief good in the same way, in proportion to the lowness of their principle, and do not expect a greater happiness, than may be acquired by human prudence (to which temperance or taming the inclinations belongs)*; which, as is well known, must fall out sorrily enough and very variously according to circumstances; without taking into the account the exceptions, which their maxims cannot but incessantly grant, and which make them unfit for laws.

Whereas the Stoics have chosen their supreme

* Prudence, which we may explain to be, Ability in the choice of the means the best adapted to the accomplishment of one's greatest wellbeing, is nothing but the maxim of self-love.

practical principle, virtue, as the condition of the chief good, quite right, but, as they represent the degree of it (virtue), which is requisite to its pure law, to be fully attainable in this life, not only raise the moral faculty of man, under the name of a sage, above all the limits of his nature, and assume something inconsistent with all human knowledge, but do not allow the second essential or constituent of the chief good, happiness, to hold as a peculiar object of the human appetitive faculty, but make their sage, like a Godhead, in the consciousness of the excellence of his nature, totally independent upon nature (in consideration of his contentment), by exposing but not subjecting him to the ills of life (and exhibiting him as free from bad), and thus leave out the second element of the chief good, one's own happiness, by placing it in acting merely and in the contentment with one's personal value, and therefore locking it up in the consciousness of the moral cast of mind; in which however they might have been sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own nature.

The doctrine of Christianity, if we consider it, relatively to our present subject, in a philosophical point of view only, gives a conception of the chief good (of the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason.* The

* See this subject fully handled in 'The (above-cited) Elements of a System of Education according to the critical Philosophy.'

moral law is holy (unindulgent) and requires sanctity of morals, though all the moral perfection, which man can attain, never is but virtue, that is, a legal mindedness out of reverence for the law, consequently a consciousness of a continual propensity to transgression, at least to impurity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) motives to the observance of the law, of course a self-estimation conjoined with humility, and therefore, in regard to the holiness, which the Christian law requires, leaves nothing else for the creature, than a progress to infinite, but for that very reason justifies him in the hope of his duration going to infinite.* The value of a mindedness fully adequate to the moral law is infinite; because all possible happiness, in the judgment of a wise and an all-powerful Dispenser of it, has no other limitation, than the want of the adequateness of rational beings to their duty. But the moral law by itself does not promise happiness; for this is, according to conceptions of an order of nature in general, not necessarily conjoined with the keeping of that. The Christian doctrine, however, supplies this want (of the second indispensable constituent of the chief

* The principles of the Cynics, of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, and of the Christians are, the simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. It is evident, that the last is the most sublime, but not within the reach of the natural powers of man.

good) by the exhibition of the world, in which rational beings devote themselves to the moral law with all their souls, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morals unite in a harmony, foreign to each of them separately, by a Holy Author, who makes the desired chief good possible. The sanctity of morals is pointed out to them in this life as a rule, but the weal proportioned to it, beatitude, represented as attainable in an eternity only; because that must always be the archetype of their conduct in every state, and the progress to it is, even in this life, both possible and necessary, but the latter in this world, under the name of happiness, cannot be attained (so far as it depends upon our power), and hence is made an object of hope only. This notwithstanding, the Christian principle of ethics is not theological (by consequence not that of heteronomy), but that of the autonomy of pure practical reason by itself; because it (this principle) makes the knowledge of God and his will not the ground of these laws, but the attainment of the chief good on the condition of keeping them, and places the proper spring even of their observance not in the wished-for consequences of it, but in the representation of duty, as in the due performance of it (duty) the worthiness of the acquisition of happiness solely consists.

Thus the moral law, by means of the conception

of the chief good, as the object and scope of pure practical reason, leads to Religion, or, subjectively considered, the cognition of all our duties as Divine commandments, not as sanctions, that is, arbitrable casual ordinances, of a foreign will, but as essential laws of every free will by itself, but which must be considered as commandments of the Supreme Being; because we can, only from a morally perfect [holy and good] and omnipotent Will, hope for the chief good, to lay down which as the object of our aspiration the moral law makes it our duty, and by the harmony with this will to attain this good.* Hence every thing here remains disinterested and founded in duty merely; without needing a ground of either fear or hope as springs, which, when they become principles, destroy all the moral value of actions. The moral law commands us to make the highest possible good in a world the first object of all conduct. But this we cannot hope to effect but by the agreement of our will with the will of a holy and good Author of the world, and, though in the conception of the chief

* Religion (according to our conception) is, Ethics with reference to God as legislator; or (subjectively considered) The cognition of all our duties or the maxim of doing them as Divine commandments.—But Sincerity, as the very basis of conscience, is of course that of all moral religion; and it is the want of it (sincerity), which makes hypocrites of so many in their hearts.

good, as that of a whole, in which the greatest happiness is represented as conjoined with the fullest measure of moral perfection (possible in a creature), in the most exact proportion, our own happiness is likewise contained; not this, but the moral law (which rather strictly limits our unbounded desire for it to conditions) is the determinative of the will which is directed to the promotion of the chief good.

Hence the ethics, correctly speaking, are not the doctrine how we are to make ourselves happy, but how we are to become worthy of happiness. And only when religion survenes we are animated with the hope of partaking of felicity in proportion to our having been careful not to be unworthy of it.

A person is worthy of the possession of a thing or of a state when his being thus possessed accords with the chief good. It now is easily seen, that all worthiness depends upon moral conduct; because this in the conception of the chief good constitutes the rest (what belongs to the state), the share in happiness. It hence follows, that moral philosophy itself must never be treated as a doctrine of felicity, that is, as a direction how to participate of happiness; for it has to do entirely with the reason's condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of the latter, not with a means of its acquisition. But when it

(which merely imposes duties, not furnishes selfish wishes with measures) is completely propounded; the doctrine of morals, after the wish that is moral and founded in a law to promote the chief good (to bring the kingdom of God to us), which no interested soul could have entertained before, is awaked, and this done for the behoof of the step to religion, may be named the doctrine of happiness; because the hope of it (happiness) begins first of all with religion only.

And it may be hence seen, that, when the first end of God in the creation is inquired after, we must not answer the happiness of the rational beings in it, but the chief good, which superadds to that wish of these beings a condition, that of being worthy of happiness, that is, the morality of the very same rational beings, which alone contains the only scale, according to which they can hope to partake of the former by the hand of a Wise Author. For, as Wisdom, theoretically considered, signifies the cognition of the chief good, and practically, the adequateness of the will to this good,* we cannot attribute to a Supreme Self-sufficient Will an end, which is founded in goodness merely. For of this its effect (in regard to the happiness of rational

* Wisdom, in its perfection, is the agreement of the will with the scope of humanity. And the wisdom of man consists in the will's internal principle of the observance of moral laws.

beings) we can conceive on the limiting condition only of the harmony with the holiness of his will, as adequate to the original chief good. For which reason those, who place the end of the creation in the honor of God (supposing that it is not thought of anthropomorphistically, praised as an inclination), have hit the best expression. For nothing honors God more, than that, which is the most valuable in the world, reverence for his commandment, the performance of the sacred duty which his law imposes upon us, when his excellent arrangement survenes to crown so beautiful an order with adequate happiness. If the latter (to speak the language of man) makes him worthy of love, he is by the former an object of adoration. Even men may by beneficence acquire love for themselves, but thereby only can never acquire reverence; so that the greatest beneficence redounds, by nothing but by its being exercised according to worthiness, to their true honor.

That, in the order of ends, man (as well as every rational being) is an end in itself, that is, never can be used as a means barely by any body (even by God) without being at the same time an end himself, that therefore the humanity in our person must be sacred for us, follows of itself; because he is the subject of the moral law,* consequently that

* Or, as it is expressed in the scriptures, the temple of the Holy Ghost.

which is sacred in itself, and on whose account only and in unison with which it is that any thing in general can be termed sacred. For this moral law is grounded in the autonomy of his will, as a free will, which must, according to its universal laws, necessarily be able to harmonize with that, to which it ought to subject itself.

Again; the effectuating of the chief good in the world, is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this the full adequateness of the mindedness to the moral law is the higher condition of the chief good. It therefore must be possible, as well as its object; because it is contained in the same commandment to promote this good. But the full adequateness of the will to the moral law, is Holiness, a perfection, of which no rational being of the aspectable world is, at any moment of his existence, capable. And it, as it is required as practically necessary, cannot be met with to that full adequateness but in a progression going to infinite, and it is, on principles of pure practical reason, necessary to assume a practical progression of this sort as the real object of our will.

But this infinite progression is possible on the presupposition of an existence only and a personality of the same rational being's continuing to infinite (which existence and personality are denominated

the immortality of the soul). The chief good therefore is practically possible on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul only; consequently this, as inseparably conjoined with the moral law, is a postulatum of pure practical reason (by which we understand a theoretical but as such not an evincible proposition, provided that it inseparably adheres to a practical law holding unconditionally *à priori*).

The proposition of the moral destination of our nature, to be able, only in a progression going to infinite, to attain the full adequateness to the moral law, is of the greatest use not only in regard to the present completion of the want of power of speculative reason, but in respect to religion. Without this proposition either the moral law would, by our artfully representing it as indulgent and thus suited to our convenience, be totally degraded from its holiness, or we should stretch our vocation and our expectation to an unattainable destination, to a hoped-for total acquisition of holiness of the will, and bewilder ourselves in extravagant theosophical dreams quite contrary to self-cognition; which are both prevented by the incessant endeavour only to keep punctually and thoroughly a strict unindulgent, yet not ideal, but true, commandment of reason.* For a rational but finite being nothing but

* Theosophy is a transcendent conception of God confusing reason.

the progress to infinite, the approximation towards perfection, is possible. The Infinite, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees, in this series which is endless to us, the whole of the adequateness to the moral law, and the holiness, which his commandment incessantly requires in order to be suitable to his justice in the share, which he destines to every one in the chief good, is entirely to be met with in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings. What can belong to the creature only in the hope of this share, is, the consciousness of his proved mindedness, in order, from his progress hitherto from the worse to the wordly better and from the invariable design thereby become known to him, to hope for a farther uninterrupted prosecution of it, how far soever his existence may extend, even beyond this life, and thus to be, never here or at any one future moment of his existence to be foreseen, but in the infinity of his duration (possible to be seen by God only), fully adequate to His will (without indulgence or remission, which does not accord with justice).

BUT, if a stubborn empiric should start the difficulty to the immateriate nature of the soul, that experience seems to evince as well the origin as the decay of the powers of our spirit as various modifications of our organs only;* the force of this argu-

* An Empiric (in philosophy) is he, who has faith not (like a No ologist) in pure knowledge (or that *à priori*), but in what

ment may be weakened by supposing (transcendentally, it is true), that the human body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as a condition, in this state (in life) the whole sensitive faculty together with all thinking refers. That the separation from the body is the end of this sensual use of our cognitive power and the beginning of the intellectual. The body therefore is to be considered as not the cause, but a mere restraining condition of thinking, by consequence the promotion of the sensual and animal, but an impediment to the pure and spiritual life, and the dependence of the thinking upon the corporal quality, proves nothing in favor of that of the whole life upon the state of our organs.

The casualty of the generations too, which, with men, as well as with irrational creatures, depends upon opportunity, often upon food, upon the government, its whims and caprices, and not unfrequently upon vice even, occasions a great difficulty against the opinion of the perpetual continuance of

strikes his external senses, that which he gathers from experience (or *à posteriori*), and whose sublime dictum is, "Seeing is believing, and feeling the naked truth;" (which certainly is not of metaphysical extraction, which neither smells nor tastes of the lamp, and of which the whole world has undoubtedly heard). The empirical method in philosophy is what is commonly termed, taking the eel of science by the tail.

a creature whose life begins under such insignificant circumstances so entirely left to our freedom. As to the continuance of the whole species (upon earth), this difficulty is but little, as accident in single ones does not subject the species in the main the less to a rule; as to every individual, however, it certainly seems inconsistent to expect so powerful an effect from so trifling causes. But to this difficulty we may oppose a transcendental hypothesis, That all life is but spiritual (*intelligibilis*), not liable to alterations of time, and neither begins with birth, nor ends in death. That this life is nothing but a mere phenomenon, that is, a sensual representation of the life spiritual (noumenon), and the whole world of the senses, a mere image, which is perceptible by our present mode of cognition, but, like a dream, has not objective reality in itself; that if we could intuitively discern things and ourselves as they and we are *in se*, we should find ourselves in a world of intelligential natures (of noumena), our only true commerce with whom neither begins with our birth, nor ends in our death (as mere phenomena).

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
GROUNDS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.

PART THE FIFTH.

MORAL THEOLOGY.

ETHICOTHEOLOGY we may explain to be, The endeavour, from the moral end of rational beings in nature (which end can be cognised* *à priori*), to conclude the First Cause of nature and his attributes.

Pure reason, in its practical use, leads us to the idea, which reaches its (reason's) chief end, and, in the point of view of its practical interest, accomplishes that, which it quite denies us in regard to

* See Kant's Logic.

its speculative interest, and which is the Ideal of the chief good as a determinative of the final end, or of the scope, of pure reason.

All the interest of our reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the three following questions; 1, What can we know? 2. What ought we to do? 3. What may we hope for?

The first question is merely speculative. We have, we flatter ourselves, exhausted all the possible answers to it, which are relative to our subject, and at last found that one, with which reason must be satisfied, and, when it has not the practical field in view, has cause to be so, but are just as far from the great end, to which the whole effort of pure reason has been directed, as if we had, for the sake of our own ease, refused at the beginning to undertake this Herculean labour. If therefore knowing is on the carpet, this much at least is certain and established, that it (knowing) will, relatively to our cardinal proposition, never fall to our lot.

The second question is merely practical. It, as such, belongs to pure reason, but is then moral, not transcendental, and does not just pertain to our present subject.

The third question, If we do what we ought, what may we hope for? is at once practical and

theoretical, so that the practical leads as a clew to the theoretical and, if this goes high, speculative, question. For all hoping refers to happiness, and is in respect to the practical and to the moral law the very same as knowing and the law of nature are in respect to the theoretical cognition of things. The former amounts at last to the conclusion, that something is (that determines the last possible end), because something ought to take place; and the latter, that something is (that acts as the chief cause) because something takes place.

Happiness (we have already said) is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (as well the extensive, as to the variety, as the intensive, as to the degree, and the protensive, as to the duration). The practical law from the motive of happiness we shall term pragmatism (the rule of prudence); but that law, which has nothing else, than the worthiness of being happy, for a motive, moral (the moral law). The former advises what is to be done when happiness is our object, but the latter commands us how to act so as to become worthy only of happiness. The one is founded on empirical principles; for we cannot know but by means of experience either what inclinations there are to be satisfied, or what the causes of nature that can effect their satisfaction are. And the other abstracts from inclinations, and the physical means of satisfying them, and

considers nothing but the liberty of a rational being in general, and the only and necessary conditions, on which it agrees on principles with the distribution of happiness, and can therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason at least, and be known *à priori*.

We shall only suppose here, that there really are moral laws, which determine fully *à priori* (with regard to empirical motives, that is, happiness) conduct, that is, the use of the liberty of a rational being in general, and that these laws command absolutely (not hypothetically merely on a presupposition of other empirical ends), and are therefore necessary in every view : This proposition we, by appealing not only to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists, but to the moral judgment of every one, if he will think of so holy a law distinctly, are justified in presupposing.

Pure reason therefore contains, not in its speculative, but in a certain practical, the moral, use, principles of the possibility of the experience of such actions as are, suitably to moral precepts, to be met with in the history of man. For, as it commands them to be done, they must be possible to be so, and therefore a particular sort of systematic unity of nature according to speculative reason cannot be proved ; because reason has causality in respect to liberty in general, but not in respect to all nature, and moral principles of reason can pro-

duce free actions, but not laws of nature. By consequence the principles of pure reason in its morally practical use have objective reality.

The world, thought of as suitable to all moral laws (as it, according to the liberty of rational beings, can be, and, according to the necessary laws of morality, ought to be), is named a moral world. This is conceived of as an intelligible world provided that all conditions (ends) and even all impediments to morality (frailty or impurity of human nature) in it are abstracted from. So far therefore this is a mere idea, but a practical one, which actually can have its influence on the sensible world and ought to have it, in order to make it suitable, as much as possible, to this idea. Hence the idea of a moral world has objective reality, as if it referred not to an object of an intellectual intuition (which we cannot conceive of), but to the sensible world, as an object however of pure reason in its practical use, and a *corpus mysticum* of rational beings in it provided that each free arbitrament under moral laws has in itself thorough systematical unity as well with itself, as with the liberty of every other person.

The answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason that concern the practical interest is, 'Do that, by which thou wilt become worthy of being happy.' The latter now asks, How, if we con-

duct ourselves so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may we hope to be thereby able to partake of it? The answer to this question depends upon this, whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe the law *à priori*, necessarily connect this hope with it.

We therefore maintain, that, as moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, it is alike necessary to assume, according to reason in its theoretical use, that every body has cause to hope for that measure of happiness, of which he has rendered himself worthy by his conduct, and consequently, that the system of morality is, but in the idea of pure reason only, inseparably conjoined with that of happiness.

We may now, in an intelligible,* that is, the moral, world, in whose conception all the impediments to morality (of the inclinations) are abstracted from, conceive of such a system of happiness as is proportionately conjoined with morality to be necessary; because liberty, partly actuated and partly restrained by moral laws, would itself be the cause of universal happiness, of course the rational being himself, under the guidance of such principles as these,

* See Kant's *Prolegomena* for the distinction between intelligible and intellectual.

the author at once of his own lasting welfare and of that of others.

But the system of morality rewarding itself is an idea only, whose execution depends upon the condition of every one's doing what he ought to do, that is, of all the actions of rational beings' taking place or being performed as if they arose from one supreme will, which comprises in itself or under it all private arbitrament.

But, as the obligation from the moral law holds for every particular use of liberty, even if others should not conform to this law, it is neither determined from the nature of the things in the world, nor from the causality of the actions themselves and their relation to morality, how their consequence would have reference to happiness, and the adduced necessary connexion of the hope of being happy with the incessant endeavour of rendering one's self worthy of happiness, cannot, if nature merely is laid as a ground, be cognised by reason, but can be hoped for when a Supreme Reason only, which commands according to moral laws, is, as the Cause of nature, laid as a foundation.

The idea of an Intelligence of this nature, in whom the morally fully perfect will conjoined with the greatest felicity is the cause of all happiness in the world, provided that happiness is exactly pro-

portioned to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), we denominate the Ideal of the chief good. Pure reason consequently cannot meet with the ground for the practically necessary connexion of both the elements of the chief derived good, an intelligible or a moral world, but in the idea of the Supreme Original Good. As we must of necessity represent, by reason, ourselves as belonging to an intelligible or invisible world, though our senses exhibit nothing to us but a world of phenomena, we must assume that, as a consequence of our conduct in the sensible world, because this does not offer us a connexion as a future state for us. God, therefore, and a future life are, according to pure reason, two presuppositions inseparable from the obligation imposed upon us by the very same reason.

Morality in itself constitutes a system, but happiness, unless it is precisely distributed suitably to morality, does not. But this distribution is possible in the intelligible world only under a Wise Author and Governor. Reason sees itself obliged either to assume a moral world together with the life in it, which life we must consider as a future one, or to look upon the moral laws to be empty chimeras; because their necessary result, which the same reason connects with them, would, without this assumption, not have place. Hence every body considers the moral laws as commandments, but which

they could not be if they did not connect *à priori* adequate consequences with their rule, and therefore carry with them promises and threats. But this the moral laws, if they, like the chief good, do not lie in a Necessary Being, who only can make a unity of this sort, which answers the end, possible, cannot do neither.

Leibnitz names the world, if attention is bestowed upon rational beings only and their coherence according to moral laws under the government of the chief good, the kingdom of grace, and distinguishes it from the kingdom of nature in this, that rational beings, though subject to moral laws, do not expect any other consequences of their conduct, than those that happen according to the physical course of our sensible world. To consider ourselves then in the kingdom of grace, where all happiness awaits us, unless we ourselves limit our share of it by the unworthiness of being happy, is a practically necessary conception of reason.

Practical laws, if they become subjective grounds of actions, that is, subjective principles, are termed Maxims. The judgment of morality, as to its (morality's) purity and its consequences, is formed according to ideas; and the observance of the laws of morality, according to maxims.

It is necessary, that our whole course of life

should be subject to moral laws ; but it is impossible, that this should be the case if reason does not connect with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause, which determines to the conduct according to this law an issue precisely corresponding to our highest ends, whether in this, or in another life. Without a God, therefore, and a world invisible to us at present, but hoped for, the sublime ideas of morality are objects of approbation and of admiration, but not springs of design and of execution ; because they do not answer the whole end, which is determined to every rational being naturally and by the very same pure reason *à priori*, and necessary.

Happiness alone is by far not the complete good in the eye of our reason. It (reason) does not approve of happiness (how much soever inclination may wish for it) unless it is united with the worthiness of being happy, that is, the morally good conduct. Nor is morality or the mere worthiness of being happy sufficient to constitute the complete good. In order to complete this good, he, who has not conducted himself in a way unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope to participate of it. Even reason, when it is free from all private views and when it puts itself in the place of a Being who has all happiness to distribute to others, cannot judge otherwise ; for both the constituents are essentially conjoined in the practical idea, though in such

a way that the moral mindedness, as the condition, first makes the share in happiness possible, but not conversely, the view to happiness, the moral mindedness. For, in the latter case, it were not moral, and therefore we would not be worthy of all happiness which in the eye of reason has not any other limitation, than what proceeds from our own immoral conduct.

Happiness then in the most exact proportion to the morality of rational beings, by which they are worthy of that, constitutes alone the chief good of a world to which we must translate ourselves according to the precepts of pure practical reason entirely, and which indeed is an intelligible world only, as the sensible world does not promise us from the nature of things a similar systematical unity of ends, whose reality can be founded in nothing else, than the presupposition of a Supreme Original Good, when self-sufficient reason, furnished with all the sufficiency of a Supreme Cause, founds, accomplishes and maintains, according to a perfect conduciveness to the end, the universal order of things, though it is very much hidden from us in the sensible world.

Moral theology has this particular pre-eminence over speculative theology, that it infallibly leads to the conception of one all-perfect and rational Original Being (to monotheism), which the latter can-

not so much as indicate on objective grounds, not to mention, convince us of. For we do not find, either in transcendental or natural theology how far soever reason may lead us in it, a single significant ground for assuming but one being, which we have sufficient reason to prefer to all the causes of nature, and upon which to make these dependent in all points.

Whereas, if we, in the point of view of the moral unity as a necessary law of the world, ponder the only cause, which can give this law the adequate effect, consequently obligatory power on us, it must be One Supreme Will that comprehends all these laws in itself. For, how could we find perfect unity of ends under various wills? This Will must be omnipotent, that all nature and its reference to morality in the world may be subject to it; omniscient, that it may know the heart or the inmost thoughts and their moral value; omnipresent or ubiquitary, that it may be immediately near all, which is requisite to the good of the world; eternal, that this harmony of nature and of liberty may not be at any time wanting; and so forth.

But this systematical unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, though it as mere nature can be called a sensible world only, may, as a system of liberty, be denominated the intelligible or

moral world (*regnum gratiæ*), leads infallibly to the unity that is suitable to the end of all the things which constitute the great whole, according to universal laws of nature, in the same way as the former according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites practical with speculative reason. The world, if it shall accord with that use of reason, without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of reason, the moral use, which absolutely depends upon the idea of the chief good, must be represented as arisen from one idea. Thereby all the investigation of nature receives a direction according to the form of a system of ends, and in its greatest extension becomes physicotheology. But this, as it arises from moral order, as a unity founded in the very nature of liberty, and not casually established by external commands, reduces the suitability to the end of nature to grounds, which must be inseparably connected *à priori* with the internal possibility of things, and thereby to a transcendental theology, which takes to itself the Ideal of the full ontological perfection for a principle of the systematical unity, which connects all things according to universal and necessary laws of nature ; because all these things have their origin in the absolute necessity of One First Being.

What sort of a use can we make of our understanding, even with regard to experience, if we do

not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends are undoubtedly those of morality, and nothing but pure reason can give us to know them. Even provided with these, and by their guidance, we cannot make a use of the knowledge of nature which is answerable to the end, and with regard to cognition, where nature itself has not laid unity answerable to the end; for without this unity we should not have even reason itself; because we should not have a school for it, nor any culture by objects, which furnish matter for conceptions of this sort. But this unity conducive to the end is necessary, and founded in the very nature of the arbitrament itself; and this, which contains the condition of its application in the concrete, must be so; and thus the transcendental gradation of our cognition of reason is not the cause, but the effect of the practical suitableness to the end, which pure reason imposes upon us.

In the history of human reason we consequently find, that, till the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and the systematical unity of ends perspected according to them on necessary principles, the knowledge of nature and even a considerable degree of the culture of reason in many other sciences, partly could not produce but gross and vague conceptions of the Godhead, partly occasioned a wonderful indifference with regard to the question in general. A greater ela-

boration of moral ideas, which is rendered necessary by the extremely pure moral law of our religion, has, by the interest that reason is forced to take in the object, called its attention to it, and, without other enlarged knowledge of nature or right and certain transcendental insights' (such as have been always wanting) contributing thereto, brought to pass a conception of the Divine Being, which we now hold the right one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its rightness; but because it is in perfect unison with the moral principles of reason. And thus pure reason alone, but in its practical use only, has at length the merit of fixing a cognition which mere speculation can surmise only, but not render valid to our highest interest, and thereby of not making a demonstrated dogma, but an absolutely necessary presupposition or assumption for the most essential ends of reason.

But practical reason, though it has reached this high point, 'the conception of One Original Being,' as the Supreme Good, must by no means attempt, as if it had raised itself above all the empirical conditions of its application and to the immediate knowledge of new objects, to set out from this conception and to derive the moral laws themselves from it. For it is just these laws that lead us to the presupposition of a Self-sufficient Cause or a Wise Ruler of the world in order to give them effect; and therefore

we cannot consider them again, according to this assumption, as casual and derived from a mere will, especially from a will, of which we should not have a conception, did we not form it agreeably to these laws.

We, if practical reason has the right to guide us, do not hold actions obligatory because they are Divine commandments, but consider them as Divine commandments because we are internally obliged to perform them. We have studied liberty, under the unity answerable to the end, on principles of reason, and think we act so far conformably to the Divine will only as we keep the moral law, which reason teaches us from the nature of the actions themselves, holy, and do not believe we serve God but by promoting the good of the world in others and in ourselves.

Ethicotheology therefore is of a merely immanent use, that is, for fulfilling our destination in this world by accommodating ourselves to the system of all ends and not fancifully nay wickedly quitting the clew of morally legislative reason in the good life in order to tie it immediately to the idea of the Supreme Being, which procedure would be a transcendental use, but, like that of mere speculation, pervert and elude the final ends of reason. So that the proper way for us to take, is not from grace to virtue, but, *vice versa*, from virtue to grace.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.

PART THE SIXTH.

PHYSICOTHEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

PHYSICOTHEOLOGY is The endeavour of reason, from the ends of nature (which cannot be but empirically known), to infer the Supreme Cause of nature and his attributes.

The ways of mounting to the knowledge of God from contemplations on nature may be reduced to the two following, which we term the physicotheological method: either the **CASUAL** order of nature, which we clearly see is possible in various other

ways, but in which a display of great art, power and goodness leads to the Divine Author ; or the NECESSARY unity, which is perceived in nature, the essential order of things, which is conformable to great rules of perfection, in a word, that which is necessary in the regularity of nature, leads to a Supreme Principle not only of this contexture, but of all possibility.

The right contemplation of a well meaning mind on so much casual beauty and so much combination answering the end, as the order of nature displays, finds proofs enough to gather from them a Will accompanied with great wisdom and great power, and the common conceptions of the understanding are sufficient to this conviction, so far as it shall suffice for a virtuous conduct, that is, be morally certain. But philosophy is necessarily required for the latter mode of concluding, and it of itself is capable of a higher degree of philosophy, to attain the same object with clearness and a conviction suitable to the greatness of the truth.

The chief criterion of the physicotheological method hitherto used is this, that the perfection and the regularity are first properly comprehended as to their casualty, then the artificial order is shewn according to all its references answerable to the end in order thence to conclude a wise and a good will, and the conception of the immense power of the

Author is, by the superadded consideration of the magnitude of the work, afterward united with it.

This method is excellent, in the first place, because the conviction is sensual, and consequently lively and engaging, easy and comprehensible to the most common intellect; because it, in the second place, is more natural than any other, as there is no doubt but every body makes the beginning with it; and because it, in the third place, affords a conception, accompanied with much intuition, of great wisdom, care or even potency of the adorable Being, which fills the soul, and has the greatest power of raising astonishment, humility and awe.* This mode of proof is more practical, than any other, even with regard to the philosopher. For, though he does not find in it the determinate abstract idea of the Godhead for his searching un-

* If we consider microscopical observations, for instance, and perceive very numerous species of animals in a single drop of water, robbers accoutred with instruments of destruction, and which, whilst intent on persecuting others, are overwhelmed by still more powerful tyrants of this aqueous world; when we see the enmity and strife, the power, and the scene of rebellion in a single globule of matter, and look up in a clear night and behold the immense space filled with worlds, which appear like particles of dust; no human language has words to express the feeling, which such an intuition excites, and all subtile metaphysical dissections yield to it very much in point of grandeur and sublimity.

derstanding, and the certainty itself is not mathematical, but moral, so many proofs, every one of them of so great energy, take possession of his soul, and speculation follows quietly with a certain confidence and conviction, which had previously taken place. One would hardly risk his whole happiness on the pretended rightness of a metaphysical proof, particularly if lively sensual persuasions stood in its way. But the force of conviction, which springs from this argument, is, just by reason of its being so sensual, so great, that the physicotheologist is apprehensive of no danger from syllogisms and distinctions, and far above minding the power of subtile objections. Yet this method has its faults, which, though in justice not to be imputed but to the procedure of those who have made use of it, are considerable enough.

In it all perfection, harmony and beauty of nature are considered as casual, and, though many of them flow with necessary unity from the essential rules of nature, as arrangements by wisdom. What is the most hurtful in this to the design of physicotheology consists in the casualty of the perfection of nature's being considered as highly needful to the proof of a wise Author; hence all the necessary order and harmony of the things of the world become by this supposition dangerous objections.

This method is not sufficiently philosophical, and has often prevented the dissemination of philosophical knowledge very much. The moment an arrangement of nature is useful, it usually is immediately explained from the design of the Divine will or by an order of nature particularly made by art; either because the opinion, that the effect of nature could not, conformably to its universal laws, produce such regularity, has been once formed, or if it were granted, that they had such consequences, this would be entrusting the perfection of the world to a blind chance, whereby the Divine Author would be the most mistaken. Hence in such a case limits were set to the investigation of nature. Degraded reason willingly desists from any farther inquiry, because it (reason) considers it here as idle curiosity, and the prejudice is the more dangerous, because it, by the pretence of piety and the subjection to the Great Author, in whose knowledge all wisdom must centre, gives the lazy a superiority to the indefatigable searcher. The eminent example of Newton will not serve idle confidence for a pretext to give out a precipitate appeal to an immediate Divine interposition for an explanation in the philosophic taste. Besides, it is a great impediment to philosophical insight to have recourse to moral grounds, that is, to the elucidation from ends, where it is still to be presumed, that physical grounds determine the consequence by a connexion with necessary universal laws.

This method can serve to prove an author of the connexions and the artificial combinations of the world only, but not of matter in itself, or of the constituent parts of the universe. This considerable fault must expose all those, who use this method only, to the danger of incurring that error, which is termed the finer atheism, and according to which God is, in the proper sense, considered as a workmaster, who has ordered and formed matter, but not as a Creator of the world, who hath created or produced it (matter).

But this physically theological method always remains one of those methods, which are the most suitable at once to the dignity and to the weakness of the human understanding. In fact there are innumerable arrangements in nature, whose proximate ground must be a final design of their Author, and it is the easiest way that leads to Him when we ponder those arrangements, which are immediately subordinated to his wisdom. For which reason it is proper to exert ourselves rather to complete this method, than to attack it, rather to correct its faults, than to undervalue it on their account.

The following considerations, then, may tend to improve this method :

Order and harmony, though they are necessary, denote an intelligent Author. Nothing can be more

disadvantageous to the thought of a Divine Author of the universe or more irrational, than always to be ready to ascribe a great fertile rule of regularity, of utility and of harmony to accident ; the *klinomen* of atoms in the systems of Democritus and of Epicurus is of this nature. Without dwelling on the absurdity and the premeditated illusion of this way of judging, as they are already made sufficiently evident by others, we have to observe, That the perceived necessity in the reference of things to regular connexions, and the coherence of useful laws with a necessary unity, yield, as well as the casual and arbitrable arrangement, a proof of a wise Author ; though the dependence upon him in this point of view must be represented in another way. In order to see this properly we perceive, that order and various advantageous harmony in general denote, even before we reflect whether this reference is necessary or casual to the things, an intelligent Author. According to the judgments of common sane reason the course of the alterations of the world or that connexion, in whose stead another is possible, has, though it affords a clear proof of casuality, little effect in occasioning the understanding of the presumption of an author. Thereto philosophy is required, and even its use is in this case implicated and uncertain.

Whereas great regularity and harmony in a great multifarious whole astonish, and common reason

itself never can find them possible without an intelligent author. Let the things themselves be necessary or contingent, let the one rule of regularity essentially lie in the other or be arbitrarily conjoined with it, it is directly found impossible, that order and regularity should thus have place of themselves (*sponte*) either by accident, or among many things which have their separate existence; for the possibility of extensive harmony or agreement without an intelligent ground never is sufficiently given. And a great distinction between it and the way, in which we have to judge of the origin of perfection, is immediately perceived.

Necessary order of nature denotes an Author of even the matter which is thus ordered. The order in nature, if this order is considered as casual and arising from the arbitrament of an intelligent author, is by no means a proof, that the things of nature too, which are connected in an order of wisdom of this sort, have their existence from the same author. For this conjunction is of such a nature only as to give occasion to presuppose an intelligent plan; hence Aristotle and many other ancient philosophers derive not matter, or the elemental part of nature, but form from the Godhead.

Perhaps it is but since revelation has taught us a perfect dependence of the world upon God, that philosophy has taken sufficient pains to consider

the origin of the things that constitute the rude matter of nature, as something which is not possible without an author. We doubt of any body's ever having succeeded in it. At least the casual order of the parts of the world, provided that it shews an origin from an arbitrament, can by no means contribute to its proof. For instance, in the structure of an animal, members of sensation* are so artfully conjoined with those of voluntary motion and of the vital parts, that one must be very obstinate (for so unreasonable nobody can be), when he is shewn it, to mistake a wise Author, who hath put the matter, of which an animal body is composed, in such excellent order. From that more than this does not follow. Whether this matter be eternal and independent by itself (absolutely), or whether it is produced by the same Author, is not thereby decided.

But the judgment, when it is perceived, that all the perfection of nature is not artificial, but that rules of great utility are conjoined with necessary unity, and that this conjunction lies in the possibilities of things themselves, falls out quite otherwise. What are we to judge of this perception? Is this unity, this fruitful order, possible without a dependence upon a wise Author? That which is formal of so great and so various a regularity de-

* Sensation is a perception, which refers to the subject only, as the modification of his state.

nies it. But, as this unity is itself founded in the possibilities of things, there must be a wise Being, without whom all these things of nature themselves are not possible, and in whom, as a Great Ground, the essences of so various things of nature unite in so regular references. But it is then clear, that not only the mode of conjunction, but the things themselves are not possible but by this Being, that is, can exist as his effects only; which is the first thing that sufficiently gives to know distinctly the total dependence of nature upon God.

If the question now is, How do these natures depend upon such a being as God, that we may thence be able to understand the agreement with the rules of wisdom? We answer, that They depend, in this Being, upon that, which, whilst it contains the ground for the possibility of things, is the ground of his own wisdom; for this justifies the presupposition of that in general.* But by this unity of the

* Wisdom presupposes, that harmony and unity in the references are possible. That Being, who is of an independent nature, cannot be wise unless the very grounds of such possible harmony and perfections as offer themselves to his execution are contained in him. Were no such reference to order and to perfection to be found in the possibilities of things, wisdom would be a chimera. But this wisdom, were it not grounded in the Wise Being himself, never could be independent in every respect (absolutely).

ground as well of the being of all things, as of wisdom, of goodness and of power, it is necessary, that all possibility should harmonize with these properties.

We shall comprise the improved method of physicotheology in the following short rules: Guided by a confidence in the fertility of the universal laws of nature, because of their dependence upon the Divine Being, let us,

1, seek the causes of even the most advantageous constitutions in universal laws, which, with a necessary unity, bear, besides other regular consequences, a reference to the production of these effects;

2, observe what is necessary in this connexion of various fitnesses in one ground; because the way of thence concluding the existence of God is distinct from that, which has the artificial and chosen unity in view, as well as the consequence according to constant and necessary laws is to be distinguished from accident;

3, presume greater necessary unity, than is directly obvious, not only in unorganized, but in organized nature; for even in the structure of an animal, it is presumable, that a single predisposition has a productive fitness for many useful consequences, for

which we at first might find various particular arrangements necessary ; this attention is very suitable to philosophy, as well as advantageous to the physicotheological consequence ;

4, make use of the manifestly artificial order thence to infer the wisdom of an Author as a ground, but of the essential and necessary unity in the laws of nature, thence to conclude a Wise Being by means not of his wisdom, but of that in him, which must accord with it ;

5, from the casual combinations in the world conclude of the Author of the way in which the universe is composed ; but, from the necessary unity, of the very same Being as the Author of matter itself, or of the very elemental or constituent parts of all the things of nature. And let us,

6, enlarge this method by universal rules, which can render intelligible the grounds of the regularity of what is mechanically or even geometrically necessary, and not neglect to consider under this point of view the properties of space, and from the unity of its great multifariousness to illustrate the same chief conception.

When we have suitably admired the productions of the immediately artificial arrangements, let us not cease to admire and to adore, in the delightful

view of the productive reference which the possibilities of the created things have to thorough agreement and of the artless result of such various beauty that spontaneously displays itself, that Power, in whose eternal fundamental source the essence of things lies ready, as it were, for an excellent plan.

If we, by a mature judgment on the essential properties of things, which become known to us by experience, perceive a unity in the multifarious and order in those things which are separated in even the necessary determinations of their internal possibility, we can by the mode of cognition *à posteriori* argue back to a Single Principle of all possibility, and we find ourselves at last at the same fundamental conception of the Absolutely Necessary Existence, from which we first set out by the way *à priori*. Let us therefore see whether a necessary reference to order, harmony and unity in this multifarious is to be met with in even the internal possibility of things, that we may be able to judge therefrom whether the essences of things acknowledge a Supreme Common Ground.

The unity in the multifariousness of the essence of things may be evinced by the properties of space. The necessary determinations of space, by the evidence in the conviction and by the exactitude of the execution, as also by the wide sphere of the application, which no human cognition can shew

any thing to equal, much less to exceed, afford the geometrician not a common pleasure. But we at present consider the same object in a totally different point of view. When we behold it (space) with a philosophic eye, we perceive, that in so necessary determinations order and harmony, and in so prodigious a multifariousness adaptation and unity reign. From the describing of so simple a figure as a circle, for instance, it is wonderful, that so much order and so perfect a unity in the multifarious should flow.

If we by such dispositions of nature are entitled to inquire after a ground of so extensive an accordance of what is various, are we less so by the perception of the equal measure and the unity in the infinitely manifold determinations of space? Is this harmony less wonderful because it is necessary? We deem it the more so on that account. And, because that multifarious whole, every one member of which should possess its particular and independent necessity, never could have order, agreement and unity in the reciprocal references, are we not led, just as well as by the harmony in the contingent arrangements of nature, to the presumption of a Supreme Ground of even the essence of things; as the unity of the ground occasions a unity in the sphere of all the consequences?

And the unity in the multifariousness of the es-

sence of things may be proved by that, which is necessary in the laws of motion. When we discover in nature an arrangement, which, as it would not have been made by the universal properties of matter merely, seems to have been done for the sake of a particular end, we consider it contingent, and the consequence of a choice. If new harmony, order and utility, and means particularly adapted to them, manifest themselves, we judge of them in the same way; this coherence is quite foreign to the nature of things, and merely because it has pleased somebody to connect them thus they stand in this harmony? We cannot give a universal reason for the claws of the cat or of the lion's being so constructed as to be sheathed, but because some one author or other has adjusted them in this manner, to secure them from being worn, as these animals must have sharp claws to seize upon their prey and to hold it fast.

But, if certain more general qualities, which are inherent in matter, and besides one advantage which they yield, and on whose account we may represent to ourselves, that they have been ordered in this manner without the least new disposition, shew a particular fitness for still more agreement, if a single law, which every body would find necessary for the sake of a certain good only, shews an extensive fertility for many other advantages, if

other uses and regularities flow thence without art but rather of necessity, if all these things in fine are found through all material nature, thorough references to unity and coherence obviously lie in the very essence of things, and a universal harmony is diffused over the kingdom of possibility itself. This occasions an admiration on account of so much fitness and natural adaptation, which, while they cause, that painful and compelled art may be dispensed with, never can themselves be attributed to accident, but denote a unity lying in the possibilities themselves and the common dependence of the very essences of all things upon a Single Great Ground. We shall endeavour to render this very remarkable thing distinct by an easy example, in which we shall carefully follow the method of slowly rising from that, which is immediately certain, to the more general judgment :

If a reason for the first occasion of an arrangement in nature is required, we may chuse one out of a thousand for finding an atmosphere necessary. Let us then say, that the respiration of men and animals is its final design. The air, by the same properties that it requires for breathing only and no others, gives occasion to an infinity of beautiful consequences which it is necessarily productive of and need not be promoted by particular predispositions. The very same elastic power and gravity of the air make sucking, without which young ani-

mals would need to go without food, necessary, and the possibility of the pump is a necessary consequence of these properties. By the air it happens, that moisture ascends in vapour, which is condensed in clouds that beautify the day, often moderate the excessive heat of the sun, but serve especially, by the evaporation from low damp countries and from the sea, to moisten and to water the dry and to cool the torrid regions of the earth. The twilight too, which lengthens the day and, by a gradual transition from night to day, prevents this change's hurting the eye, and the winds in particular are its (the air's) quite natural and free consequences.

If casualty is taken in the real sense, that it consists in the dependence of the material of possibility upon another material, it is evident, that the laws of motion and the properties of matter which obey them, must depend upon some one great, common, Original Being, the Ground of order and harmony. For who could think, that, in an extensive multifarious world, in which every single member should have its own totally independent nature, every thing should, by a strange coincidence of fortuitous circumstances, be so adapted as to agree with one another, and unity in the whole be produced? But that this Common Principle must not refer to the existence of matter and the properties ascribed to it, but to the possibility of matter in general and to being itself, is obvious ;

because that, which is to fill a space that shall be capable of impulse and of pressure, cannot be conceived of on other conditions, than those, whence the said laws necessarily flow.

Thus it may be perceived, that these laws of motion are absolutely necessary to matter, that is, if the possibility of matter is presupposed, it is incompatible with it (matter) to act on other laws, which circumstance is a logical necessity of the first sort ; that the internal possibility of matter itself, the data and what is real which lie as substrata or grounds to this cogitable thing, are not given independently, or by themselves, but laid down by some One Principle, in which the multifarious receives unity, and the discrepant connexion ; which evinces the casualty of the laws of motion in the real sense.

But, though God is the Ground of the existence of things, we allow, that this dependence is always moral, that is, that they are, because he hath willed that they should be, or he is their ground by his will.

Our design by the foregoing observations is, merely to point out, that a greater possibility would need to be granted the things of nature to produce their consequences according to universal laws, than is usually done. For cosmogony teaches

us, that nature, left to its own universal laws, originally implanted by the Deity, has, from the very chaos, a tendency to order and regularity.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE SEVENTH.
TESTIMONY OF REVELATION.

MOSES, as the most ancient of all our historians both sacred and profane, is the first that mentions, by an allowed symbolical anthropomorphism, God's immediate revelation or discovery of himself in the language of man by the omnific word, the sublime omnipotent FIAT (Gen. I. 3). I AM God Almighty (XXV. 2. XLVI. 3). I AM THAT I AM (Ex. III. 14). I AM the Lord. And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVA was I not known to them (VI. 2, 3). In this thou shalt know that I AM the Lord : behold I will smite with the rod that is in mine hand upon the

waters which ARE in the river, and they shall be turned into blood (VII. 17). I AM the Lord thy God. Thou shalt have no other gods before me &c. (XXI. 1.). And the Lord said unto Moses, Come up to me into the mount and be there; and I will give thee tables of stone, and a law, and commandments which I have written; that thou mayest teach (XXIV. 12). And he said thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and live (20).

But, as we have confined our subject to the revelation of Jesus Christ, and as the New Testament is the fountain of the Christian doctrine of faith, we shall immediately proceed to the writings of the evangelists or inspired authors of the gospel and of the epitome of the history of Christ.

According to St. Matthew's testimony concerning the existence of the Supreme Being we find as follows: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve (IV. 10). Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God (V. 8). Blessed are the peace makers; for they shall be called the children of God (9). Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (V. 48). Our Father which art in heaven hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven &c. (VI. 9). For whomsoever shall do the will of my Father,

which is in heaven &c. (XII. 50). And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee; but my Father which is in heaven (XVI. 16). Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God (XIX. 17). Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God (XXII. 29). Have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham &c? (31, 32) Jesus saith unto him (one of the Sadducees, who was a lawyer and asked him which is the great commandment in the law), Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind (37). This is the first and great commandment (38). And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (39). On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets (40). Call no man your father upon the earth; for One is your Father which is in heaven (XXIII. 9).

According to St. Mark we find but little in addition: And Jesus saith, Have faith in God (XI. 22). But if ye do not forgive, neither will your Father which is in heaven forgive your trespasses (26). The Lord our God is one God (XII. 29). There is one God, and there is none other, but he (32).

According to St. Luke too we find but little variation from St. Matthew : Blessed be ye poor ; for yours is the kingdom of God (VI. 20). All things are delivered to me of my father (X. 22). Father forgive them ; for they know not what they do (XXIII. 34). Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit (46).

And according to St. John the only remarkable passages farther on this head are : The word was God (I. 1.) The same was in the beginning with God (2). All things were made by Him ; and without Him was not any thing made that was made (3). No man hath seen God at any time (18). God is a Spirit ; and they that worship him must worship HIM in spirit and in truth (IV. 24). Jesus saith, My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish His work (34). I am come in my Father's name, and ye receive me not (V. 43). My doctrine is not mine ; but His that sent me (VII. 16). If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself (17).

And so much for the grand written testimony, in the typical mode of representation, of the four evangelists of the revelation of God by Christ ; which, especially as the moral doctrine of Jesus so evidently betrays unequivocal marks of its Divine origin, we consider so ample, and so sufficient to

establish the required proof upon this sacred historical ground, *à posteriori*, as not to stand in need of a comment,* Besides, the cardinal truth,

* Our blessed Saviour, the phenomenon of the Son of God upon earth, we here consider as to his HUMANITY only or state of incarnation, and as being sent by God the Father to preach the gospel to the Jews. But his DIVINITY, the miraculous union of his divine and his human natures, the mystery of the Holy Trinity, and the other essential articles of creed or first tenets of the Christian system of faith, are evangelical doctrines, which do not pertain to the subjects intended to be handled in this treatise. Nor is it necessary for us, in this place, to express our sentiments and conviction on this incontestable point, this established truth, That whoever should take the Bible for the rule of his faith and life or practice, regulate his conduct according to the true spirit of the gospel, that is, make the sacred precept, ‘the moral love of God and of man,’ his ruling principle, or faithfully and willingly discharge, to the utmost of his power, the various moral obligations or duties, which are imposed upon him by the holy religion of Christ and perfectly consonant to the dictates of both reason and conscience, from pure motives of virtue, could not go astray, and might reasonably entertain the heart cheering hope of becoming acceptable to his Maker, and worthy of entering into glory, or of partaking of that felicity which is awarded the good in heaven. All, says the estimable and rationally pious Blair, that is requisite for the conduct of life both in nature and in religion, divine wisdom has rendered obvious to all. And the gospel has the same features, the same general character, as the system of the universe and that of natural religion, which are acknowledged to be of divine origin: ‘plain and comprehensible in what relates to practice; dark and mysterious in what relates to speculation and belief.’

‘there is a God,’ is so obvious to the eye of sane reason, and the practical belief in Him so naturally crowns all morality, as not to leave a cultivated and virtuous mind a moment in doubt of this indispensable basis, this first principle, of all true religion.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE EIGHTH.
THE THEODICY.

By the Theodicy is meant, The defence of the supreme wisdom of the Author of the world against the arraignment of this wisdom by reason from what defeats the end in the world.

This is said to be defending the cause of God ; though it at bottom may be nothing more, than the cause of our assuming reason mistaking its limits, which cause indeed is not the very best one, but may be so far approved, as (laying aside this conceit) man, as a rational being, has a right to prove

all assertions, and all the doctrines which impose reverence upon him, before he submits himself to them, that that reverence may not be hypocritical.

To this justification it is required, that the opinative advocate of God shall prove either that what we deem contrary to the end in the world is not so ; or that, were it so, it would not by any means need to be judged to be a fact, but an inevitable consequence of the nature of things ; or, lastly, that it at least must not be considered as an act of the Supreme Author of all things, but of mundane beings to whom something can be imputed, that is, men (and perhaps higher, good or bad, spiritual beings also).

The author of a theodicy consents, then, that this action shall be brought to the bar of reason ; engages himself as counsel for the defendant by formally refuting all the charges preferred by the plaintiff ; and therefore must not nonsuit him or during the course of law put him off by an authoritative decision on the incompetency of the tribunal of reason (*exceptionem fori*), that is, not dismiss the charges by imposing upon the plaintiff a concession of the supreme wisdom of the Author of the world, which directly declares groundless, even without inquiry, all doubts that may be made ; but attend to the objections, and, by answering and removing them, render comprehensible how they by

no means derogate from the conception of the Supreme Wisdom.*

He however has no occasion to enter on one thing, the proof of the supreme wisdom of God it

* The proper conception of Wisdom represents nothing but the property of a will to harmonize with the chief good, as the scope of all things; Art, on the other hand, nothing but the faculty in the use of the fittest means to ends laid down at will; yet art, when it as art is adequate to ideas, whose possibility transcends all insight of human reason (for instance, when means and ends, as in organized bodies, produce one another reciprocally), as a Divine art, may not improperly be named wisdom; in order however not to confound the conceptions, it may be termed a wisdom of art of the Author of the world, for the purpose of distinguishing it from his moral wisdom. Teleology (and by it physicotheology) furnishes abundant proofs of the former by experience. But from it no inference of the moral wisdom of the Author of the world holds; because the law of nature and the moral law require quite heterogeneous principles, and the proof of the latter wisdom must be given *à priori* totally, therefore absolutely not grounded upon the experience of what happens in the world. As the conception of God, which shall be fit for religion (for we do not use it for the explanation of nature, of course not with a speculative view), must be a conception of him as a moral Being; because this conception can be just as little made out from the merely transcendental conception of an absolutely necessary being, which is totally transcendent to us, as it can be grounded upon experience; it is sufficiently obvious, that the proof of the existence of the Supreme Being cannot be any other, than a moral one.

self from what experience teaches of this world ; for he absolutely would not succeed in it ; because omniscience is requisite to know, in a given world (as it may be known by experience), that perfection of which it may be said with certainty, that there is nowhere any so full in the creation and its government possible.

But what frustrates the end or is contrary to it in the world, and which may be opposed to the wisdom of its Author, is of a threefold nature :

I. That which is absolutely contrary to the end, or which can be approved and desired by wisdom neither as an end, nor as a means,

II. That which is conditionally or relatively contrary to the end, and which never consists with the wisdom of a will as an end, but as a means.

The former is what is morally contrary to the end, as the bad (sin) in the proper sense ; and the latter, what is physically so, evil (pain).— But this is an answerableness to the end in the relation of the evils to the moral bad, when the latter once exists, and neither can be lessened, nor should be so ; and that, in the conjunction of evils and pains, as punishments, with the bad, as crimes ; and relatively to this answerableness to the end in the world

the question is, whether, in this, justice be done every one in the world. Consequently still a

III. species of that which is contrary to the end in the world, the disproportion of crimes and of punishments in the world, must be to be conceived of.

The attributes of the supreme wisdom of the Author of the world, against which (wisdom) those things that are contrary to the end seem to be objections, are likewise three :

First, his HOLINESS, as Legislator (Creator), in contradistinction to the moral bad in the world.

Secondly, his GOODNESS, as Governor (Preserver), which contrasts the innumerable evils and pains of the rational mundane beings.

And thirdly his JUSTICE, as Judge, in comparison of the evil state in which the disproportion between the impunity of the vicious and their crimes seems to be in the world.*

* These three attributes, the one of which can by no means be reduced to the other, as, for instance, justice to goodness, and thus the whole of them to a smaller number, constitute the moral conception of God. Nor can their order be altered (as, for example, to make goodness the chief condition of the creation of the world, to which the holiness of legislation is subordinate, without derogating from religion, which is founded in this very

The answers to these three impeachments must be represented in the above-mentioned threefold distinct way, and proved according to their validity.

I. The first vindication of the holiness of the Di-

conception. Our own pure (practical) reason determines this order of rank, as, when the legislation is made to conform to the goodness, its dignity is lost, and there is not a firm conception of duties. Man, it is true, wishes first of all to be happy, but knows and grants (though unwillingly), that the worthiness of being happy, that is, the consension of the use of his liberty with the moral law, must in the decree of the Author of the world be the condition of his goodness and therefore necessarily precede. For the wish, which the subjective end (of self-love) has at bottom, cannot determine the objective end (of wisdom), which the law that gives the will unconditionally the rule prescribes.—Punishment in the exercise of justice is founded, not as a means, but as an end, in the legislative wisdom; the transgression is not combined with evils that another good may accrue, but because this combination is good in itself, that is, morally and necessarily so. Justice indeed presupposes goodness of the legislator (for his will, if it did not tend to the weal of his subjects, could not oblige them to obey him); it however is not goodness but, as justice, essentially distinct from it, though comprehended in the general conception of wisdom. Hence the complaint of the want of justice, which want is shewn in the lot that falls to men in this world, is not that the good do not fare well here, but that the bad do not fare ill (though, when those fare ill, the contrast still increases this difficulty). For in a Divine government even the best man cannot found his wish for wellbeing in the Divine justice, but must always do it in the Divine goodness; because he, who barely does his duty cannot lay any claim to grace or the favor of God.

vine will on account of the moral bad which is complained of as disfiguring the world, the work of God, consists in this :

a. That there is by no means any thing so absolutely contrary to the end, as we take the transgression of the pure laws of our reason to be, but that it is a fault in the eye of human wisdom only ; that the Divine wisdom judges of it according to quite other rules incomprehensible to us, when what we find justly rejectable relatively to our practical reason and its determination, may, in the relation to Divine ends and supreme wisdom, be the fittest means as well for our particular weal, as for the good of the world in general, that the ways of the supreme Being are not our ways (*sunt Supera sua jura*), and we err when we judge that, which is a law but relatively for men in this life, absolutely so, and thus hold that, which seems to our contemplation of things from so low a station contrary to the end, to be so when contemplated from the highest station.—This apology, in which the defence is worse than the charge, requires no confutation, and may certainly be freely left to the detestation of every one who has the least sense or spark of morality.

b. The second pretended vindication grants the reality of the moral bad in the world, but excuses the Author of the world by its not having been pos-

sible to be prevented ; because it has its foundation in the limits of nature of men, as finite beings.— But thereby this bad itself would be justified ; and, as it could not be imputed to men as their fault, we would need to cease to name it a moral bad.

c. The third vindication, that, supposing that, with respect to what we denominate moral bad, men are guilty, no guilt must be imputed to God, as he hath for wise reasons permitted this bad merely, as an act of men, but by no means doth approve, will or prepare it, tends (if no difficulty shall be found in the conception of the mere permitting of

Being, who is the sole Author of the world) to the same consequence as the foregoing apology (b), that, as it was impossible even for God to prevent this bad without derogating from other higher and even moral ends, the ground of this evil (for it must in strict propriety be thus named) must be unavoidably to be looked for in the essence of things, the necessary limits of humanity as finite nature, and consequently cannot be imputed to it.

II. The justification of the Divine goodness on account of the evils, the pains, which are complained of in the world, consists in this,

a. That in the fates of men a preponderance of evil over the agreeable enjoyment of life is falsely supposed ; because every one, however badly he

may fare, chuses rather to live, than to die, and those few, who resolve on the latter, still allow, as long as they delay it, this preponderance, and, when they are insane enough to destroy themselves, merely pass to that state of insensibility, in which no pain can be felt.—But the answer to this sophistry may surely be left to every man of a sound understanding: who has lived long enough, and reflected sufficiently on the value of life to be able to form a judgment on it when the question, Whether, we shall not say on the same conditions, but on any other ones he pleases (only not of a fairy land, but of our terrestrial world), he would chuse to act the play of life over again? is put to him.

b. To the second justification, That the preponderancy of the painful feelings over the agreeable ones cannot be separated from the nature of an animal creature, like man (as, for instance, count Veri maintains in his book on the Nature of Pleasure)—one would answer, that, if it is so, there occurs another query, Why the Author of our existence hath called us into life when it, according to our just calculation, does not deserve to be wished for by us? Ill-humour would answer, as the Indian woman says to Gingis-khan, who could neither give her satisfaction for the violence offered, nor afford her security against the future, ‘If thou wilt not protect us, why dost thou conquer us?’

c. The third solution of the knot is said to be, that for the sake of a future felicity God hath placed us, only out of goodness, in the world, but that that beatitude, which may be hoped for, must absolutely be preceded by a state of trouble and misery of the present life, where we must by the struggle with difficulties become worthy of that future glory.—But that this time of probation (in which the greater number succumb and the best have not any real satisfaction of their lives) shall absolutely be the condition, by the Supreme Wisdom, of the pleasure that one day or other may be enjoyed by us, and that it was not feasible to let the creature become contented with every epoch of his life, may be pretended, but absolutely cannot be known, and consequently by an appeal to the Supreme Wisdom, who hath so willed it, the knot may be cut, but cannot be untied; the theodicy however engages to resolve it.

III. To the last charge preferred against the justice of the Judge of the world,* it is answered :

* It is remarkable, that of all the difficulties of uniting the course of the events of the world with the divinity of its Author, not one forces itself so strongly on the mind, as that of the appearance of justice wanting in the world. If it happens (though it is but seldom) that an unjust villain, especially one possessed of power, does not escape unpunished out of the world, the impartial spectator, as it were, reconciled to heaven, rejoices. No suitableness to the end of nature excites, by its admiration his

a. That the pretext of the impunity of the vicious in the world has not a ground ; because every crime, from its very nature, carries with it here below the punishment suitable to it, as the stings or reproaches of conscience torment the vicious more than furies would.—But in this judgment there evidently is a misunderstanding. For the virtuous herein lends his character of mind, conscientiousness in its whole strictness, to the vitious, which conscientiousness, the more virtuous a man is, punishes the more rigorously on account of the smallest precipitation, of which the moral law in him disapproves. But, when this cast of mind or conscientiousness is wanting, the tormentor for crimes committed is likewise wanting ; and the vicious, if he can but escape the external chastisement for his crimes, laughs at the anxiety of the honest man, who torments himself internally with his own rebukes ; but the slight reproaches, with which he may sometimes charge himself, he makes either not at all from conscience, or, if he has any, they are abundantly outweighed by the sensual pleasure, for which he has a taste.—

affect* to such a degree, and, so to speak, renders the hand of God so discernible. Why ? Because it is, in this case, moral, and the only one of the sort, which we may hope to perceive in some measure in the world.

* See this word explained in ‘ The Elements of a System of Education according to the critical Philosophy.’

If this charge shall be further refuted,

b, by this, That it is not to be denied, that there absolutely is no proportion, agreeable to justice, between guilt and punishment to be found in the world, and, in the course of it, we must often perceive, with indignation, a life led with glaring injustice, and yet happy to the very end; that this however lies in nature and is not intentionally prepared, by consequence not moral dissonance, because it is a property of virtue to wrestle with adversity (to which the pain that the virtuous man must suffer by the comparison of his own misfortune with the good fortune of the vicious belongs), and sufferings serve but to enhance the value of virtue, in the eye of reason therefore this dissonance of the undeserved evils of life is resolved into the most glorious concord;—this solution is opposed by this, that, though these evils, if they, as the whetstone of virtue, either precede or accompany it, may be represented to be in a moral harmony with it, when at last the end of life crowns virtue and punishes vice; but that, if even this end falls out nonsensically, and experience gives many examples of its doing so, suffering seems to have fallen to the lot of the virtuous not that his virtue shall be pure, but because it has been so (but was contrary to the rules of prudent self-love); which is directly the contrary of justice, as man is able to form a conception of it to himself. For, as to the possibility,

that the end of this terrestrial life may not be the end of all life, it cannot serve for a vindication of Providence, but is merely an authoritative decision of morally faithful reason, by which the sceptic is not satisfied, but referred to patience.

c. If finally the third solution of this discordant proposition between the moral value of men and the lot that falls to them shall be attempted by saying, that, In this world all weal or ill must be judged to be a consequence of the use of the faculties of men according to laws of nature merely, in proportion to their applied ability and prudence, as well as to the circumstances, into which they accidentally fall, but not according to their agreement with supersensible ends; whereas in a future world another order of things will subsist, and every one obtain what his deeds here below are worth according to a moral judgment;—thus this presupposition is arbitrable. Reason, if it, as a morally legislative faculty, does not give an authoritative decision suitable to its interest, must rather find it probable, according to mere rules of theoretical cognition, That the course of the world according to the order of nature will, as here, for the future, determine our fate. For what other clew has reason for its theoretical presumption, than the law of nature? and, though it lets itself, as is required of it (b), be referred to patience and to the hope of a better future world, how can it expect, that, as the course

of things here below according to the order of nature is wise by itself, it would according to the same law be unwise in a future world? As, according to reason, there is no comprehensible relation whatever between the internal determinatives of the will (by the moral cast of mind), according to laws of liberty, and the (for the most part external) causes of our wellbeing independent of our will, according to the laws of nature; the presumption, that the agreement of the fate of men with a Divine justice, according to the conceptions we form of it, is to be expected there, as little as here, remains.

The issue of this process before the court of philosophy is, that no theodicy has hitherto performed, what it promises, justifying the moral wisdom in the government of the world against the doubts entertained of it (this wisdom) from what experience gives to know in this world; though these doubts, as objections, cannot, as far as our introspection into the nature of our reason goes with regard to this world, prove the contrary. But whether, in progress of time, there may not be found more proper grounds for its vindication, not to absolve the arraigned wisdom (as hitherto done) merely *ab instantia*, still remains undetermined, if we do not succeed in shewing, with certainty, that our reason is absolutely inadequate to the insight of the relation which a world, that we may always know by

experience, bears the Supreme Wisdom ; for then all farther essays of opiniative human wisdom to know the ways of Divine Wisdom, are totally rejected. That a negative wisdom at least, the insight of the necessary limitation of our pretensions in regard to what is beyond our reach, is attainable by us, must, in order to put an end to this lawsuit for ever, yet be proved ; and it may be easily done.

We have a conception of a wisdom of art in the arrangement of the world, to which wisdom objective reality, for our speculative faculty of reason, is not wanting, for the purpose of arriving at a physicotheology. In like manner we have a conception of a moral wisdom which may be placed in a world in general by a fully Perfect Author, in the moral idea of our own practical reason.—But of the unity in the agreement of that wisdom of art with the moral wisdom in the sensible world we have not a conception, and never can hope to attain one. For, being a creature, and, as a being of nature, following the will of its Author merely, but yet being, as a free agent, (whose will is independent of external influence, which may be very contrary to the will of the former), capable of imputation, and for all that considering his own act as the effect of a Superior Being, are an association of conceptions, which we must conceive in the idea of a world as the chief good, but which he only, who perspects the cognition of the supersensible (in-

telligible) world, and knows the way, in which it forms the basis or substratum of the sensible world, can know; in which insight only the proof of the moral wisdom of the Author of the world in the latter world can be founded; because the sensible world exhibits nothing but the phenomenon of the intelligible—an insight, which no mortal can attain.*

All theodicy must, properly speaking, be an explication of nature provided that God maketh known by it the design of his will. But every explication of the declared will of a legislator is either doctrinal, or authentic. The former is what discovers by reasoning that will from the expressions, which it has used, in conjunction with the designs of the law-giver otherwise known; and the latter the legislator himself gives.

The world, as a work of God, may be considered by us as a divine publication of the designs of his will. In this however it is often a shut book to us; but it is always so if concluding from it, though an object of experience, the very final end of God (which is always moral), is aimed at. The philosophical essays of this sort of explanation are doc-

* “*Notre raison appelle à son tribunal ce qu'elle devrait admirer en silence. Elle ne doit pas se permettre des jugemens sur les ouvrages de Dieu même.*”

trinal, and constitute the real theodicy, which may therefore be termed the doctrinal one.—Yet the mere dismissal of all the objections to the Divine wisdom, cannot, if it is a divine authoritative decision, or (what is to the same purpose) a judgment of the same reason by which we form to ourselves of necessity and before all experience the conception of God as a moral and wise Being, be refused the name of a theodicy. Then, however, it is not the explication of speculative, but that of practical reason, possessing power, which reason, as it is, without farther grounds, absolutely commanding in legislating, may be considered as the immediate declaration and voice of God, whereby he giveth a meaning to the letter of his creation. And an authentic interpretation of this species we find allegorically expressed in an ancient sacred book :

Job is represented as a man, for the enjoyment of whose life every thing possible to be conceived is united in order to render it perfect. Health, opulence, free, a commander of others, whom he may make happy, surrounded with a happy family, among beloved friends ; and above all (what is the most essential) contented with himself because of his good conscience. All these riches, his good conscience excepted, a hard fate, hung over him for a trial, suddenly tears away from him.

From the astonishment at this unexpected over-

throw come by degrees to recollection, he gives vent to his complaints against this disaster ; on which there is soon begun a controversy between him and his friends, who are present under a pretext of consoling him, wherein both parties, each in his own way of thinking (but chiefly according to his situation), set forth their particular theodicy for the moral interpretation of this bad fate.

Job's friends declare themselves for the system of the interpretation of all the evils in the world from Divine justice, as so many punishments for crimes committed, and, though they cannot charge the unfortunate man with any, think they can judge *à priori*, that he must needs be guilty of some, else it were not possible, according to the Divine justice, that he should be unhappy.

Whereas Job—who protests, with emotion, that his conscience does not reproach him in the least on account of his whole life ; but, as to inevitable human faults, God doth know, that he made him a frail creature—declares himself for the system of the unconditional decree of God. He is of one mind (saith Job) and who can turn him ?

In the reasoning or, if we may use the word, overreasoning on both sides, there is little re-

markable ; but the character, in which they reason or overreason, deserves more attention.

Job speaks as he thinks and as he feels, and as every body in his situation would feel ; his friends, on the other hand, speak as if the Almighty, on whose affairs they decide, and to gain whose favor by their judgment they have more at heart, than the truth, listened to them in secret. These their tricks, for the sake of semblance to maintain things, which they must allow they do not know, and to feign a conviction, with which they in fact are not impressed, contrast Job's plain frankness, which is so far from flattery, as almost to border on temerity, greatly in his favor. Will you (says he) speak wickedly for God ? and talk deceitfully for him ? Will you accept his person ? will you contend for God ? He will surely reprove you, if you do secretly accept persons !—for an hypocrite shall not come before him.

The issue of the history is, that God deigned to disclose the wisdom of his creation to Job on the side of its inscrutableness chiefly. He let him view not only the beautiful side of the creation, where ends comprehensible to man set the wisdom and the beautiful care of the Author of the world in a clear light, but the frightful side by naming productions of His potency to him and among them even pernicious dreadful things, every one of which seems to be adjusted for itself and its species answerably to

the end proposed, but with regard to others and even to men destructive, baffling the end, and not agreeing with a universal plan arranged by goodness and wisdom; whereby He however sheweth the disposition and the preservation of the whole announcing the Wise Author of the world, though at the same time his ways, which are inscrutable to us, must be hidden even in the physical order of things, how much more then must they be so in its connexion with the moral order (which is yet more impenetrable to our reason).

The conclusion is this, that, as Job owns to have decided not maliciously, for he is conscious to himself of his probity, but imprudently, on things, which are too high for him, and which he does not understand, God pronounces the condemnation of Job's friends; because they did not speak of Him so well (in point of conscientiousness), as his servant Job:

If each of their theories is considered, that, which Job's friends maintain, may carry with it a greater semblance of speculative reason and of pious humility; and he in all likelihood would have experienced a bad fate before a tribunal of dogmatical theologians or an inquisition.

Not the superiority of knowledge, therefore, but the sincerity of heart, the honesty to own his doubts

openly, and the aversion to feign conviction, when it is not felt, chiefly before God (when this craft is besides absurd), are the properties, which in the Divine judgment decide the superiority of the man of probity, in the person of Job, over the religious flatterer.

But the belief, which arose in him from so strange a solution of his doubts, the conviction of his ignorance merely, could enter into the mind of none but him, who in the midst of his greatest doubts can say, 'Till I die I will not remove my integrity from me &c.' For, by this mindedness, he proves, that he did not found his morality in his belief, but *vice versa*; and this belief only, how weak soever it may be, is of a pure and genuine sort, that is, of that species, which founds a religion of the good life, not of adulation or courting favor.

The theodicy, as it has been here shewn, has not so much to do with a problem for the advantage of science, as with an affair of belief. By the authentic theodicy we have seen, that in such things it depends less upon reasoning, than upon sincerity in the observation of the inability of our reason, and upon the honesty not to falsify one's thoughts in the utterance, let them be falsified with ever so pious a view.

And this gives occasion to the following short contemplation on a rich fund of matter, Sincerity,

as the chief requisite in affairs of faith, in collision with the propensity to falseness and impurity, as the principal defects in human nature.

That what one says, either to himself or to another, is true, he cannot always be answerable (for he may err); but he can be answerable for his profession or his acknowledgment's being veracious, and must be so, for of it he is immediately conscious to himself. In the former case he compares his assertion with the object in the logical judgment (by the understanding), but in the latter, as he professes his holding-true, with the subject (before conscience). Does he make the profession concerning the former without being conscious to himself of the latter? he lies; because he gives out something else, than that of which he is conscious.

The observation, that there is such an impurity in the human heart, is not new (for Job makes it); but one should almost think, that the attention to it is new to teachers of moral philosophy and of religion; so little is it found, that they, notwithstanding the difficulty, which the purifying of the minds of men, even if they have a mind to act suitably to duty, carries with it, have made sufficient use of this observation.

This veracity may be named the formal conscientiousness, the material consists in the circumspection of venturing nothing at the risk of its be-

ing wrong; whereas that consists in the consciousness of having employed this circumspection in a given case.

Writers on morals speak of an erroneous conscience. But there is no such thing; and, were it otherwise, we could never be sure of having acted right; because the judge himself might err in the last instance. We can err in the judgment, in which we believe we are right, for this judgment is the province of the understanding which judges objectively only (either truly or falsely); but in the consciousness, whether we in fact believe we are in the right (or pretend merely to do so), we absolutely cannot err; because this proposition says nothing but that we judge thus of the object.

In the carefulness to be conscious to one's self of this believing (or not believing), and not to give out any holding-true, of which one is not conscious, the very formal conscientiousness, the ground of veracity, consists. Who therefore says to himself (and, what amounts to the same thing in the confessions of religion, before God), that he believes, perhaps without having examined himself a moment whether he in fact is conscious to himself of this holding-true or of this degree of it, lies* not only

* The means of extorting veracity in external deposition, the Oath (*tortura spiritualis*), is held before a human tribunal not

in the most absurd manner, (before a Knower of hearts), but in the most wicked; because it saps,

only allowed) but indispensable. A sad proof of the little reverence of man for truth, even in the temple of public justice, where the mere idea of it ought to inspire the greatest reverence! But men lie with regard to conviction, which they have not, at least of the sort and in the degree they pretend, even in their internal acknowledgments; and, as improbity (since it becomes by little and little real persuasion) may be productive of external pernicious consequences, this means of extorting truth, the oath (but an internal one only, that is, the essay whether holding-true stands the test of an internal juratory examining of the profession) may be very well used if not to restrain, at least to embarrass the audaciousness of daring, and at last even externally violent, assertions.—By a human tribunal nothing more is demanded of the conscience of him that makes oath, than engaging that, if there is a future Judge of the world (therefore a God and a life to come), he will be answerable to him for the truth of his external profession, that there is a future Judge of the world, is a profession not necessary to be demanded of him; because, if the former protestation cannot withhold the lie, the latter false profession would create just as little scruple. According to this internal declaration of an oath, then, one would ask himself, Would thou take upon thee, by all that is dear and sacred to thee, to answer for the truth of an important tenet of faith or of one held so? At such a demand conscience would be suddenly roused by the danger, to which one exposes himself, of pretending more than he can maintain with certainty, when the holding-true regards an object that is not attainable by the way of knowing (theoretical insight), but whose assuming, only by its rendering possible the connexion of the chief practical principle of reason with the principle of the theoretical cognition of nature in one system (and thus reason agreeing with itself), is above all recommendable, but yet always free.—But professions of faith,

the very foundation of every virtuous intention, sincerity.

It is not difficult to be conceived how soon blind and external confessions of this sort (which are easily united with an internal confession just as false), may, if they become means of acquisition, gradually occasion a certain falseness in even the turn of mind of the nation. And as this public purifying of the way of thinking will in all probability be delayed to a distant period, till it perhaps shall one day become a universal principle of education and of doctrine under the protection of the liberty of thinking; a few words still may not be improperly bestowed on the consideration of this vice which seems to be deeply rooted in the human nature.

There is something touching and which moves the soul in displaying a sincere character, divested of all falseness and simulation; as honesty, a mere simplicity and rectitude of the way of thinking (especially when ingenuousness is not expected from it) is the least that is requisite to a good character,

whose source is historical, if they are enjoined others even as precepts, must be still more subjected to this fiery ordeal of veracity; because the impurity and feigned conviction are extended to more persons, and their guilt becomes a burden to him, who, as it were, answers for the conscience of others (for men are willingly passive with their consciences).

and therefore it is not to be conceived in what that admiration, with which we are filled by an object of this sort, is founded; unless it is, that sincerity is the property, with which human nature is the least endowed. A melancholy observation indeed! As by that only all other properties, provided that they rest upon principles, can be of an intrinsic true value. A contemplative man only (who wishes nobody ill, but is inclined to believe every thing bad of men) can be doubtful of finding men deserving whether of hatred or of contempt. The properties, whereby he would judge them to be qualified for being treated with the former, are those, by which they wilfully or designedly do harm. That property, however, which seems rather to expose them to the latter degradation can be no other, than a propensity, which is bad in itself, though it hurts nobody, to what can be used as a means to no end whatever; which therefore is objectively worthless.

The former bad is that of enmity only (or more mildly expressed, unkindness); and the latter can be nothing else than a lying disposition (falseness even without any design to do hurt). The one inclination has a view, which may in certain other references be allowed and good, for instance, enmity against incorrigible disturbers of the peace. The other propensity, however, is that to the use of a means (a lie) which, whatever be the view, is worthless; because it is bad in itself and blamable.

In the quality of man of the former species there is wickedness, yet with which there may be combined a fitness for good ends in certain external relations, and it sins but in the means; which however is not repudiable in every view. But the bad of the latter sort is worthlessness, by which all character is refused man.

Here we may chiefly insist on the impurity lying deeply concealed; because man knows how to falsify the very internal declarations in presence of his own conscience. The less ought the inclination to (external) fraud to surprise; but it perhaps may surprise us that, though every body knows the baseness of the coin with which he trades, it (the coin) can maintain itself equally well in circulation.

In De Luc's Letters on the Mountains, and the History of the Earth and of Man, we remember to have read the following result of his, in part, anthropological journey: The philanthropic author sets out with the presupposition of the original good quality of our species, and seeks the confirmation of this quality, where city luxury cannot have so much influence on corrupting the minds, in the mountains, from Switzerland to the Schwartz-forest; and, when his belief in disinterestedly helpful inclination begins somewhat to stagger by an experience in the former, he at last infers this conclusion, 'That man, as to benevolence, is good enough'

(no wonder ! for it rests upon implanted inclination, of which God is the author); ‘ if a bad propension to fine deceit were but not inherent in him’ (still not wonderful ; for to withhold it depends upon the character, which man himself must form in himself) !— A result of the inquiry, which every one, even without travelling in the mountains, may meet with in the circle of his society, nay, yet nearer, in his own breast.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE EIGHTH.

**REVIEW OF THE ONTOLOGICAL, OF THE COS-
MOLOGICAL AND OF THE PHYSICO-
THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS.**

THERE cannot be but three sorts of proof of the existence of God from speculative reason: the Physicotheological, in which we begin with the determinate experience and the thereby known peculiar quality of our sensible world and mount from it, according to laws of causation, to the very Supreme Cause out of the world; the Cosmological, in which we lay indeterminate experience only, that is, any one existence, empirically as a ground; and the Ontological, in which we abstract from all experience, and from mere conceptions infer the exist-

ence of a Supreme Cause quite *à priori*. But reason can effect as little in the one way (the empirical), as in the other (the transcendental), and spreads its wings in vain to soar above the world of the senses by the mere power of speculation.

Let us bring the transcendental argument to the test, and then see what the addition of the empirical argument can do to increase the power of proving of the former; and first as to the Ontological Proof:

FROM what has been said it may be easily perceived, that the conception of an absolutely necessary Being is a pure conception of reason, that is, a mere idea, whose objective reality is by no means proved by reason's standing in need of it, and which refers to a certain completeness only though unattainable, and serves more to bound the understanding, than to extend it to new objects. It is strange and unaccountable, that from a given existence in general the conclusion of any one absolutely necessary being should, notwithstanding that we have all the conditions of the intellect quite against us for forming to ourselves a conception of a necessity of this nature, seem right.

An absolutely necessary being has been always spoken of, and less trouble taken to understand whether a thing of this nature can be but conceived

of and how it can be so, than to evince its existence. A nominal explanation of this conception, 'That this being is something, whose nonexistence is impossible,' is very easy ; but we are not a whit the wiser with regard to the conditions, which make it impossible to consider the nonexistence of a thing as absolutely incogitable, and which are really what we want to know, whether we by this conception conceive of any thing at all or not. For, to reject all the conditions, which the intellect always requires in order to consider something as necessary by means of the word absolute, does not make us understand whether we then combine any sense or none with a conception of an absolutely necessary thing.

Again, this conception, first hazarded and at last become current, has been attempted to be explained by a multitude of examples, so that all farther inquiries into its meaning seemed quite unnecessary. Every proposition of geometry, for instance, 'That a triange has three angles,' is absolutely necessary, and thus an object, which lies entirely without the sphere of our intellectual faculty, has always been talked of as if the meaning of the conception were well understood.

All the given examples are without exception taken from nothing but judgments, not from things and their existence. But the absolute necessity of

judgments is not that of things. For the absolute necessity of a judgment is a relative conception only of a thing or of the predicate in a judgment. The geometrical proposition says not that three angles are absolutely necessary, but, on the condition of a triangle's being given, that three angles exist of necessity (in it). Yet this logical necessity has evinced so great a force of its illusion, that, by forming to ourselves a conception of a thing *à priori* of this nature, that in our opinion existence is comprised in its sphere, we thought we surely could thence infer, that, as existence necessarily belongs to the object of this conception, that is, on the condition, that we lay down this thing as given (existing), its existence too is of necessity laid down (according to the rule of identity), and this being itself therefore absolutely necessary; because its existence is likewise thought of in a conception assumed at will and on the condition of our laying down its object.

If we annul the predicate in an identical judgment and retain the object, a contradiction arises, and hence we may say, that that belongs to this in a necessary way. But if we annul the object together with the predicate, no contradiction arises; for there is nothing more to be contradicted. Laying down a triangle and yet annulling its three angles, are contradictory; but annulling the triangle together with its three angles, does not involve a contradiction. The conception of an absolutely necessary

being is exactly of the same nature. If we annul the existence of this being, we annul the thing itself with all its predicates ; whence then should the contradiction come ? Externally there is nothing to be contradicted, for the thing must not be externally necessary ; not internally, for we, by the annulling of the thing itself, have annulled all that is internal. God is omnipotent ; is a necessary judgment. Omnipotence, if we lay down a Godhead, that is, an Infinite Being, with whose conception it is identical, cannot be annulled. But, if we say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates or attributes is given ; for they together with the object are all annulled, and in this thought there is not the least contradiction,

We have therefore seen, that, if we annul the predicate of a judgment together with the object, an internal contradiction, let the predicate be what it will, never can arise. Our last resource now is, that we must say, that there are objects, which cannot be annulled, and which of course must remain. But, this would say just as much as that there are absolutely necessary objects ; a presupposition, of whose rightness we have but this very moment doubted, and whose possibility we want to shew. For we cannot form to ourselves the least conception of a thing which, if it together with all its predicates is annulled, should leave a contradiction behind, and we, without a contradiction, have

not a single mark of impossibility by pure conceptions, or those *à priori*.

In spite of all these universal conclusions (which nobody can avoid), a case, put as a proof by the fact, That there is one conception only, in which the nonexistence or the annulling of its object is absurd in itself, is required, and this is the conception of the Real Being. It possesses, we are told, all reality, and it is said, that we are justified in assuming a being of this nature to be possible (let us grant this for the present, though the conception that is not inconsistent is far from proving the possibility of the object).* But existence is comprehended in all reality. By consequence existence lies in the conception of a possible thing. If this thing now is annulled, the internal possibility of the thing is likewise annulled; which is contradictory.

* A conception, if it is not inconsistent, is always possible. This is the logical mark of possibility, and its object is thereby distinguished from the *nihil negativum*. But it may, for all that be an empty conception, if the objective reality of the synthesis, by which it (the conception) is formed, is not particularly shewn; but which always depends upon principles of possible experience, not upon the principle of analysis (that of contradiction).† A caution not to infer too readily the possibility of things (the real possibility) from the possibility of conceptions (the logical possibility).

† The principle of contradiction is, 'No predicate, which is repugnant to a thing, belongs to it.'

Our answer is this, a contradiction, if the conception of the existence of a thing is brought into the conception of this thing which was, under whatever concealed name, intended to be thought of as to its possibility only, is committed. Were that even granted, the question would be gained in semblance but nothing in fact said ; for we were guilty of nothing but mere tautology. Whether is the proposition, ' This or that thing (which, whatever it is, we grant to be possible) exists', an analytic or a synthetic proposition ? If it is the former, nothing is added to the thought of the thing by the experience of the thing, and either the thought, which is in us, must be the thing itself, or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and then concluded existence as is pretended from the internal possibility ; which is nothing but miserable tautology. The word reality, which sounds otherwise in the conception of the thing, than existence in the conception of the predicate, does not make out the affair. For, if we term all laying down (without determining what is laid down) reality, we have laid down and actually assumed the thing itself with all its predicates in the conception of the object, and it (this thing) is repeated only in the predicate. Let us on the other hand suppose, as every reasonable person must naturally grant, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how will you then maintain, that the predicate of existence cannot be

annulled without a contradiction? as this superiority belongs to analytic propositions, whose very character depends upon it.

We should hope, that this false reasoning would, by an exact determination of the conception of existence, be directly done away with, had we not found, that the illusion in converting a logical predicate to a real one (that is, the determination of a thing), almost excludes all instruction. Any thing we please may serve for a logical predicate, even the object may be predicated of itself; for in logic we abstract from all matter (as logic is a system of the formal rules only of thinking in general).* But a determination is a predicate, which is superadded to the conception of the object and increases it. The determination therefore must not be contained in the object.

Being evidently is not a real predicate, that is, an adjunct, or a conception of a thing, which can be superadded to the conception of a thing. It is the laying down merely of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. It in the logical use is nothing but the copula in a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent,' contains two conceptions, God and omnipotence, which have their ob-

* See Kant's Logic, which is the purest and most systematical of any.

jects ; the word *is*, is not a predicate, but that which lays down the predicate relatively to the object. If we take the object (God) together with all its predicates (to which omnipotence belongs), and say, that God is or there is a God, we lay down not a new predicate to the conception of God, but the object in itself with all its predicates, the object in reference to our conception. Both must contain exactly the same, and nothing farther can be superadded to the conception, which expresses the possibility merely, because we conceive its object to be absolutely given (by the expression, *he is*). And thus the real contains nothing more, than the mere possible. A hundred real guineas contain not a tittle more, than a hundred possible ones. For, as these signify the conception, and those the object and its being laid down in itself, our conception, provided that the latter contains more than the former, does not express the whole object, and therefore cannot be its adequate conception. But our fortune is more increased by a thousand real guineas, than by their mere conception (that is, their possibility). For the object is not only comprised analytically in our conception by the reality, but synthetically superadded to our conception (which is a determination of the state of our fortune), without the hundred guineas' being increased in the least by this existence without our conception.

If we therefore think of a thing, by what predi-

cates and by as many of them as we chuse (even in the thorough determination), not the least is added to it by saying, that this thing is. For else not the very same thing, but more things, than we thought of in the conception, exist, and we cannot say, that the very object of our conception exists. If we think of a Being of the supreme reality (without wants), the question, whether he exists or not, always remains. For, though nothing is wanting to our conception of the possible real matter of a thing in general, something is wanting to the relation to our whole state of thinking, and which is, that the cognition of that object *à posteriori* be possible. And herein the cause of the reigning difficulty lies. Were an object of the senses the subject of discussion, we could not exchange the existence for the mere conception of the thing. For, by the conception the object is thought of as agreeing with the universal conditions only of a possible empirical cognition in general, but by the existence, as contained in the complex of all experience; the conception of the object is not increased in the least by the connexion with the matter of all experience, but our thinking receives by it an additional possible perception. Whereas, if we will conceive by the pure category alone, it is no wonder if we cannot give a mark to distinguish it from mere possibility.

Whatever and how much our conception of an object may therefore contain, we must quit it, in

order to dispense existence to this object. That, with objects of the senses, takes place by the coherence with any one of our perceptions according to empirical laws ; but as for objects of pure thinking, there is no means of knowing their existence, because it would need to be known totally *à priori*, but our consciousness of all existence (whether by perception immediately, or by syllogisms, which connect something with perception), belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and an existence out of this field (of experience) cannot be declared absolutely impossible, but is a presupposition, which we can justify by nothing (in a theoretical view).

The conception of the Supreme Being is in many respects a very useful idea ; but it, just because of its being an idea, cannot enable us by means of it alone to enlarge our cognition in regard to that which exists. It cannot even so much as inform us relatively to the possibility of many. The analytic mark of possibility, which is, that mere laid down things (realities) do not create a contradiction, cannot indeed be refused it, but as the connexion of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, of whose possibility we cannot judge *à priori*, because the realities are not given us specifically, and even were they so, no judgment on this has place, because the mark of the possibility of synthetic cognitions never can be sought but in experience, but to which the object of an idea cannot belong ; the celebrated Leibnitz is far from having accomplished (what he

flattered himself he should accomplish) obtaining an insight *à priori* into the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being.

All trouble and labour are therefore lost on the so celebrated ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from conceptions, and we can grow rich in insights from mere ideas just as little, as a merchant in property by adding a cipher to the credit side of his balance-sheet.

It is unnatural and a mere innovation of scholastic sense to think of picking out of an idea, framed quite in an arbitrable way, the existence of the object itself which corresponds to it (the idea). It in fact would never have been sought in this way, had not the want of our reason to assume for the behoof of existence in general some one necessary thing or other (at which we can stop in ascending) preceded, and had not reason, as the necessity must be certain absolutely and *à priori*, been constrained to seek a conception, which, if possible, should satisfy this demand, and give to know an existence fully *à priori*. This was thought to be found in the idea of a most real Being, and this idea was used for a more determinate knowledge only of that of which one was formerly convinced or persuaded that it must exist; that of the necessary Being. Meantime the natural course of reason was concealed, and, instead of ending with this conception, an en-

deavour to begin with it was made, in order to deduce from it the necessity of existence, but which it is destined to complete only. Hence originated the unlucky ontological proof of Des Cartes, which carries with it nothing satisfactory either to the natural and sound understanding, or to the scholastic test.

THE Cosmological Proof, which we shall now investigate, retains the connexion of absolute necessity with the supreme reality, but, instead of concluding, like the former proof, the necessity in existence from the supreme reality, rather from the previously given absolute necessity of some one being concludes its unbounded reality, and brings every thing so far into the track if not of a rational, at least of a natural, way of conclusion, which carries with it the most persuasion for not only the common, but the speculative, understanding; as it evidently draws the first lines of all the proofs of natural theology, which have always been followed, and will, let them be ever so much ornamented and concealed, still be followed. This proof, which Leibnitz calls the *à contingentia mundi*, we shall now submit to review.

It runs thus: If something exists, an absolutely necessary Being must exist. Now I, at least, exist myself; therefore an absolutely necessary Being exists. The minor proposition contains an experi-

ence, and the major the existence of the necessary Being from an experience in general.* The proof therefore sets out from experience, consequently is not made totally *à priori* or ontologically, and it, as the object of all possible experience is termed world, is denominated the cosmological proof. And it, as we abstract in it from every particular property of the objects of experience, by which this world may be distinguished from every possible world, is in its very determination distinguished from the physicotheological proof, in which observations on the particular quality of this our world of the senses are used for arguments.

In the proof it is farther argued, that the necessary Being cannot be determined but in one way, that is, in regard to all possible opposite predicates, but by one of them, consequently must be so by his conception. But there is one conception only of a thing, which thoroughly determines it *à priori* possible, and which is that *entis realissimi*; the conception of the most real Being therefore is the only one, by which a necessary being can be

* This consequence is too well known to require to be delivered here in a prolix way. It rests upon the opiniatively transcendental law of causality, That every thing contingent has its cause, which, if it again is contingent, must likewise have a cause, till the series of causes subordinate to one another must terminate in an absolutely necessary Cause, without which it (this series) would not be complete.

cogitated, that is, there exists a Supreme Being of necessity.

In this cosmological argument so many dialectical principles meet, that speculative reason seems to have exerted its whole dialectical art to bring about the greatest possible transcendental illusion. But the reader will easily perceive the trick of clothing a threadbare argument in a new dress and appealing to the agreement of two witnesses, a pure one of reason and another of empirical testimony, but it is the former only that alters his dress and his voice with a view to be taken for the latter. This proof, that its foundation may be laid very solidly, is bottomed upon experience, and thereby seems to be distinguished from the ontological proof, in which the whole confidence is placed in pure conceptions. But in the cosmological proof this experience is made use of for no other purpose, than taking one step, that to the existence of a necessary being in general. What sort of properties this being may possess, the empirical argument cannot teach, and reason therefore takes its leave of it for ever and investigates, among conceptions entirely, what sort of properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which of all possible things contains the requisites to an absolute necessity. It thinks it finds them in the conception of a most real being only, and then concludes, that That is the absolutely necessary Being. But it is obvious, that in this procedure it

is presupposed, that the conception of a being of supreme reality is fully sufficient for the conception of the absolute necessity in existence, that is, this may be inferred from that; a proposition, which the ontological argument maintains, and which, though it was intended to be avoided, is assumed and laid as a foundation in the cosmological proof. For the absolute necessity in existence is an existence from mere conceptions. If we say, that the conception *entis realissimi* is one of this sort and the only conception that is suitable and adequate to the necessary existence; we must grant, that the latter can be inferred from it. It therefore is nothing but the ontological proof from mere conceptions, which contains all the force of evincing in the cosmological proof, and the pretended experience is quite idle, and perhaps designed to lead us to the conception only of absolute necessity, but not to shew this necessity by any one determinate thing. For, the moment we intend this, we must relinquish all experience and seek among pure conceptions which of them contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary Being. But, if an insight into the possibility of a Being of that nature is to be had in this way only, his existence is evinced; for it is said, that, among all possible things, there is one, which carries with it absolute necessity, that is, this Being exists of absolute necessity.

All illusion in syllogizing is, if scholastically exposed to view, the most easily detected. Here then an exhibition of this sort follows :

If the proposition, ' Every absolutely necessary being is the real one ' (which proposition is the *nervus probandi* of the cosmological proof), is right ; it, like all affirmative judgments, must be susceptible of being converted *per accidens* at least ; therefore, some most real beings are absolutely necessary ones. But one *ens realissimum* is not distinct from another in any point, and, what therefore holds of some contained in this conception, holds of all. By consequence we (in this case) can convert absolutely, that is, every most real being is a necessary one. As this proposition now is determined *à priori* from its conceptions merely ; the bare conception of the most real being must carry with it the absolute necessity of this Being ; exactly what is maintained in the ontological proof, and not acknowledged in the cosmological, but laid, in a cryptical way, as a foundation to its syllogisms.

And thus the second way, which speculative reason takes to prove the existence of the Supreme Being, is not only alike fallacious with the first, but has this blamable in it, that it, by promising us a new path, but after a short circuitous course, bringing us back again to the old one, which we left on its account, is guilty of an *ignoratio elenchi*.

We have just mentioned, that there lies concealed in this cosmological argument a whole remainder of dialectical pretensions, which transcendental criticism can easily detect and destroy. We shall now make mention of them, and leave it to the reader to investigate the fallacious principles farther and to annul them:

In it we find, in the first place, the transcendental principle of concluding from the contingent a cause which is of signification in the sensible world only, but out of it has not any meaning. For the mere intellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce a synthetic proposition like that of causation, and the principle of the latter has not any signification and no mark of its use but in the world of the senses; but here it is used for the purpose of going out of this world. Secondly, inferring from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes given above one another in the sensible world, a first cause, to which the principle of the use of reason even in experience does not entitle us, much less can we extend this principle beyond it (whither this chain can by no means be lengthened). Thirdly, the false self-satisfaction of reason with regard to the conception of this series by doing away at last with all condition, without which however not any conception of necessity can have place, and, as nothing farther can be comprehended, assuming this as a completion of its conception. And lastly,

the permutation of the logical possibility of a conception of all united reality (without an internal contradiction) for the transcendental possibility, which requires a principle of the feasibility of a synthesis of this sort that can however extend to the field of possible experience only.

The artifice of the cosmological proof aims merely at avoiding the proof of the existence of a necessary Being *à priori* by conceptions; which latter would need to be ontologically made, but to do which we feel ourselves totally unable. With this view we, from real existence laid as a foundation (from an experience in general), infer, as well as it can be done, any one of its absolutely necessary conditions. It then is not necessary for us to explain this possibility. For, if it is proved, that it exists, the inquiry after its possibility is quite unnecessary. If we should have a mind to determine this necessary Being as to his quality more exactly, we would not seek that which is sufficient to comprehend the necessity of the existence from its conception; for, could we do that, we should have no occasion for an empirical presupposition; as we would be seeking the negative condition only (*conditio sine qua non*), without which a being could not be absolutely necessary. That in every other mode of syllogizing might do; but it unfortunately happens here, that the condition, which is requisite to absolute necessity, can be found in one being only, which must

therefore contain in its conception all that is requisite to absolute possibility, and consequently make an inference *à priori* to it possible; that is, we would need to be able to infer conversely, To whatever thing this conception (of supreme reality) belongs, it is absolutely necessary, and, if we cannot do that (which, if we would avoid the ontological proof, we must allow that we cannot), we have not succeeded in our new way, and find ourselves just where we began. The conception of the Supreme Being satisfies all questions *à priori*, which can be put relatively to the internal determinations of a thing, and is that of an incomparable ideal; because the universal conception distinguishes it as an individual from all possible things. But it by no means gives satisfaction to the inquiry after its own existence, which inquiry is the subject in hand, and to the question of one, who should assume the existence of a necessary being and wanted to know, only, which of all things must be held it, we could not answer, that This is the necessary being.

It is allowable to assume the existence of the Being of the highest sufficiency as the cause of all possible effects, in order to facilitate for reason the unity of the grounds of explanation, which it seeks. But to arrogate to one's self so much as to say, that a Being of this nature exists of necessity, is not the modest language of an allowed hypothesis, but the forward pretension of an apodictical certainty; for

the cognition of that which we hold out to cognise to be absolutely necessary must carry with it absolute necessity.

The whole problem of the transcendental ideal depends upon this, Finding either a conception for the absolute necessity, or the absolute necessity of any one thing for the conception of this thing. If we can do the one, we can the other; for reason does not cognise any thing to be absolutely necessary but what is necessary from its conception. But both defy our utmost efforts to satisfy our understanding on this point, as well as all endeavours to quiet it (our understanding) on account of this its inability.

The unconditional necessity, of which we so indispensably stand in need, as the first supporter of all things, is the true abyss of human reason. Even eternity, how terribly sublime soever a Haller may paint it, is far from making the same vertiginous impression; for it measures the duration of things only, but does not (according to Locke's expression) support them. We can neither avoid nor bear the thought of a Being, whom we represent as the highest of all possible beings, to ourselves, as it were, saying to himself, 'I am from eternity to eternity, besides me there is nothing, every thing exists by my will only; but whence am I then?' Here every thing sinks under us, and absolute perfection as

well as relative, only floats without support from speculative reason, which can make either the one or the other vanish without the smallest difficulty.

Many powers of nature, which manifest their existence by certain effects, remain inscrutable to us ; for we cannot trace them far enough by observation. The transcendental object lying as a substratum or foundation to phenomena, together with the reason of our sensitive faculty's having this rather than other chief conditions, is, though the thing itself is given, but not perspected, and remains to us, inscrutable ; because it has not to produce any other testimony of its reality, than the want of reason to complete by means of it all synthetic unity. It, not being given us even as a cogitable object, is not as such inscrutable ; but it, as a mere idea, must rather have its seat and its solution be found in the nature of reason, and therefore be capable of being scrutinized ; for reason consists just in our being able to give an account of all our conceptions, opinions and affirmations, whether on objective, or, if merely illusory, on subjective, grounds.

Both of these proofs are attempted transcendently, that is, independently of empirical principles. For the cosmological proof, though founded upon an experience in general, is not made from any one of its particular qualities, but from pure principles of reason, in reference to an existence given by

the empirical consciousness in general, and leaves even this guide in order to rest upon pure conceptions only. What in these transcendental proofs is the reason of the dialectical but natural illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and of reality, and realizes and hypostatizes that which can be an idea only? What is the cause of the unavoidableness of assuming something as necessary in itself among the existing things, and of starting back from the existence of this Being as from an abyss, and how does reason begin to comprehend this procedure, and, from the trembling state of fear, and of assent withdrawn again and again, arrive at a quiet insight?

It is very remarkable, that, if we presuppose, that something exists, we cannot have currency to the consequence, that something or other exists of necessity. Upon this quite natural (though on that account not safe) conclusion the cosmological argument depends. Whereas, let us assume any conception of a thing we please, we find, that its existence never can be represented by us to be absolutely necessary, and that nothing hinders us, let what will exist, to think of its nonexistence, by consequence we must assume something necessary to an existing thing in general, but cannot conceive of a single thing to be necessary in itself. That is, we never can complete recurring to conditions of existence without assuming a necessary Being, but never can begin with this Being.

If we must think of something necessary to existing things in general, but are entitled to think of nothing as necessary in itself, it inevitably follows, that necessity and casualty do not concern and must not affect the things themselves, otherwise a contradiction would precede; consequently neither of these principles is objective, they of course can be nothing but subjective principles of reason, on the one hand, of seeking something that is necessary to all, which is given, that is, never stopping but at a complete explanation, *à priori*, and, on the other, of never hoping for this completion, that is, assuming nothing empirical as unconditional, and thereby doing without farther deduction. In this view both principles, as heuristical and regulative, which regard nothing but the formal interest of reason, may perfectly well subsist together. For, on the one, we should philosophise [think discursively] on nature after such a method as if there were a necessary first ground to all that belongs to existence, merely to introduce systematical unity into our cognition by pursuing an idea of this sort, an imaginary chief ground; and the other principle puts us on our guard not to assume a single determination, which concerns the existence of things, as a chief ground of this sort, that is, as absolutely necessary, but always to keep the way open for ourselves to farther derivation, and therefore always to treat it (that determination) as conditional. But, if all, which is perceived in things, must be consi-

dered as conditionally necessary by us, nothing (that can be empirically given) can be considered as absolutely necessary.

And hence it follows, that we must assume the absolute necessary out of the world ; because it must serve for a principle of the greatest possible unity of phenomena only; as their chief ground ; and this never can be accomplished in the world ; because the second rule orders us to look upon all the empirical causes of unity to be derived.

The ancient philosophers considered all form of nature as casual, but matter, according to the judgment of common reason, as original and necessary. But, had they considered matter not as the substratum of phenomena respectively, but in itself as to its existence, the idea of absolute necessity would have immediately vanished. For there is nothing which absolutely binds reason to this existence, but which it (reason) can always and without opposition annul in thought ; but absolute necessity lies in thought only. This persuasion must therefore be grounded in a certain regulative principle. And extension and impenetrability (which constitute the conception of matter) are in fact the chief empirical principles of the unity of phenomena, and have, if they are empirically conditional, a property of the regulative principle in itself. Yet, as every determination of matter, which constitutes what

is real of it (matter), therefore impenetrability, is an effect (an act), which must have its cause, and consequently is still derived, matter is not fit for the idea of a necessary Being, as a principle of all derived unity; because every one of its (matter's) real properties, as derived, is conditionally necessary only, and can therefore be annulled in itself, herewith the whole existence of matter however would be annulled, but, if this circumstance should not take place, we should attain the chief ground of unity empirically, which attainment is forbidden by the second regulative principle, it follows, that matter or in general what belongs to the world, is not fit for the idea of a necessary Being, as a mere principle of the greatest empirical unity, but that it must be placed out of the world, when we can always freely derive the phenomena of the world and their existence from others, as if there were not a necessary Being, and yet incessantly aspire to the completeness of the derivation, as if a Being of this sort were presupposed as a supreme ground.

According to these considerations the ideal of the Supreme Being is nothing else than a regulative principle of reason to look upon all conjunction in the world as if it sprung from one all-sufficient necessary Cause, in order to found in it the rule of a unity, systematical and necessary according to universal laws, in explaining them, and is not a maintaining of an existence necessary in itself. But it

is unavoidable to represent to one's self, by means of a transcendental subreption, this formal principle as constitutive, and to conceive of this unity hypostatistically. For, like space, which, as it originally makes all figures that are its various limitations only possible, is, though but a principle of the sensitive faculty, held a something absolutely necessary and subsisting by itself and an object given in itself *à priori*, it happens quite naturally, that, as the systematical unity of nature can by no means be laid down as a principle of the empirical use of our reason, provided that we lay as a foundation the idea of a Real Being as the supreme cause, this idea is thereby represented as a real object, and this again, as it is the chief condition, as necessary, by consequence a regulative principle is turned to a constitutive one; which supposititious act is manifested by this, that, when we consider this supreme being as a thing by itself, which, respectively to the world, is absolutely (inconditionally) necessary, this necessity is not capable of a conception, and therefore must not be to be met with in our reason but as a formal condition of thinking, not as a material and hypostatical condition of existence.

IF then neither the conception of things in general, nor the experience of any one existence in general, can accomplish what is required, there still remains a means of trying whether a determinate experience, consequently that of the things in the

world, their quality and arrangement, may not yield an argument, which can produce a conviction of the existence of the Supreme Being. This Method of Proof we have named the Physicotheological. Should it too be impossible, no satisfactory proof, from merely speculative reason, of the existence of a Being, which should correspond to our transcendental idea, is possible.

From the foregoing observations it may be easily foreseen, that the answer to this question will not be difficult. For how can experience adequate to an idea ever be given? The peculiarity of the latter is, that no experience can ever be congruous to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary all-sufficient first Being is so immensely great, so high above all that is empirical, which is always conditional, so sublime, that we never can collect matter enough by experience, so to say, to feel such a conception, and are always groping among empirical things, and will constantly seek in vain for the inconditionate, which no law of any one empirical synthesis gives an example of or the least guide to.

Were the Supreme Being in this chain of conditions, he himself would be a link of it, and, like the lower links, which he precedes, require still farther inquiry after his higher ground. But, if we would separate him from the chain, and, as a merely intelligential being, not comprehend him in the se-

ries of the causes of nature, what bridge could reason build to arrive at him? For all the laws of the transition from effects to causes, yes, all synthesis and all enlargement of our cognition in general, rest upon nothing but possible experience, by consequence refer to objects of the aspectable world merely, and can have meaning relatively to them only.

This world opens to us so vast a theatre of variety, of order, of answerableness to the end, of symmetry and of beauty, whether they are sought in the infinity or in the illimited divisibility of space, that even from the knowledge of them, which our feeble understanding has been able to acquire, all language wants energy to express, all numbers lose their power to measure, and even our very thoughts to bound so many and so immensely great wonders, so that our judgment on bounds must resolve into a silent, but so much the more expressive, astonishment. We every-where see the series of causes and of effects, of ends and of means, regularity in beginning and in ending, and, as nothing is of itself (*sponte*) in the state, in which it is, it always refers farther to another thing, as its cause, which makes the very same farther inquiry necessary, so that in this way all would, if we did not assume something that, subsisting by itself (*absolute*) primitively and independently, without this infinite world of casualty, supports it, and, as the cause of its origin, secures to it its duration, need to sink in-

to the abyss of nothing. How great must this chief Cause (relatively to all the things in the world) be thought? We do not know the whole matter of the world, and still less how to estimate its (the world's) magnitude by the comparison with all, which is possible. But, as we in point of causality stand in need of a highest being, what prevents our placing it, as to full perfection, above every thing else that is possible? which we can easily accomplish, though by the delicate outline of an abstract conception only, if we represent to ourselves all possible perfection united in this being as one substance; which conception is favorable to the demand of reason in the frugality of principles (*entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda*), not subject in itself to any contradictions, even serviceable to the enlargement of the use of reason in the field of experience by the clew of order and of conducibleness to the end, which an idea of this sort gives, and nowhere decisively contrary to any experience.

This proof always deserves to be spoken of with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most adapted to the common reason of man. It animates the study of nature, and, as it derives its existence from this study, thereby gets fresher and fresher strength. It unfolds ends and designs where our observation would not have discovered them of itself, and enlarges our knowledge of nature by the clew of a peculiar unity whose principle is not in na-

ture. And this knowledge reacts on its cause, the occasioning idea, and increases the belief in a Supreme Author to even an irresistible conviction.

Hence it would be not only comfortless, but quite vain, to endeavour to lessen the importance of this proof. Reason, which is incessantly elevated by so powerful and in its hands always increasing, though but empirical, arguments, cannot be so depressed by any doubt of subtile abstract speculation, as not to be roused from that scrupulous irresolution, as from a dream, by a single glance cast on the wonders of nature and the grandeur of the construction of the world, in order to raise itself (reason) from greatness to greatness to the very greatest of all, from the conditionate to the condition, the Supreme and Inconditional (Absolute) Author.

But, though we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and the usefulness of this procedure, but rather to recommend and to encourage it, we cannot approve of the pretensions which this mode of proof has to apodictical certainty and to an assent not requiring any favor or any other assistance, and it can by no means hurt the good cause to lower the lofty dogmatic language of a contemptuous reasoner to the strain of moderation and modesty of a belief sufficient to tranquillity, though not just commanding inconditionate subjection. We there-

fore maintain, that the physicotheological proof alone never can evince the existence of a Supreme Being, but must always leave the ontological (to which it serves for an introduction only) to supply this want, consequently the latter still contains the only possible argument (provided that a mere speculative proof have place), which no human reason can disregard.

The main points of the physicotheological proof are as follows: 1. Every-where in the world there are distinct marks of an arrangement according to a determinate design, executed with great wisdom, and in a whole of indescribable variety, as well as of unbounded greatness of sphere. 2. This arrangement so answerable to the end is quite foreign to the things of the world, and adheres to them fortuitously only, that is, the nature of the different things could not agree of its own accord in determinate designs by so various uniting means, were it not chosen and disposed for that purpose entirely by a rational Principle ordering it according to ideas laid as a foundation. 3. Therefore there exists a sublime and a wise Cause (or more of them) which must be that of the world not only as blind working all-powerful nature by fertility; but, as an Intelligence, by liberty. 4. This Cause's unity may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal reference of the parts of the world, as members of an artificial structure, in that, to which our observation reaches, with certainty, but farther, on all the principles of analogy, with probability.

Without chicaning here with natural reason about its inference, as it (reason) concludes according to the analogy of a few productions of nature with that, which human art produces (houses, ships and watches), when it does violence to nature and forces it not to proceed according to its own ends, but to conform to ours, a causality of this very sort, understanding and a will, would, if it derived the internal possibility of free working nature (which makes all art and perhaps reason itself first possible) from another though a superhuman art, lie as a foundation to it, which mode of inference perhaps might not bear the strictest transcendental criticism; we must grant, that, if we must name a cause, we cannot proceed in a safer way, than according to the analogy with those productions, which are suitable to the end, and the only ones, whose causes or modes of producing effects are fully known to us. Reason, if it should go from the causation, which it knows, to obscure and invincible grounds of explanation, could not be responsible to itself.

According to that inference the answerableness to the end and the regularity of so many arrangements of nature would prove the contingency of the form only, not of matter, that is, of the substance in the world; for to the latter it would still be required, that it could be proved, that the things of the world would, if they were not, even as to their substance, the production of a Supreme Wisdom, be

unfit in themselves for such order and harmony according to universal laws ; but to which quite other arguments than those of the analogy with human art (a weak ectype indeed) would be required. The proof could therefore evince an architect of the world at most, who, by the fitness of the materials with which he wrought, might be very much limited, but not a Creator of the world, to whose idea every thing is subject ; which is not sufficient by far for the great design, which we have in view, that of proving an all-sufficient First Being. Had we a mind to prove the casualty of matter itself, we would need to have recourse to a transcendental argument, but which should just be avoided here.

The inference therefore goes from the order and the suitableness to the end so thoroughly to be observed in the world, as an absolutely casual arrangement, to the existence of a cause proportionate to them. But the conception of this cause must give us to know something quite determinate of it, and it can therefore be nothing else than that of a being, who possesses all power, all wisdom, in a word, all perfection, as an all-sufficient Being. For the predicates of very great, of astonishing, of immense power and excellence, give not a determinate conception, and in fact do not say what the thing in itself is, but are all relative representations of the magnitude of the object, which the observer (of the world) compares with himself and his power of ap-

prehension,* and which fall out alike admirably whether the object is magnified, or the spectator lessens himself relatively to it. If the greatness (of the perfection) of a thing in general is the subject under consideration, there is not any other precise conception, than that, which comprises all possible perfection, and nothing but the whole (*omnitude*) of reality is thoroughly determined in the conception.

We do not expect, that any one will pretend to know the relation of the magnitude of the world (as to the sphere as well as the substance) to the omnipotence, of the order of the world to the supreme wisdom, of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of the Author &c. Physicotheology therefore cannot give a precise conception of the Supreme Cause of the world, and by consequence of a principle sufficient for theology,* which must again constitute the groundwork of religion.

The stride to absolute totality is quite impossible in the empirical way. But it is taken in the physicotheological proof. What is the means used to get over so wide a chasm?

We, when once arrived at the admiration of the

* Apprehension is, reception into the empirical consciousness. See Kant's *Prolegomena*.

* The complex of certain doctrines as Divine revelations bears the name of Theology.

greatness of the wisdom; of the power &c. of the Author of the world, and can go no farther, all at once relinquish this argument followed out on empirical grounds of proof, and go to the casualty of the world concluded at the very first from the order and the answerableness to the end of the world. From this casualty alone we now proceed, merely by transcendental conceptions, to the existence of an absolutely necessary Being, and from the conception of the absolute necessity of the First Cause to its thoroughly determined or determining conception, to an all-comprehending Reality. The physicotheological proof therefore sticks in its undertaking, suddenly leaps over in this embarrassment to the ontological proof, and thus actually accomplishes its design by pure reason merely, though it (this proof) denies at the very beginning all affinity with it, and makes every thing depend upon luminous proofs from experience.

The physicotheologists then have no occasion to think so slightly of the transcendental method of proof, and, with the conceit or self-sufficiency of perspicacious knowers of nature, to look down upon it, as the cobweb of obscure scrutators. For, would they but try themselves, they would find, that, after they have gone a considerable way on the ground of nature and experience, and yet find themselves just as far from the object, which seems near their reason, they suddenly quit this ground, and go into

the kingdom of mere possibilities, where they hope, on the wings of ideas, to approach that, which withdrew from all their empirical inquiry. At length, when they are of opinion to have got, by so powerful a leap, a firm footing, they extend the now determinate conception (the possession of which they have got without knowing how) over the whole field of the creation, and illustrate the idea, which is a production of pure reason merely, though sorry enough, and far beneath the dignity of its Object, by experience, without being willing to allow, that they have reached this knowledge (or presupposition) by another path, than that of experience.

Consequently the cosmological proof is the groundwork of the physicotheological proof, but the ontological argument for the existence of one first being as the Supreme Being, is the foundation of the former, and as there is, besides these three ways, not any other open to speculative reason, the ontological proof from pure conceptions of reason merely, is, if a proof of a proposition so sublime and so exalted above all empirical use of the understanding be in any way possible, the only proof.

But, though the empirically valid law of causality (as aforesaid) cannot lead to the First Being, nor even a leap over the bounds of experience, by means of the dynamical law of the reference of effects to their causes, afford a conception of a Supreme Be-

ing; and, though reason, in its merely speculative use, is not sufficient by far for so great a design as that of reaching the Existence of God, it (reason in this use), by rendering his conception correct, is of very great utility. The Supreme Being therefore remains, to the barely speculative use of reason, a mere ideal or prototype, the transcendental object of a conception that crowns all human cognition.

A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PROOF
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
PART THE TENTH.

**INFERENCES THE MOST NECESSARY AND
USEFUL TO MANKIND DRAWN FROM
THE CONTEXT OF THE FOREGOING
SUBJECTS.**

HAVING had enough of the barren and dreary scene of mere speculation, let us turn our view again to a more goodly prospect, the more productive field of pure practical reason. In it we find an argument of a distinct nature, more satisfactory and consolatory. As we have a sufficient reason to conclude, 'that there is but one God, and he a moral being; there cannot be but one proof of his existence, which, like this existence, must be a moral proof.'

In physical teleology we have met with a principle, which opens quite new prospects for our reason, ap-

plied to the field of experience, of connecting the things of the world according to teleological laws, and thereby of attaining the greatest systematical unity of these things of the world. This science, from the ends of nature, proves an intelligent Cause of the world sufficiently for the theoretically reflecting judgment. But moral teleology effects that sufficiently for the practically reflecting judgment by the conception of a scope which it, with a practical view, is obliged to attribute to the creation ; as well as yields a moral ground for assuming a Moral Being as the Author of the creation.

In Teleology nature is considered as a kingdom of ends. In the Ethics, again, a possible kingdom of ends is considered as a kingdom of nature. In the former the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea for the explanation of what exists ; but it, in the latter, is a practical idea, for bringing to pass what does not exist, but can, conformably to this very idea, become actual by our conduct.

And in the moral argument we have seen, that, as there is a practical law, which is absolutely necessary, the existence of a Supreme Being, as this law necessarily presupposes some one existence as the condition of the possibility of its (the law's) obligatory power and of its fulfilment, must be postulated ; because the conditionate, from which the inference goes to the determinate condition, is itself

cognised *à priori* to be absolutely necessary. And we have shewn of the moral law, not only that from it the presupposition of this existence flows, but, as it (the moral law) is absolutely necessary itself, that we are warranted, with a practical view, in postulating this existence.

In fact nothing but the moral argument produces conviction, and this with a moral view only ; to which every one feels his most intimate assent ; but physical teleology has the merit of leading the mind in the contemplation of the world to the way of ends, and thereby to an intelligent Author of the world ; when the moral reference to ends and the idea of a Moral Legislator and Author of the world seem, as theoretical conceptions, though pure additaments, to develop themselves spontaneously from this weighty argument.

By our minute exposition of the totally heterogeneous qualities of the principles, the necessity of nature and moral liberty, we trust, that the proper sphere of action of each is so clearly pointed out and so precisely determined or ascertained, that we hope no one, who has sufficiently attended to the reasoning (in the Introduction) on this abstract metaphysical subject, and understood it, will again espouse a doctrine not only so shallow and so absurd in itself, but really so pernicious to the most essential interests of mankind, as that of either the materiate or

the intellectual machinery of the mind, or the fatality of human actions.

For, without the conception of Liberty, which, we have seen, is the only one of all the ideas of pure speculative reason that opens an extensive nay an interminable prospect for us in the field of the supersensible, though in reference to practical cognition only, we could effectuate nothing, the moral law could not exist; consequently there would not be a ground sufficient to justify a practical belief in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul. Of such moment then is a complete refutation of a system which, by degrading our intelligible nature, and reducing it to the level of the nature of the very brute, yes, to that of senseless matter itself the subject of mere mechanical laws, destroys all our hopes and all our prospects.

But the question, Whence this so great fertility, which has exclusively fallen to the lot of the idea of liberty? still occurs naturally to a reflecting mind. The answer to it, however, obliges us to recur once more to metaphysic, a science which, like medicine, how much soever we may fancy ourselves vindicated in abusing it, and though it must seem a mere jargon to those, who have not studied moral science, we cannot do without.

Whence then the so great fertility that has exclu-

sively fallen to the share of this idea? for the other conceptions of pure speculative reason denote the empty places for pure possible beings of the understanding, but cannot determine their conception. It may be easily comprehended, that, as we can think of nothing without a category, that of liberty, which is the subject of present investigation, must be first sought in the conception of reason, and which is here the category of causality, and that, though a corresponding intuition cannot be laid as a foundation to the idea of liberty, as it is a transcendental conception, a sensual intuition must first be given the conception of the understanding (causality), for whose synthesis that conception requires the inconditionate, by which objective reality is first secured to it.*

All the categories are divided into two classes, the mathematical categories, which go to the unity of the synthesis merely in the representation of objects, and the dynamical categories, which go to that in the representation of the existence of objects.

* By Categories we mean, Original forms of thought, original acts of intellect, original modes of representation or of procedure, nay, the very understanding dissected into its original functions. This view of them is very distinct from that of Aristotle. His categories are nothing but a trifling aggregation of mere predicates without systematical coherence. See Kant's *Prolegomena* on this transcendental subject in particular.

The former (the categories of quantity and of quality) always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, in which the inconditionate, as it cannot be found to the conditionate given in the sensual intuition in space and in time, must again belong itself to them, and of course be always conditional; hence, in the dialectic of pure theoretical reason, the antinomies are both false. But the categories of the latter class (those of the causality and of the necessity of a thing) do not require this homogeneity (of the conditionate and of the condition in the synthesis), because we have here to represent not how the intuition is composed from a multifarious in it, but how the existence of the object corresponding to it is superadded to the existence of the conditionate (in the understanding, as therewith connected), and in this case it is allowed to place, for the thorough conditionate in the sensible world (as well in respect to the causality as to the contingent existence of the things themselves), the inconditionate, though otherwise indeterminately, in the intelligible world, and to make the synthesis transcendent; hence it, in the dialectic of pure speculative reason, occurs, that both ways of finding the inconditionate for the conditionate, seemingly opposed to one another, for instance, in the synthesis of causality conceiving, for the conditionate, in the series of causes and of effects in the sensible world, of the causality, which is no longer sensually conditional, are in fact not contradictory, and that the same action, which, as be-

longing to the sensible world, is always conditional, that is, mechanically necessary, can as pertaining to the causality of the agent so far as he belongs to the intelligible world, have a sensually unconditional causality for a ground, consequently be thought of as free.

It depends upon this merely, that this ability shall be turned to action, that is, that we, in a real case, can prove, as if by a fact, that certain actions give to presuppose such a causality (the intellectual, sensually unconditional), whether they are actual or only commanded, that is, objectively practically necessary. In actions really given by experience, as events of the sensible world, we cannot hope to meet with this connexion; because liberty must always be sought out of the sensible in the intelligible world. But other things than beings of the senses are not given us for perception and observation. Nothing therefore remains but to find an incontrovertible objective principle of causality, which excludes all sensual conditions from its determination, that is, a principle, in which reason, in respect to causality, does not require any thing else as a ground of determination, than what it (reason) contains itself by this principle, and where it, as pure reason, is therefore practical.

But this principle does not require any seeking or any discovery; for it has always been inbred in

the reason of all men, incorporated with their very being, and is the principle of morality.* That in conditional causality, therefore, and its faculty liberty, together with a being (I myself), who belongs to the sensible world, yet as belonging at the same time to the intelligible, are not merely vaguely and problematically thought of (which is feasible for even speculative reason to do), but in regard to the law of his causality precisely and positively cognised, and in this way the reality of the intelligible world is given us and determined with the practical view, and this determination, which would in the theoretical respect be transcendent, is, in the practical, immanent. But such a stride as this we cannot take in regard to the second dynamical idea, that of a Necessary Being.

We cannot reach Him from the sensible world but by means of the first dynamical idea, liberty. For, if we should try it, we would need to hazard a leap, to quit all that is given us, and to fly to that,

* The formula of this fundamental proposition may be variously expressed, for instance, thus: 'Act on no other maxim, than that, which is qualified to be the principle of a universal legislation.'—It is obvious, that a will adequate to this law, is holy; a purity of mindedness, which no creature can ever attain in this life. But it is a duty of virtue incumbent upon us to strive incessantly towards its approximation; always to endeavour, as much as in us lies, to make the moral law the sole spring of our actions, or (in other words) this universal (objective) principle our particular (subjective) principle.

of which nothing, whereby we could accomplish the connexion of an Intelligible Being of this nature with the sensible world, is given us (because the Necessary must be known as given out of us); but which is, in respect to our own subject, provided that it knows itself determined by the moral law, on the one hand, as an intelligible being (by means of liberty), and, on the other, as active in the sensible world according to this determination, at present obviously very possible.

The conception of liberty occasions, that we need not go out of ourselves to find the inconditionate and intelligible for the conditionate and sensible. For it is our own reason, which knows itself by the chief unconditional practical law, and the being, who is conscious to himself of this law (our own person), and of belonging to the pure world of the understanding, and that even with the determination of the way in which he as a being of this sort can be active. And thus it may be comprehended why in the whole faculty of reason the practical part only can be that, which helps us out of the sensible world, and procures us cognitions of a supersensible order and connexion, but which can, just because of this circumstance, be enlarged as far only as is exactly necessary to the pure practical design.

If the intention is to introduce, in the room of unsuccessful essays in philosophy, another princi-

ple, and to procure it influence, it must afford great satisfaction to see why these essays could not but fail.

God, Liberty, and the Immortality of the Soul, are those problems, to whose solution all the efforts of metaphysic are directed. It was thought, that the doctrine of liberty is necessary as a negative condition only for practical philosophy, but that of God and immortality must, as belonging to theoretical philosophy, be delivered by itself and separately, in order to connect both afterward with that, which the moral law (that is possible on the condition of liberty only) commands, and thus to bring about a religion.

But we shall soon shew, that these endeavours could not succeed. For, from mere ontological conceptions of things in general or from the existence of a necessary being a determinate conception of a First Being absolutely cannot be formed by predicates, which experience supplies, and can consequently serve for cognition; and that, which is grounded upon experience from the physical answerableness to the end in nature, cannot yield a sufficient proof for moral philosophy, by consequence for the cognition of God. And the knowledge of the soul by experience (which knowledge we have in this life only) can just as little yield a conception of her spiritual (immaterial or incorpo-

real), immortal nature, consequently is alike insufficient for moral philosophy.

Theology and Pneumatology, as problems for the behoof of the sciences of speculative reason, cannot, as their conception is transcendent to all our cognitive faculty, be brought to pass by any empirical data and predicates.—The determination of both conceptions, of God and of the soul (with regard to her immortality), can be accomplished by predicates only which, though but possible themselves on a supersensible ground, must evince their reality in experience; for they in that way only can make a cognition of totally supersensible beings possible.—The only conception of that sort to be met with in human nature is, that of the liberty of man under moral laws, together with the scope which reason prescribes by them: the former is fit for attributing to the Author of nature, the latter, to men, those properties, which contain the necessary conditions for the possibility of both; so that from this very idea the existence and the quality of that Being, otherwise totally hidden from us, can be inferred.

The ground of the disappointed view of proving the existence of God and immortality in the merely theoretical way, therefore, lies in this, that no cognition of the supersensible is possible in this way (by the conception of nature). That we, on the other hand, succeed in the moral way (by the conception

of liberty, has this ground, that the supersensible (liberty), which is the basis, not only, by a determinate law of causation, which springs from it, affords matter for the cognition of the other supersensibles (the moral scope and the conditions of the possibility of its execution), but manifests its reality in actions as a matter of fact, and can just on that account yield no argument valid in any other view, than a practical one (which is the only view that religion requires).

What is very remarkable in this point is, that of all the three pure ideas of reason, God, liberty, and immortality, that of liberty is the only one that evinces its objective reality (by means of the causality which is conceived in it) in nature, by its (liberty's) possible effect in it, and thereby renders possible the connexion of the other two with nature, and of all three together for religion; and that we have in us a principle, which is able to determine the idea of the supersensible in us, and thereby the idea of that out of us, for a cognition though possible with a practical view only; must bring barely speculative philosophy (that can give a merely negative conception only of liberty) to despair; consequently the conception of liberty (as the fundamental conception of all unconditionally practical laws) can extend reason beyond those bounds, within which every conception of nature (every theoretical one) must remain confined.

Two so heterogeneous principles, as Nature and Liberty, cannot yield but two distinct modes of proof; of course the endeavour to take from the former what is necessary to that which is to be proved, is found insufficient.

Whereas moral teleology, which is not less firmly founded than physical teleology, but rather, by its resting upon principles *à priori* inseparable from our reason, deserves the preference, leads to that, which is requisite to theology, and which is a determinate conception of the First Cause as the Cause of the world according to moral laws, consequently such a one as is sufficient for our moral scope; to which nothing less than omniscience, omnipotence, &c., as properties of nature thereto belonging, are requisite, which properties must be conceived as conjoined with the moral scope that is infinite, and therefore as adequate to it; and in this way moral teleology quite alone furnishes us with the conception of one Author of the world fit for theology.

And thus theology immediately leads to religion; because the knowledge of our duty, and of the scope therein imposed upon us by reason, can first produce determinately the conception of God, which scope therefore is in its very origin inseparable from the obligation to this Being; instead of which, if the conception of the First Being could be deter-

minately found in the merely theoretical way (the conception of him as the mere Cause of nature), it would afterward be combined with greater difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, to accomplish, without arbitrariable interpolation, attributing by substantial proofs to this Being a causality according to moral laws; but without which this theological conception cannot constitute the groundwork of religion. And even if a religion could be founded in this theoretical way, would it (religion), as to the mindedness (in which its essential point consists), be really distinct from that, in which the conception of God and the (practical) conviction of his existence arise from fundamental ideas of morality? For, if we must presuppose omnipotence, omniscience, and the other attributes of an Author of the world, as conceptions given us elsewhere, in order but to apply afterward our conceptions of duties to our relation to him, they must carry with them a strong colour of coercion and compelled subjection; instead of which, when the reverence for the moral law represents to us quite freely, by means of the precept of our own reason, the scope of our destination, we adopt in our moral precepts a Cause harmonizing with it (this scope) and its execution, and willingly submit ourselves to this Cause with true reverential fear, which is totally distinct from pathological fear.

According to the analogy with an understanding

we can, nay, we must, with another view than a theoretical one, conceive of a Supersensible Being, yet without wanting thereby to know him theoretically; when this determination of his causality regards an effect in the world, which (effect) contains a design that is morally necessary but not possible to be accomplished by sensitive beings, a knowledge of God and of his existence (theology) is possible by the properties and the determinations of his causality conceived of according to the analogy with it (an understanding), and which, in the practical reference, but in consideration of it only (as the moral one), possesses all requisite reality.

An ethicotheology therefore is possible; for the ethics can subsist with their rule, but not with the final view, which this very rule imposes, without theology, and without leaving us helpless with regard to this view. But theological ethics (of pure reason) are impossible; because laws, which reason does not give itself originally, and whose observance it, as a pure practical faculty, effects, cannot be moral. Just so theological physics were a nonentity; because they would not propound laws of nature, but decrees of a Supreme Will; whereas physical (strictly speaking, physically teleological) theology, by giving occasion, by the contemplation of the ends of nature which affords rich matter in them for the idea of a scope that nature cannot propose, may serve for a propædætic (pre-exercitation) at least

to theology in the proper sense ; by consequence physico-teleological theology makes us feel the want of a theology which sufficiently determines the conception of God for the greatest practical use of reason, but cannot produce this conception, and sufficiently found it in its proofs.

As we have already seen, that the ethics infallibly lead to religion, by which they enlarge themselves to the idea of a Moral Legislator out of man, the will of which Legislator is that scope (of the creation of the world), which at once can be and ought to be the scope of man ; we shall make a concise recapitulation only of their mode of procedure in attaining this sublime aim.

The proposition, ‘there is a God, consequently a chief good in the world,’ if it (as a proposition of belief) shall spring from moral philosophy entirely, is a synthetic proposition *à priori*, which though it is assumed in a practical reference only goes beyond the conception of duty, which the ethics contain, (and which presupposes not any matter of the arbitrament but its formal laws), and cannot be analytically unfolded out of them. But how is such a proposition as this possible *à priori* ? The harmonizing of all men with the mere idea of a Moral Lawgiver is identical with the moral idea of duty in general ; so far the proposition, which commands this harmony, is analytical. But the assumption of this existence

says more, than the mere possibility of the object. The key to the solution of this problem is the following:

An end is always the object of an inclination; that is, of an immediate desire of the possession of a thing by means of one's action; as the law (which commands practically) is an object of reverence. An objective end (that is, such a one as we ought to have) is that, which is proposed to us by mere reason. The end, which contains not only the indispensable, but the sufficient, condition of all other ends, is the scope or ultimate end. One's own happiness is the subjective scope of rational terrestrial beings (which every one of them has by means of his nature dependent upon sensible objects, and it were absurd to say of it (this scope), that we ought to have it), and all the practical propositions, which have this end for a ground, are both synthetical and empirical.

But that every body ought to make all the good possible in the world his scope, is a synthetic practical proposition *à priori*, yes, an objectively practical one proposed by pure reason; because it is a proposition, which goes beyond the conception of duties in the world, and superadds a consequence of them (an effect), which is not comprised in the moral laws, and therefore cannot be developed out of them. These, whatever their consequence may be,

command absolutely, nay, they, if a particular action is in question, necessitate to abstract entirely from the consequence and thereby make duty an object of the greatest reverence without proposing and giving us an end (and a scope), which would constitute the recommendation of the consequence and the spring to the fulfilling of our duty. All men would, if they adhered (as they ought to do) to the precept of pure reason entirely in the law, have enough. What need have they to know the issue of their moral conduct, which the course of the world brings about? For them, supposing that every thing were at an end with this earthly life, and even that happiness and worthiness should never meet in it, it is enough that they do their duty.

But it is one of the unavoidable limitations of man and of his practical faculty of reason (and perhaps of all other beings of the world) to look round him in all actions after their consequences, and to find in them something, which can serve him for an end and also prove the purity of the mindedness, which end in the execution (*nexu effectiva*) is the last, but in the representation and the mindedness (*nexu finale*) the first. In this end now man, though it is laid before him by mere reason, seeks something that he can like; the law, therefore, which instils reverence only into him, enlarges itself to the assumption of the moral scope of reason under its determinatives, that is, the proposition, ‘make all the good possible in the world thy scope,’ is a synthetic

proposition *à priori*, which is introduced by the moral law itself, and whereby practical reason enlarges itself beyond this law ; which is possible by the moral law's being referred to the physical property of man of being obliged to think of an end, besides the law, for all actions (which property of man makes him an object of experience), and (like the theoretical and thereby synthetic propositions *à priori*) not being possible but by its containing the principle *à priori* of the cognition of the determinatives of a free arbitrament by experience in general, provided that this, which lays open the effects of morality in its ends, affords the conception of morality as a causation in the world objective though but practical reality.

But, if the strict observance of the moral law shall be conceived as the cause of bringing about the chief good (as the end), and as the faculty of man does not suffice to effect the happiness in the world consonantly with the worthiness of being happy, an all-powerful Moral Being must be assumed as the Ruler of the world, under whose care and providence this happiness and worthiness take place, that is, the ethics inevitably lead to religion. And thus they, when they, in the holiness of their law, give to know an object of the greatest reverence, and, upon the step of religion, represent, in the Supreme Cause executing this law, an object of

worship or adoration, appear in all their sublimity and majesty.

THE sum and substance of the contemplations in this treatise lead to a conception of the Supreme Being, which comprehends all that men are capable of conceiving, if they, who are made of dust, attempt to look behind the curtain that conceals the mysteries of the Inscrutable from created eyes, and which is the conception of his ALL-SUFFICIENCY. What exists is something, only provided that it is given by him. A human language may make the Infinite speak to himself thus: 'I am from everlasting to everlasting, and without me not any thing was made that was made.' This the most sublime of all thoughts has hitherto been much neglected, and for the most part not touched upon. That, which exhibits itself in the possibilities of things for perfection and beauty in excellent plans, is considered by itself as a necessary object of the Divine wisdom, but not as a consequence of this incomprehensible Being. The dependence of other things has been limited to their existence merely, by which circumstance a great share of the ground of so much perfection is taken away from this Supreme Nature, and ascribed to (we know not what) sort of everlasting nonentity.

Fertility of a single ground in many consequences, accordance and fitness of natures, combining in a regular plan according to universal laws

without frequent collision, must be first found in the possibilities of things, and wisdom can then only be active in chusing them. What limits would there not be set to the Independent on a foreign ground if these possibilities were not found in him? And what an unintelligible chance, which finds unity and fruitful coincidence for itself in this field of possibility without the presupposition of the Being of the highest degrees of potency and wisdom! Huygens, when he completed the pendulum clock begun by Galileo, could not, had he thought of it, attribute to himself entirely the equability which constitutes its perfection; the nature of the cycloid only, which renders it possible for small and large arcs to be described by a free fall in it in equal time, could put this execution in his power. That so great a sphere of beautiful consequences is possible on the simple ground of gravitation would, if it did not depend upon him, who produces all this coherence by actual execution, evidently lessen and divide his share of the charming unity and of the great compass of so much order depending upon one ground.

The admiration of an effect ceases the moment that we distinctly and easily understand the sufficiency of its cause. On this ground no farther admiration, if we consider the mechanical structure of the human body or any other artificial production as a work of the Almighty, and regard the rea-

lity merely, can have place ; for it is easily and distinctly to be understood, that he, who can do every thing, can produce such a machine as this if it is possible. Yet admiration, though this structure should be brought to an easier comprehensibility, still remains. For it is wonderful, that such a thing as an animal body should be possible. And, though we could fully understand all its springs and tubes, all the nervous vessels, the vascular and lymphatic systems, the levers and its mechanism, it is still wonderful how it is possible that so multifarious arrangements are united in one structure, as the work is so well adjusted to one end with that, by which another is attained, and besides, how the very same combination serves to preserve the machine and to repair the consequences of accidental hurts, and how it is possible, that a man can be of so fine a texture, and yet, in spite of so many grounds of destruction, live so long. And even after we have informed ourselves, that so much unity and harmony are possible because of the existence of a Being, who comprises, together with the grounds of reality, those of all possibility, this information does not destroy the ground of admiration. For we can, by means of the analogy with that which men execute, form some conception how a being can be the cause of something actual, but never how it can contain the ground for the internal possibility of other things, and it should seem as if this thought soared too high for a created being to reach.

This sublime conception of the Divine Nature when we conceive of it according to its all-sufficiency, may, even in the judgment of the quality of possible things, where immediate grounds of decision are wanting to us, serve us for a means of arguing from it as a ground to foreign possibility as a consequence. The question is, whether among all possible worlds a gradation without end is to be met with in advancing towards perfection, a gradation, in which not any natural order whatever, beyond which a more excellent one cannot be thought of, is possible; again, if we should grant a highest step in this, whether there are not different worlds, surpassed by none, and quite equal to one another in point of perfection? In such questions it is difficult and perhaps impossible to decide any thing from the consideration of possible things only. But if we weigh both problems in connexion with the Divine Being, and perceive distinctly, that it may be collected, that the preference of the choice falls to the share of the one world before the other, without the preference in the judgment of the very same Being that chuses, or even, contrary to this judgment, a want in the accordance of his various active powers and a distinct reference of his efficacy, without a proportionate distinction in the grounds, consequently a bad state in the fully perfect Being, we conclude, with great conviction, that the cases under consideration must be fancied and impossible. For, according to all the arrange-

ments which we have seen, we comprehend, that we, from presupposed possibilities, which we cannot sufficiently prove, have much less ground to conclude a necessary conduct of the All-perfect Being (which is of such a nature as to seem to lessen the conception of the greatest harmony), than, from the known harmony, which the possibility of things must have with the Divine Nature, of that which is known to be the most suitable to this Being, to conclude the possibility. We therefore presume, that in the possibilities of all worlds there cannot be any such relations as must contain a ground of the perplexity in the rational choice of the Supreme Being ; for this very Being comprises the first ground of all this possibility, in which by consequence never any thing else, than what harmonizes with its origin, can be met with.

Besides, this conception of the Divine all-sufficiency enlarged beyond all that is either possible or real, is a much better word to denote the full or absolute perfection of this Being, than the word infinite, which is in common use. For the latter, though it may be interpreted as one pleases, is, as to its proper signification, manifestly mathematical. It denotes the relation of one quantum to another as the standard, which relation is greater than all number. Hence, in the proper sense of the word, the Divine cognition, if it, comparatively with any other that can be given, bears a relation which sur-

mounts all possible number, would be termed infinite. And, as a comparison of this sort reduces Divine determinations to a homogeneity or puts them on an equality of nature, which cannot well be maintained, with those of created things, and besides does not just give to understand what is intended, the undiminished possession of all perfection, all, which is possible to be thought of in this possession, is found united in the word all-sufficiency. Infinity, however, is beautiful and, correctly speaking, esthetical * Enlarging beyond all conceptions of number moves, and, by a certain embarrassment, fills the soul with astonishment. Whereas the word, which we recommend, is more adequate to the logical rightness.

IN the life and the divine doctrine of Christ, which are recorded in the gospel, example and precept (humility, and brotherly love, and beneficence towards enemies) conspire to call men to the regular discharge of every moral duty for its own sake, to the unwearied practice of pure virtue. "He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

And the sermon on the mount, in particular, comprises so pure a moral doctrine of religion, which Jesus obviously had the intention of introducing

* What in the representation of an object is merely subjective, that is, constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object, is termed by the philosopher its Esthetical quality.

among the Jews, yet without shocking entirely at first their reigning prejudices or the mode of their ancient external worship to which they were but too much accustomed, that we cannot avoid considering it as the word of God.*

The law of all laws, ‘Love God above all and thy neighbour as thyself,’ represents, like all moral precept of the gospel, the moral mindedness in its very perfection, because it (this mindedness) like an ideal of holiness, is not attainable by any creature, but the archetype, which we ought to aspire to approximate and to equal in an uninterrupted but infinite progression.†

Beyond doubt Christ is the founder of the first true (visible) church, that is, that church, which, purified from the folly of superstition and the madness of fanaticism, exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God upon earth as far as it can be done by men. And it is equally certain, that the moral doctrine of the gospel, by the purity of its principle, is the first

* “The word of God endureth for ever, and this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you.”

† To Love God (not in the pathological sense, that were absurd, but in the moral) is, to keep his commandments willingly; and to Love one’s neighbour, to discharge every duty to him willingly.—See ‘The Elements of a System of Education according to the critical Philosophy,’ on this point too.

that subjected all human conduct to the discipline of a duty which does not allow men to wander either among dreamt perfections, or practical precepts and theoretical doubts, and sets limits of humility (that is, of self-knowledge) to conceit.* For the true end of all religion of reason is, the rectification of the heart, or the moral amendment of man.

But the Supreme Being himself is (through the morally legislative faculty in man, practical reason)† the sole Author of all the true (internal) religion, which is written in every human heart and not of arbitrable origin, as well as the Lawgiver of all the moral duties incumbent on man.

WE must allow, that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to the doctrinal belief. For, though in regard to the theoretical knowledge of the world we have not occasion necessarily to presuppose this thought as the condition of the explanation of the phenomena of the world, but are rather bound to use our reason as if all were nature merely; the unity answerable to the end is so great a condition

* Though in this work we consider our Redeemer in his human capacity only, we, notwithstanding the disadvantages of his birth and education, cannot wonder at his being the greatest of all moral teachers, if we reflect on his mission by God to teach his word to man.

† The law of God is the law of the mind (Rom. vii. 22, 23).

of the application of reason to nature, that we, as experience over and above affords us examples of it richly, can by no means neglect it. But of this unity we do not know any other condition, which makes it a clew of the investigation of nature for us, than that of our presupposing, that a Supreme Intelligence hath so ordered every thing according to the wisest ends. It consequently is a condition of a casual, but not of an insignificant, design, to presuppose a Wise Author of the world in order to have a guide in the investigation of nature.

The issue of our inquiry confirms the utility of this presupposition so often, and nothing can in any decisive way be adduced against it, that we, if we should name our holding-true an opining only, would say far too little ; for it, even in this theoretical reference, may be said, that we firmly believe in God ; yet this belief is, in the strict sense, not practical, but must be termed a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physicotheology) must necessarily effectuate every-where. And with respect to the very same wisdom, in consideration of the excellent endowment of human nature and the shortness of life so little adequate to it, a sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul may be found equally well.

In such cases belief is expressive not only of modesty in an objective view, but of firmness of confi-

dence in a subjective one. If we should call the merely theoretical holding-true, which we are entitled to assume, only a hypothesis here, we should thereby pledge ourselves to have more conception of the quality of a cause of this world and of another, than we can really shew ; for what we assume as a hypothesis only, we must know so much of its properties, that we can imagine not its conception but its existence. But the word believing refers to the guidance only, which an idea gives us, and to the subjective influence on the promotion of our act of reason, which influence, though we are not able to give an account of it in a speculative view, confines us closely to this promotion.

But the merely doctrinal belief has something fluctuating in it ; we are often put out of it by difficulties which occur in speculation, though we always return unavoidably to it again.

The practical conviction or moral belief is of a totally discrepant nature. For in it something, that we should fulfil the moral law in all points, is absolutely necessary to be done. In this case the end is indispensably established, and, as far as our insight goes, there are but two conditions, on which this end coheres with all ends and is thereby of practical validity, possible, conditions, that there are a God and a future world. And we are quite certain, that nobody knows of other conditions,

which lead to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But, as the moral precept is our maxim (for reason orders it to be so), we infallibly believe in the existence of God and in the life to come, and are sure, that nothing can shake this belief; because our very moral principles, which we cannot relinquish without being despicable in our own eyes, would thereby be overthrown.

In this way, after having rendered all the ambitious views of reason roaming beyond the bounds of all experience vain, there remains enough for us to have cause to be satisfied and contented with in a practical view. It is true, nobody can boast of knowing, what does not belong to the sphere of the *scibilia*, that there is a God or a life after death; for, if any one should possess this knowledge, he would be the very person whom we have been long looking for in vain. As all knowledge, when it regards an object of mere reason, may be communicated, we, by his invaluable instruction, might, especially as we are docile and keep our minds open to edification, hope for the enlargement of our cognition to so wonderful a degree.* No; the con-

* The principal argument for the being of God, in doctor Brown's 'Essay on the Existence of a Supreme Creator,' consists of bare conceptions, is merely theoretical or speculative. But a ground of proof, with a theoretical or speculative view, for the existence of a Moral Author of the world, in order to effect the least degree of holding-true, is totally impossible to human

viction in this case is not a logical, but a moral, certainty, and, as it rests upon a subjective ground (the moral mindedness), we must not so much as say, that 'it is morally certain,' but that 'we are morally certain,' that there are a God and a future world. That is, The belief in one God (in monotheism) and in another (the intelligible) world, is so interwoven with our moral mindedness, that, as little as we are in danger of losing the latter, as little are we apprehensive of ever having the former torn from us.

As the inscrutable Author of our existence, then, hath drawn an impenetrable veil between us and the knowledge of himself for the wisest of purposes; it is not of small import to point out not only all that is possible for mankind to attain, but all that is necessary for them and salutary, a belief in God

reason; because the things in the sensible world afford us no materials at all adequate to the determination of the ideas of the supersensible world. The argument in support of the belief of pure reason in the Father of spirits must be a moral argument. But doctor Brown has not so much as touched on the practical or moral argument, though it is forcible to say, the very *nervus probandi*, not even hinted at the supreme moral law, nor at the absolute necessity of postulating the All-sufficient Intelligence, as the indispensable condition of the possibility of the obligatory power and of the fulfilment of this holy law of duty, of this pure sublime and vital, chief principle of morality. The doctor consequently has not performed what was required of him. Instead of a profound investigation of a most important, abstract

and in, its natural consequent, the final aim and issue of all our inestimable hopes and aspirations, the immortality of the human soul ; upon which stable moral foundation every thing material to man may be built. And as we know and can know nothing of futurity, we should not seek after any thing more than what stands in a rational conjunction with the springs and the end of morality.*

And it may be easily gathered from the foregoing heads, that, as to what concerns men without distinction, Nature is so impartial in the distribution of her gifts, that the most sublime philosophy cannot with regard to the essential ends of humanity, carry the inquiry farther, than the guidance, which has fallen to the lot of the most common but sound intellect.

metaphysical subject, he has presented the public with nothing but a popular dogmatic work. And the incompetency of the judges in awarding the first prize (Mr. Burnett's well-meant bequest) for so superficial a performance, cannot, in the author's humble opinion, but be obvious to every one sufficiently versed in pure philosophy.

* It is impossible for us to know but objects of experience or phenomena, and them we know as they appear only to us, not as they are in themselves. But in supersensible objects or noumena we cannot but believe; and this practical certainty is quite sufficient and all that is good for us, and no effort of human reason will ever increase it to knowledge. Belief (as *habitus*) may be explained to be, The moral way of thinking of reason in holding true that, which is beyond the reach of theoretical cognition.

And therefore the free holding-true, ‘I believe in God, the Father Almighty, the Maker of heaven (the moral world), and of earth (the physical world),’ is not only the real result and the whole amount of the most subtle researches of reason, in both its theoretical and its (morally) practical use, on this subject, but what the common (uncultivated) but uncorrupted understanding may reach by the natural exercise of its own innate power without the assistance of all metaphysical disquisition or even of all written revelation.* But, as Home justly says, an appetite to know what human sagacity cannot discover, is a weakness in our nature inconsistent with every rational faculty. We therefore “presume not God to scan.”

WE maintain, that the cognitive power of man is wisely proportioned to his moral destination. If human nature is ordained to strive to attain the chief good, the measure of its (human nature’s) faculties of cognition, especially their relation to one another, must be assumed as answerable to this purpose. But from the tenor of the foregoing subjects it is manifest, that pure speculative reason is quite insufficient to solve the most weighty problems proposed to it adequately to the end, though we do

* This is not a blind belief, betraying ignorance or superstition (that says *credo quia incredibile est*, but a free *credo* of pure practical reason (*quia non cognoscibile, sed mere credibile est*).

not mistake the natural and obvious hints of the very same reason, nor the great steps it can take with a view to approach this grand aim, which is held up to it, yet without ever reaching it by itself or even with the assistance of the greatest knowledge of nature. It should therefore seem, that on this occasion Nature, in providing us with a faculty necessary to our end, has acted the part of a step-dame only.

Let us suppose, that she had complied with our wish, and granted us that faculty of insight or that light, which we might willingly possess or which some even fancy that they really do possess; what would in all likelihood be the consequence? unless our whole nature were altered, the inclinations, which have always the first word, would require their satisfaction, and, combined with rational reflection, their greatest possible and lasting satisfaction, under the denomination of happiness; the moral law would then speak, in order to keep them within their proper limits, and subject them all to a higher end, which pays no attention whatever to inclinations. But, instead of the contest, which the moral mindedness has at present to maintain with the inclinations, and in which, after a few defeats, moral strength of mind is to be gradually acquired, God, in his dreadfully sublime majesty, and eternity, would incessantly lie open to our view (for, what we can perfectly prove holds, as to cer-

tainty, for us, equally with that, of which we can assure ourselves by eyesight). The breach of the law would be avoided, what is commanded done ; but, as the mindedness, from which actions should be performed, cannot be infused by any command, the spur to activity would always be ready at hand and external, and reason therefore not need to rise up against or to collect force to resist inclinations by lively representations of the dignity of the law ; most legal actions would be performed from fear, few from hope, and none from duty, but a moral value of the actions, upon which alone the value of the person and even that of the world in the eye of Supreme Wisdom depend, would not at all exist. The conduct of men, therefore, were their nature as it at present is, would be converted to a mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppetshow, every thing would gesticulate well, but not any life be to be met with in the figures.

But, as it is quite otherwise with us, as we, with all the efforts of our reason, have but a very faint and nebulous prospect of futurity, for the Ruler of the world allows us to conjecture only, but not to behold or clearly to prove his existence and his awful majesty, whereas the moral law in us, without promising us any thing with certainty or threatening us, requires disinterested reverence from us, and besides, and only when this reverence is become active and prevailing, and thereby alone, allows

us but clouded prospects in the kingdom of the supersensible ; a mindedness truly moral and immediately devoted to the law can have place, and the rational creature become worthy of that share of the chief good, which is adequate to the moral value of his person, and not to his actions merely.

And the theodicy, by all the failures of the philosophical essays on it, sufficiently convinces us, that man, when he attempts but to guess at the views of the Almighty in the government of the world, is in the dark. He was not born to build everlasting habitations upon this stage of vanity. His life has a far nobler aim. How beautifully do all devastations, such as those occasioned by the destructive effects of tempests, of volcanos and of earthquakes, harmonize with this aim ! And not only these, but the inconstancy of the world, even in those things which seem to us to be the greatest and the most important, may serve to put us in mind, that the goods of the earth cannot satisfy our instinct for happiness, and that this life, this mere infancy of our moral being, is not the final issue of all our hopes and prospects.

So that, what the study of nature and of man sufficiently teaches us, ‘ that the unsearchable Being, by whom we and all things exist, is not less worthy of reverence, of gratitude and of thanks for what he hath hidden from us, than for what he

hath imparted to us,' is right. "Know thy own point: This kind, this due degree Of blindness, weakness, Heav'n bestows on thee."

UPON the strong irresistible arguments adduced throughout this work, but upon the invincible practical argument especially, the required proof is so firmly established, as to convince even the most obstinate infidel or the most inflexible sceptic who, if he will but listen to reason, can no longer harbour a doubt, supported by any one objective ground, either of the moral existence, or of the omnipotence, or of the greatest wisdom (holiness, goodness and justice), or of the all-sufficiency and other attributes of the utterly incomprehensible and inscrutable Supreme Intelligence, who is not only the Creator of the very matter in itself, or of the intelligible elemental substance, of nature, the First Causator and the Ruler of the universe, but the Author of the spiritual world, consequently of all moral order and perfection.

IN this elaborate treatise, in which the author flatters himself it will be found, by judges, that he has essentially contributed if not to the enlargement, at least to the strict determination, of moral science, he has confined himself so closely to pure moral principle, and so carefully avoided every polemical point or every object of controversy and even all casuistry, that the candid and enlightened readers

may safely say, "Forbid him not ; for he that is not against us, is on our part."

He, not being an advocate for diffuse voluminous publications, but rather holding, with Callimachus, that *μεῖα βιβλίον μεῖα κακόν*, and as it was not his design to write a sermon for the multitude or a popular discourse calculated for sale chiefly, has concentrated his subject, but trusts, that it, from the bounds of our insight's being precisely ascertained, is so much exhausted, that nothing of any moment has been omitted. And, as he is convinced, that he cannot dwell longer on either of the topics without enfeebling the cogency of the arguments and running into mere verbosity, for every body knows, that it is not the bulk, but the solidity, or compressed matter, which constitutes the intrinsic value or merit of a book, he has brought this his labour (the harvest of a mature reflection of many years), which he humbly submits to the judgment of men of moral science, in which he will acquiesce with due deference, to a conclusion.

BOOKS

just published and printed for

W. SIMPKIN and R. MARSHALL,

Stationers' Court, Ludgate-Street.

LOGIC from the German of E. KANT, to which is annexed A Sketch of his Life and Writings, by John Richardson, price 8s. in boards ; and

PROLEGOMENA to every future **METAPHYSIC**, which can appear as a Science, from the German of E. KANT by the same Translator, price 8s. in boards.

